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v  
ABSTRACT 
The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Right (the Court) is the most recent of the three 
regional Human Rights Bodies. Envisioned by the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Right, its structures was not planned until the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) 
promulgated a protocol for its creation in 1998. 
The Court complements the protective mandate of the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (‘The Commission’) and the Court has the competence to take final and binding 
decisions on human rights violations. Unlike its European and inter-American versions where 
their courts are integral parts of the cardinal instrument of the system ab initio, the establishment 
of the African Court was merely an afterthought. 
At the initial, protection of rights rested solely with the Commission upon African justice system 
which emphasises reconciliation as it is non-confrontational method of settlements of. The 
Commission is a quasi-judicial body modelled after the United Nations Human Right Committee 
without binding powers and with only limited functions covering examination of State reports, 
communications alleging violations and interpreting the Charter at the request of a State, the 
OAU or any organisation recognised by the OAU. 
The thesis answers the question whether the adoption of the African Court means that the 
African model of enforcing human rights has failed or whether having the Court constitute a 
concession to the triumph of the western model of law enforcement. 
The imperative of the 30
th 
Ordinary Session of the OAU in 1994 where the creation of an African 
Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights was viewed as the best way of protecting human rights 
across the region would be treated. The relevance of such an examination is highlighted by the 
fact that the African Charter d id  n o t  make a ny provision for the establishment of a Court 
to enforce the rights guaranteed thereunder. If we are to assume that justice by reconciliation 
has failed and should be replaced by or complimented with justice by adjudication as the 
primary means of conflict resolution, what guarantees are there that the latter form of justice 
will not also fail? 
This thesis therefore will critically evaluate the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
and assessed its potential impact on the African human rights system. It will also probe the 
power of the Court and see whether a clear and mutually reinforcing division of labour between 
it and the African Commission can be developed to promote and protect human rights on the 
continent. 
This research brings to focus an area that requires attention if the African human rights regime is 
to be effective. It put to test the criticism against the African Charter and the Protocol to the 
African Charter on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights and 
also identified the present existing flaws in the African regional system. Furthermore, it 
ascertained whether or not, given the availability of other options, a regional Court is, in fact, the 
ideal mechanism for the protection of human rights in Africa. 
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1  
Chapter 1 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Hope and despair, illusion and disillusion, optimism and pessimism alternated in 20th century 
Africa. The first half of the century saw a denial of humanity by colonising forces who claimed 
to lead the African people from darkness to the light of ‘civilisation.’1 
The journey towards an effective human rights system in Africa has been a long and gruelling 
one, though still far from being achieved, significant progress has been made. The African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, which establishment was provided for by the 
African Charter,
2 
has established some important working practices and jurisprudence, but these 
have been hampered by myriad of constraints among which are the fact that its recommendations 
are not legally binding on States, and they have therefore not been implemented, the 
Commission’s lack of visibility on the continent to the wider public and its inadequate 
resources.
3
 
Without the power of enforcement, human rights would stand stripped of all value.  International 
human rights treaties have thus made provisions for the creation of bodies which are tasked with 
the supervision of the principles contained in the texts of the instruments. 
 
The continent of Africa, in the last two decadees, has witnessed huge development as regards 
human rights development within the region.  This modest development of human rights in the 
region, though steady, can be seen in the growth of norms and institutions s e t  u p  for the 
promotion and protection of human rights in the continent. The African Court on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights, the latest entrance to the growing institution edifice after the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, stands out in particular.4 
Despite the length of time involved in the drafting of the Court’s Protocol, not every situation 
was covered in the Protocol and several shortcomings have been identified in its text thereby 
casting doubt whether the Court can actually replace the reconciliation and non-confrontational 
                                                             
1
 Conrad J Au coeur des ténèbres (1999)  
2 Article 30, African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights.  
3
 George MukundiWachira, ‘African Court on Human and Peoples Rights: Ten years on and still no justice’ A report 
published by the Minority Rights Group International, 2008. 
4
 Dan Juma, ‘Access to the African Court on Human and Peoples Rights: A case of the Poacher turned Game 
Keeper’ (2007) 4 Essex Human Rights Law Review 1. 
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2  
values of Africans.
5 
While some of these may have been legitimate accidental omissions, it has 
been suggested that others were deliberate omissions intended to give the African Court the 
opportunity to address them through its rules of procedure. One gaping omission in the Court’s 
Protocol relates to the question of the admissibility of cases before the Court under its 
contentious jurisdiction.
6
 
After the adoption of the Protocol, other events had happened with the most important one being 
the adoption of a Protocol by the Assembly of Head of States and Government
7 
to merge the 
court with the African court of Justice established by the Constitutive Act of the AU
8 
to form 
a single Court to be known as the African Court of Justice and Human Rights. This, in July, 
2008, materialised
9 
as a result of the adoption of the Protocol
10 
by the African Union thereby 
creating a new African Court of Justice and Human Rights.
11
 
 
Questions as to the procedural legality, in the light of the Law of treaties and the haste with 
which the merger was transacted has been raised by some people. Even more critical are the 
                                                             
5
African Indigenous justice system employs restorative and transformative principles in conflict resolution. Victims, 
offenders and the entire community are involved and participate in the definition of harm and search for resolution 
acceptable to all stakeholders. Extracted from Elechi Oko, ‘Human Rights and the African Indigenous Justice 
System’ (2004). A paper presented at the 18th International Conference of the International Society for the Reform 
of Criminal Law, August 8-12, 2004 at Montreal, Quebec, Canada.   
6 See Art 3 of the Courts Protocol. Art 4 of the Courts Protocol confers advisory jurisdiction on the Court: advisory 
opinions may be sought by a member state of the AU, the AU or any of its organs, or any African organisation 
recognised by the AU. 
7
The Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the AU (the Assembly) is the supreme organ with the 
functions of rule-making, creation of standards, and guidance of the administrative organs of the AU in the 
implementation of AUs standards and strategic goals. The Act, Articles 8 & 9; The decisions of the Assembly 
include: regulations, directives, recommendations, declarations, resolutions and opinions, among others (Rule 33 of 
the Rules of Procedure of the AU Assembly).  
8
The Constitutive Act of the AU (the Act) is the grundnorm of the African regional and sub-regional IOs, 
establishing a constitutional framework for the AU and its organs and linking the AU system with the other regional 
and sub-regional organisations. It aspires to create a system encompassing all the African regional international 
organisations with the aim of consolidating African unity, and ultimately creating an economic and political union on 
the model of the EU.  
9 Protocol of the Court of Justice of the African Union, adopted on 11 July, 2003, entered into force 11 February, 
2008, AU Doc. Assembly/AU/Dec.25 (II). Article 2 of the Protocol established the African Court of Justice, 
hereinafter called the Court of Justice. 
10
 Protocol  on  the  Statute  of  the  African  Court  of  Justice  and  Human  Rights,  adopted  1  July  2008, 
Assembly/AU/Dec. 196 (XI) hereinafter referred to as the new Protocol. This is still to enter into force. As at 6th of 
August, 2010, only 5 States namely Libya (6th May, 2009), Mali (13th August, 2009), Burkina Faso (23rd June, 
2010), Congo (14th December, 2011) and Benin (28th June, 2012) has ratified this Protocol while 30 out of the 
53countries have signed the protocol. See.au.int/en/sites/default/files/treaties/7792-sl-  
protocol_on_statute_of_the_african_court_of_justice_and_hr_0.pdf . (Accessed 18th October, 2016). 
11
Article 1 of the new Protocol establishes the African Court of Justice and human Right, hereafter referred to as the 
new Court.   
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3  
attrition of some provisions in the instruments which the new Protocol replaces and the failure of 
the Africa Union to re-examine the normative and institutional problems of the African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights12 in general transition. Also, the linkages between the Court and 
the Commission, the limited direct access of individuals and non-governmental organisations 
before the Court and the new restrictive provisions on advisory opinions stand out in particular. 
With the merger now a fait accompli, the fundamental question remains whether the Court will 
bring home an effective system of protection or whether it has been a mere transition in name 
and anatomy. Some see it as a significant development in the institutionalisation of Human 
Rights in Africa.
13
 
 
The coming into being of the Court brings in an era whereby Judgement delivered are to be made 
binding on infringing States unlike mere recommendations of the Commission.
14 
The binding 
legal force behind the Judgement might be the missing impetus to make States comply. 
 
1.2 Background to the Study 
 
During the 1960s, when many African countries attained their independence, the desire for 
continental unity led to several attempts at establishing a pan-African organisation. Through the 
efforts of Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia and President SekouToure of Guinea, the heads of 
32 independent African states met in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in May 1963 to establish the 
Organisation of African Unity (OAU). The Charter of the OAU was approved on 25 May, 
1962 and signed on the next day by 30 Heads of State and Prime Ministers. The 
following decades saw 23 more states joining the OAU as they became independent.
15
 
 
Besides the creation of the OAU, eradication of colonialism and the dismantling of apartheid 
was another major concern of the Charter.
16 
In spite of its general expressions on human 
                                                             
12 The African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights adopted 27 June, 1981, entered into force 21 October, 1986, 
O.A.U.Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev. 5 hereinafter referred to as ‘The Charter’.  
13 Frans Viljoen & Evarist Baimu, ‘Courts for Africa: Considering the Co-Existence of the African Court on Human 
and Peoples Right and the African Court of Justice’ (2004) 22 NETH. Q. HUM. RT.S. 241.  
14 The Commission is a supervisory body set up by the Charter with a mandate to promote and protect human rights in 
Africa as it is enshrined in the Charter. Before coming into existence of the Court, the Commission was the only body 
with competence with supra-national human rights. It will now play a complementary role with the Court as regards 
promoting and protecting human rights in the continent.  
15Membership comprises of the independent mainland and island states and the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic 
(Western Sahara). History of the Organisation of African unity, Available at www.au.int/en/history/oau-and-au 
(Accessed 18
th
October 2016).  
16 Article 111(6) of the OAU Charter. 
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rights, it, however, did not proclaim individual rights for African people. Its main focus was 
political unity, non-interference in the internal affairs of member states and the liberation of 
other African territories.
17
 
Discussions regarding the creation of a human rights regime for Africa also began as early as 
1961.
18 
However, it was not until 1979, after several Africans had suffered at the hands of 
despotic rulers that the drafting of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African 
Charter) began.
19 
From the onset, the instrument focused attention on the need to Africanise 
international human rights and does not only guarantee individual rights but also provides for 
second and third generation group rights.
20
 The Charter also tries to merge African values with 
international norms. It further guarantees civil and political rights including the equal protection 
of laws, rights to due process and freedom from ex post facto laws. The African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights (‘The Commission’) was the only body victims of human rights 
violation in Africa looked onto for relief but unfortunately it has suffered many attacks for being 
toothless. The implementation of its recommendations was a major challenge. 
 
Prior to 2004, Africa and Asia were the only regions with a human rights regime which had 
no judicial institution to uphold and enforce human rights on the continent.  That changed on 
25 January 2004 when the 53-members of the African Union ratified the Protocol to the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights (The Court).21 The 15
th
 
instrument of ratification by the Union of 
                                                             
17 Okere O., ‘The protection of Human Rights in Africa and The African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights: A 
comparative Analysis with the European and the American systems’ (1984) 6 Human Rights Quarterly 147.  
18 The principal discussions took place during the following: Congress of African Jurists held in 1961 in Lagos, 
Nigeria; Congress of French speaking African Jurists, held in 1969 in Dakar, Senegal; United Nations Seminar held 
in 1969 in Cairo, Egypt; United Nations Seminar held in 1974 in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania; Conference of the 
International Commission of Jurists held in Dakar, in 1978; Conference of French speaking African Bar Association, 
held in Dakar in 1979; and a United Nations seminar held in Monrovia, Liberia in 1979. 
19 The African Charter was adopted in 1981 by the 18th Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU, the 
official body of African states.  It is also known as the Banjul Charter because a final draft of it was produced in 
Banjul, the capital of the Gambia. Mutuah I. M, ‘The African Human Rights System: A Critical Evaluation’ 
http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/mutua.pdf (Accessed 18th October, 2016). 
20 OAU Charter, Arts. 1(e) & 11(c).  
21OAU Doc. OAU/LEG/MIN/AFCHPR/PROT.1 rev.2 (1997), was adopted on 9 June 1999 at the Summit of Heads of 
State and Government and entered into force January 25, 2004, when the minimum number of ratification 
required was achieved. Tendai Nhenga: A Critical Analysis of the African Human Rights Enforcement Regime 
LLM Dissertation 18. Algeria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Côte d Ivoire, Comoros, Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, 
Libya, Lesotho, Mali, Malawi, Mozambique, Mauritania, Mauritius, Nigeria, Niger, Rwanda, South Africa, Senegal, 
Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia and Uganda are the 25 States that have ratified the protocol. See www.africa-  
court.org/index.php/about-us/mandate-mission-values (Accessed on 18th October, 2016).The adoption of this 
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Comoros was deposited on the 26
th
 December, 2003. The inauguration of the Court was the 
conclusion of a long and eventful journey that began with the call by the African Conference on 
the Rule of Law held in Lagos, Nigeria, in 1961 for the ‘creation of a court of appropriate 
jurisdiction’ to protect human rights on the continent of Africa.22 
 
The events following the Lagos Conference manifested into the adoption of the African 
Charter wherein the issue of creating a court was carefully avoided
23
 instead of a court, it 
was decided to ‘concentrate on the establishment of an African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights’24 (herein after referred to as the Commission). The African Commission was 
thus established by the African Charter and remained as its sole supervisory body until June 
1998 when the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the 
Establishment of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights was ratified. As a result of 
pressure from different quarters, but mostly following civil society criticisms that trailed the 
work of the African Commission, the stage was set for the Organisation of African Unity 
(OAU), now the African Union (AU), to give serious thought to the establishment of an 
African Human Rights Court.
25
 Meanwhile, to keep abreast of globalisation, avoid further 
marginalisation of the continent, and take up the challenge of development inherent in the 
dream of an African Renaissance or revival, African leaders felt compelled to replace the 
Organisation of African Unity (OAU) with the African Union (AU).
26
 
Like other international human right instruments, the African Charter established a specialist 
body: African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Commission) to oversee 
treaty performance by State parties. This body was established under Article 30 of the African 
Charter and was officially inaugurated on 2 November 1987 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia when the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
Protocol has generated a lot of literature and reference is made to some of these and the official website of the 
African Union during the course of writing this thesis.   
22 The conference was convened by the International Commission of Juris and was attended by participants from 
around Africa. See Law of Lagos, reprinted in (1961) 3 Journal of International Commission of Jurists 9. 
23 See for example, Harrington J ‘The African Court on Human and Peoples Rights’ in M Evans and R Murray 
(eds) ‘The African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights: The system in Practice, 1986–2000’( 2003) 305, 309. 
24 Pityana N. B.,‘Reflections on the African Court on Human and Peoples Rights’ (2004) 4 African Human Rights 
Law Journal 121. 
25The OAU which was established by the Charter of the Organisation of African Unity in 1963 was succeeded by the 
African Union (AU) in 2001. The Constitutive Act of the African Union (AU Act) was accepted in July 2000 and 
entered into force in May 2001. Text of the AU Act is reprinted in C Heyns and M Killander 
(eds),‘Compendium of key human rights documents of the African Union’(2006) 4. All reference to the OAU in the 
African Charter would be read as the AU in this thesis.   
26
 See ‘Transition from the OAU to the African Union’ Available at 
www.au2002.gov.za/docs/background/oau_to_au.htm (Accessed 15th August, 2016). 
https://etd.uwc.ac.za
 
 
6  
OAU 23
rd
 
Assembly of Heads of States and Governments had elected its members in July of the 
same year. The African Commission was created with quasi-judicial functions and not with full 
judicial mandate.  The  rationale  for  this  was  to  avoid  the  confrontational  style  of  dispute 
resolution which is associated with the received judicial systems in Africa. The African 
Commission was perceived to epitomize an African sense of justice based on reconciliation and 
non-adversarial procedures. 
 
Despite the initial optimism about the creation of the Commission, hopes that the body would 
robustly ensure the enjoyment of human rights on the continent have largely gone unrealised. 
By the turn of the century, most critics were of the view that the African Commission has been a 
disappointment with respect to specific functions and its performance in general. The African 
Commission’s failure to curb the widespread human rights violations on the continent came 
under severe criticism. Of most concern was its lack of judicial and enforcement powers. Calls 
for the creation of a regional human rights court, akin to that of Europe, grew louder. 
 
Proposal for an African Court on human rights date back to 1961 when legal practitioners in 
Africa, judges and teachers of law invited governments to consider the adoption of an African 
Convention on human rights and the establishment of a court and safeguard the rights enshrined 
therein. This failed and in the late 1970s, when the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights was negotiated, the idea of setting up a Court was raised again. It was rejected on the 
ground that Africans prefer to settle disputes through negotiation and conciliation rather than 
through contentious proceedings, but the fear of many African States, that they would be 
subjected to the Judgements of an international body may have played a role.
27
  
 
By early 1990, it became obvious that the African Commission was unable to act as a strong 
protector of human and Peoples’ rights.28 This thereby bolstered the efforts toward the 
establishment of a court in the region. The Commission’s response was merely to issue a 
resolution condemning the human rights situation in the country.
29
 
                                                             
27 Naldi & Magliveras, ‘The Proposed African Court of Human and Peoples Rights: Evaluation and Comparison’ 
(1996) 8 RADIC 945. 
28 Example is the gross human rights violation in Nigeria that occurred between 1993 and 1998 during Abacha’s 
regime highlights the weaknesses of the Commission’s powers of implementation and investigation.  
29
 Resolution on Nigeria of the 16
th 
Ordinary Session of the African Commission on Human and peoples’ Rights (25 
October-3 November, 1994).  
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By 1994, the Organisation of African Unity’s30 Assembly formally requested the Secretary- 
General of the OAU to convene an expert meeting to discuss methods of enhancing the 
efficiency of the Commission and the establishment of a Court.On9 June, 1998, the Assembly of 
Heads of States and Government, in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, adopted the Protocol on the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights.31 
 
1.2 Statement of the problem 
 
The setting up of the Court was a milestone in the history of the African human rights regime. 
It was created with the aim of complementing the African Commission that has exercised 
continental oversight on human rights since 1987.
32  
The Protocol creating the Court suggests 
that this judicial body will make the African human rights regime more effective in the 
promotion and protection of human rights. 
 
In the light of the above fact that the African Commission was based on the idea of 
African justice which emphasises reconciliation and non-confrontation, the question then is does 
the adoption of the African Court mean that the African model of enforcing human rights has 
failed? Does having the Court constitute a concession to the triumph of the western model of 
law enforcement? These, the thesis will try to answer.
33
 
                                                             
30Now known as ‘African Union.’   
31This thesis thus examine whether the problems of the Commission are attributable to the conceptual design of the 
African Commission as an embodiment of the African perspective of dispute resolution. Furthermore, it also tries to 
answer the question whether, if the Commission had properly and optimally used the African model of justice which 
is discussed in chapter 4 of this thesis, it would have performed better.  
32 The Court is presently located in Arusha, Tanzania.  
33The thesis explores to see whether the Protocol makes room for such African based dispute resolution and to what 
extent. Also, should it have been rooted in African concepts of justice? It will examine why in June 1994, at its 30th 
Ordinary Session in Tunis, the OAU viewed the creation of an African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights as the 
best way of protecting human rights across the region. The relevance of such an examination is highlighted by the 
fact that the Banjul Charter makes no provision for a Court to enforce the rights guaranteed thereunder. If we are to 
assume that justice by reconciliation has failed, and should thereby be replaced by or complemented with justice by 
adjudication as the primary means of conflict resolution, what guarantees are there that the latter form of justice will 
not also fail? This thesis will therefore critically evaluate the new African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights and 
assess its potential impact on the African human rights system. It will probe the power of the Court and see whether 
a clear and mutually reinforcing division of labour between it and the African Commission can be developed to 
promote and protect human rights on the continent. 
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1.3 Research Questions’ 
Having in mind the problem being quizzed, the questions in this study are as follows: 
 
 
a) Is the African value of reconciliation and non-confrontation upon which the African 
Commission was built compatible with the idea of western-style-Court systems? 
b) Where the answer in (a) above is in the affirmative, have those values been reflected in 
the conceptualisation of the African Human Rights Court and the proposed African Court 
of Justice and Human Rights? 
c) Does adequate promotion and protection of human rights require judicial enforcement 
mechanisms at the regional level? 
 
1.4 The purpose and importance of the Research 
 
The main aim of this research is to bring to the spotlight an area that requires attention if the 
African human rights regime is to be effective. It will put to test the criticism against the African 
Charter and the Protocol to the African Charter on the Establishment of an African Court on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights and also identify the present existing flaws in the African regional 
human rights system. Furthermore, it will ascertain whether or not, given the availability of other 
options, a regional Court is, in fact, the ideal mechanism for the protection of human rights in 
Africa. 
 
As the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights is a relatively new institution this thesis will 
therefore inform (supported by its own research findings), prompt debate on the efficacy of this 
entity and make suggestions on ways of improving it. 
 
1.5 Research Methodology 
 
The research was carried out by extensive deskwork while the use of textbooks provided 
information on the historical background of Africa’s human rights regime. Journals assisted the 
researcher in providing information on current trends and analysis. 
 
Having in mind that other regional system exists, a comparative approach to draw inspiration to 
the African human rights system was adopted by way of literature review. 
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The internet was also used as a source of information of current activities in the field of study 
and minimal informal consultations with experts in the field was done to provide the researcher 
with guidance. 
 
1.6 Chapter Synopsis 
Chapter One: Introduction 
This is the introductory chapter.  It introduces and delineates the focus of the study. 
 
Chapter Two: Conception of the Enforcement of Human Right in Africa 
 
This chapter will focuses on the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. It discusses the 
historical development of the Charter, and critically analyse its content, application, 
implementation and enforcement. The chapter also discusses the Africa conception of ‘rights’ 
and their application to African cultural, social and economic realities. 
Chapter Three: Notion of Justice 
 
This chapter will explore the concepts of justice and relate them to human rights from an African 
perspective. It demonstrates that human rights are the rationale for the quest for justice, peace, 
reconciliation and democracy in the society. 
 
Chapter Four: The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ 
 
This chapter will analyse and appraise the African Commission as an organ for the enforcement 
of human rights in Africa. This will necessitate a scrutiny into its structure, mandate, and rules 
of procedure. It will also determine whether the Commission reflects the African system of 
justice. 
 
Chapter Five: The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
 
This stage of the thesis will introduce the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples 
on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights. The chapter will 
critically analyse its provisions with particular focus on the constitution, jurisdiction and 
enforcement of the entity. It will also examine the relationship (if any) between the Court and the 
https://etd.uwc.ac.za
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Commission. It will also look at the situation where cases already reviewed by the Commission 
can be sent back to the Court for review. The retention or abolishment of the Commission will at 
this point be debated. 
 
Chapter Six:  Recommendations and conclusion 
 
This chapter provides an overview of the entire thesis. It concludes this study with 
recommendations for an effective African human rights system. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
CONCEPTION OF THE ENFORCEMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
A clear understanding of the background to the human rights regime in Africa is a prerequisite 
for a full appreciation of how the African human rights regime came into existence and how it 
operates. The purpose of this chapter is to set the tone of the study generally by discussing the 
historical developments of human rights in Africa. The chapter will lay a foundation for the 
examination of the relationship between human rights and culture in Africa. The chapter will 
also look at the historical development of the African Charter by critically analysing its content, 
application, implementation and enforcement. Furthermore, it will look at the African conception 
of rights and its application to African cultural, social and economic realities. A critique of the 
concept of human rights including questions as to their universality will also be done. 
 
2.2 Defining Human Rights 
 
One of the initial questions in any inquiry for this research is to define what is meant by ‘human 
rights’. The term may be used philosophically or as an abstract which means a ‘special kind of 
moral claim’ which every human can invoke.34  It is further described as ‘the manifestation 
of moral claims in positive laws’.35  The concept (human rights) presupposes the existence of 
humans which finds its application in human interaction and thereby relational in nature.
36
 
 
Definition according to Heyns and Stefiszyn
37 
is crucial as this tells us ‘why’ especially in 
the international sphere where diverse cultures are involved, where positivist foundations are 
shaky and where implementation mechanisms are fragile. According to some schools of 
                                                             
34 Frans Viljoen, ‘International Human Rights Law in Africa’ (2007) 4. See also Frans Viljoen, ‘International 
Human Rights Law: A Short History in UN Chronicle’ Article XLVI No. 1 & 2, January, 2009. Available at  
http://unchronicle.un.org/article/international-human-rights-law-short-history (Accessed 17thMay, 2015).  
35 Viljoen cited an example of constitutional guarantees that serve as the basis to hold government accountable under 
national legal processes. See Frans Viljoen, ‘International Human Rights Law in Africa’ (2007) 4.  
36 Sustained human contact and the community require mutual respect as regards other Peoples’ life, respect of the 
childs needs, of the elders age and wisdom among others. In a close society such as the traditional African society 
which does not have a centralised structure the reciprocity of expectations is always taken for granted and this does 
not need to be determined formerly because members of the society are socialised into their roles. Non- compliance 
carries the risk of social exclusion and at times, expulsion. See Meckled-Garcia & Cali B, ‘Lost in Translation: The 
Human Rights Ideal and International Human Rights Law’ in Meckled-Garcia & Cali B (eds), ‘The Legalisation of 
Human Rights: Multidisciplinary Perspectives on Human Rights and Human Rights Law’ (2006) 10.  
 
37 Christof Heyns & Karen Stefiszyn (eds.), ‘Human Rights, Peace and Justice in Africa: A Reader’ (2006) 3.  
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thought the entire task of philosophy centres on meaning. They believe that how one 
understands the meaning of human rights will influence one’s Judgement on such issues as 
which rights are regarded as universal, which rights call for international pressures and which 
rights can demand programme for implementation.
38
 
Human rights were also defined as ‘those claims made by men, for themselves or on behalf of 
other men, supported by some theory which concentrates on the humanity of man, on man as a 
human being, a member of humankind…’39 According to Cassese40 who described rather than 
define the term, it is ‘an ideology and normative ‘galaxy’ in a rapid expansion, with a specific 
goal: to increase safeguards for the dignity of the person. Human rights represent an ambitious 
(and in part, illusory) attempt to bring rationality into the political institutions and the societies of 
all states’. They are tenets that dominate the natural instinct, making man a ‘social’ rather than a 
‘natural’ animal, and crystallise rules of behaviour to be respected by all persons and all nations. 
They are ‘based on an expansive desire to unify the world by drawing up a list of guidelines for 
all governments, an attempt by the contemporary world to introduce a measure of reason into its 
history.’41 
Justice Kayode Eso,
42 
in the case of (Dr) Mrs Olufunmilayo Ransom Kuti v Attorney-General 
of Nigeria
43 
described human rights as: 
 
A right which stands above the ordinary laws of the land and which in fact is antecedent to the 
political society itself. It is a primary condition to a civilised existence, and what has been 
done by our (Nigerian) constitution since independence is to have these rights enshrined in the 
constitution so that the rights could be immutable to the extent of the non-immutability of the 
constitution itself. 
 
Though the position in pre-colonial Africa cannot be idealised and far from being alike, there 
were established ways and means of arranging customs and wise leadership which led to 
effective consensus and legitimate dispute resolution then. 
 
                                                             
38Christof Heyns & Karen Stefiszyn (eds.), ‘Human Rights, Peace and Justice in Africa: A Reader’ (2006)3.   
39 Dowrick FE (ed.), ‘Human Rights, Problems, Perspectives and Texts’, a series of lectures and seminar papers 
delivered in the University of Durham in 1978 (1979) 8-9. He also pointed out that human rights in essence combine 
ethical and political doctrines with rationalistic and theological roots. See also Arvind Sharma (ed.), ‘The Worlds 
Religions after September 11’ (2009) 39; George Uzoma, Des Obi &IksNwankwor (eds), ‘The KPIM of Social 
Order: A season of Inquiry, Meaning and Significance in the Modern World’ (2013) 285. 
40 Cassese A, Human Rights in a Changing World, (1990) 3.  
41 Cassese A (1990)158, see also Umozurike Oji U, ‘The African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights’ (1997) 3.  
42
 Retired Justice of the Supreme Court of Nigeria.  
43 (1985) 2 NWLR (part 6) 211.  
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Some philosophers claimed that definitions of human rights are futile because they involve moral 
judgement that must be self-evident and that are not further explicable while some focused on 
the consequences of human rights and purpose.
44 
To some jurists,
45 
one should not be concerned 
with what is sought to be achieved by issuing a moral utterance but with that which is actually 
accomplished.
46 
According to An-Na’im,47  human rights are those claims which every 
human being is entitled to have and enjoy, as of right, by virtue of his or her humanity, 
without distinction on such grounds as sex, race, colour, religion, language, national origin 
or social group.
48
 
According to Heyns and Stefiszyn,
49 
the revitalisation of qualified or modified natural rights or 
core theories has strongly influenced conventional international human rights norms. The 
Universal Declaration of Human Right
50 
reflects that influence, as seen in the Declaration’s 
opening statement: ‘whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable 
rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the 
world.’51 
 
If one classifies a right as a claim against a government to refrain from certain acts, such as the 
obligation not to torture its citizens or deny them freedom of speech, religion, or emigration, then 
other difficulties arise. If a particular claim stems from a metaphysical concept such as the nature 
                                                             
44 Hart H.L., ‘Definition and Theory of Jurisprudence’ (1954) 70 Law Quarterly Review 37-46.  
45 See Salmond J, in ‘Salmond on Jurisprudence’ 12th Edition, 1966. See also Hohfeld WN, ‘Fundamental Legal 
Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning’ (1923) essay 1.  
46 The definition process is not easier when examining the term human rights. Sometimes right is used in its strict 
sense of the right holder being entitled to do something with a correlative duty in another. At times it is used to 
indicate immunity from having a legal status altered; sometimes it refers to a power to create a legal relationship. 
Each of these terms has been identified as rights but they all invoke different protections. For example, an alienable 
right, does it mean a right to which no expectations or limitations are valid? Or does one mean a prima facie right 
with a special burden on the proponent of any limitation? Or is it a principle that one must follow unless some other 
principle weighty enough to allow abridgment arises? 
47 Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na`im (ed), ‘Expanding Legal Protection of Human Rights in African Context’ in ‘Human 
Rights under African Constitutions: Realising the Promise for Ourselves’ (2003) 3.  
48 See also Universality of Human Rights in a Pluralistic World, proceedings of the colloquium organised by the 
Council of Europe in Cooperation with the International Institute of Human Rights, Strasbourg 17-19 April 1989; 
Cerna C.M. , ‘University of Human Rights and Cultural Diversity: Implementation of Human Rights in Different 
Socio-Cultural Contexts’ (1994) 16 (4) Human Rights Quarterly 740-752. 
49Cited in Ronald Cohen (ed), ‘Human Rights in Pre-colonial Africa’ in ‘Human Rights and Governance in Africa’ 
1993.This is a collection of eleven essays, arising from a 1988 to 1989 Carter Lecture Series at the Centre for 
African Studies of the University of Florida.   
50Adopted by the UN General Assembly on 10December, 1948, it arose directly from the experience of the Second 
World War and represents the first global expression of rights to which all human beings are inherently entitled. It 
consists of 30 Articles which have been elaborated in subsequent International treaties, regional human rights 
instruments, national constitutions and other laws.   
51
Article 1 provides that all human beings are born free and equal in dignity. They are endowed with reason and 
conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.   
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of humanity, or from a religious concept such as divine will, or from some other a priori 
concept, then the claim may really be an immunity to which normative Judgements should not 
apply. Where, however, the claim is based on certain interests such as the common good, other 
problems arise such as the need to determine what constitutes the common good, or the need to 
balance other societal interests, that may allow a wide variety of interpretations not supportive of 
individual human rights demands. 
 
Where one speaks of privileges, other concerns arise. If the privileges are granted by the State, 
then presumably the State is entitled to make them conditional. Does the right of a State to 
derogate from some rights in an international covenant mean that the rights are, in fact, only 
privileges? Here too, the answer is connected to the moral strength and inviolability of the ‘right’ 
or ‘privilege’ that is involved. The definitional answers to these questions are obviously complex 
and fall outside the scope of this thesis. 
 
To summarise, even where international law has established a conventional system of human 
rights, a philosophical understanding of the nature of rights is not just an academic exercise 
understanding the nature of the ‘right’ involved. It can help clarify one's consideration of the 
degree of protection available, the nature of derogations or exceptions, limitations, the priorities 
to be afforded to various rights, the question of the hierarchical relationships in a series of rights, 
the question of whether rights ‘trump’ competing claims based on cultural background, and 
similar problems. The answers to these questions may evolve over time through legal rulings, 
interpretations, decisions and pragmatic compromises, but how those answers emerge will be 
influenced, if not driven by, the moral justifications of the human rights in issue. 
 
The philosophical justification and affirmation of the core principles of human rights as universal 
principles are highly significant and reassuring for the strength of human rights in rules for the 
world of nations. Rights that preserve the integrity of the person flow logically from the 
fundamental freedom and autonomy of the person, so does the principle of non-discrimination 
that must attach to any absolute conception of autonomy.
52 
However, affirming such basic or 
                                                             
52The traditional categorisation of three generations of rights, used in both national and international human rights 
discourse, traces the chronological evolution of human rights as an echo to the three-dimensional call of the French 
revolution:liberté meaning freedoms, civil and political or first generation rights (These rights, invoking and 
obtaining guarantees from autocratic governments that the individual should be left alone, were first contained in the 
English Bill of Rights of 1689, the Virginia Declaration of Rights of 1776 and the Declaration des Droits de 
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core principles is one thing; working out all the other elements of a complete system of rights 
such as international law seeks to provide is something else. 
 
2.3 HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA 
 
2.3.1 Human Right and Pre-Colonial Africa 
 
The debate on the existence of human rights as a concept in pre-colonial African legal thought is 
a very controversial one, and is hinged on another controversial subject: whether law existed in 
pre-colonial Africa. In dealing with this, the writer will look at the existence of law in the pre- 
colonial Africa/traditional African society and then follow it up with the debate concerning 
human rights. 
 
Some western scholars have probed the notion of law in pre-colonial Africa and this originated 
from the historical obscurity given to the continent by early western historians. Hegel
53 
in his 
Philosophy of History, positioned Africa outside history and civilisation and the reason for this 
lack of recognition of the existence of law in early African societies has been attributed to the 
fact that African societies in the pre-colonial era were very traditional in nature, governed by 
custom rather than law. The argument below shows that there were laws in pre-colonial Africa 
but they existed as customs. 
To scholars in the 19
th
 
century, who tried to distinguish between custom and law, custom is 
absolutely rigid and obedience was ensured by the overwhelming power of group sentiment 
which was fortified by magic.
54 
According to this argument, in the circumstance ‘it was 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
lHomme et du Citoyen meaning Declaration of Man and Citizen of 1789); equalité meaning equality, socio- 
economic, or second generation rights (These rights, inspired by socialist philosophy and responding to increasing 
urbanisation and poverty in the rapidly industrialising world at the beginning of the 20th century, were first included 
in the 1917 Mexican Constitution. Under the heading Of Personal Guarantees (Title 1, Chapter 1), it is provided that 
[p]rimary instruction in public institutions shall be gratuitous (art.3). These provisions generally are not formulated as 
claims against the government (for example, the reconceptualization of property as being vested originally in the 
Nation (art. 27), combined with the guarantee that property shall not be expropriated except for reasons of public 
utility and by means of indemnification). See also the 1918 Constitution of the former Soviet Republic, and the 1919 
Weimar Constitution of Germany) and fraternité meaning solidarity, collective or third generation rights (with the 
growing globalisation and a heightened awareness of overlapping global concerns, especially due to extreme poverty in 
some parts of the world, rights such as the right to a healthy environment, to self-determination and to development 
were developed). See Frans Viljoen (2007)6.   
53 Cited in Alternative Histories And Non-written Sources: New Perspective from the South 4 (Proposal for an 
International Seminar organised by the South- South Exchange Programme for Research on History of Development 
(SEPHIS), Amsterdam, at La Paz, 12-15 May, 1999). 
54
 Eze O, ‘Human Rights in Africa: Some Selected Problems’ (1984) 10. See also Rowley C. & Schneider F., ‘The 
Encyclopedia of Public Choice’ (2004) 344.  
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impossible to make any distinctions between legal, moral, or religious rules, which were all 
interwoven into the single rules of customary behaviour.’55 
 
To Eze, the argument that traditional societies did not possess a legal system was based either on 
inadequate information or lack of appreciation of the true nature of pre-colonial African 
societies. It is also based on the Western scholars’ concept of law as emanating from the State on 
the other hand.
56
 
It is often claimed that colonial Africa had no concept of human rights and therefore could not 
practice human rights;
57
 as such, human rights are only achievable through liberal regimes which 
are a product of western culture.
58  
According to Gyeke,
59
 Motala
60 
and Busia Jr.,
61 
the concept 
of human rights was not alien to pre-colonial Africa and that human rights are deeply rooted 
in African cultural values. Making reference to the Akan culture in Ghana, Gyeke observed that 
the African conception of the individual as endowed with dignity underscores the belief 
that all human beings are equal. He buttressed this with the Akan maxim that ‘all human 
beings are children of God; no one is a child of the earth.’62 He stressed further that 
Africans believe in humanity which is an expression of the natural and moral rights of the 
individual. The individual’s right must be appreciated within a communal context and this is 
because the group or community rights or interest according to him, generally override that of 
                                                             
55 Lloyd D, ‘Introduction to Jurisprudence’ (1972) 566. See also Mbodenyi MK, ‘International Human Rights and 
their Enforcement in Africa’ (2011) 54.  
56 Eze at 9. One would agree with Eze that defining law to be that which emanates from a State, as a particular form of 
societal organisation, ignores that law did exist outside the framework of a State in the modern sense. One would also 
agree with the reasoning that this argument has the implication that African societies operated in total legal 
vacuum before the Arabs and the colonialists overran the continent. 
57Elechi O. O., ‘Human Rights and the African Indigenous Justice System.’Paper presented at the 18th International 
Conference of the International Society for the Reforms of Criminal Law, 8-12 August, 2004, Montreal, Canada. 
Available at www.isrcl.org/papers/2004/Elechi.pdf (Accessed 22 March 2015).  
58Elechi O.O. ‘Human Rights and the African Indigenous Justice System.’ A paper presented at the 18th International 
Conference  of  the  International  Society  for  the  Reform  of  Criminal  Law,  8-12,  Montreal,  Quebec,  Canada. 
.Available at www.restorativejustice.org/rj-library/human-rights-and-the-african-indigenous-justice-system/5449/ 
(Accessed 15th August, 2016). See also Elechi O. O. ‘Doing Justice without the State: The Afikpo (Ehugbo) Nigeria 
Model’ (2006) 63. Durkheim in 1966 argued that there are ideally two types of societies, namely mechanical and 
organic. In societies characterised by mechanical solidarity, members of the society are highly integrated through 
their cultural and functional similarities. Mechanical solidarity prevailed in pre-industrial societies, and religion and 
law worked together, with little or no difference between the two. Mechanical solidarity as described by Durkheim 
was closest to acephalous societies, while his organic solidarity societies describe European societies with 
centralised state systems. He insisted that the law that prevailed in societies characterised by mechanical solidarity 
was basically repressive. What this means is that there is a lack of human rights in mechanical solidarity societies.  
59 Gyekye Kwame, ‘African Cultural Values: An Introduction’ (1996)150. 
60 Motala Ziyad, ‘Human Rights in Africa: A Cultural, Ideological and Legal Examination’ (1989) Hastings 
International and Comparative Law Review 12, 373-410.  
61 Busia, Jr. N.K.A., ‘The Status of Human Rights in Pre-Colonial Africa: Implications for Contemporary Practices’ in 
Eileen McCarthy-Arnolds et al (eds.), ‘Africa, Human Rights and the Global System’ (1994) 225-250.  
62 Gyeke Kwame, ‘African Cultural Values: An Introduction’ (1996) 150.  
https://etd.uwc.ac.za
 
 
17  
the individual. The individual’s membership of a community does not take away from him 
his dignity and by extension, his rights.
63
 
According to Onwuachi,
64
 African spiritual communalism is derived from the African 
indigenous principles of ‘live and let’s live; collective sharing, common concern for one another; 
sense of belonging together; social justice; economic progress and viability for all; and the 
African indigenous political process of participatory democracy.’ In supporting this, Awa65 
argues that ‘a society which believes in the values of equality, individual rights and human 
freedom will tend to evaluate quite highly any political systems which maximises opportunities 
for participation and in other ways promote these values.’ African community makes the welfare 
and well-being of one the concern of all. Morality in Africa has a humanistic and a social basis 
rather than a religious foundation.
66
 Moral values are derived in the main from Peoples’ 
experience living in the community and this is informed by the Peoples’ understanding of what is 
appropriate in inter-personal relationships. African moral values were not revealed to them by 
Supreme –being and any behaviour that is not directed towards the well-being of the individual 
and the community is viewed as wrong according to African cultural values.
67
 
It is asserted that in traditional Africa, as well as in modern Africa, the individual is neither 
                                                             
63 This view is supported by Ifemesia who describes the Igbo tribe in Nigeria as humane. A humane living according 
to him is a way of life centred upon human interests and values, a mode of living evidently characterized by 
empathy, and by consideration and compassion for human beings. He said further that the Igbo humanness is deeply 
ingrained in the traditional belief that the human being is supreme in the creation, is the greatest asset one can 
possess, is the noblest cause one can live and die for. See Elechi O. O.‘Human Rights and the African Indigenous 
Justice System’ (2000) 9.  
64 Onwuachi C. P., ‘African Identity and Ideology,’ (1977) IN FESTAC 77.  
65 Awa E.O. ‘Igbo Political Culture: Nature and Role of Political Culture’ in ‘The Igbo Socio-Political System.’ A paper 
presented at the Ahiajoku Lecture Colloquium in Owerri, Nigeria organised by the Ministry of Information, Culture, 
Youth and Sports in 1986. Available at www.isrcl.org/papers/2004/Elechi.pdf (Accessed 4thJuly, 2014).  
66 Gyekye (1996) 57.  
67Gyekye said that such a basis of moral values enjoins a moral system that pursues human well-being. Thus, in 
African morality, there is an unrelenting pre-occupation with human welfare. What is morally good is that which 
brings about, or is supposed, expected or known to bring about, human well-being. This means, in a society that 
appreciates and thrives on harmonious social relationships, that what is morally good is what promotes social 
welfare, and in human relationships. It is also observed that morality is a corporate affair in African societies. It is 
recognised that the individual’s wrong doing does not only affect the direct victim and his or her family, but also 
undermines the community’s well-being. Since the community is an entity affected by criminal behaviour, 
community needs and concerns are to be addressed. This includes creating new positive relationships and or 
strengthening existing relationships and increasing community skills in problem solving. It is also important to note 
that the community also shares in the responsibility of the wrong-doing of its member. According to Mutua Makau in 
‘Why Redraw the Map of Africa: A Moral and Legal Inquiry’ (1995) 16 Michigan Law Journal 1113, the 
emphasis on individual rights as against communal rights in Western societies is connected to their peculiar 
historical experience, which Africa lacks. As such, the pursuit of individual rights is neither natural nor universal. 
See Elechi E.O. (2000) 9.  
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autonomous nor alienated. The individual was always a member of an extended family or 
community and this membership bestowed the individual with rights and duties.
68 
Within the 
framework of the group, an individual enjoys freedom of expression, freedom of religion, 
freedom of movement, freedom of association, the right to work and the right to education and 
failure to conform to the norms of the society could jeopardise the rights of the individual. This 
could occur because freedom of thought, speech and beliefs were considered communal rights. 
Conditions for enjoying these rights were guided by ‘the principle of respect.’69 Here, respect 
involves respect for oneself and for others; respect for others varied according to age, ability and 
sex. Respect for others was very much a part of the normative structure of the legal system and it 
determined the extent to which freedom of speech could be expressed.
70
 
Pre-colonial Africa can be broadly divided into two (2) types: those with advanced systems of 
government, with kings ruling over large areas, such as, the Hausa-Fulani emirates, the Yoruba, 
Benin, and Arochukwu kingdoms in Nigeria, and the Ashanti Kingdom in Ghana of West Africa; 
Bunyoro of Uganda in East Africa and Monomotapa in Central Africa; the Zulu, Swazi and 
Lesotho Kingdoms in the South and the Arab kingdoms in North Africa.
71 
Executive, legislative 
and judicial powers were usually concentrated in the rulers, who designated their power to their 
officials and subordinates.
72 
The greater part of Africa consisted of small communities with 
recognised heads that were Kings, elders, title holders or other functionaries.
73 
In both types of 
societies, members were accorded full recognition that both the community and the heads sought 
to protect. The rights to life and property, for instance, are as old as human society and 
infringements on these had criminal consequences. With some notable exceptions, the kings 
were occasionally authoritarian and every society had its democratic processes. The Ashanti 
kings in Ghana were ritually warned against dictatorship and abuse of office before they assumed 
office.
74
 
                                                             
68 Motala Z., ‘The Protection of Human Rights in African Criminal Proceedings’ (1996) 381.  
69Sarolta T, ‘The Modern world: Civilisations of Africa’ (2015) 116; Christof H & Karen S, ‘Human Rights, Peace 
and Justice in Africa: A Reader’ (2006) 37.   
70Christof H & Karen S (2006) 37.   
71 Adedeji A, ‘Comparative Strategies of Economic Decolonisation in Africa’ in Mazrui A.A. (ed), ‘General History of 
Africa VIII: Africa since 1935’ (2003) 401.  
72 Umozurike U. O., ‘The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ (1997)15.  
73 Ajayi F. & Espie I. (eds.), ‘A Thousand Years of West African History’ (1965). See also Basil Davidson, ‘Old 
Africa Rediscovered’ 1970; Elias T. O., ‘Africa and the Development of International Law’ 1972; Elias T. O., ‘The 
Nature of African Customary Law’, 1962. 
74Umozurike (1997) 15.   
https://etd.uwc.ac.za
 
 
19  
The individual’s rights to food and shelter were respected in the traditional African societies. 
Almost everyone had access to land since land was owned both privately and communally, there 
was no wealthy class of land owners as we have today in post-colonial Africa. Land was a major 
means of economic production and all were encouraged to work because idleness carried a social 
stigma. The elders, being custodian of the community land, administered the land to the best 
interest of the lineage or community. The elders were not the owners of the land nor did they 
control the community land but they held it only in trust for the lineage or on behalf of the 
community.
75 
An African traditional council allowed for free expression of all shades of opinions 
and everyone has full rights to express their mind on public questions. It was observed that the 
individual can assert his or her civil and political rights against violation by the leaders. There 
was recognition by the people that those entrusted with power were capable of abusing it and as 
such, assertion of political rights sometimes led to the removal of autocratic or corrupt leaders 
from office. This practice is geared towards safeguarding the individual’s dignity, which is 
generally referred to as African humanism.
76
 
 
The existence of law in pre-colonial Africa was a result of the stage of development of its 
societies in that era. While one may agree that the predominant socio-economic formations 
before colonial penetration were communalism, slave owning societies and feudalism; laws had 
to, and did exist to govern these societies and the relations within them.
77
 
Scholars of African political, social and economic history agree that African societies in pre- 
colonial era achieved a reasonable degree of political, social and economic organisation that had 
the characteristics of modern States.
78 
Davidson
79
 observed that: 
                                                             
75Traditional African societies were democratic and egalitarian, and allowed for the participation of all adults in 
decision making processes. Even in communities with Kings or Chiefs, decisions were reached only after full 
consultation with community members. All participating adults were free to express their opinions on issues before 
decisions were reached and all decisions reached were reached through consensus. No one was punished for holding 
opposing views on issues and no attempt was made to suppress any voice. In some cases, decisions on issues were 
differed until all the constituting members or groups of the community are represented. See Umozurike (1997) 15.  
76In this regard, torture, killing and other abuses would be objectionable in terms of human rights. See Umozurike 
(1997) 15.   
77 Sociological, economic, historical and anthropological studies in the last three decades of the twentieth century 
have resulted in works that have thrown more light and provided useful information for a reasonably accurate 
appreciation and assessment of Africa’s past political, social and economic formations. Elias T. O., ‘The Nature of 
African Customary Law’ (1962); Walter Rodney, ‘How Europe Underdeveloped Africa’ (1972); Basil Davidson, 
‘Old Africa Rediscovered’ (1970). There may not have been legal studies focusing directly on the existence of law 
as a concept in pre-colonial Africa, these studies fairly incorporate the existence of law in the political, social and 
economic settings of pre-colonial Africa. 
78 According to Elias, in African Law although theories about social contract have not been formulated in this way, yet 
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Behind the obscurities of early West Africa History… one may reasonably detect iron 
smelting and international trade as underlying factors which had decisive influence in the hands 
of men who practiced them. Political and military concentration became possible and, at least 
for those who could rule, desirable alliances of interests emerged, became fused into centres 
of power, acquired geographical identity, reappeared as territorial states: even when, as was 
surely the case, the people of the riverside villages and the nomads following their herds 
would continue to live much the same way as they lived before.
80
 
 
In the study of the Southern African societies, Gluckman
81 
saw a traditional African society with 
a fairly advanced legal system. He observed that the body of law in Loziland consisted of rules 
of varying types and origin. These in their own right are the various sources of law as commonly 
defined in Western jurisprudence. He found that in Lozi, as in Western jurisdictions, these 
sources consisted of customs, judicial precedents; legislation of natural morality and of nations, 
good morals and equity.
82 
The argument is that the judicial process in Loziland on the whole 
corresponded to, rather than differed from, the judicial process known in Western societies. 
 
Meek
83 
followed the same line with Gluckman, regarding traditional legal systems in Zululand, 
East Africa and West Africa. He was of the opinion that the mentality of ‘primitive’ peoples did 
not differ from that of Europeans, as was known by any European who had lived at close 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
the indigenous ideas of government are not essentially dissimilar, at least in its presuppositions, to that of 
Grotius as well. See Elias T. O., ‘Africa and Development of International Law’ (1988)36. Kingdoms flourished in 
African as far back as the fourth century. In West Africa, there were the Ghana, Songhai, Mali and Walata empires. In 
the South-East, there was the Zulu Empire, in Central Africa the Kingdom of the Monomotapa, and in East 
Africa, the ancient Bunyoro Empire and the Buganda Kingdoms. Walter Rodney argued that up to the fifteenth 
century when the colonialist arrived in Africa, State formation was in an embryonic stage. The Western Sudanese 
techniques of political organization and administration reached many neighbouring regions and influenced the 
emergence of innumerable small states scattered throughout the coastal region from Senegal River to the Cameroon 
mountains. He argued further that the level of development between Europe and Africa was comparable based on the 
confirmation of the first Europeans to reach East and West Africa by sea. He however cautioned that it would be self-
delusion to think that all things were at par, because the Europeans did not have an edge.  
79 Davidson B., ‘Africa in History: Themes and Outlines,’ 1974. 
80 Not only did pre-colonial Africa witness the emergence of States, but also there was some level of technological 
development  and  capacity,  based  among  other  things,  on  accepted  separate  territorial  identity,  to  enter  into 
international relations. In addition to the level of development, the structures of various African societies also had 
some effect on the development of the legal systems. According to Elias, African societies with strong centralised 
political systems tended to have a more advanced body of legal principles and judicial techniques than had those 
with more or less rudimentary political organisation. In the former, there were usually hierarchically graded courts 
ranging from the smallest chiefs to kings courts, with well-defined machinery for due enforcement of judicial 
decisions. In the latter, rules rather than rulers, functions rather than institutions, characterised the judicial 
organisation of these societies. He opines that the fact that in the latter, the legal arrangements, were informal in 
nature, should not be interpreted as an actual situation of chaos, since the mechanism of choosing the adjudicating 
elders for the settlement of disputes, as well as that of enforcing their decisions, followed clearly recognised 
patterns, even if the means adopted appeared casual to the unwary observer. See page 94. 
81Gluckman M., ‘The Judicial Process among the Bartose of Northern Rhodesia’ (1967) 231 reprinted in Eze (1984) 11.   
82
 Eze (1984) 231.  
83 Meek C.K, ‘Law and Authority in a Nigerian Tribe’ (1937) xiii reprinted in Eze at 11.  
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quarters with natives. It was therefore not to be expected that the norms governing conducts in 
these African societies should diverge very profoundly from that of early European societies. 
 
The point being made here is not to get even with Western societies in selling the notion that the 
concept of law in pre-colonial Africa existed in much the same fashion as in the West. It is rather 
that those scholars who deny the existence of law in pre-colonial Africa tend to give the 
impression that African legal systems must be comparable to those in the more  advanced 
societies of Western Europe in order to be valid. This notion is misleading in the sense that no 
two societies could actually be the same in terms of development of legal norms and socio-
economic formations, at each stage of the evolution of human society, a legal system and indeed 
laws corresponding to a given state of socio-economic development existed to regulate it.
84
 
 
Progressing with the argument whether human rights as a concept existed in pre-colonial Africa, 
many African scholars, as earlier stated in this chapter, have defended the existence of human 
rights concepts in pre-colonial Africa.
85 
Howard and Donnelly are the Western scholars in the 
fore front of the argument that human rights did not exist as a concept in pre-colonial Africa.
86 
To  Howard,  African  proponents  of  the  concept  confuse  human  dignity with  human  rights. 
According to her, 
 
The African concept of human rights is actually human dignity, of what defines ‘the inner’ 
(moral) nature and worth of the human person and his or her proper (political) relations with 
                                                             
84 Eze at 12. The writer will argue further that the whole colonial agenda of Europe was responsible for attempts to 
discredit the legal formation and development of pre-colonial African societies. It is unimaginable that societies 
would have gone along without an established legal order of things. The fact that religion or metaphysics is said to 
overwhelmingly influence African customs does not in any way discredit the attributes of the norms existing in these 
societies from being law. In Africa, as in other modern societies, certain mores deriving originally from religion or 
general morality have not only influenced the development of positive legal rules, but have in fact come to form part 
of them. The natural law argument that law derives from God or a Supreme Being has long been a substantial 
element of African legal philosophy, even though it may not have been couched into a thesis by any ancient African 
legal philosopher. It is nothing but a belief in religion as a source of law, which in turn was applied and enforced in 
modern European States. 
85Scholars that have written on the existence of human rights in pre-colonial Africa include but not limited to Kwasi 
Wiredu, ‘An Akan Perspective on Human Rights’ in Abdullahi An-Na’im & Francis Deng (eds.), ‘Human Rights in 
Africa: Cross-Cultural Perspectives’ (1990) 243; Francis Deng, ‘Cultural Approach to Human Rights among the 
Dinka’; in Abdullahi Ahmed AN-Naim& Francis Deng (eds.) ‘Human Rights in Africa: Cross Cultural 
Perspectives’ (1990) 261; MakauWa Mutua, ‘The Banjul Charter and the African Cultural Fingerprint: An 
Evaluation of Language of Duties’ (1995) 35 Va. J. Intl L. 339.  
86 Rhoda Howard, ‘Group versus Individual Identity in African Debate on Human Rights’, in ‘Human Rights in 
Africa:  Cross-Cultural  Perspectives’  (1990)  49;  Rhoda  Howard,  ‘Evaluating  Human  Rights  in  Africa:  Some 
Problems of Implicit Comparisms’ (1984) 6 Human Rights Quarterly 160. Jack Donnelly, ‘Universal Human Rights 
in Theory and Practice’ (1989) 34. See also, Vincent R. J., ‘Human Rights and International Relations’ (1986) 13- 
18. 
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society. Despite the twinning of human rights and human dignity in the preamble to the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and elsewhere, dignity can be protected in a society 
not based on rights. The notion of African communism, which stresses the dignity of 
membership in, and fulfilment of one’s prescribed social role in a group (family, Kinship 
group,  tribe),  still  represents  accurately how  many  Africans appear to view their personal 
relationship to society.
87
 
 
Donnelly also dismissed the notion that pre-colonial African societies knew the concept of 
human rights. He joins Howard in opining that the argument is now lame since the 
communitarian ideal has been destroyed and corrupted by the ‘teeming slums’ of non-Western 
States, the money economy, Western value and products; even if it could be agreed that societies 
based on communitarian ideals existed at a point in time in Africa.
88
 
African scholars have risen in defence of the concept that human rights were in existence in pre- 
colonial Africa thereby disagreeing with Howard and Donnelly. Mutua dismissed the notion held 
by the two authors above that human rights are only possible in a post-feudal state and that the 
concepts of human rights are alien to specific pre-capitalist traditions and ideals such as 
Buddhism, Islam or pre-colonial African societies.
89 
His interpretation of this view is that it is a 
suggestion that these traditions can make no normative contributions to the human rights corpus; 
and that societies governed under a centralised modern State necessarily Westernised through 
industrialisation and urbanisation and thus become fertile a ground for human rights to 
germinate.
90 
Foremost of Mutua’s criticism of the views of the two scholars is the implication in 
                                                             
87 See Rhoda Howard, ‘Group Versus Identity in the African Debate on Human Rights’ (1984) 165-166. This view 
has been criticised because it appeared that the scholar has a problem with the idea that African communal 
characteristics could harbour the concept of human rights within it. The fact that an African sense of well-being and 
due regard finds distinct expression in a group makes it impossible for Howard to equate human dignity with human 
rights. The concept of justice, unlike human rights, is rooted not in individual claims against the State but in the 
physical and psychic security of group membership as argued by Howard herself. Rather than agree that pre-colonial 
Africa had embedded in its notion of human dignity, the concept of human rights, Howard strongly insisted that 
although relatively homogenous, undifferentiated simple societies of pre-colonial Africa had effective means of 
guaranteeing what is now known as human rights, there was nothing specifically African about them. See Rhoda 
Howard, ‘Evaluating Human Rights in Africa: Some Problems of Illicit Comparisons’ (1984)176. She referred to the 
situation as the communitarian ideal which represented typical agrarian, pre-capitalist social relations in non-state 
societies.  
88Jack Donnelly, ‘Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice’ (1984) 119.   
89 Mutua (1995) 335. See also Legesse, ‘Human Rights in African Political Culture’ in Kenneth Thompson (ed), ‘The 
Moral Imperatives of Human Rights: A World Survey’ (1980) 123-138; Nyerere J, Ujama ‘Essays in Socialism’ 
(1968) 106-108; Sivji I.G., ‘The Concept of Human Rights in Africa’ (1989) 12 and Mojekwu C. C., ‘International 
Human Rights: The African Perspective’ in Nelson J.L. & Green V. M (eds.), ‘International Human Rights: 
Contemporary Issues’ (1980) 85-95. 
90 Mutua at 356. I agree with Mutua that pre-colonial values have been undermined by change as a result of 
interaction between different cultures brought about by the colonisation of African peoples but that it will be 
difficult to believe that the change process arising   from this interaction will totally or completely invalidate or 
eradicate them, the same way it will be difficult to imagine that the modernisation of Asia and the Arab world will 
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their works that only European liberalism can be the foundation for the concept of human rights. 
He argued that this view destroys the claim that human rights are universal. Universality of 
human rights does not derive from Western imposition of the concept on colonised societies; it 
rather means that the concept of what is articulated today as human rights is prevalent 
universally.
91
 
 
African writers, in their attempt to counter the view on the lack of human rights in pre-colonial 
Africa, have tried to trace historical practices in some pre-colonial African societies that accord 
with the present day notions of human rights. Aside from the Akan of West Africa referred to 
earlier in this chapter, there is also the Akamba system of the East African people. According to 
Wiredu,
92  
the Akamba believed that all members of the society were born equal and were 
supposed to be treated as such regardless of sex and age. Thus, the Akan society and the Akamba 
societies of Kenya are credited with having believed that the individual as an inherently valuable 
being was naturally endowed with certain basic rights. The existence of political rights in these 
societies is based on their practice of choosing their rulers. The Akamba justice system involved 
a trial with each party to a dispute appearing before the Council of Elders with his or her own 
jurors who rather than preside over the case advise the party on how to win the case. The case 
progressed to a finding with the appropriate punishment for the guilty or liable party, depending 
on the infringement or crime committed.
93 
Fernyhough
94 
also shared the view of the existence of 
human rights in pre-colonial Africa in reaction to the views expressed by Donnelly and Howard, 
noting how politicised the debate had become. According to him, 
 
Fairly similar views have led to very different discussions. From one perspective the human 
rights tradition was quite foreign to Africa until Western, ‘modernising’ intrusions dislocated 
communities and denied newly isolated individuals access to customary ways of protecting 
their lives and human dignity. Human rights were alien to Africa precisely because it was a 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
completely destroy the cultural norms and forms of consciousness evolved through Buddhism and Islam. It needs to 
be stressed that culture is dynamic, and the whole cultural interaction is the possibility of the interacting cultures to 
affect each other. The fact that the modern State is becoming a feature of African societal organisation does not 
eliminate the ability of pre-colonial norms to influence the lives of Africans. The view that the old ways have been 
eroded by modernisation is just a fact of the nature of culture, not that the old ways were not in existence or that they 
depend on the Western ideals to be legitimated. In fact, not all the old ways have been eroded. Every culture has the 
tendency of phasing out some of its mores as time progresses, especially those that cannot be said to be generally 
accepted by those or the majority within that culture.  
91 Wa Mutua M., ‘Human Rights and Politics in Africa: Democratising the Rights Discourse’ (1993) 1 East Africa 
Journal of Peace and Human Rights 250-255.  
92 Kwesi Wiredu, 49.  
93 Joseph Muthiani, ‘Akamba from Within’ (1984) 350.  
94
 Timothy Fernyhough, ‘Human Rights and Pre-colonial Africa’, in Ronald Cohen et al (eds.) ‘Human Rights and 
Governance in Africa’ (1993) 39. 
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pre-capitalist society, social organisation. From the opposing viewpoint, there is a fundamental 
rejection of this as a new, if rather subtle, imperialism, and an explicit denial that human 
rights evolved only in Western political theory and practice, especially during the American 
and French revolutions, and not in Africa. Behind this protest is the very plausible claim that 
human rights are not founded in Western values alone but may also have emerged from very 
different and distinctive African cultural milieus.
95
 
 
The fact that human rights were prevalent in pre-colonial Africa must be accepted. It existed 
more as a concept rather than a defined set of rights as later enumerated in the International Bill 
of Rights. The lack of a thorough definition by the content of what constituted human rights in 
pre-colonial Africa does not defeat the assertion of the existence of human rights in that African 
era. Human rights are dynamic and not all that are considered today as human rights were a part 
of the concepts at the time of formal articulation of the concept.
96
 
 
Human rights therefore are not a purely Western idea neither did the concept of human rights 
originate from any part of the world or from liberal democracy as argued by some scholars. All 
people of the world do not assent to the same basic values and beliefs, but what is certain is that 
every society has been concerned with the notion of social justice, the relationship between the 
individual and his or her political authorities.
97
  
African societies had stabilising factors which included the sense of obligation to one’s relatives, 
the fear of the deity that was omnipotent and omniscient, and accountability to the Almighty for 
                                                             
95 Donelly J (1989) 40-41.  
96 Vincent Orlu Nmehiemelle, ‘The African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights and the Human Rights Question in 
Nigeria’ (LL.M thesis, University of Notre Dame Law School, Notre Dame, Indiana, 1996) 23. He argued that the 
history of African pre-colonial development showed advanced state structures which recognised some notions of 
human rights, but that the formal articulation of human rights had its origin in Western legal and political 
philosophical thought, especially after the atrocities of the World Wars and the ravages of colonialism. See also 
Mbondenyi MK, International Human Rights and their Enforcement in Africa (2011) 67.  
97 Phillipson & Swain (eds) ‘Language Rights in Post –Colonial Africa’, in ‘Linguistic Human Rights: Overcoming 
Linguistic Discrimination’ (1994) 335, pointed out that the struggle for human rights is as old as the world history 
itself because it concerns the need to protect the individual against the abuse of power by the monarch, the tyrant or 
the State. What the West did provide was not a monopoly of ideas on the subject but rather greater opportunities for 
visions such as those to receive fuller consideration, articulation and eventual implementation. According to Eze, all 
societies recognise human rights. However, its manner of conceptualisation varies across different cultural settings. 
He asserts that pre-colonial Africa had a system of law which is similar to the systems of law in Western States. 
According to him, the difference is that in most traditional African societies, law existed outside the framework of a 
State in the modern sense. Obedience to the law was maintained through custom and religion as well as established 
patterns of sanction. These pre-colonial African societies had a high level of organisation in which political, 
economic and social control was maintained. See as cited by Concurring with the view of Eze, Gluckman, ‘The 
Judicial Process among the Barotse of Northern Rhodesia’, (1996) 272, argued that the functions and objectives of 
law in Africa is similar to that of other societies. According to him, the central objective of the Lozi jurisprudence 
for example, is the regulation of established and the creation of new relationships, the protection and maintenance of 
certain norms of behaviour, the readjustment of disturbed social relationships and the punishing of offenders against 
certain rules. 
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all human actions on earth. This had a restraining effect on human activities, since the good were 
expected to be appropriately rewarded and the wicked or their successors to be condemned.
98
 
 
The description of pre-Christian and pre-Islamic Nigeria by Uchendu
99 
holds good for Africa and 
provides the setting for the assessment of human rights. He found that the social order was 
ontologically-oriented and resolved problems with a few principles of organisation-kinship, 
reciprocity and redistribution.
100
 
2.3.2 Human Rights in Colonial Africa 
 
Colonialism, as an aspect of foreign intervention in Africa, impacted negatively on the relative 
dignity and human values which were enjoyed by Africans in the pre-colonial era. The Atlantic 
trade in African slaves
101 
reached its height in the 18
th 
century and was complemented by 
the Arab operators in East and Central Africa.
102 
It is true that once Africa had been 
successfully conquered, British and French rule were relatively benign, but the history of the 
conquest of Africa, however, reveals massive violations of the rights to life and liberty.
103 
Civil 
                                                             
98 Relating individuals rights to societal rights, Ake, ‘The African Context of Human Rights’, in ‘Africa Today,’ 
1st/2nd Quarters (1987) 5-12; concluded by saying we put less emphasis on individual and more on the collectivity, 
we do not allow that the individual has any claim which may override that of the society. We assume harmony, not 
divergence of interests, competition and conflict; we are more inclined to think of our obligations to other members 
of our society rather than our claims against them. 
99 Uchendu V.C., ‘Traditional and Social Order’, except from lecture, University of Calabar, Calabar, Nigeria, 11 
January, 1990. This is reproduced in TiyanjanaMaluwa (ed.), ‘Law, Politics and Rights: Essays in Memory of Kader 
Asmal’ (2013) 40. See also Umozurike at 19. The kinship principle provided the individual with a community 
whose moral order emphasised shared values, a sense of belonging, security and social justice. In such social order, 
duties preceded rights. The principle was clear: to enjoy your rights you must do your duty; and duty and right have a 
reciprocal relationship, and structurally both where balanced. The genealogical structure, whatever its depth, 
solved the dialectical problem of relating the present to the past and both to the future. It is a simple transformation 
embedded in the lineage system which incorporates the living, the dead and the unborn. By the principle of 
reciprocity, the living respects the ancestors and the traditions they left; the ancestors reciprocate by maintaining the 
priority of the living community and through re-incarnation, strengthen the living lineage. When the living dies, they 
join their ancestors. 
100See also Marasighe L., ‘Traditional Conceptions of Human Rights in Africa’ in Welch C.E. and Alston P. (eds.), 
‘Human Rights and Development in Africa’ (1989) 32-45; Adegbite L.O., ‘African Attitudes to the International 
Protection of Human Rights’ in Eide A & Schou A (eds.), ‘International Protection of Human Rights,’ proceedings 
of the Seventh Nobel Symposium, Oslo, September 25/27 (1967) 69-81.  
101The Atlantic slave trade foreran colonialism in Africa and it began in 1510. Slave trade and colonialism in 
response to economic changes in Europe; the industrial revolution in Europe required cheap sources of raw materials 
produced by cheap labour; it also required a market for surplus goods. With the end of the slave trade in sight due to 
humanitarian sentiments against it, colonial subjugation of Africa was the desired alternative in the quest for the 
expansion of commercial activities. See Vicent Orlu Nmehielle, ‘The African Human Rights System: Its Laws, 
Practice and Institutions’ (2001) 17; also Amy Mckenna, ‘The History of Western Africa’ (2011) 29.   
102Enough Africans were transported to the New World for the exploitation of its resources; attention was 
increasingly turned to the continent and its people, which were nearer to Europe.   
103 The British were often ruthless in their suppression of resistance, for example, every person in the market of the 
village of Muruka in Kenya was slaughtered to revenge the killing of one British soldier in 1902. Recalcitrant chiefs 
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and political rights as the contemporary world now defines them were certainly not practiced 
under colonial rule. In fact, the British initially opposed the U.N. passage of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights because they were afraid that the Declaration would oblige 
them to implement those rights in their colonies.
104 
The congress of Vienna in 1815 considered 
that slave trade was repugnant to the principles of humanity and of universal morality.
105 
In 
bilateral treaties with a number of states, Britain, which championed the abolition of slave 
trade, negotiated the end of the trade.
106
 
The practice of preventive detention, a favourite weapon of African governments, is a direct 
heritage of the colonial era
107 
and it is worthy to note here that colonial Africa experienced no 
political participation of any form to speak of. A few African members were allowed into 
Legislative Councils of Ghana and Sierra Leone as early as the 1920s, but all decisions of such 
councils could be overridden by the colonial executive and the colonial secretary.
108
 
Broader discussions on the nature of the human rights in colonial Africa require the examination 
of the specific systems of colonialism as adopted by the various European powers. The major 
colonial powers were France, Britain and Belgium. Portugal and Spain also exacted some 
measure of colonial authority. 
A.  British Colonialism 
The British colonial administration made use of the policy of indirect rule, a situation whereby 
they utilised native chiefs for administration
109 
in order to reduce costs. They created new chiefs 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
were routinely exiled or detained. The Machine gun was used in Africa as early as the 1890s against indigenous 
Ugandan and Tanzania resistance. That such brutality was not confined merely to the 19th century imperialist phase is 
evidenced by the massive incarcerations of Mau Mau rebels in Kenya in the 1950s and by the confinement of 
Kenyan women and children to protective concentration camps. See Micheal Crowther, (eds.) ‘West Africa 
Resistance: The Military Response to Colonial Occupation’ (1971) 111-143; Ngugi Wa Thiongo, ‘Detained: A 
Writers Prison Diary’ (1981) 35; John Ellis, ‘The Social History of the Machine Gun’ (1975) 88.  
104 James Frederick Green, ‘The United Nations and the Human Rights’ (1956) 56 and reproduced by Rhoda 
Howards (1986)11.  
105 Umozurike at 19.  
106 The Berlin Treaty of 1885 was the first multilateral treaty that recognised the illegality of the slave trade; it also 
laid down the ground rules for the colonisation of the unoccupied parts of the continent. Parties were expected to 
communicate the acquisition of new areas to the others and maintain effective government. Thus the treaty not only 
followed the acquisitive exploits of the powers but actually encouraged the scramble for African territories by 
interested powers.  
107Ngugi, at 44-51   
108 Howard Rhoda (1986) 9. These African members were appointed and not elected except for few municipal seats. 
Ordinary Africans had no political rights whatsoever and also there was no real independence of the judiciary. The 
local district commissioner was normally prosecutor, judge and jury, in fact, a patronising great white father. Only in 
the higher courts and the urban areas were separation of the judiciary and other organs of government established. 
109 The British made use of the administrative machinery that the natives had created. Under this system, each 
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at places where there were no chiefs. They (British) adopted two approaches by which they 
related with Africans, they either treated the African rulers as dependent on them, or allowed 
them to be independent. In both cases, African freedom of government was only on the condition 
that the British economic and political goals were helped and not hindered.
110
 
The African Chief was the instrument of local government as he appointed all the local officials 
who were responsible to him. He, along with his appointed officials, presided over the law 
courts, which, as far as possible, applied African law. His agents levied taxes for the local 
treasury and part of the revenue was sent to the central government and the remainder kept for 
local improvements such as roads, sanitation, markets and schools and to pay salaries of local 
officials.
111
 
 
It is true that the reason for the indirect rule is that the practice was facilitated by the reluctance 
of the British to turn their African colonies into Britons. This was rather race related than the 
usual reasons. 
112
Lord Lugard 
113 
alluded to this reasoning as the essential nature of British 
indirect rule policy in Africa, he said: 
 
Here, then, is the true conception of the interrelation of colour: complete uniformity of ideals, 
absolute equality in the paths of knowledge and culture, equal opportunity for those who 
strive, equal administration for those who achieve; in matters social and racial a separate path, 
each pursuing his interested traditions, preserving his own race purity and race pride; equality in 
things spiritual, agreed divergence in the physical and material. 
 
After an initial conquest, the natives would be allowed to rule themselves as long as they 
behaved themselves, but once they failed, retribution was swift and a foreign Governor would be 
installed, as a guide to the remaining native government.   They were skillfully controlled and 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
colony was divided into regions under regional or chief administrators, each region into provinces under provincial 
commissioners, and each province into districts under district commissioners. Each district consisted of one or more 
traditional states, and the day to day affairs and local ordinances were left in the hands of traditional rulers and their 
council of elders. See Ayittey G., ‘Africa Betrayed’ (1992). 
110 Vincent Orlu Nmehielle (1996) 23.  
111 Boahen A.A. & Webster J.B., ‘History of West Africa’ (1970) 742. Two factors account for the adoption of the 
indirect rule by the British first, in 1860s, Britain was generally reluctant to extend direct rule over territories 
thousands of miles away, as that would entail considerable expense. Thus, the British colonisers were apparently 
interested in preserving African institutions to use them as intermediaries and to minimise the cost of administering 
the territories that would have resulted from direct utilisation of British labour. Secondly, Britain was more 
preoccupied with its Asian Empire, particularly India, than with its African possessions, which were to be prepared 
for eventual self- rule. 
112 See Eze 18. See also Ayittey at 86.  
113 Lord Lugard was the British Governor General who championed the amalgamation of Northern and Southern 
Protectorates of Nigeria in 1914 to form the present single entity known as Nigeria. See Lord Lugard, The Dual 
Mandate in British Tropical Africa (1965) 5 cited by Nmehielle at 22.  
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placed under the supervision of the colonial administrators; they could be removed or deported if 
they did not dance to the official tune.
114
 
 
In the economic field, forced labour was practiced until well into the 1920s. During World War 
I, West Africans forcibly recruited into the British Army’s carrier corps died by the thousands 
from exhaustion, inadequate provisioning and unhealthy living conditions.
115 
The exploitation 
and subjugation witnessed during this period were done with impunity in deliberate violation of 
international standards, trade unions were not permitted until the 1920s and when they did exist, 
had very few rights.
116 
According to M’baye, the application of these standards in the colonial 
territories appeared to be practically outside the purview of the ILO Conventions or the 
colonialists chose on their own not to apply them without any consequences.
117
 
In the cultural field, the British, perhaps, unintentionally, undermined local pride and dignity by 
the introduction of the Christian churches and missionary schools, where members of recognised 
African elite learned to imitate white men in their mode of dressing and manner and to malign 
their own cultural heritage. Cultural diffusion, in which Africans might have made their own 
choices about which aspects of the Western morals they wished to adopt, was accompanied by 
cultural compulsion: the price of schooling was conversion to Christianity. Newly Westernised 
‘youngmen’ challenged the authority of their elders, while the traditional relations between the 
                                                             
114 The policy of indirect rule sought to interfere as little as possible with indigenous institutions except in so far as 
they offended colonialist sensibilities. In some parts, Western education was withheld to ensure the continuation of 
the status quo and such preserves of traditional conservatism were often used to checkmate the drive for 
modernisation in other areas. This policy, in its most vicious form, incubated apartheid in South Africa. See 
generally, Myers JC, ‘Indirect Rule in South Africa: Tradition, Modernity and the Costuming of Political Power’ 
(2008) 4; Wiliam DJ & Jackson SJ, ‘World History’ (2010) vol. 2 at 633; Van der Merwe CG & Du Plessis JE, 
‘Introduction to the Law of South Africa’ (2004) 14.  
115 Rhoda Howards at 9. Especially in the French colonies, forced labour was rampant. Here it was allowed if the 
public interest demanded it and if there was no other means of getting labour. The Colonialists were too ready to 
justify the use of forced labour. Article 421 of the Treaty of Versailles provided for the application of the 
International Labour Organisation Conventions in the colonial territories. The conventions were applicable in so far as 
local circumstances permitted and as determined by the colonial powers, which resulted in their almost complete 
exclusion. No freedom could be tolerated that challenged colonial domination. The rights to self-determination, 
freedom of speech, freedom of assembly etc. were combined within the limits of colonial domination and 
exploitation. Nationalist leaders were jailed for speaking up against colonial denial of the rights of self- 
determination. Political, economic, social and cultural developments were thus stultified. 
116 In Kenya, hundreds of thousands of Africans were expelled from their land to make way for white settlers, and 
African peasants were forbidden to grow profitable crops, such as coffee, in competition with the whites. See Heike 
Liebau,  KatrinBromber,  Katharina  Lange,  Dyala Hamzah &  Ravi  Ahuja  (eds.)  ‘The  World  in  World  Wars: 
Experiences, Perceptions and Perspectives from Africa and Asia’ (2010) 278; Brett E.A., Colonialism and 
‘Underdevelopment in East Africa’ (1978) 208. 
117
 Keba Mbaye, ‘Human Rights in Africa’ in Karel Vasak (ed.) ‘The International Dimensions of Human Rights’ 
(1982) vol. 2 at 583.  
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sexes were distorted by the imposition of Western patriarchal ideals. In defence of the British, it 
can be noted that ‘native’ languages were not formally abolished, nor were the indigenous 
religious disallowed, except when their provisions, such as infanticide of twins were deemed 
contrary to ‘natural justice.’118 On the other hand, racial discrimination was commonplace;119 in 
the field of family law, British colonial law accepted continuation of polygamy on the condition 
that it is not combined with other forms of marriage such as civil marriage. 
 
The British colonial law must be looked at in its totality as it relates to their effects on the rights 
of the colonised people while not dismissing their positive impact on objectionable traditional 
practices. Colonial rule was authoritarian and the introduction of English law as the basis for 
local legal systems did not result in the colonial subjects enjoying the full rights of liberty, due 
process, free speech and other rights, which the common law is said to guarantee to the English 
themselves.
120 
The convenient but ill-defined doctrine of indirect rule, supporting the powers of 
traditional rulers, the creation of special native courts to apply unwritten customary laws and 
administrative orders, the exercise of powers of political detention or deportation and use of laws 
of sedition and censorship framed more widely than in England, were all important intrusions 
upon the rule of law which preserved English liberties.
121
 
The British recognised and provided for the application of customary law. Importantly, the 
policy of the British government in respect of customary law as well as Islamic law was to use 
both for the purpose of local administration in so far as possible, except when they had been 
varied or superseded by statutes and ordinances. The courts established by the British 
government had the duty of enforcing the native laws and customs as part of the laws of the land 
as far as they were not barbarous.
122
 
 
Most colonial Supreme Court statutes contained provisions which prescribed two situations in 
which native law and custom would apply and which are: 
 
                                                             
118 Eze at 25.  
119 Rhoda Howards at 10.  
120 Vincent Orlu Nmehielle, ‘The African Human Rights System: Its laws, Practice and Institutions’ (2001) 26.  
121 Osita C. Eze, ‘Human Rights in Africa: Some selected Problems’ (1984) 20.  
122 In Nigeria, most cases decided in the colonial era in the context of the availability of customary law as the law of 
the land applied this test. Cases such as Oke Lanipekun and others v. Amao Ojetunde (1944) A.C. 170; Eshugbayi 
Eleko v. Nigerian Government (1931) A.C. 662 at 673 to mention a few applied the test. See Hooker M.B.,‘Legal 
Pluralism: An Introduction to Colonial and Neo-Colonial Laws’ 129 See also Eze, note 1, at 20.  
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(a) Where the parties to an action were natives; 
(b) Where neither party to a dispute had agreed to, or must be taken to have agreed, that its 
obligations should be regulated exclusively by some laws other than native customary law.
123
 
It was further provided that where there was no express rule to regulate a matter in dispute, the 
court was to be guided by the principle of justice, equity and good conscience. In addition to 
making a distinction between Africans and Europeans, British colonial laws also contained the 
so-called repugnancy clause, which was generally formulated as follows: 
 
Nothing in this Ordinance shall deprive the courts of the right to observe and enforce the 
observance, or shall deprive any person of the benefit, of any native law and custom not being 
repugnant to natural justice, equity or good conscience, or incompatible, either in terms or by 
necessary implication, with any Ordinance or any rule, regulation, order, proclamation or 
by-law made under any Ordinance for the time being in force in the territory.
124
 
On the basis of the repugnancy doctrine, the British abolished customary practices which were 
considered objectionable like the trial by ordeal, the custom of killing twins, caste systems and 
witchcraft.
125
 
In British colonies with white settler regimes, the denial of fundamental human rights was 
emphasised. The administration established and maintained by means of law, a government and 
social system characterised by dictatorship and racial discrimination in such areas as the 
administration of justice, the development of representative institutions and agrarian 
administration. The essential repressive and discriminatory nature of the colonial system and its 
hostility to human rights is borne out by such powers as preventive detention and the restriction 
of the freedom of movement, conferred on the Commissioner of East African protectorate. 
Neither did the colonial legislature create adequate machinery, nor were fundamental and 
justiciable limitations of power placed on either the legislature or executive. The legislature had 
a wide range of freedom in the areas in which it could legislate and the emergency powers 
granted to it could only have exacerbated the denial of fundamental rights and freedoms.
126
 
 
 
 
                                                             
123 Nmehielle (2001) 25.  
124 See chapter 3 of Laws of Northern Rhodesia, section 17 (1954); Chapter 4 of Laws of the Gold Coast, section 
74(1) (1936); Chapter 211, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, section 19 (1948). See Oputa C. A., Crime and the 
Nigerian society in Elias T.O., Nwabara S.N. &Akpamgbo C.O. (eds), ‘African Indigenous Laws’ (1975) 12. 
125
 Oputa C. A., ‘African Indigenous Laws’ (1975) 12. 
126 See Ghai Y. &Mcauslan J.P.W.B, ‘Public Law and Political Change in Kenya’ (1970) 407-408.  
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B. French colonialism 
 
French colonial administration can be said to be characterised as more ‘direct rule’ compared to 
the British administration as traditional authorities were largely ignored. The difference between 
the British administration and the French administration is that the British were generally pleased 
to leave their acquisitions with their own traditions, and to take on a more paternal relationship 
with them. The French, on the other hand intended to teach the local population to be French, 
and to assimilate them into French ‘superior’ culture. The French idea about colonial policy was 
divided in to assimilation
127 
and association.
128
 
 
According to Nmehielle, the underlying factor for the French colonialism was that of political 
and cultural assimilation. With the system, the colony became a fundamental part of the mother 
country instead of a separate but protected state. The colonised people were expected to learn the 
French language and the motives behind this were based on the belief that the French culture was 
superior. French law and jurisprudence prevailed in these colonies as it was said that French 
colonialists felt that they had a mission civilisatrice as the policy was aimed at entirely turning 
the African into French in all aspects of his or her thinking.
129 
Assimilation came about when the 
French were confronted by ‘barbarian’ people and they felt it was the duty of the French 
colonialists to civilise them and turn them into ‘Frenchmen.’130 
As pointed out earlier, the possibility of acquiring French citizenship was opened to Africans 
then. Some even became members of the French parliament
131 
but only few could take the 
                                                             
127 This approach had its origin in the French revolution wherein the belief was that equality, fraternity and freedom 
should apply to anyone who was French, regardless of race or colour; thus, rights of citizenship, including political 
rights, were extended to residents of the cantons of Saint-Louis in Senegal in the 1790s. However, people in the 
conservative, catholic and monarchist tradition in France were never happy with this; in fact, political rights to 
people in Senegal became weather vane of politics in France: when the republicans were dominant and controlled 
the constitution, the Senegalese had the vote, but when the monarchists were dominant, they did not. This approach 
was never applied anywhere else in Africa until after 1945. See Richard Fogarty, ‘Race and War in France: Colonial 
Subjects in the French Army,’ 1914-1918 (2008) 10. 
128 Roland Oliver & Anthony Atmore, ‘Africa since 1800’ (2005) 177; Norrie MacQueen, ‘Colonialism’ (2007) 85; 
Ruth Ginio, ‘French Colonialism Unmasked: The Vichy Years in French West Africa’ (2006) 153.  
129 Vincent O. Orlu Nmehielle (2001) 20.  
130 Wallace G.M., ‘French Approaches in Colonial Policy’ Available at www.saylor.org/site/wp-
content/uploads/2011/12/HIST252-French-Approaches-in-Colonial-Policy.pdf (11th August, 2016). 
131On October 21, 1945, six (6) African were elected to the French Constitutional Assembly and they are Lamine 
Gueye from Senegal/Mairutania, Leopold Sedar Senghor from Ivory Coast/Upper Volta, Felix Houphouet-Boigny 
from Dahomey/Togo, Sourou Migan Apithy from Sudan-Niger, Fily Dabo Sissoko and Yacine Diallo from Guinea. 
They were all re-elected to the 2
nd 
Constituent Assembly on 2 June, 1946. See Chafer Tony, The End of Empire in 
French West Africa: Frances Successful Decolonisation (2002) 62-63.   
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advantage of the offer. There were conditions that were to be satisfied by an African willing and 
wishing to acquire French citizenship under the assimilation policy of the French colonialists. 
Such persons were expected to have attained a certain level of education, including knowledge of 
the French language, and done military service, as well as not having contracted a polygamous 
marriage.
132   
Assimilation granted rights to Africans in theory, equality to those few who were 
considered assimilated, but however, from the late 19
th
 
century until 1944, it was restricted and 
under attack.
133 
Assimilation had to be modified on many occasions to what eventually became 
the second strand of French colonial policy which is the policy of association.
134
 
 
The opposing idea was that the relationship between the conqueror and the conquered, of white 
and black people, should be one of ‘association’ and not one of merged identity. This system 
emphasised cooperation between the rulers and the ruled. It was supposed to respect the culture 
and political values and institutions of Africans and not turn them into black French people as 
done under assimilation. Like the dual mandate, it was asserted that economic development was 
for the mutual advantage of both France and to some extent Africans especially after 1918. 
Proponents referred approvingly to the British model of indirect rule and claimed the intention to 
rule more indirectly, retaining traditional custom and law.  Conquering administrations like 
Faidherbe in Senegal had done this much earlier and for many of the same reasons as the British, 
it was cheaper and provoked less resistance.
135
 
                                                             
132 Ruth Ginio (2006) 114. See Umozurike (2001) 20.  
133 The great expansion of the French empire in the 19th century had brought about large numbers of Africans under 
French control and this provoked a far-ranging debate on colonial policy. There was a growing reaction in France 
against assimilation; some argued on racist grounds that Africans were inferior and thus incapable of full 
assimilation while others argued that the tremendous educational effort involved in making assimilation a reality 
was too much and that beyond some arithmetic and minimal literacy, training in agriculture and simple trade was 
more important. Also in the background was Algeria with a large, influential French settler population pushing for 
special privileges and rights as compared to the large Moslem population. However, there was a growing 
recognition that Africa had a very difficult culture. See Maurice Larkin, ‘Religion, Politics and Preferment in France 
Since 1890: Le Belle Epoque and its Legacy’ (2002) 3; BoahenAdu, ‘Africa Under Colonial Domination, 1880- 
1935’ (1990) Vol. 7 at 70. 
134 The French soon realised that French Laws could no longer be imposed on the people with different cultural and 
political backgrounds who had not attained a comparable level of economic development. Thus, customary laws and 
Islamic laws were applied by different institutions created for the purpose, subject to the qualification that they were 
not contrary to the principles of French civilisation. See ToyinFalola& Augustine Agwuele, ‘African and the Politics 
of Popular Culture’ (2009)76. See also Maurice Larkin, ‘Religion, Politics and Preferment in France since 1890: Le 
Belle Epoque and Its Legacy’ (2002) 3. 
135 The concept of association is said to have been developed and applied by Savorgnan de Brazza in Central Africa 
wherein the advocates believed that though assimilation was desirable, it was impracticable because non-Western 
people were racially inferior and would never be accepted, even if fully assimilated. The association would allow the 
colonised people to develop within their own cultures. See Donald Stark, Urbanisation and Cultural Assimilation in 
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In practice, however, implementation was always a bit superficial, at best; Africans and 
traditional authorities were used only at the very lowest level of the administration.
136  
They 
were subordinate cogs in the bureaucracy for carrying out policies which were developed by 
expatriate French officials with no real consultation with Africans.
137
 
 
African societies were carved up into ‘cantons’(districts), chiefs who were not adequately 
efficient or subservient were deposed and replaced, most times with little regard for traditional 
status. The kingdom of Dahomey,
138 
which would have been an ideal candidate under the British 
system of ‘indirect rule’, was completely dismantled. No significant members of the royal family 
were employed by the colonial administration. New Chiefs were appointed for places where there 
were no known legal authorities by the French. At the end of the day, advisory councils were 
established in each level of the bureaucracy to provide knowledge about African law and custom 
but they had no power and not much influence and the effect of this is that there was a dual 
legal system in place which were the French law for the whites, métis, African residents of 
Saint-Louis and the few Africans in West Africa who were naturalised ‘citoyens’; ‘sujets’ were 
subjected to a system called ‘justice indigene’.139 
Despite the name, it was not a real attempt to preserve or revive African law or justice but rather, 
French  administrators,  assisted  by  African  assessors,  dispensed  civil  and  criminal  justice 
ostensibly according to African law. This was done mostly according to what the white official 
decided was African law or more usually, according to what he thought was natural justice. This 
produced a great variation in the law and its administration. There was little machinery or penal 
provisions to curb an administrator. As a result, there were few appeals from his decisions. He 
could not execute on his own authority so he will present the evidence to his superior in 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
British and French West Africa 1900-1960 obtained from www.donaldstark.co.uk/baguette.html. (Accessed on 25th 
March, 2014).  
136 Oliver Roland & Michael Crowther (eds), ‘The Cambridge Encyclopaedia of Africa’ (1981) 446.  
137 The French colony was part of France rather than a separate political entity and they had no intention of using 
traditional rulers as intermediaries. They allied themselves with African rulers in order to neutralise them until they 
could be eliminated or deposed at convenience while those who remained were put in the position of serving as 
agents of the colonial State rather than rulers in their own right. See Claire Griffiths, ‘Contesting Historical Divides in 
French-Speaking Africa’ (2013) 32. 
138 The Kingdom was conquered by the French in 1894 under General Dodds who dismembered the Kingdom. It 
was only the central province (the area around Abomey) that remained intact; the other provinces were put under 
direct French rule or made into new kingdoms. See AduBoahen (eds.), Africa under Colonial Domination 1880- 
1935 (1990) 17. See also Amy Mckenna, The History of Western Africa (2011) 83. 
139 Wallace (2011) 3.  
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order to get his decision confirmed.
140
 
 
There was also a system called indigénat which allowed for administrative tyranny. With it, 
Governors could define certain offences by decree and persons could be tried summarily by local 
administrators. Very heavy obligations were placed on African population by the colonial 
administration such as prestation which is twelve (12) days of free labour or its money 
equivalent for public works and purposes, compulsory or forced labour paid at very low rates 
(conscription of labour) and conscription in wartime.  Money taxes were designed to force 
Africans to grow export crops or to work.
141
 
 
‘Association’, in practice, brought a greater degree of authoritarianism as it provided a rationale 
for withholding rights which were taken for granted in France
142 
from African ‘sujets’. There 
was no development of rights in Francophone areas of Africa before 1945 and this was in sharp 
contrast to British colonies.
143
 
 
Despite the system of colonial policy adopted by the French, at the political level, French 
colonialism meant that the traditional rights of African societies to participate in their own 
government were often postponed and were initially non-existent. Some scholars even believed 
that French colonial policies posed the gravest danger to indigenous African institutions, 
especially the great paramount chieftaincies, which were deliberately destroyed.
144
 
Colonialism presented an enormous potential for the plunder, abuse, misrule and mistreatment of 
African natives without much check.
145 
The Statute de L’indigent consisted of regulations that 
allowed colonial administrators to inflict punishment on African subjects without obtaining a 
court order or approval from the metropolis. It allowed the colonial officers to jail any African 
for up to two years without trial, to impose heavy taxes and punitive fines, or to burn the villages 
                                                             
140Robert Aldrich, ‘Greater France: A History of French Overseas Expansion’ (1996); See also Crawford Young, 
‘The African Colonial State in Comparative perspective’ (1994) 182.   
141 Melvin  Page  &  Penny  Sonnenburg  (eds),  ‘Colonialism:  An  International  Social,  Cultural  and  Political 
Encyclopedia’ (2003) 574.  
142 This includes the freedom of the press, trade unions, free speech among others.  
143 Knight M.M., ‘French Colonial Policy: The Decline of Association in the Journal of Modern History’ (1933) vol. 
5 No. 2, 208-224. 
144Ayittey at 86.   
145 Ayittey at 86, gave example of a Frenchman in his 20s, who just finished school and was entrusted with 
enormous colonial power. He would be posted to a colony as commandant de cercle with complete authority over 
some 200, 000 African natives. He could literally do as he pleased since his personal powers were granted by the 
Statut de Lindigent, the most hated feature of the colonial system in French West Africa.  
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of those who refused to pay. Traces of some of these methods can still be seen in the mode of 
operation of some African leaders today.
146
 Some apologists of colonialism held out the 
improvement of the moral and material well-being of Africans as the fundamental purpose of 
European expansion. There is no doubt that profits and territories were the driving force as it was 
manifested in their administrative styles which were influenced by their national characteristics 
and economic circumstances.
147
 
The description of human rights under the British rule serves to illustrate that the colonial power 
was not concerned to grant to its subjects, the rights held by citizens in the ‘mother country’, 
even given the limited definition of human rights prevailing at the time. What they did during the 
colonial period was to eliminate all overt inter-ethnic conflict; to abolish, where it existed, 
African domestic slavery; and to stop the expansion of African empires. Thus, a great deal of 
political conflict that might have occurred in a non-colonised Africa was deflected, only for it to 
emerge in some more violent form after colonisation.
148
 
 
To compare human rights in contemporary Africa unfavourably with human rights in colonial 
period is to concentrate upon a very limited range of ‘rights’ namely peace, relative predictability 
and ‘benign neglect’ of indigenous ethnic groupings.149 
All that the colonialists were interested in was to exploit the colonies. Their concern was more in 
siphoning off their resources, and this was facilitated by the various policies put in place by the 
colonial masters irrespective of which colonial power adopted them. Differences in method of 
achieving this objective were based on the philosophical and historical experiences of the 
colonisers. The French and Belgian practice of attempting to transform Africans into Frenchmen 
and Belgians respectively was only partially successful since very few Africans became 
assimilated into either the French or Belgian way of life.
150
 
Colonialism disrespected African traditions and values, it relegated Africans to subservience in 
                                                             
146 The reign of the late General Sani Abacha, former Nigerian Military President can be cited as a good example as a 
lot of atrocities were committed. Notorious among these atrocities was the killing of human rights activist, Ken 
Saro-wiwa. 
147 Umozurike at 20.  
148 Rhoda Howard-Hassmann, ‘Human Rights in Commonwealth Africa’ (1986)12.  
149 Makau Mutua, ‘Human Rights: A Political and Cultural Critique’ (2002) 197; Rhoda Howard, ‘Human Rights in 
Commonwealth Africa’ (1986) 12.  
150
 It should be observed that the French were able to increase the number of Francophone nations, a very important 
issue in the competition with the Anglophones.  
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all fields; it arrested and destroyed the internal dynamics of the evolution of African societies.
151 
There is no doubt that by abolishing certain objectionable traditional practices that were 
prevalent in pre-colonial Africa, such as human sacrifice, slavery among others, which were 
carried over to colonial Africa, the colonialists did contribute to selective progressive 
development of human rights. On the balance, there is no arguing against the fundamental 
negative effects of colonialism on colonial and independent Africa.
152
 
2.4      OVERVIEW OF THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW SYSTEM 
 
The emergence of international human rights law as a significant dimension of world order and 
foreign policy for many powerful states has been described as the most exciting and surprising 
development in international law over the last decades. This is so because it brings law 
increasingly to bear on many important aspects of individual and group wellbeing, thereby 
improving greatly the prospect of humane governance on all levels of social existence.
153
 
The international human rights regime developed mainly within the framework of the United 
Nations and later spread to the regional and sub-regional spheres. According to Piovesan
154 
the 
‘international human rights system reflects a contemporary ethical conscience that is shared 
among states, to the degree that these invoke the international consensus on minimum protective 
parameters with regard to human rights’.155 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
156 
a Declaration which came to being as a result of 
the experience of the 2
nd
 
World War, represents what is believed to be the rights human beings 
are entitled to as an individual. The Declaration recognised that the inherent dignity of all 
members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world.
157 
Although it is not binding since it is not a treaty, it is however, an expression of fundamental 
values which are shared by all members of the international community. It has had profound 
influence on the development of international human rights law. 
                                                             
151 Vincent Orlu Nmehielle (2001) 29.  
152 MeenaAnand, ‘Struggle for Human Rights: Nelson Mandela’ (2004) 45.  
153 Robin Bradley Kar, ‘Outcasting, Globalisation and the Emergence of International Law’ (2012) 121 Yale Law 
Journal 413. 
154 Piovesan Flavia, ‘Social, Economic and Cultural Rights and Civil and Political Rights’ (2006) 1 SURInternational 
Journal on Human Rights 21. 
155 Piovesan F (supra) 24.  
156
 Adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on the 10
th 
of December, 1945 at the Palais de Chaillot, Paris.  
157 Preamble to the General Assembly Resolution 217 (III) A.  
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At the normative level, the international human rights system is made up of general global and 
regional treaties on one hand and subsidiary specialised treaties on the other hand.
158 
Global and 
regional treaties include the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
159 
and 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)
160 
at the United 
Nation level; and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (the African Charter),161 
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
162 
the 
Arab Charter on Human Rights and the American Convention on Human Rights, at the regional 
level. Specialised treaties include the Convention on the Rights of a Child (CRC);
163
 the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW);
164 
the 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
(CAT)
165
 and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
                                                             
158 Sieghart A., ‘The International Law of Human Rights’ (1983)16.  
159 Resolution No. 2200A [XX1] 16 December, 1966. The UN General Assembly adopted the ICCPR and opened it 
for signature, ratification and accession on 16 December 1966. The Covenant entered into force on 23 March 1976 
and it acknowledges that the recognition of the inherent dignity and inalienable rights of all members of the human 
family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world. See UN General Assembly Resolution 2200A 
(XXXI) of 16 December 1966. As at today, all African States have either signed, ratified and acceded to the 
Covenant. See ICCPR Anniversary: Opportunity for Protection of Freedom of Speech, in Article 19 published on 23 
March, 2012 and available at http://www.article19.org/resources.php/resource/3001/en/iccpr-anniversary:- 
opportunity-for-protection-of-freedom-of-speech (Accessed on 17th May, 2014). 
160 GA Res. 2200 (XXI) 21 UN GAOR Supp. (No.16) at 49. UN Doc. A/6316 (1966) 993 UNTS 3 entered into force 
3 January, 1976. This is one of the Human Rights treaties which converted the ideals elaborated in the Universal 
Declaration into binding State obligations. In its attempt to realise social justice, it covers a wide scope of rights 
ranging from education, employment and the family, to minority language and cultures. See Frans Viljoen, 
International Human Rights Law in Africa Second Edition at 114. As at 31 December, 2011, 48 UN African 
Member States had ratified this Covenant while all except Sao Tome e Principe and Comoros had become party to at 
least one of the covenants. See Frans Viljoen, ‘International Human Rights Law in Africa’ (2007) 116. 
161 CAB/LEG/67/3 rev.5 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982).  
162 ETS 5; 213 UNTS 221.  
163G. A. Res. 44/25 (1989); UN Doc. A/RES/44/25 (1989) Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and 
accession by the General Assembly resolution 44/25 of 20th November, 1989. It entered into force on the 2nd of 
September, 1990 in accordance with Article 49. The Convention was the first to incorporate the complete range of 
international human rights, including civil, cultural, political and social rights as well as aspects of humanitarian 
law. See www.unicef.org/crc/index_30177.html, (Accessed on 22nd March, 2012).   
164 CEDAW General Recommendations Nos. 19 and 20 adopted at the Eleventh Session, 1992 (contained in 
Document A/47/38), 1992, A/47/38. The Convention was adopted in 1979 by the UN General Assembly by votes of 
130 to none with 10 abstentions. The Convention defines what constitute discrimination against women and set up an 
agenda for national action to end discrimination against women.  
165 GA res. 39/46, annex, 39 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 51) 197; UN Doc.A/39/51 (1984); 1465 UNTS 85. The 
Convention was adopted and it opened for signature, ratification and accession General Assembly resolution 39/46 
of 10th December, 1984. It entered into force on 26th June, 1987 in accordance with Article 27 (1) after it was ratified 
by 20 States. For the drafting history of this Convention, see http://legal.un.org/avl/ha/catcidtp/catcidtp.html 
(Accessed on 31 May, 2014). 
https://etd.uwc.ac.za
 
 
38  
(CERD).
166
 
International human rights law was established as a normative symbol of hope, summoning 
states to an internationally agreed upon minimum standard of behaviour and as a ‘safety net’ for 
individuals who are denied their rights under the domestic system, or who fall through the flaws 
of the national legal system
167 
and international complaint mechanisms serve as a last hope when 
all other recourse fail. 
 
The sub-regional and regional levels have advantage over the global level at the higher level of 
meeting and coherence between states, as they allow for greater norm-specification in the 
regional and sub-regional spheres; and the immediacy of interlocking interests, opening the 
possibility for faster response and improved implementation when states are closely bound by 
economic and political ties. At the global level, reaching an agreement on standards takes a lot of 
time and necessarily involves striking compromises in the interest of universal acceptance. 
Closer economic, cultural and political ties and common loyalties are likely to ensure better 
implementation and more immediate and effective ‘mobilisation of shame’168 as communities 
sharing common loyalties are likely to be in harmony with each other than those separated by 
vast geographical and psychological divides.
169
 
 
The quest for a United Nation began as a result of the terrible atrocities committed during the 
Second World War. This made the people of the United Nation determined to reaffirm faith in 
fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of human person, in the equal rights of men 
and women to resolve to combine their efforts to accomplish these aims
170 
and in accomplishing 
these aims as enshrined in the Preamble to the United Nations Charter, seven Articles were 
specifically set aside to bring human rights within the agenda of the United Nations.
171
 
Furthermore, the United Nations Charter also provided for International Cooperation in solving 
                                                             
166 The Convention was adopted and open for signature and ratification by General Assembly resolution 2106 (XX) 
of 21 December, 1965. It entered into force on the 4th of January, 1969 in accordance with Article 19. For the 
drafting history of this Convention, see http://legal.un.org/avl/ha/cerd/cerd.html (Accessed on 31 May, 2014). 
167 Viljoen (2007) 9.  
168 Drinan RF, ‘Mobilisation of Shame: A World View of Human Rights’ (2001). The author here traced the term 
mobilisation of shame to early Amnesty International campaigns. See also Viljoen, International Human Rights Law in 
Africa (2007)10.  
169 Claud I. L., ‘Swords into Ploughshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organisation’ (1974) 103.  
170
 Preamble to the United Nations Charter, Paragraph 2.  
171 Articles 1, 13, 55, 56, 62, 68 and 76 of the United Nations Charter.  
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international problems which involve economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character in 
maintaining international peace and security
172 
and in promoting and encouraging respect for 
human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language 
or religion.
173 
Article 1(3) is further complimented by Article 55 of the United Nations Charter 
by putting obligations on the United Nations and its Member States in order to ensure the 
promotion of universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms 
for all, without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion. 
 
The General Assembly of the United Nations is, under Article 13 of the Charter of the United 
Nations, to initiate studies and make recommendations for the purpose of promoting and 
realising human rights and fundamental freedoms. The obligations by State Parties under Article 
55 of the Charter would be realised by the State Parties under Article 56 pledging themselves to 
take joint and separate actions with the United Nations for the purpose of achieving the goals set 
out under Article 55. 
 
2.4.1 National Level 
 
At the national level, states carry the responsibility for human rights due to its dominant role and 
for this to become meaningful, international law has to be introduced into the state. When 
international treaties are ratified by states, an undertaking to domesticate the treaties and comply 
with their provisions is given as the implementation and enforcement of International law has to 
take place locally because it is where rights are protected effectively.
174 
Civil Societies play a 
major role domestically in raising awareness and hold governments accountable. They also 
exhort external pressure in reinforcing and supplementing national protection. 
 
 
                                                             
172 Article 1(3) United Nations Charter.  
173 On the Objectives or Purposes of the United Nations, see Year Book of the United Nations (2004) 654.  
174 Ideally, the ratification of international law is supposed to be preceded by a compatibility study whereby a perfect 
overlap would be created between national law and international law. However, some states do not become party to 
international human rights treaties; they do not conduct compatibility studies and all states violate their treaty 
obligations from time to time. See Redson Edward Kapindu, ‘From the Global to the Local: The Role of International 
Law in the Enforcement of Socio-economic Rights in South Africa’, Socio-Economic Rights Project, Community 
Law Centre, University of the Western Cape, (2009) 6. See also, Christina Dominice, The International Responsibility 
of States for Breach of Multilateral Obligations (1999) 10 European Journal of International Law 353-363. Also 
DavidKoplow, ‘Indisputable Violations: What Happens When the United States Unambiguously Breaches A 
Treaty’ (2013) vol. 37:1 at 53-74. Available at www.fletcherforum.org/wp-  content/uploads/2013/02/koplow_37-
1.pdf (Accessed on 31 May, 2014).  
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2.4.2 Sub-regional Level 
 
The sub regional level is basically focused on economic integration rather than the promotion 
and protection of human rights. This is due to the fact that they function at a level at which inter- 
country bonds may be assumed to be relatively strong. There are however, a number of sub- 
regional intergovernmental groups that include a concern for human rights within their regional 
mandates.  The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS),
175  
the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC),
176   
the Economic Community of Central 
African States (ECCAS),
177 
the East African Community (EAC),
178 
the Common Market for 
Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA),
179
 the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-
                                                             
175 The organisation was established in Lagos, Nigeria in May, 1975 and the founding members were Benin, Burkina 
Faso, Cote d Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Sierra 
Leone and Togo. Following the report of a Committee of Eminent Persons appointed to review the founding Treaty, 
the ECOWAS Treaty was revised in 1993 and in 2000; Mauritania withdrew its membership from the organisation 
because of conflicting opinions on some of the decisions that were made during the Summit. The revised Treaty was 
adopted in 1993 and it entered into force on the 3rd of August, 1995. See www.ecowas.int (Accessed on 18th March 
2012). See also Solomon Ebobrah, Critical Analysis of the human rights mandate of the ECOWAS Community 
Court of Justice (2008) 6. Available at http://www.escr-net.org/usr_doc/S_Ebobrah.pdf (Accessed on 3rd June, 
2014). 
176 The SADC was formally established in August 1992 in Windhoek, Namibia and it replaced the Southern African 
Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) which was established in 1980 in Lusaka during the Apartheid 
era. It is one of the regional economic communities recognised by the AU as building blocks for the African 
Economic Community and it has recently served as a platform for the adoption of protocols with implications for 
human rights. Presently, there are fifteen (15) member states which are Angola, Botswana, DR Congo, Lesotho, 
Malawi, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia 
and Zimbabwe. The text establishing the SADC was adopted on 17th August, 1992 and it entered into force on 30th 
September, 1993 and since it entered into force there has been two amendments to the original treaty. See 
www.sadc.int (Accessed on the 18th March 2015). See also, Solomon Ebobrah, ‘Human Rights Realisation in the 
African Sub-Regional Institutions’ in ManisuliSsenyonjo (Ed), ‘The African Regional Human Rights System: 30 
years after the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights’ (2015) 282-300 at 298. 
177 The organisation was established in Libreville, Gabon in 1983 by the then leaders of the Central African Customs and 
Economic Union (UDEAC) and members of the Economic Community of the Great Lakes Region. The treaty was 
adopted on 18th October, 1983 and it entered into force in December, 1984. In 1999, Angola acceded to the Treaty 
after some years of participation as an observer and the present members are Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Central 
African Republic, Chad, Congo-Brazzaville, DR Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and Sao-Tome & Principe. 
See www.ceeac.eccas.org (Accessed on 18th March, 2015). See also, Viljoen, ‘International Human Rights Law in 
Africa’ (2007) 494. 
178 The East African Community was first established in 1967 but was defunct in 1977 and subsequently revived in 
1999 with the adoption of a new Treaty by Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. The treaty was signed in Arusha, Tanzania 
on 30th November, 1999 and it entered into force on the 7th July, 2000 after it was ratified by founding member 
states. The treaty was amended in December, 2006 and August, 2007 while its membership was increased also in 
2007 with the accession of Burundi and Rwanda to the treaty. The EAC is recognised by the AU as a building block 
of the Africa Economic Community. See www.eac.int (Accessed on 18th March 2015). See also Ebobrah, ‘Human 
Rights Realisation in the African Sub-Regional Institutions’ (2012) 294; Ruppel O.C., ‘Regional Economic 
Communities and Human Rights in East and Southern Africa’ in Bosl A andDiescho J (Eds.), ‘Human Rights in 
Africa: Legal Perspectives on Their Protection and Promotion’ (2009) 275-317 at 277. 
179 The treaty was signed on the 5th  of November, 1993 in Kampala, Uganda and it entered into force on 8th 
December, 1994. COMESA is currently composed of Burundi, Comoros, Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, 
Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
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SAD),
180
 the Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD)
181
 and the Arab Maghreb 
Union (AMU/UMA)
182 
are the eight sub-regional communities in Africa officially recognised 
by the AU. In addition to these eight recognised regimes by the AU, the International 
Conference on the Great  Lakes  (IGGLR)
183  
has  also  made  great  strides  in  human  rights  
standard  settings  in Africa. Itis pertinent to note here that all these international Organisations 
have contributed greatly to the development of human rights in Africa.
184
 
 
2.4.3 Regional Level 
 
The adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was followed by the creation of 
various regional instruments that address concerns of particular importance in the regional 
context. There are established, three regional human rights regimes, with a set of norms and 
institutions that are accepted by states as binding and each of these systems operates under the 
auspices of an intergovernmental organisation or international political body.
185 
Africa, the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
See www.comesa.int (Accessed on 18th March, 2015). 
180 Established in 1998 in Tripoli, Libya during the summit instigated by the late Colonel Gadhafi and it became a 
regional economic community during the 30th Ordinary Session of the Conference of Heads of States and 
Government of the AU held in Lome, Republic of Benin on the 4th - 12th July, 2000. It became an observer at the 
UN General Assembly under Resolution A/RES/56/92. Presently, there are 23 member states. See www.africa-  
union.org/root/au/res/cen_sad.htm (Accessed on 18th March, 2015). 
181 It was established on the 21st  March, 1996 as a replacement for the defunct Inter-governmental Authority on 
Drought and Development (IGADD) and the agreement establishing it was signed in Nairobi, Kenya. The current 
members are Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. It now operates as a regional 
economic community and it is recognised as one of the building blocks of the African Economic Community. See 
www.igad.int (Accessed on 18th March, 2015). 
182 The treaty establishing it was adopted in Marrakech, Morocco on 17th February, 1989 by Algeria, Libya, 
Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia. Although Morocco has pulled out of the AU, the UMA is recognised by the AU 
as one of the regional organisations in Africa. It must be pointed out here that though UMA is recognised by the 
African Union, it does not have any formal relation with the AU. See www.maghrebarabe.org, (Accessed on 18th 
March, 2015). 
183 On the 19th and 20th  November, 2004, the Heads of States and Government of Angola, the Central African 
Republic, Congo, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Uganda, Tanzania and Zambia met in 
Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania under the umbrella of the United Nations and the African Union to discuss matters 
touching on the conflicts and persistent insecurity in the Great Lakes Region. One of the outcomes of the meeting was 
a declaration expressing their collective determination to tackle the issues of conflict and insecurity. The 
declaration became known as Dar-es-Salaam Declaration and constitutes the founding platform for the activities of 
the International Conference of the Great Lakes Region. Although the Conference of the Great Lakes is not one of 
the REC recognised by the AU, it has the potentials of contributing immensely to the realisation of human rights 
within the countries that make up the Great Lakes Region. See www.icglr.org (Accessed on 18th March, 2015). 
184 On the institutional decisions on the rights of people, see Nwauche E.S., ‘Regional Economic Communities and 
Human Rights in West Africa and the African Arabic Countries’ in Bosl and Diescho (Eds) (2009) 318 – 351. 
particularly at 319; Registered Trustees of the Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project (SERAP) v. 
Nigeria ECW/CCJ/APP/12/07; Essien v The Gambia (2007) AHRLR 131. 
185 Freeman M, ‘Human Rights: An Interdisciplinary Approach’ (2002) 53. For a comparison of the three regional 
Human Rights Systems see Christof Heyns, Padilla D &Zwaak L, ‘A Schematic Comparison of Regional Human 
Rights Systems’ in Gomez Isa & De Feyter K (eds.), ‘International Protection of Human Rights: Achievements and 
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Americas and Europe have established their regional instruments together with supporting 
machinery such as multilateral commissions and courts.
186 
A considerable number of statements 
and documents of the regional meetings demonstrate that Asian states have in recent years been 
trying to address the absence of a regional human rights instrument and to uphold the Vienna 
Declaration which emphasised the fundamental role of the regional arrangements in the 
promotion and protection of Human Rights.
187
The Arab Charter on Human Rights eventually 
made its way through after the initial Charter which was drafted in 1994 was not ratified.
188
 
 
It is pertinent to note that each regional system has originated from shared interest and a demand 
for the establishment of a framework for human rights protections; the European system came 
into being as a natural reaction to gross human rights violations perpetrated during World War II 
and a defence against all forms of totalitarianism.
189 
It was believed by European states that 
human rights need to be respected so as to secure democracy and avoid dictatorship. The conflict 
between countries in Eastern and Western Europe enabled countries in the West to make an 
exclusive human rights system.
190 
This can be said to be the best developed out of the three 
regions and it is referred to as the Council of Europe. The Council was founded in 1949 by 11 
Western European states to promote human rights and the rule of law in post-World War II 
Europe, to avoid a regression into totalitarianism and to serve as a barricade against 
Communism.
191
 
The Inter-American system (Organisation of American States) was designed to be an ideological 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
Challenges’ (2006) 545.  
186 These mechanisms include the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, the American Convention on Human Rights and the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights. 
187 Article 37 of the Vienna Declaration and Plan of Action states that, Regional arrangements play a fundamental 
role in promoting and protecting human rights. They should reinforce universal human rights standards, as contained 
in international human rights instruments and their protection… The World Conference on Human Rights reiterates 
the need to consider the possibility of establishing regional and sub-regional arrangements for the promotion and 
protection of human rights where they do not already exist. See also Jina Kim, ‘Development of Regional Human 
Rights Regime: Prospect for and Implications to Asia’ Available at www.sylff.org/word press/wp-  
content/uploads/2009/03/sylff_p7-1022.pdf (Accessed on 15th March, 2015).  
188 The Charter entered into force in March 2008 after it was ratified by the 7th Member State. The revised Charter 
was Algeria (2006), Bahrain (2006), Iraq (2012), Jordan (2004), Kuwait (2006), Lebanon (2011), the United Arab 
Emirates (2008) and Yemen (2008) have all ratified the Charter. Egypt signed in 2004; Sudan signed in 2005 and 
Tunisia signed in 2004 but they are yet to ratify this Charter. See Oliver De Schutter, ‘International Human Rights 
Law’ (2014) 33.  
189 Robertson A. H. & Merrils J. G., ‘Human Rights in the World: An Introduction to the study of the International 
Protection of Human Rights (2014) 33. 
190 Robertson A. H. &Merrils J. G. ‘Human Rights in the World: An Introduction to the study of the International 
Protection of Human Rights’ (2014) 33. 
191 See www.coe.int Accessed on 10th March, 2015.  
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framework to make a coalition against communist threats.
192 
The Organisation of American 
States (OAS) was founded in 1948 to promote regional peace, security and development
193 
with 
membership including all 35 states in the Americas. 
194
The Inter-American regional human 
rights system was thought to be a springboard to defend effective political democracy in the 
region. 
 
The African system was created by common interests shared among states. These common 
interests were safeguarding independence, collective security, territorial integrity and promoting 
solidarity.
195 
The human rights system in Africa was adopted under the auspices of the 
Organisation of African Unity (OAU) but this has since being transformed into African Union.
196
 
 
The fledging Arab and Muslim systems had also emerged and according to the Islamic world- 
view, the Holy Qur’an and other religious sources play a dominant role in the regulation of social 
life. All Muslims are bound to other believers in a code of life conduct based on the will of 
Allah.
197
 
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) adopted the ASEAN Charter.
198 
It has a 
frayed provision for the establishment of a human rights body thereby giving room for the 
appointment of another drafting group known as ‘The High Level Panel.’199 This panel was 
responsible for the drafting of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights 
Term of Reference.
200 
This panel, in achieving its result, worked with the Working Group, the 
National Human Rights Institute and Civil Society Organisations
201 
and by July 2009, the Term 
                                                             
192 Odeen Ishmael, ‘Statement in the Permanent Council of the OAS during Discussion on the Inter-American 
Democratic Charter, OAS,’ June, 2001; The Declaration of Solidarity for the Preservation of the Political Integrity of 
the American States Against the Intervention of International Communism, Tenth Inter-American Conference, 
March 1-28, 1954. States in the 10th Inter-American Conference at Caracas expressed serious concern about 
solidarity for the preservation of the political integrity of the American states against intervention.  
193 See www.coe.int 
194 Viljeon, ‘International Human Rights Law in Africa’ (2007) 11.  
195 Makau W. Mutua, ‘The African Human Rights System in a Comparative Perspective: The Need for Urgent 
Reformation’ (1993) 3 Review of the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights 5. 
196 196www.african-union.org. The African Union comprises of all African States, including Southern Sudan that 
has just attained independence except Morocco. 
197 Syed M, ‘Human Rights in Islam: The Modern Approach’ (2003) 140. 
198 Adopted at the 13th  ASEAN summit held in Singapore in November 2007. See also, Tommy Koh, Rosario 
Manalo & Walter Woon (eds.) ‘The Making of the ASEAN Charter’ (2009) 49; Tae-Ung Baik, ‘Emerging Regional 
Human Rights Systems in Asia’ (2012)142.  
199 Dinal Shelton & Paolo GC, ‘Regional Protection of Human Rights’ (2013) 191.  
200 Yuval Ginbar, ‘Human Rights in ASEAN: Setting Sail or Treading Water?’ (2010)10 Human Rights Law Review 
504-518. 
201 Dinah Shelton & Paolo CG (2010) 191.  
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of Reference was finalised and approved by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers.
202
 
 
The Term of Reference of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights 
reiterates the cautious attitude of the Charter towards human rights. Its purpose is to ‘promote 
and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms of the people of ASEAN.’203 Another 
‘Purpose’ of the Term of Reference of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission of Human 
Rights   named   specific   ‘international   standards   along   with   ‘international   human   rights 
instruments to which ASEAN Member States are parties’204 as standards which the ASEAN 
Intergovernmental Commission of Human Rights must uphold. 
 
The Arab Charter of Human Rights, on its part, establishes an Arab Human Rights Committee
205 
which is made up of seven members. The members are elected via secret ballot; they are 
expected to serve in their personal capacity and to be fully independent and impartial when 
carrying out their functions.
206
 
2.4.4 Regional Characteristics 
 
Regional characteristics are found mainly in legal arrangements. The rights in the European 
Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom (ECHR) and its Protocols focus mainly 
on civil and political rights, they do not contain provisions relating to self-determination and to 
the rights of minority groups, children, refugees and aliens.
207 
The Social Charter on the other 
hand guarantees social and economic rights, but lacks an efficient implementation system. 
Unlike the ECHR, it depends on a monitoring procedure based on national reports indicating 
how European states implement the Charter in practice. For those who ratified the protocol that 
came into force in 1998, collective complaint of any violation of the Charter may be lodged with 
the European Committee of Social Rights and it may be argued that the relatively less binding 
                                                             
202 Adopted on the 20thJuly, 2009 at Phuket, Thailand during the 42nd  ASEAN Ministerial Meeting. This Term of 
Reference is available at www.asean.org/Doc-TOR-AHRB.pdf. (Accessed on 21 March, 2015).  
203 See Terms of Reference of ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (2009) Paragraph 1.  
204 Terms of Reference of ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human rights (2009) paragraph 6.  
205 Article 48 Arab Charter of Human Rights. 
206 Article 48(4) Arab Charter of Human Rights. The Committee examines State parties reports as submitted to it by 
member States periodically. The reports are discussed, commented on and necessary recommendations will be made 
where necessary in accordance with the aim of the Charter. See Olivier De Schutter (2014) 33. See also Rishmawi M, 
‘The Arab Charter of Human Rights and the League of Arab States: An Update’ (2010) 10 Human Rights Law 
Review 169-178.  
207 Willem-Jan van der wolf, S. de Haardt & Global Law Association, ‘Global Human rights Law Collection’ (2008) 
vol. 11 Part 2 at 27. See also Hurst Hannum & Eileen Babbitt, ‘Negotiating Self-determination’ (2006) 71. 
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influence of the Charter shows lack of commitment of the Council of Europe.
208
 
The American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) deals with civil and political rights except 
in Article 2
209 
and in one general provision on economic, social and cultural rights.
210 
However, 
its two Protocols have a very weak protection mechanism, reserving the individual petition 
system only for the violations of the right to education and trade union rights.
211 
The fact that the 
American system does not offer the same judicial protection to all economic, social and cultural 
rights as it does to civil and political rights shows that the influence of the ideological hegemony 
has been more powerful than any practical demand.
212 
Instead, new provisions are recognised in 
the American Convention on Human Rights. Rights like the rights of reply,
213 
 right to 
property,
214 
prohibition of expulsion from territory,
215 
right of political asylum
216 
and prohibition 
of collective expulsion of aliens
217 
are not in the International Convention on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR)
218 
but are included in the jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee and 
other United Nations documents.
219
 
 
Provisions such as the right to a name, rights of a child, right to nationality and the lawful 
recovery and adequate compensation to the dispossessed people are not found in the European 
                                                             
208 Malte Brosig, ‘Human Rights in Europe: A fragmented Regime?’(2006) 133. See also Department of Foreign 
Affairs, Government of Ireland, Revised European Social Charter Collective Complaint Mechanism International 
Law, July 20, 2006. Available at www.foreignaffairs.gov.ie/home/index.asp?id=5604 (accessed on 13th February, 
2014).  
209 Where the exercise of any of the rights or freedoms referred to in Article 1 is not already ensured by legislative or 
other provisions, the States Parties undertake to adopt, in accordance with their constitutional processes and the 
provisions of this Convention, such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to those rights or 
freedoms.  
210 Article 26 of the American Convention on Human Rights which deals with economic, social and cultural rights 
provide as follows: The States Parties undertake to adopt measures, both internally and through international 
cooperation, especially those of an economic and technical nature, with a view to achieving progressively, by 
legislation or other appropriate means, the full realization of the rights implicit in the economic, social, educational, 
scientific, and cultural standards set forth in the Charter of the Organization of American States as amended by the 
Protocol of Buenos Aires. 
211 The American Convention has two Protocols namely on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and on the 
Abolition of the Death Penalty. See Jan Knippers Black, ‘The Politics of Human Rights Protection’ (2010) 40.  
212 Article 1.1 of the America Convention for example, stipulates that state parties should ensure to all persons 
subject to their jurisdiction the free and full exercise of those rights and freedoms but the additional protocol states 
that States parties should ‘adopt the necessary measures’ to achieving the full observance of the rights.  
213 American Covention, Article 14.  
214 Ibid, Article 21.  
215 Ibid, Article 22.5.  
216 Ibid, Article 22.7.  
217 Ibid, Article 22.9.  
218 Alex Conte & Richard Burchill, ‘Defining Civil and Political Rights: The Jurisprudence of the United Nations 
Human Rights Committee’ (2009) 4.  
219 Alex Conte & Richard Burchill, ‘Defining Civil and Political Rights: The Jurisprudence of the United Nations 
Human Rights Committee’ (2009) 4. 
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Convention.
220 
The Convention is also complemented by treaties against torture,
221 
the forced 
disappearance of persons,
222
 gender violence,
223
 and discrimination against persons with 
disabilities.
224 
It must be noted that religious background, that is Catholic heritage, is reflected in 
the right to life, which is protected from the moment of conception.
225
 
 
The African Charter, on its part, specifically recognises collective rights and it clearly indicates 
legal obligations of the community, family, society and nation. Its far-reaching recognition of 
rights includes the rights to development and the third generation of rights.
226 
However, it does 
not specify the right to privacy which can be found both in the European Convention on Human 
Rights
227 
and the American Convention on Human Rights.
228 
Infact, the ACHR went further to 
state the relationship between duties and rights
229 
but the African Charter on its part described 
more comprehensive rights and corresponding duties.
230 
This can be said to be due to the fact 
that the African system defined personhood a bit different from the Western concept of 
‘individualism in a large community’ and therefore duties and respect for the family and 
community are uniquely found in the African Charter.
231 
It is obvious that the African system has 
made spirited efforts to respect the universality of human rights in many respects while it meets 
regional needs.
232
 
                                                             
220 Doebbler Curtis, ‘Introduction to International Human Rights Law’ (2006) 141-142.  
221 The European Convention on the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 
adopted 26 November, 1987 and entered into force 1 February, 1989. (ETS. 126) See also Nigel Rodley and Matt 
Pollard, ‘Treatment of Prisoners under International Law’ (2009) 49; Karen De Costa, ‘The Extraterritorial 
Application of Selected Human Rights Treaties’ (2012) 276; Magdalena Forrowicz, ‘The Reception of International 
Law in the European Court of Human Rights’ (2010) 192. 
222 ETS 24, 13 December, 1957. See Helen Duffy, ‘The War on Terror and the Framework of International Law’ 
(2005) 109; Marko Milanovic, ‘Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties: Law, Principles, and Policy’ 
(2011) 204.  
223 The Convention was adopted by the Council of Europe Committee of Ministers on 7 April, 2011. It opened for 
signature on 11 May, 2011 on the occasion of its 121st Session of the Committee in Istanbul, Turkey. As at April, 
2014, the Convention has been signed by 33 States, followed by ratification of the minimum eight (8) Council of 
Europe states to wits Albania, Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Italy, Montenegro, Portugal, Serbia and Turkey. 
224 It came into force on the 3rd of May, 2006 and it was ratified by the European Union on 23 December 2010. See 
Jeff Kenner, ‘European Union Legislation 2011-2012’ (2013) 625.  
225Ibid, Article 4.1.   
226 This includes the right to peace, solidarity, a healthy environment and development. See The Report of the 
African Commissions Working Group of Experts on Indigenous Populations/Communities adopted by the African 
Commission in November, 2003. The report is available at www.iwgia.org.sw163.asp Accessed 1st August, 2016.  
227 Ibid, Article 8.  
228 Ibid, Article 5.  
229 Ibid, Article 32.  
230 Article 32(1) states ‘Every person has responsibilities to his family, his community and mankind.’ 
231 It should be noted that the harmonious development of the family (Article 29[1]), national solidarity and 
independence (Article 29(4) (5)) and African value and unity (Article 29 (7) (8)) are highlighted.  
232 Although some are vaguely defined, duties of the States to promote and ensure the respect of rights and freedoms 
through education and publication as specified under Article 25, to guarantee the independence of the courts and to 
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The African Commission in SERAC & Another v Nigeria
233 
interpreted the provisions of the 
Charter to include unenumerated rights. It held that there are rights which are not explicitly 
mentioned in the Charter but which should be regarded as being implicitly included. Such rights 
which were identified by the Commission in the case include the rights to housing or shelter 
deduced from the provisions on health, property and family in the Charter.
234 
The right to food 
which was deduced from right to life, right to dignity, right to health and right to economic, 
social and cultural development.
235
 
The Commission further stated that all rights listed under the Charter are enforceable through the 
Communication procedure no matter whether the rights are civil and political rights or economic, 
social and cultural rights.
236
 
As colonialism, urbanisation and industrialisation shattered African societies, the bonds of 
immediacy and reciprocity grew weaker, people became alienated and isolated while new 
communities were formed. 
237
Formalised state structures were established to organise social 
interaction on the basis of pre-determined expectations of roles, referred to as ‘rights’ and 
‘duties’ while the idea of a community based on relationship gave way to a society made of 
rights.
238 
With this, States set up a legal system to mediate on claims based on rights and with 
time, state power became increasingly intrusive, exemplified by the use of a criminal justice 
system to arrest, interrogate, search and seize, imprison and execute. 
 
Although majoritarianism legalises legislation and the increasingly bureaucratised functioning of 
the executive, majorities sometimes get it wrong. They may have little regard for ‘numerical’ 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
establish national institutions (Article 26) are described. Another  unique  characteristic of the  ACHPR is the 
prohibition of mass expulsion of non-nationals (Article 12), encroachment upon the right to property in the interest 
of public need or in the general interest of the community (Article 14), elimination of every discrimination against 
women and children (Article 17(3)). In addition, the African system expresses regional concerns such as special 
concerns for the rights and welfare of children. The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child calls for 
special mention of persons with disabilities and for special protection, participation and access for handicapped 
children.   
233 Communication No. 155/96 Social and Economic Rights Action Centre (SERAC) and The Centre for Economic 
and Social Rights (CESR) v Nigeria (2001); 15th Annual Activity Report: 2000-2002. See also, Michelo Hansungule, 
‘African courts and the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights’ in   Bosl, A &Diescho J (eds) ‘Human 
Rights in Africa: Legal Perspectives on their Protection and Promotion’ (2009) 233.  
234 Articles 14, 16 and 18 of the African Charter. See also paragraph 60 of the case available at 
www.achpr.org/search/?q=SERAC+V+Nigeria. Accessed on 3rd July 2014.  
235 Article 4, 5, 16 and 22 of the African Charter.  
236 Mashood Baderin &Manisuli Ssenyonjo (eds.), ‘International Human Rights Law: Six Decades after the UDHR and 
Beyond’ (2010) 238.  
237
 Viljoen (2007) 5.  
238 Viljoen, ‘International Human Rights Law in Africa’ (2012) 4.  
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minorities such as sentenced criminals, linguistics or religious minorities, non-nationals, 
‘indigenous Peoples’, and the socially stigmatised.239 It therefore becomes necessary to 
guarantee the existence and rights of numerical minorities, of the vulnerable, and the powerless. 
This is done by agreeing on the rules governing society in the form of a constitutionally 
entrenched and justiciable Bill of Rights, containing the basic human rights of ‘everyone’. 
Through a bill of rights, human rights become integral to the legal system thereby becoming 
‘human rights law’ which is superior to ordinary law and executive action. 
 
With this, it shows that human rights law is closely linked to the emergence of the nation state 
and the implication of this state centeredness is that states are the primary duty bearers in respect 
of these rights.
240 
Individuals depend on the states to guarantee their rights, but they also need to 
defend their rights against these very states as the principal violators of their rights. 
241
In a 
particular state, ‘human rights laws’ serve as a yardstick against which the nature and extent of 
these obligations may be assessed, an ideal towards which to strive, and an inspiration for 
struggles to improve the current state of affairs.
242
 
‘International human rights law’ differs from national law as to its source in the sense that its 
concretised content is found mainly in provisions of international human rights treaties. It is in 
this sense that the term ‘international human rights law’ is used in this thesis. The next sections 
will discuss some of the leading rights theories that have wrestled with the practice and 
justification of an overall system of rights in Africa. 
 
                                                             
239 Viljoen (2007) 5.  
240 It is accepted that the provisions of national and human rights instruments may be applied against states. It is 
more exceptional for these instruments to bind individuals, or non-state actors. The constitutional guarantees under 
both the South African 1996 Constitution (section 8 (2)) the Bill of Rights binds a natural person…) and Section 9 
(4) (no person may unfairly discriminate), and Uganda 1995 Constitution (art. 137 (3) (the Constitutional Court may 
adjudicate an allegation that any act or omission by any person violated the Constitution)) provide for horizontal 
application. The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women imposes the 
obligation on states to eliminate discrimination at the horizontal level (art.2 (e): states must take all appropriate 
measures to eliminate discrimination against women by any person…). See Viljoen (2007) 6.  
241 Douzinas C, ‘The End of Human Rights’ (2000) 100-107, 115-122.  
242
 Christof Heyns, ‘A Struggle Approach to Human Rights’ in Heyns C & Stefiszyn (eds.), ‘Human Rights, Peace 
and Justice in Africa: A Reader’ (2006) 15-35.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
NOTION OF JUSTICE IN AFRICA 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The restoration of victims and their reintegration into the community is the essence of justice 
making in Africa. Resolving relationships and social harmony already damaged by conflict is 
also another significant goal of the African justice system. The success of the African justice 
system is due to the fact that all stakeholders have equal access and participation in the 
conflict resolution process. Every stakeholder is listened to, their opinion respected in the 
process and decisions are reached through a consensus. Justice-making further creates an 
opportunity for the learning and the re-examination of important values and the socio-economic 
conditions of the community. Important African communitarian principles of caring for one 
another and the spirit of mutual support are fostered in the process of justice-making and it is 
also appreciated that the survival of the community depends on the well-being of the individual 
in the community. 
 
This chapter explores the concepts of justice and relates them to human rights from an 
African perspective. It will look at the process of justice making within the traditional African 
context. To accomplish this objective, an examination of African belief systems, values, 
culture, the economic system and the social and political structure of African societies is 
imperative. It must however be pointed out that Africa is not a homogenous cultural group. 
Although African cultures are diverse and, moreover, have been tempered by external 
influences and colonialism, there still remain certain tenets of African culture that have 
survived, to which we can refer to as ‘African culture’. No culture is static, and African 
societies have had to borrow from others to enhance their viability and adaptability to 
technology and economic changes. The goal of justice as a practical matter in Africa is the 
restoration of relationships, peace and harmony within the community. It will demonstrate 
that human rights are the rationale for the quest for justice, peace, reconciliation and 
democracy in the society. 
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3.2 African Indigenous Justice: The System in Practice. 
 
The quality and efficacy of African justice is measured through the well-being of victims, the 
community, offenders and the system’s capacity in restoring social equilibrium following a 
conflict. Despite the fact that the post-colonial states are corrupt, oppressive and ineffective, pre- 
colonial African community themselves were characterised by low crime rates and relative 
peace. 
243
Although generalisation about traditional Africa are always dangerous due to the 
distance of time and space involved, it cannot also be denied that there are many threads of 
continuity. The past and the present, the old social order and the new ones are linked by these 
threads.
244
 
‘Traditional Africa’ is history now as what we have left is oral history but it does not mean it can 
be ignored. Africa cannot be spoken or written about as if it was a single, homogeneous society 
or even a series of isolated, ethnic groups, all basically similar or comparable but rather; it is and 
was socially and culturally fragmented.
245 
There are very diverse physical environments wherein 
the various human groups have adapted themselves economically and socially in relative 
isolation. 
Also, there has been no uniformity in this adaptation but rather a multiplicity of independent 
traditions and inventions even in the same or similar environment. The different traditions and 
systems, have however, been modified in different ways according to the impact of historic 
personalities and historic contact between ethnic groups. The result is the various political and 
social systems, languages, cultures and religion.
246
 
 
Acting as a buffer between the predatory Africa, post-colonial states and the people are Africa’s 
                                                             
243 Elechi, O. O., ‘Human Rights and the African Indigenous Justice System’ (2004)1. See also Okereafoezeke, N., 
‘Law and Justice in Post-British Nigeria: Conflicts and Interactions between Native and Foreign Systems of Social 
Control in Igbo’ (2002) 9; Kalunta-CrumptonA&Agozino, B. (eds.) ‘Pan-African Issues in crime and Justice’ (2004) 
159. They have all noted that one of the negative consequences of colonialism is its imposition of alien 
political, educational and judicial systems on African societies. One consequence of this is the 
emergence of two parallel systems of social control with the first one based on African indigenous 
justice values and the other based on Eurocentric values and the crisis of confidence and development it 
has engendered in the society.  
244 Alyward Shorter, ‘Concepts of Social Justice in Traditional Africa’ in Pro Diago Bulletine (1977) vol. 12 at 32-51 
Available at www.afrikaworld.net/afrel/atr-socjustice.htm (Accessed on 21st July, 2014).  
245 Ambe NJ, ‘Tradition, Culture and Development in Africa: Historical Lessons for Modern Development Planning’ 
(2006) 51.  
246 Alyward Shorter (1977) 34.  
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traditional social institutions
247 
which provide the necessary social support that prevents conflict 
and work toward the restoration of law and order when necessary. As a victim-centred justice 
system, the primary goal of the African indigenous justice system is the restoration of victims 
through empowering them and addressing their needs. Offenders are held accountable to the 
victim and the community. Efforts are also made to reintegrate the offenders back into the 
community while counselling efforts are geared toward the healing and transformation of the 
offender into a conforming citizen.
248 
Though this is basically the responsibility of the offender’s 
family and well- wishers, the tone of the tribunals do also encourage the healing and 
reintegration of the offender. 
 
The African system of justice administration, as shown by traditional courts, is inclusive, 
democratic, open and welcoming to those who seek justice. In contrast to Western value-inspired 
courts, which are intimidating, alienating, complicated, retributive, incarcerating and expensive, 
traditional courts seek to foster harmony, reconciliation, compensation to the aggrieved, easy and 
inexpensive access to justice, and the rehabilitation of the offender.
249 
It promotes a spirit of 
communalism, where the individual exists for the benefit of the greater community. Justice is 
fostered within the family, the clan, the neighbourhood and governance of the community, from 
the lowest level to the highest.
250
 
Indigenous justice system in Africa employs restorative and transformative principles in conflict 
resolution. The system is process-oriented rather than rule based with emphasis on the process of 
achieving peaceful resolutions of disputes rather than on adherence to rules as the basis of 
determining disputes.
251 ‘
A fair and just Judgement must take into account a wider range of 
facts and interests, including that of the community, without necessarily compromising the facts 
of the matter in dispute and the rights of the litigants.’ 
                                                             
247 The African traditional social institution here refers to the extended family system, the family, the economy, 
religion and political system.  
248 Elechi O. O., Sherill V.C & Edward J.S ‘Restoring Justice: An African Perspective in International Criminal 
Justice Review’ (2010) 20 at 73 Available at http://icj.sagepub.com/content/20/1/73 (Accessed on 21st September, 
2013).  
249 In Western philosophy and penology, there are three major purposes of punishment to wit: retribution, deterrence 
(specific and general) and rehabilitation. Courts in different common law countries emphasise these purposes. 
Restorative justice is also emphasized in some African countries, for example, South Africa in cases when an 
offender has been convicted of a relatively minor offence.  
250 Elechi (2000) 361.  
251 Armstrong, et al ‘Uncovering Reality: Excavating Women’s Rights in Africa Family Law’ in ‘Women and Law in 
Southern Africa’ Working Paper No.7, WLSA Harare, Zimbabwe, 1993.  
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It must be noted that African customary legal processes focused mainly on the victim rather than 
on the offender and the goal of justice then was to vindicate the victim and protect his/her rights. 
The imposition of punishment on the offender was designed to bring about the healing of the 
victim rather than to punish the offender. In any conflict rather than punish the offender for 
punishment sake, the offender was made to compensate the victim.
252
 
African Indigenous justice system supports offenders by persuading them to understand and 
accept responsibility for their actions. Accountability may result in some discomfort to such 
offenders but not so harsh as to degenerate into further ill feeling and hatred. Obligations must 
also be achievable hence justice processes recognise and respond to community bases of crime. 
Above all, efforts were made by the community to disapprove of wrongdoing, rather than the 
wrong-doer. As such, the collaboration and reintegration as a process of justice-making is 
encouraged, rather than coercion and isolation and underlying this assumption is a belief that all 
human beings are important and are not expendable. Healing must go deep to the centre of the 
problem, to the soul of the person.
253
 
 
For example, the penalty for murder among the people of Kenya was compensatory in nature 
such as repayment to the family of the victim for the economic loss of a person. The family of 
the murderer usually engaged in peaceful negotiations with the family of the victim, most often 
involving a transfer of cattle or sheep as compensation.
254 
Also, the Turkana people of Coast 
Province punished murder with the compensation of cattle as blood money. Crime of theft 
required the restoration of the stolen value while crimes of injury required payment for the 
victim’s care and rehabilitation.255 
The justice system then in Africa was negotiative and democratic; hence it empowered victims, 
offenders, their families and the entire community to participate in the identification, definition 
of harm and the search for restoration, healing, responsibility and prevention. Justice-making 
was seen as an opportunity for dialogue between the victim, the offender, their families and 
                                                             
252 Compensation here goes beyond restitution; it represents a form of apology and atonement by the offender to the 
victim and the community. See Nsereko N.; ‘Victim of Crime and their Rights in Criminology in Africa;’ Mwene 
Mushanga (ed.) (1992) Rome: United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI). 
253 In addition to this, it is generally believed that human beings are naturally good and are capable of change when 
they make mistakes. See Oko Elechi, ‘Human Rights and the African Indigenous Justice System’; a paper presented at 
the 18th International Conference of the International Society for the Reform of Criminal Law (2004) 3.  
254 Andrew Novak, ‘Constitutional Reform an d the Abolition of the Mandatory Death Penalty in Kenya: An 
International Comparison’ (2011) Suffolk University Law Review 54 at 285.  
255 Andrew Novak (2011) 285.  
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friends and the community.
256 
It was believed that if participants are free to express their feelings 
in an environment devoid of power, there will be nothing left to embitter leading to a more 
enduring peace. 
 
When people involved in a conflict participate and are part of the decision making process, they 
are more likely to accept and abide by the resolution. Furthermore, conflict provides 
opportunities for stakeholders to examine and bring about changes to the society’s social, 
institutional and economic structure.
257
 
Justice making here was also an opportunity for the re-socialisation of community members and 
learning of important African values and principles of restraint, respect and responsibility. 
Participants in the justice process were reminded about the danger of bearing grudges and the 
importance of reconciliation with one’s adversaries, repentance, empathy, forgiveness and 
apology. This is in line with the goal of justice which is the restoration of relationships and social 
harmony. Family members of litigants were urged to see it as their responsibility to make sure 
that the lessons of conflict making are not lost on their loved ones.
258
 
Africans then are litigious people and can bring up a case for hearing not because they are in the 
right but to simply to make a point. Additionally, tribunals are able to distinguish between legal 
and moral rights
259 
African people believed that individuals and the community can be reformed 
through education and the teaching of morals. People with strong connection to their family and 
community are more likely to conform to societal norms and value their relationships, as 
opposed to those who are disconnected and feeling alienated and this can be compared to the 
Confucian concept.
260
 
                                                             
256 When the primary stake-holders to a conflict participate in the definition of harm and potential repair, all 
complaints and issues relating to the case are openly discussed. The thorough airing of complaints facilitates the 
gaining of insight into and the unlearning of bizarre behaviour which is socially disruptive. See Gibbs, Jr.& James L. 
‘Two Forms of Dispute Settlement among the Kpelle of West Africa’ in Donald Black & Maureen Mileski 
(eds)‘The Social Organisation of Law’ (1973) 368.  
257 Justice-making in the African indigenous justice system presented an opportunity for the re-evaluation of societal 
values and socio-economic conditions. The response of the Indigenous Justice system to conflict and law breaking 
partly accounted for the relatively low crime and incarceration rates in most African states then. See Oko O, Shrill VC 
& Edward (2010) 74.  
258 Oko, Sherill & Edward (2010) 74.  
259 Elechi O.O.; ‘Doing Justice without State: The Afikpo (Ehugbo) Nigeria Model of Conflict Resolution’ (1996) 20 
International Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice 337-355.  
260 As social beings, it is said that human beings desire to be part of the group and will make the necessary sacrifices to 
meet community expectations to belong. According to Worfel JK in Arthur Waley, ‘Analects of Confucius’ 
(2005) 27, Confucius believes that human beings are by nature good, but that the reason for the nations downturn 
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In discussing justice in indigenous Africa, a look at some of the causes of conflict will not be out 
of place. The various nature and sources of conflict in Indigenous Africa will also be discussed. 
The features of indigenous conflict resolution, traditional resolution of conflict institutions, the 
resolution of conflict principles and the prevention of conflict nature will all be discussed under 
this sub-heading as it is imperative to appreciate the background study of conflict in indigenous 
African societies. 
3.3 Conflict in Indigenous African Society 
 
Conflict played a major role in traditional African society and sometimes had its origin in many 
aspects of their cultural life. It is glaring that conflict was a natural occurrence in human society 
except that the way it is approached and managed by different indigenous African societies 
differs. The ways and manners of these conflicts also differ from one community to the other. 
The understanding of conflicts in traditional African society and its exploitation was based on 
the problem between humans and the supernatural and except an ontological balance was 
upheld between the two parties, peace remained uncontainable. It is imperative to point out that 
conflict, from whatever angel it is viewed, is inevitable. The first party to the conflict, who 
are seen as imperfect beings, are the humans (Africans in this respect) while the other party are 
the deities and ancestors (perfect spirit) and supernatural supreme-being. 
It can be established here that it is not just the inevitability and phenomenology of conflict, but 
also that highly placed, that is, the supernatural and the so lowly that is human beings, often had 
occasion for disagreement and disaffection.
261
 
It is important to note that the results of conflict in traditional African societies was connected to 
the cultural activities of the people therefore, peace and conflict are signs of culture 
associated with governance and social engineering in indigenous African societies. Although 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
was due to people either forgetting how to be good or not practicing being good. For the community to learn, or to 
remember, how to act with virtue requires active participation on the part of everybody. Emphasis was placed on 
political, social and familiar order of human life. Order comes from doing, or practicing what is right…  
261 Beyond the unexplainable sources of conflict also do lay the desirability of conflict from the generational point of 
view. Thus conflict derived from diverse sources in African traditional societies which include family, economic, 
chieftaincy, social and religion as well as breakdown of deplomatic relations and personal annoyance over 
behavioural pattern. It is important to point out here that there exist many sources of conflict in traditional/indigenous 
African societies and the knowledge about the various sources will help to decipher the difference between the 
written and unwritten sources of conflict. Unwritten sources were derived from oral data namely songs, pithy 
sayings, proverbs and maxims as well as from arbitral proceedings while written sources are textual/archival 
materials, journal article and books.  
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conflict has been seen as a basic unity of the culture of African political culture, it stems from the 
family level. I ndividuals in the family had the right of protest showing grievance over many 
things starting from inheritance, interpersonal relations to marital situation/matter. 
From the economic point of view, it was discovered that in traditional African societies that 
conflict cannot be do away with. ‘This, in a way justified Coser’s262 approach to the 
phenomenology of conflict.’ ‘Land encroachment, territorial dislocation, house sequestration, 
trade imbalance and non-payment of tributes or loans, even across cultural boundaries of the 
world, are identified as some of the reasons for conflict originating in traditional African 
societies.’263 
The collapse of diplomatic relations among African societies can also lead to conflicts and this 
often led to communal conflict and violence between African communities. It is also 
evident that attack on territories had often occasioned war.
264
 
It cannot be disputed that breach of sacred sanctions, ‘insult to the supernatural, breaking of 
communal taboo, the defecation of shrines, sanctuaries or groves have been some of the 
reasons for religious conflict in traditional African societies.’ As indicated earlier in this 
chapter, the breach of religious codes often occasioned conflict between Africans and their 
deities, the expression of such disaffection and hatred, had shifted the balance of relationship 
and power between the sacred and the profane.
265
 
                                                             
262 Coser L, ‘The Functions of Social Conflict’ (1956) 3.  
263 Various jurisprudences have been written by various distinguished jurists on African indigenous law showing 
numerous examples of forces of conflict. Chieftaincy imbroglios are also prevalent in African societies and they 
have had their origin from time immemorial, from the inevitability of competing forces to the royal throne especially 
when the norms and customs have been relegated to the background. The elements of chieftaincy conflict derived 
from tussle to the throne, misapplication of custom and tradition and impeachment/dethronement.  Literature abounds 
on the nature and effects of Chieftaincy conflicts in African societies too. For example, see Akanmu Adebayo, 
Jesse Benjamin & Brandon Lundy (eds.), ‘Indigenous Conflict Resolution Management Strategies’ (2014)79. See also, 
John Mc Cracken, ‘A History of Malawi: 1859-1966’ (2012) 67.  
264 The Ashanti people occupied the present Ghana in the 18th and 19th centuries. Their expansion started around 
1670 when King Osei Tutu defeated Denkyera and other nearby communities. His authority was symbolised by a 
golden stool (known as sika dwa) on which all subsequent kings were enthroned. Also, in the 17th century, the 
Kingdom of Dahomey gradually extended its domination around Abomey. Agaja, in the 18th century established a 
corps of women soldiers, gained control of the coast and became a major supplier of slaves to European traders. See 
Pre-Colonial African History Available at www.berdo.net/page99/99en-afr-notes.html (Accessed on 8th August, 
2014).  
265 Olaoba BO et al; ‘African Traditional method of conflict Resolution,’ course guide developed by National Open 
University of Nigeria, 2010 Available at www.nou.edu.ng/NOUN_OCL/pdf/SASS/PCR%20831.pdf (Accessed on 
24th March, 2014).  
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Assault on personality of Africans has always led to conflict because they cherish their 
personality and ethos of respect and honour. In the same vein, it is discovered that the 
breakdown of covenant and the negligence of social responsibilities were clear grounds for 
causing conflict,
266 
cultural norms which sometimes lead to social engineering, especially 
during the celebration of festival and other traditional ceremonies also generated conflict in 
traditional African societies.
267
 
 
Conflict was in the mind of the indigenous Africans and its belief was  often expressed to 
make everyone opened to its conditions of development. It was part of the life and an aspect of 
the activities of culture performed by traditional Africans that has often exhibited evidence of 
virility, responsibility and versatility. They were swift in understanding its nature, 
fundamentals and impact on social development.  
Conflict resolution in indigenous Africa had great uncommon characteristics. The noble 
feature of this conflict resolution put Africans in the vantage position of demonstrating their 
culture and according it a radiant splendour and flame. This was why in pre-colonial African 
societies, peace and harmony somehow reigned supreme and often produced unique 
atmosphere for peace to thrive and development became dynamic.
268
 
Conflict resolution in Indigenous African society’s features included among other things, 
performance stance, resolving of conflict due to the accepted means/mechanisms, exhibition of 
the customs and norms and deification of the ethnical framework of the society. The drive 
for conflict resolution was prevalent throughout the society thereby creating conducive 
                                                             
266 Anthony E.E. & Emmanuel I., ‘Traditional Methods for the Settlement of Conflicts: Appraising the Challenges for 
Justice in South –East’ (2015) 1 (2) International Journal of Multidisciplinary Research and Information 124- 132.  
267 The knowledge of the sources of conflict is significant towards the understanding of the nature of conflict in the 
society because it will make us understand that conflict existed in traditional African societies, that it derived from 
various sources with particular nature and that it can either be positive or negative. This will also make us 
understand that conflict was inevitable in traditional African society and that they have their own ways of resolving 
such conflicts once the source of it has been discovered. It is also equally important to point out here that the 
sources of conflict often served useful purposes as they dictated the direction of understanding the nature of conflict in 
traditional African societies; it exposed the relationship between conflict and culture thereby revealing significant 
aspect of African cultural heritage; and induced the inevitability of developing incidental capacity for resolving 
conflicts.  
268 Birgit Brock-Utne, ‘Indigenous Conflict Resolution in Africa’. Being a paper presented at the weekend Seminar on 
Indigenous Solutions to Conflicts held at the University of Oslo, Institute of Education Research on 23-24 
February, 2001. Available at  
www.africavenir.org/fileadmin/_migrated/Content_uploads/BruckUtneTradConflictResolution_06.pdf (Accessed 13th 
August, 2016).  
https://etd.uwc.ac.za
57 
 
 
 
environment for the facilitation of peace and the enhancement of harmony.
269
 
Conflict resolution model in traditional Africa was based on the dramatisation of the issues 
which led to the conflict. The level of performance of conflict resolution in African societies 
assisted participants in the ensuring drama to further appreciate the custom and norms 
bequeathed to them by their ancestors.
270
 
During conflict resolution process in indigenous African societies, some rules were obeyed 
by all participants in the process of conflict resolution. These rules were designed for to 
ensure even distribution of justice and the maintenance of order. Accordingly an officer 
involved in the conflict resolution, a personality on the higher platform, was responsible for 
announcing to other dramatis personae, of the commencement of the action on stage. Such 
pronouncement signified to the participants of the atmosphere which is to be adhered to. 
The mechanism of conflict resolution in the indigenous African societies was distinct as it was 
based on African cultural heritage and such distinctiveness, was as a result of the popularity 
of the custom and norms associated with conflict resolution. Every community member was 
satisfied with the ways and manner the hearing was handled as well as the dispatch with which 
the adjudicators handled the conflict issues. It is also important to understand the fact that the 
adjudicators were unwavering in their aspiration towards providing solutions to any dispute 
which may be tabled before them. They were also very rational when making their 
decisions by sticking to the custom and norms laid down by their ancestors.
271
 
 
Aside providing solutions to the conflict, educating everyone present at the scene of the 
conflict resolution regarding the cultural heritage of the community through respect for 
personalities, astonishment of the supernatural, interpretation of the norms in order to appeal to 
the warring parties conflicting, examination and cross examining of evidences particularly on the 
volume of details given as regards the truth of the matter, is another important characteristic of 
                                                             
269 Birgit Brock-Utne, ‘Indigenous Conflict Resolution in Africa’. Being a paper presented at the weekend Seminar 
on Indigenous Solutions to Conflicts held at the University of Oslo, Institute of Education Research on 23-24 
February, 2001. Available at 
www.africavenir.org/fileadmin/_migrated/Content_uploads/BruckUtneTradConflictResolution_06.pdf (Accessed 
13th August, 2016).  
270 It is pertinent to point out here that proverbs and maxims were used in the drama of conflict resolution in 
traditional African societies. Among the Fante (Ghana), Yoruba (Nigeria), Lugbara (Uganda) and Barotse 
(Bechuanaland) for example, the lores were verbally dramatised to sharpen the memory of the audience thus 
educating them of the crucial aspects of their cultural heritage.  
271 Kaderi Bukari, ‘Exploring Indigenous Approaches to Conflict Resolution: The Case of Bawku Conflict in Ghana’ 
(2013) 4 (2) Journal of Sociological Research 89.  
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the conflict resolution mechanism of indigenous African societies.
272
 
 
The adjudicators’ attention was mostly on analysing evidence hence, truth, became sine qua non 
of resolution of conflict in indigenous African societies. The fact of honouring the invisible 
manifestation of the supernatural and evidence of demonstrating mastery of the art was 
proven by the recognition of truth. Except a person is well-taught and knowledgeable in the 
indigenous conflict resolution art, the size of the resolution could get out of control and war 
could arise. The lack of knowledge, understanding and dynamism of the whole process 
could lead to problem for the adjudicator.
273
 
Several traditional institutions
274 
set up for conflict resolution operated in indigenous African 
societies and they were responsible for the facilitation of peace and the ennoblement of 
harmony. Examples are the political, 
275
economic, 
276
social 
277 
and religious institutions.
278 
These institutions came to life at different times and at different places in African societies and 
they had been purposeful towards enhancing the social engineering which nurtured healthy 
unity in diversity through cultural boundaries and it also showed a kind of association based on 
the cultural heritage in Africa. 
Institutions for traditional conflict resolution allowed people in the society to comprehend 
and interpret the norms which gave rise to peace and harmony and the love for conducive 
atmosphere under which development and social orientation and mobilisation transpired in 
numerous African societies. The institutions, as demonstrated later in this chapter, also 
permitted a great sense of togetherness in the society and the social responsibility which a 
person owed to the society of his birth. In fact, a person was first born into a cultural society 
wherein the framework of the individual growth and development was acquired. Therefore, a 
person of African background and development grand up to join forces of development under 
the belief of peace and harmony. Such persons were also determined to learn under the several 
                                                             
272 Olaoba et al (2010) 42.  
273 Ajayi Adeyinka & Buhari Lateef, ‘Methods of Conflict Resolution in African Traditional Society’ (2014) Vol. 8(2) 
series No. 33, African Research Review 138-157 at 142.  
274 Institutions are set up or establishment or organisation for achieving some goals of development. They may refer to 
personalities or infrastructures upon which the developments of the society are anchored.  
275 Family and Palace.SeeOlaoba et al, ‘African Traditional Method of Conflict Resolution’ (2010) 69.  
276 Market See, Olaoba et al, ‘African Traditional Method of Conflict Resolution’ (2010) 95.  
277 Age-group and Professional Associations. See, Olaoba et al, ‘African Traditional Method of Conflict Resolution’ 
(2010) 95.  
278 Sanctuaries, deities and ancestors.  
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identified institutions, models of conflict resolution so that as he/she mature with it, they will 
become a master art for demonstration. 
The cultural heritage of Africa is blessed with great indigenous institutions that govern the whole 
life of the people thereby improving common understanding and unity of purpose. Africans had 
long developed institutions set up for conflict resolution and governance of the society. The 
institutions were specifically designed in line with public will and associational trust 
particularly when they have been trained to be truthful in operation and pragmatic dynamism. 
Experience was however, associated with the explanation, clarity and the use of the institutions 
in order to realise peace and the enhancement of harmonial living in a peaceful environment.
279
 
Traditional institutions like the family ensued in African society as a way of appreciating 
familial projection and unification of goals worthy of positive outcomes. Factored out from a 
lineage, the family system in Africa showed amazing unity so much at a closed range that 
mutuality was enhanced. Living in large compound with distinguishable reasonable 
responsibilities, the Africa family system represented the concept of keeping in touch to 
ascertain positive knowledge of welfare and interest for worthy wisdom associated with 
mutuality.  
Therefore, the notion of being your brother’s keeper was quite integral in the family system. 
Such a commonly exclusive trust at times boosted not only even distribution of justice but also 
unified responsibility, for a common destiny.
280
 
Family units in Africa symbolised strong political institutions which was the basis of 
governance. The palace was the apex point of the political institution, a royal institution with 
legitimate authority and a mark of state formation. It signified the splendour of cultural 
heritage in pre-colonial African societies. The king had the supreme authority to put a hold 
                                                             
279 Kwame Badu &OkyereBonna, ‘Traditional Institutions and Public Administration in Democratic Africa’ (2009) 
144.  
280 Conflicts of diverse nature especially civic ones, were resolved at the family level in the family compound. Such 
conflicts included petty quarrels between co-wives, among the polygamous children, between wives and husbands 
and the like. The conflicts were resolved based on the bond of unity and consanguinity and those saddled with the 
responsibilities of resolving the conflicts at the family level were the family heads. See Ajayi Adeyinka & Buhari 
Lateef (2014) 143. Among the Yoruba people of Nigeria, the smallest unit of the family called idile (Nuclear family) is 
headed by a Bale; the next unit is the Ebi (extended family) and is headed by Mogaji who is the most influential or 
usually the eldest person in the Ebi. The third tier comprises of several family compounds and is headed by a Baale 
(chief of ward/quarter). See Kenneth Onigu-Otite& Isaac Olawale Albert (eds.) ‘Community Conflicts in Nigeria: 
Management, Resolution and Transformation’ (1999) 13-31.  
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and seal on the issues of conflict. This was done along with the assistance of his chiefs, who met 
in the palace, to resolve conflicts particularly of criminal inclinations.
281
 
Social institutions’ importance to resolution of conflict in indigenous African societies has 
been an important aspect of cultural heritage. Social conflicts were at times resolved through 
the mechanism of social institutions like age-grade association; professional associations like 
the hunters guild and secret clubs or societies. The appropriate authority and social 
responsibilities of the recognised sections of the society relied on the acknowledgment given 
to them by members of the society. Infact, their prerogatives of position brought about the 
positive results which they normally boosted and arranged. They also had the knowledge and 
skill of tilting the extent of conflicts to practicable and manageable bounds and in their own 
sphere of influence, peace and harmony was the ultimate. As a corrective measure, punishment 
was, however, given out to offenders in order to discourage a ambitious act which might 
unsettle collective responsibility for positive results in the development process.
282
 
Irrespective of the pains and paeans that comes with being a member of a particular age-grade 
association in indigenous societies, the way members were mobilised showed the competence to 
                                                             
281 Looking at things critically, it is discovered that the success of the state apparatus for development harped on the 
economic propensities of the society. The market institutions in African society had enabled proper legitimisation of 
sovereignty. This market institution, however, gave rise to some agents of peace and harmony within the market 
system. In other words, market administrators and leaders with diverse names across cultural boundaries facilitated 
peace and enabled equitable distribution of justice, the preservers of harmonious tradition in pre-colonial African 
societies. Selling and buying was not only done in the market, the mechanism for maintaining favourable atmosphere 
for bargaining was not in place. Hence, there were commodity associations helped by their executive overlords. 
Their roles were quite noticeable and appreciated not only by African kings but also by the populace. See Olaoba et al, 
‘African Traditional Methods of Conflict Resolution’ (2010) 67. 
282Age, sex and status have been social phenomena in African societies as they have been determinants of identity, 
social relevance and instruments of development. Africans have been cautious of their birth, status and the manner of 
identification with their societies. In this regard, age brackets have made it possible to make people get along with their 
group peers and companions. The degree of deference in the age-bracket depends largely on the nature of social 
stratification and this differs from community to community. Some authors and jurists have also pointed out that the 
age difference depends on local needs, periodic events or on economic or organisational necessities of the society 
concerned. See Onigu Otite & Ogionwo W, ‘An Introduction to Sociological Studies’ (1994). The age-grade 
association in African indigenous societies was not so much of identification with a particular group in the society 
but for the purposeful attention accorded them by members of the society, whose needs as the situation might have 
been, the association capably satisfied. A person was born into a society and within a context, growing up entails 
that he found relevance and substance within a group germane to his physical growth, where he could find succour 
and social significance. Although, a person’s membership of age-group association changes from time to time 
depending on the number of years designed for the association, there was always the enthusiasm and interest to 
contribute to the associations activities and programmes irrespective of the numbers of years of membership. Each 
age-group association thus recognised active participation, sense of belongingness and social relevance towards 
development. See also Bascom WR, ‘The Principle of Seniority in the Social Structure of the Yoruba’ (1942) 44; 
Sangree, W.H, ‘The Bantu Tiriki of Western Kenya’ in Gibbs JL, Jr.(ed.) ‘Peoples of Africa- Cultures of African 
South of the Sahara’ (1977) 47.   
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introduce programmes of development and the attainment of wisdom to move ahead, aside being 
members of the association but also as members of the society was quite in focus. Graduation 
into levels of organisation therefore shows to one, numerous means of development and 
forms of challenges in African indigenous societies. 
A huge role was played by traditional religion in conflict resolution throughout cultural 
boundaries in Africa. The religion, which introduced believes, apart from explaining the 
influence of supernatural, also showed religious refuges like shrines and groves. These 
venues later became venues for many extra-judicial activities. Traditional faith encouraged 
truth, equity and justice which were the basics of conflict resolution in indigenous African 
societies as the deities and ancestors were always on ground at the scene of conflict 
resolution.
283
 
3.4 Principles of Conflict Resolution in indigenous African Society 
 
This section will show that the forebearers at the start of the institutionalisation of political 
culture had a fortuitous approach concerning absorbing the morals of social justice. Ethical 
devices and models of conflict resolution, legitimacy of power and authority principled along 
the line of mutual understanding and public peace were inherent in political culture were. These 
principles were properly installed on a strong background in this situation. At the conceive 
of the African forebearers, they did well to leave the principles of conflict resolution, which 
they have actively practised, to their descendants who they themselves never stumbled in 
justifying not only the existence of the principles, but also lived the expectation of their 
forefathers by making their legacy hireable. 
The ethics of conflict resolution in pre-colonial African cultures were perfectly modeled 
                                                             
283Most of the indigenous institutions for conflict resolution have faded out as they no longer have bearing with 
modern day governance and the first problem one is faced with is how to recognise these institutions. Only the older 
people of this generation would know them. There are modern influences on the changing pattern of the institutions; 
foreign religion and western education have created new institutional frameworks for conflict resolution. For 
example, it is a notorious fact that social clubs and mosque/church societies have replaced age-grade association 
typical of indigenous African cultural heritage. The mode of conflict resolution in indigenous African societies had 
been well organised at the beginning of state formation thereby making the various institutions quite functional and 
adaptable to the development process. The institutions were not only relevant and functional but also produced such 
positive results for the administration of all members of the society. They were so popular and vital to problem 
solving for the purpose they were so designed. See Agbaje A.A.B, ‘Traditional Channels of Political 
Communication in Africa’ in Ayoade J. A. A.&Agbaje A. A. B. (eds.) ‘African Traditional Political Thought and 
Institutions’ (1989); Ayisi E.O., ‘An Introduction to the Study of African Culture’ (1979); Ayittey, G.B.N. 
‘Indigenous African Institutions’ (1991).   
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towards good assimilaton of African cultural heritage so that they become part of their 
customs and norms. The principles were also characterised by the attitude and personality of 
the Africans in a manner that their practice and adaptation were sufficiently appropriate to the 
environment and the spiritual power. The principles followed the line of fruition and 
functional press to exhibit the cultural heritage of the Africans; it therefore set in motion the 
desirability and readiness of the Africans to institute social order and control of their affairs, in 
such a way, that public morality and etiquette strengthen the chord of relationship and mutual 
trust. 
The doctrines of conflict resolution in indigenous African societies exposed the thinking of the 
forebearers for the utmost future relevance and element of peace and harmony in the body 
polity of social organisation. Continuity of what was started by the African forebearers for 
their offsprings was in place. The enormity of the principles of conflict resolution in 
indigenous African societies was quite in place, the level of the application of the doctrines of 
conflict resolution to life expectations, nevertheless, rested mostly on the interest and eagerness 
as well as the knowledge acquired by the practitioners. This is why it is difficult at times to 
measure the level of wisdom of the congregations particularly when colonial culture had 
interfered into the unique African principle of conflict resolution.
284
 
Putting the principles of conflict resolution in African society in adequate perspective and 
within the center of African cultural heritage is very essential and doing so requires that one 
acquire appropriate knowledge and proper assimilation of the peace process in Africa. 
Essentially, parties to the conflict customarily give themselves in for cross-examination because 
they had glowing confidence in the conflict resolution doctrines which were to be applied to 
the conflict in vogue
285 
and as a matter of fact, no one was seen as a secluded being in 
indigenous African society. This was why the principle of collective responsibility was in place. 
It will be discovered that the concern of the community was always focused to the parties in 
                                                             
284 Principles  of  conflict  resolution  in  traditional  African  societies  were  anchored  on  the  confidence  of  the 
parishioners, verification of truth, attainment of impartiality and the enhancement of transparency, reconciliation and the 
display of fairness and social justice as well as adherence to forgiveness and tolerance. This principle attested to the 
fact that Africans had long been principled in the ways of life and this had transformed their mode of existence to that 
of mutual exclusiveness. It is important to point out that supernatural force propelled the operation of the principles 
of conflict resolution in various traditional African societies and this permeated the essence of peace making and 
peace keeping incentives. Olaoba, O.B. in ‘Yoruba Legal Culture’ (2002) wrote extensively on this.  
285 Tsega Endalew, ‘Inter-Ethnic Relations on a frontier: Matakkal (Ethiopia) 1898-1991’ (2006)153.  
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conflict borne out of pity and admiration to the ancestors who watched from far away and had 
the ability to reprimand the offenders or wrongdoers amongst the parties to the conflict. The 
wrongdoing when properly ascertained needed collective action to surmount, the reason why 
some jurists maintained that such a wrongdoing must be propitiated by all the members of the 
society in the area of contributing towards procuring ritual materials. This was also similar to 
the practice of being your brother’s keeper in the time of crisis.286 
Independence, impartiality and openness were the three ethics of conflict resolution in 
traditional African societies. They were embraced by the African forebearers to display the 
pressure connected with peace making and peace building. Infact, the practitioners of 
indigenous peace need the three principles to stand the test of time towards ensuring 
completeness and totality of verifying truth and asserting vibrant claims
287 
African judges 
and adjudicators also sustained these values towards playing safe and restoring peace and order 
in the troubled societies. 
Parties to the conflict in indigenous African communities had the motive of encouragement 
and compliance to equitable claims to justice. Therefore, they had the opportunity of letting off 
the steam of conflict, forgiving, loving and enduring one another for mutual alignment and 
adaptation and this was the basis of reconciliation and restoration of pleasant relationship. This 
principle had long been based on social engineering and characteristic on indigenous African 
societies. 
Fairness, justice and equity were three-way code of conflict resolution in indigenous African 
society as parties to a conflict were generally given fair hearing and representation through 
a witness to the degree that no one had his case treated in his absence because doing so 
would result to misplace of justice and an attack on the enforcer of justice which is the 
supernatural.
288 
Parties were always accorded reasonable time at the scene of conflict 
resolution to state the problem(s) in conflict. Refusal to appear at the venue by any of the 
                                                             
286 DribergJ.H.,‘The African Conception of Law’ (1934) supplement July, 34. Truth was associated with the positive 
conduct of life and was quite at home in place with conflict resolution mode in traditional African society. It has also 
been adjudged by African elders as the objective realisation of scientific trust and ethical modesty showcasing 
movement in development process. African forebearers embraced truth as a convenient logo and it was upheld as a 
salient principle of conflict resolution in indigenous African societies.  
287 Max Gluckman in ‘The reasonable man in Barotse Law’ (1956) Journal of African Administration, 8, No. 2 
attested to this fact.  
288 Indigenous Africans believed that justice delayed was outright justice denied which was to spell doom for the 
community. See Ajayi A. & Buhari L. (2014) 142.  
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parties in dispute was viewed as contempt.
289
 
Here (traditional African society), the end of justice justified the principles of justice in place. 
Parties were encouraged to give peace a chance by shifting the ground of conflict and 
moving towards peace and harmony in the spirit of ‘give a little, get a little.’290 
The result of conflict resolution was based on reasonable acknowledgment and application of the 
philosophies engaged to achieve peace process in indigenous African societies. Listing was, 
however, an important art towards determining the prudent application of the principles of 
conflict resolution. The doctrines were never played with nor played down to achieve 
harmonious settlement and reinstatement of peace and harmony to a previously bad situation or 
atmosphere of crisis. 
The principles of conflict resolution had been so universal in letters and approach to a point that 
it pleases all conflict circumstances when appropriately put into use and the non- application of 
the principles might be an insult to the forebearers who installed them. The conviction of the 
inaugurators of the principles was to the effect of sustaining the peaceful status quo of the 
society and to promote social bliss for equitable development. Therefore, once infuriated, the 
forebearers could cause all kinds of illnesses on the people until the ontological balance was 
maintained. Conflict in African society therefore was a means of measuring social balance 
between the people (Africans) and their supernatural that has the superpower of coercion and 
conformance. 
3.5 Major players in the African Indigenous Judicial system 
 
3.5.1 Victims in the African Judicial System 
 
The African Indigenous Judicial System (AIJS) is victim-centred. Victim care is more paramount 
because of the belief in the community that victims whose needs are not addressed are 
disgruntled and are potential offenders. In a communitarian society, when one individual suffers, 
the community suffers too and following the Ubuntu concept, ‘an injury to one is an injury to 
all.’291 ‘It is also a teaching about respect and having compassion for others, especially those 
                                                             
289 Examples were found among the Tswana in South Africa and the Yoruba in Nigeria. See Schapera I, ‘Contempt of 
Court in Tswana Law’ (1974) Journal of African Law 21; Olaoba, O.B. ‘Yoruba Legal Culture’ (2002) 78.  
290 Ajayi Adeyinka & Buhari Lateef (2014) 142.  
291 Broodryk, J. ‘Ubuntu Management and Motivation’. Johannesburg: Gauteng Department of Welfare/Pretoria, 
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in need.’ Van der Merwe292 noted that we affirm our own humanity by recognising the 
humanity of others. This principle is summed up by a Zulu saying: 
‘umuntungumuntungabantu’ which literally translates to be ‘a human being is a human being 
through (otherness of) other human beings’. One’s individuality and humanity has meaning 
only when others acknowledge it and it is one’s relationship with others that enhances their 
humanity and self-worth. This principle encourages indigenous Africans to respect and treat 
others with compassion and also how to relate with others in a meaningful way.
293
 
The empowerment and vindication of the victim is very central to the resolution of conflict. First, 
the victim feels vindicated by the acknowledgement by the offender and other relevant 
community members that he or she has suffered harm and loss. Victims feel empowered by 
being accorded the opportunity to bring their complaints to the community’s constituted justice 
centres which play very important roles in bringing offenders to justice in the definition of their 
harms and loss, and the search for solutions acceptable to them. Also as parties to the process of 
justice making, they are likely to abide by the decisions reached since they were party to the 
negotiation. 
It is not all victims that are always willing to bring offenders to justice, for example, rape victims 
are always reluctant to bring up rape cases to the Africa indigenous justice system tribunals. 
However, when rape cases are brought before the tribunal, Africa indigenous justice system 
tribunals have standard ways of responding to such matters.
294
 
Zion and Yazzie
295 
in discussing Navajo justice showed that negotiated justice such as the AIJS 
is more beneficial and effective than adjudicated justice. According to them, the approach to 
adjudicated justice tends to be impersonal and rationalistic and restricted to facts relevant to a 
particular case. Moreover, unlike adjudicated justice, negotiated justice is not a winner take all 
justice. Resolutions can be reached where the offender, the community and the victim are each 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
Ubuntu School of Philosophy, 1997 at pages 5, 7 and 9.  
292Van der Merwe, W. C. ‘Philosophy and the Multi-Cultural Context of (post) Apartheid South Africa: Ethical 
perspectives’ (1996) 3 at 1-15.   
293 Nusssbaum B ‘African Culture and Ubuntu: Reflections of a South African in America’ in ‘World Business 
Academy’ (2003) 17th edition, noted that African culture and principles of justice teach Africans to show companion 
(ship), reciprocity, dignity, harmony and humanity in the interest of building and maintaining community with 
justice and mutual caring.  
294 Amadi E. in ‘Ethics in Nigerian Culture’ (1982) and Elechi O.O. in ‘Doing Justice without the State: The Afikpo 
(Ehugbo) Nigerian model’ (2006) 207 extensively discussed this.  
295 Zion, J. W. & Yazzie R. ‘Navajo Peace making: Original Dispute Resolution and a way of Life’in D. Sullivan & 
L. Tifft (eds.), ‘Handbook of Restorative Justice: A global perspective’ (2006) 161-173.  
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partially wrong and it is important to also point out to the stakeholders to the conflict where each 
erred and each or every stakeholder may have to compromise. Also, one underlying assumption 
of negotiated justice is that all stakeholders have equal access and say and as such, no one 
individual has the final decision-making authority. Decisions are therefore reached through a 
consensus while it can be said that justice making present opportunities to teach values and 
social skills.
296
 
 
Negotiated justice follows a relational process in which stakeholders are actively involved in the 
process of decision making. Negotiation promotes better communication and empathy as 
participants’ statement shift from the ‘I’ statement to the ‘we’ statements297  and as such, 
participants’ feeling about the situation often prove more important than the facts of the conflict 
and this (negotiated justice) should not be confused with plea bargaining. 
Unlike in the state justice system where plea bargaining takes place, participants to a conflict in 
a negotiated justice system tend to have equal power. Equality does not mean the same influence, 
prestige and status.
298
   However, litigants appreciate the value and benefits of a peaceful 
community to the well-being and survival of all.
299
 
 
In comparison to restorative justice-based justice system, such as the Navajo justice system 
whose principles and practices are similar to the Africa indigenous justice system, and retributive 
justice-centred justice systems, the major difference between western adjudication and indigenous 
dialogue is that Western thoughts tend to be rational and based on Aristotelian logic, using 
inductive or deductive reasoning. Indigenous thoughts tend to be based on facts or feelings, 
where feelings are often more important than ‘finding facts’, and both are expressed in languages 
that are more sophisticated than English.
300 
That is, in countries where English is the official 
court language, translators are available to make sure that the parties follow the proceedings. 
This is one of the fundamental elements of the right to a fair trial. Of course, there are problems 
                                                             
296 Michael Allen, ‘Globalisation, Negotiation and the Failure of Transformation in South Africa’ (2006) 94.  
297 Zion J. and Yazzie R. (2006)163.  
298 Christie N. ‘Crime Control as Industry: Towards Gulags, Western Style’ (2000) 165.  
299 Christie N. in ‘A suitable amount of crime’ (2004) 75-76 pointed out that the questions of relevance are handled in 
a radically different way from what happens in the legal system. Relevance is seen as a concern, but in situations with 
horizontal justice as one without predefined solutions. Relevance is established through the process itself. 
Relevance is what the participants find relevant.  
300 Zion and Yazzie (2006) at 152. In the same vein, Block at page 47 has also observed that restoration comes from 
the choice to value possibility and relatedness over problems, self-interest and the rest of the stuck communitys 
agenda. It hinges on the accountability chosen by citizens and their willingness to connect with each other around 
promises they make to each other. He insists that we devalue associational life at our peril.  
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associated with this as well such as the lack of enough or competent translators. 
 
Although victims always lead the quest for justice, they are hardly alone as they are always 
supported by their family members and other well-wishers throughout the process. Ample 
opportunities are given to victims in a respectful and secure setting to tell sympathetic listeners 
how the actions of the offenders affected them. This is also visible in criminal justice systems 
such as the one in South Africa where victims have a role to play as state witnesses and at 
sentencing and parole stages.
301 
Furthermore, they are encouraged to openly vent their anger and 
frustration. Respectful and secure settings do not have to be emotionally sterile and controlled as 
is assumed in western court settings.
302
 
3.5.2 Offenders in the African Indigenous Justice System 
 
Offenders are also active participants in the African Indigenous Justice System. Their roles are 
not usurped by other professionals such as defence attorneys as it obtains in state adjudicated 
courts. As the offenders are actively involved in the definition of the harm and the search for 
solutions acceptable to all stakeholders, they are better placed to appreciate the harm their 
actions caused the victims and why other community members are concerned. 
The opened airing of the facts and issues relevant to the case and its impact on the victim and the 
community encourages the offender to understand and appreciate the impact on the victim and 
the community encourages the offender(s) to understand and appreciate the impact of their 
actions. The potential for remorse and empathy by the offender is higher when they understand 
the harm their actions have caused the victim and how the community has been affected. This 
realisation is more likely when the emphasis is on the harm their actions have caused rather than 
the law broken, which may seem like an unfamiliar concept to some. This is in line with the 
goal
303 
of the African Indigenous Justice System that is the restoration of relationships and social 
cohesion rather than the promotion of social control or other penal ideology. Retributive justice 
system seems to have elevated law and social control to values of their own, rather than a means 
                                                             
301 Bonny Ibhawoh, ‘Imperial Justice: Africans in Empires Court’ (2013) 68.  
302 Elechi O. O., ‘The Igbo Indigenous Justice System’ in Saleh-Hanna V. (ed) ‘Colonial Systems of Control: 
Criminal Justice in Nigeria’ (2008) 404.  
303 Kerry Clamp, ‘Restorative Justice in Transition’ (2013) 62. See also, Schoeman MI, ‘A Philosophical View of 
Social Transformation through Restorative Justice Teaching: A case study of Traditional Leaders in Ixopo, South 
Africa’ in ‘Phronimon’An accredited journal of the South African Society of Greek Philosophy and the Humanities 
(2012) vol. 13 No.2 at  23. Available at www.phronimon.co.za/index.php/phroni/article/view/79 (Accessed on 
19thOctober, 2016).  
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for the protection of people, their properties and their civil peace in the communities.
304 
Behaviour also tends to be held in check only by not breaking the law. Doing what is right or 
‘duty’, is little considered by citizens in a culture, which depends solely upon a retributive justice 
system. 
As the main aim of justice in the African Indigenous Justice System is the restoration of the 
victims and their positions prior to their victimisations, offender accountability includes 
reparation to the victim and apology and atonement to both the victim and the community. 
Restitution to the victim as noted by authors is central to the resolution of the conflict.
305 
Punishments are not meted out to offenders for punishment’s sake or in rigid obedience of the 
law but as a means of restoring the victim’s harm and loss. Where offenders are unable to 
compensate the victims for his or her loss, the offender’s family is held responsible.306 Human 
beings are not perfect and do make mistakes; and their actions whether intended or not, can 
cause harm to others. It is strongly believed in some parts of Africa that every wrong can be 
made right by the subsequent actions of the offender and other community members. For 
example, the Igbo people in Nigeria believe that no offense is so serious that it cannot be atoned 
for with a commensurate sacrifice and reparation, therefore punishments are finite and offenders 
had the option and opportunity to make amends and have their standing in the community 
restored.
307
 
In line with the African humanitarian culture, human beings have both intrinsic and material 
value. Again, every individual is capable of contributing to the collective survival of the family 
and community; because the mainstay of traditional African economy is subsistence agriculture, 
every hand is highly valued. Agrarian economies are labour-intensive, reintegrating offenders 
into the community is important so that they can remain productive and contribute to the survival 
of the community.
308
 
                                                             
304 Mike Batley, ‘Restorative Justice in the South African Context’ in TraggyMaepa (ed.), ‘Beyond Retribution: 
Prospects for Restorative Justice in South Africa’ (2005) Vol. 111 at 25.  
305 Such authors include but not limited to Nsereko N. in ‘Victims of Crime and their Rights’ in Mushanga T. M. 
(eds.) ‘Criminology in Africa’ (1992) 35; Elechi (2006 & 2008) 39. 
306 Restoring Justice at pg. 77 in some cases, even the community where the offender hails from can be held 
accountable for the action of one of their own. As the reasoning goes, in a communitarian setting, the family and 
community members also reap the rewards of the accomplishments of their own as such must bear the burden of 
their liability too.  
307 Oraegbunam, Ikenga, ‘The principles and practice of justice in traditional Igbo jurisprudence’ in ‘OGIRISI: a 
New Journal of African Studies’ (2009) vol. 6.1, 53-85 at 58.  
308 It should be noted that strictly violent criminal cases are not handled by the AIJS. Violent cases are referred to 
state courts that have the jurisdiction to deal with such matters.  
https://etd.uwc.ac.za
69 
 
 
 
It is important to note that there are two justice systems in operation in contemporary African 
societies. One is the state-administered justice system modelled on the Western judicial systems 
while the other is the African Indigenous justice system. Despite the relevance and popularity of 
the African Indigenous Justice System, the dominant authority of African State is not in question. 
It is also worth noting that litigants who are not satisfied with the Judgement of the African 
Indigenous Justice Systems can then take their cases to the state courts for further adjudication 
and litigants are free to choose which tribunal, either state or African Indigenous Justice System 
to take their cases to.
309 
However, many African communities insist that litigants must first bring 
their cases to the African Indigenous Justice System tribunal for adjudication and the rationale 
behind this is to forestall the rich and politically connected from using the state criminal justice 
system as instruments for the intimidation and exploitation of community members.
310
 
 
3.5.3 Community in the African Justice System 
 
To the African indigenous justice system is the community which is central. It has also been 
argued that the concept of family in Africa includes the nuclear family and the extended 
family.
311 
Family also encompasses people who do not share blood relationships or marriage. 
Conflict in Africa is seen as the community’s property and the state dominance in social control 
creates more problems than it solves.
312 
The state’s emphasis on punishment and the use of 
incarceration in response to law violation is destructive to the individuals who are confined as 
well as to the society at large.
313
 
Also, the community’s informal social control mechanism is undermined when the community is 
not empowered and involved and playing an active role in social control. Conflicts between 
community members must be adjudicated in the open with all community members participating 
both in the definition of harm and in the search for solutions acceptable to all stakeholders. 
                                                             
309 Elechi (2006) 208.  
310 Research has shown that state court interventions in conflicts have tended to polarise community members 
further. It is important to appreciate the fact that African communities are close-knit, thus conflict not quickly 
resolved to the satisfaction of litigants can undermine the peace and harmony of the community. State-based tribunal 
decisions often follow the winner takes all approach, which goes against the principles and values of the African 
Justice system.  
311 Louw, D. J. ‘The African concept of Ubuntu and Restorative Justice’ in D. Sullivan & L. Tifft (eds.), ‘Handbook of 
Restorative Justice: A global Perspective’ (2006) 151-160.  
312 Louw (2006) 151.  
313 Elechi O. O. on Restoring Justice (2006). In pre-colonial Africa, persons caught in fragrante delicto, in the act of 
theft, for example, or in the act of adultery, might receive immediate punishment. See Shorter Alyward, ‘Concepts of 
social justice in traditional Africa’ (1977) 12 Pro Dialogo Bulletin 32-51.  
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African  communities  are  close-knit  and  so  conflicts  not  resolved  quickly  are  capable  of 
jeopardising community harmony and polarising the community.
314
 
 
In the Africa Indigenous Justice System (some communities in West and EastAfrica today),
315 
victims, their family members or their well-wishers are the ones who petition the tribunal to look 
into their cases while a messenger of the tribunal is then delegated to inform the defendants that 
there is a case against them and to report at a given time for the hearing of the matter. A typical 
sitting arrangement in a tribunal is circular in form; this is reflective of the egalitarian world- 
view of African people.
316
 
In the tribunal, the victim is first invited to present his or her side of the story after which the 
offender is asked to respond to the complaint by the victim. The litigants are then asked to invite 
their witnesses, if any, to substantiate their stories. After all the testimonies have been given, the 
tribunal members or any community member present is then allowed to ask questions or provide 
commentary relevant to the resolution of the matter as decisions must be reached through a 
consensus. No individual has the authority to decide for the tribunal and decisions must be 
reached through a consensus for it to be enforceable.
317
 
 
Considering the fact that traditionally there was no standing army or police in African 
communities, the enforcement of any tribunal decisions was through the cooperation and 
goodwill of the people. Communal decisions were always reached through dialogue.
318
 Zehr
319 
                                                             
314 Marital conflicts are an exception to this rule as they are settled internally first by the family head or the parents 
of the couples involved. See MunaNdulo, ‘African Customary Law, Customs and Womens Rights’ (2011) 18 
Indiana Journal of Global Legal Issues 87. Some communities emphasise resolving marital disputes without 
involving the community as a whole, this is why elders are involved first before other members of the community 
get to know about the issues. Feminist have argued that this is one of the reasons why women are disadvantaged in 
some African communities as decisions that impact on them, sometimes negatively, are made by elders. See Kirsty 
Button, ‘South Africa’s System of Dispute Resolution Forums: The Role of the family and the State in Customary 
Marriage Dissolution’ Centre for Social Science Research working paper No. 339, July 2014. Available at  
www.cssr.uct.ac.za/sites/cssr.uct.ac.za/files/WP%20339.pdf (Accessed on 4th August, 2014). See also, Birgit Brock- 
Utne, ‘Indigenous Conflict Resolution in Africa’, presentation made at the Seminar on Solutions to conflicts held at 
the University of Oslo, Institute for Educational Research 23-24 February, 2001. Available at  
www.africanvenir.org/uploads/media/BrockUtneTradConflictResolution_02.pdf (Accessed on 4th August, 2014).  
315 Simon Robins, ‘Restorative Approaches to Criminal Justice in Africa: The Case of Uganda’ in ‘The Theory and 
Practice of Criminal Justice in Africa’ (2009) 57-84. (A publication by the Institute of Security Studies).  
316 Zion and Yazzie observed that the horizontal process is plastic and flexible. A horizontal legal system has 
individuals who are at least nominally equal who negotiate norms and compliance with a consensual decision is 
voluntary. Norms may be stated in terms of right and wrong, or they may be unstated but expressed as feelings about a 
given situation.  
317 Elechi (2008) 404.  
318 See Louw (2006). He said dialogue enhances the reconciliation efforts between the victims and the offenders. 
Through dialogue, the offender’s relationship with the community is restored. He notes that restorative justice 
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rightly observed that the dialogue may not succeed in reconciling the victim and the offender, but 
their relationship would challenge somewhat, as they begin to see one another as persons rather 
than monsters. According to him, ‘yet the nature of their hostility had changed. No longer were 
they mad at an abstraction, at a stereotype of a victim or offender. They were now mad at a 
concrete person. Even that represents some improvements’.320 
Looking at this perspective theoretically, the transformation of perspectives, structures and 
persons is the hallmark of restorative justice system. As earlier indicated, the African Indigenous 
Justice System uses restorative, transformative and communitarian principles in the resolution of 
conflicts.
321 
Most of the so called trouble makers in most communities are often people who are 
socially, politically and economically marginalised. In support of this, Jenkins
322 
in advancing 
the theory of restorative justice, made a case for justice making to begin with the emancipation 
of the community and individuals from the social conditions that precipitate conflict. According 
to him, ‘emancipation means that all participants are aware of their responsibilities in relation to 
such concepts as unity and self-determination. The primary focus of restorative justice then is to 
move the participants from a ‘survival’ orientation to a ‘liberation/empowerment’ orientation.323 
For the transformation of perspectives and structures to be effective, it must begin with the 
transformation of us, such as ‘our own values, behaviour, mind set and character.’324  They 
further posit that ‘a hallmark of restorative justice must be on going transformation. It begins 
with transformation of ourselves, for we to have recompense to pay, reconciliation to seek, 
forgiveness to ask and healing to receive.’325 
In African Indigenous Justice System that derives from egalitarian and communitarian principles, 
the defendant can become the judge tomorrow and vice versa. Mediators in conflict who are 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
creates opportunities for the venting of harmful emotions and challenges any ill-feelings some of the stakeholders 
may harbour. Through dialogue, trust is engendered so that people feel more comfortable in exposing their 
vulnerable sides to others.  
319 Howard Zehr & Toews B, (eds.) ‘Critical Issues in Restorative Justice’ (2004). 
320 Van Ness D. W. & Strong K. H. ‘Restoring Justice: An Introduction to Restorative Justice’ (2006) 86.  
321 Van Ness & Strong (2006) 176 identified four elements in the transformation of perspectives through restorative 
justice processes, namely creativity, openness to learning, looking for familiar problems in new ways and considering 
new alternatives. They observed that the transformation of structures will entail the monitoring of justice 
structures with the goal of identifying economic and political impediments to community connection and harmony.  
322 Jenkins M, ‘How do Culture, Class and Gender affect the Practice of Restorative Justice’ in Howard Zehr & B. 
Toews (eds.), ‘Critical issues in Restorative Justice’ (2004) 311-324.  
323 Jenkins M (2004) 314.  
324 Van Ness & Strong (2006) 181.  
325 Van Ness and Strong (2004) 181.  
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therefore conscious of their vulnerable and changing roles tend to approach each case with 
sensitivity, patience and understanding. 
3.6 Personalities Involved in Indigenous Conflict Resolution 
 
Conflict resolution has been described to be a rather fulfilling exercise in traditional African 
communities as it consists of statement and a great number of initiators of peace and harmony, 
with the intention of encouraging development and the maintenance of law and order.
326 
It is 
obvious individuals who ruled the different territories in Africa had the power and authority 
attached to the rule of law and the legitimacy idea thereof. 
The traditional characters renowned for active involvement in conflict resolution in African 
societies are the chiefs, the kings, ancestors, elders, family heads, diviners and priests, 
members of age-association, commodity association and professional association
327 
as well as 
members of secret societies.
328 
Every single individual mentioned above, that participated in 
facilitation of peace and harmony in the community, had the capacity of keeping the society in 
order and maintaining social decorum. 
 
Putting an end to disputes requires a lot of enthusiasm, bravery, extremely motivating 
passion and lasting sense of history. It is upon the peace facilitators to be strong minded to 
ward off disaster that conflicts may have ignited and an extensive understanding of norms and 
nuances of the art of conflict resolution at the grassroot level. This thesis will go further to 
show that all the above listed personalities involved in conflict resolution has all the 
features of responsibility based on the skill of conflict resolution. 
 
3.6.1 King and Chiefs 
 
Indigenous African societies recognised the King as the overall head and father of the territory. 
They were at the top of the order of chiefs and statesmen; they were the revered representative 
of the ancestors on earth and embodiment of his domain. Kings were seen as the connection 
between the revered world and the physical world.
329 
The indigenous African King played 
                                                             
326 Olaoba (2010) 69.  
327 Professional associations include the guilds of hunters and blacksmith among others.  
328 Olaoba (2010) 69.  
329 An example is the Akan community in Ghana where disputes which could not be resolved by the chiefs are 
referred to the king (Omanhene); also in the northern part of Nigeria, the Emir settles disputes which could not be 
resolved by its chiefs. See Morapedi G.W., ‘Demise or Resilence? Customary Law and Chieftaincy in Twenty-First 
Century Botswana’ (2010) 28(2) Journal of Contemporary African Studies 215-230. 
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diverse roles such as the guardian of culture, initiator of peace, advocate of harmony and 
controller of rituals for societal development. 
The king played a leading role in the administration of his empire and to enable him perform this 
function, he was distinguished and empowered with explicitly different royal title representing 
the history of his kingdom.
330  
The royal designations are unlimited but they are expressively 
symbolic of the suzerainty of the divine personality. In the indigenous African society, the nature 
of kingship was that of a human being in the mode of godliness, which gifted on the 
personality, the power to dish out power which cannot be questioned and here is the power of 
the African king concerning social control and instituting of law and order in the community. 
The word of the king was law which was never to be flouted by anyone in his kingdom. 
With conflict resolution in pre-colonial Africa, African kings played very important roles and as 
a result, they were declared appropriate for providing forum, process, principles, pattern, 
pace, context, direction for the perfection and initiation of peace and harmony, the protection 
of growth and development in traditional African societies.
331 
These royal principles endorse 
best royalty performance in the advancement and facilitation of cultural heritage, peace and 
harmony in their various kingdoms. The king’s legality on the throne, the installation of 
royal power, their ritual cleansing capacity, their sense of history towards understanding the 
norms and rules bestowed onto them by their forebears, the respect and reverence bestowed on 
them by their subjects were privileges of giving so immensely to peace process and 
development in African communities. They were seen as active reconciliators, judges and 
adjudicators in their various domains.
332
 
                                                             
330 Some of the titles in African kingdom are the Ga Mantse kingship in the Ga kingdom of Ghana, the Ohene 
kingship in the Ashante kingdom of Ghana, the Oni kingship in the Ife Ile Kingdom of Nigeria (also referred to as 
the cradle of the Yoruba), the Alaafin kingship in the Oyo Kingdom of Nigeria, the Zibondo kingship in the Basoga 
kingdom of Uganda, the Kabaka kingship in the kingdom of Buganda in Uganda, the Moro naba kingship in the 
kingdom of Mossi, the Bur kingship in the Serer Kingdom in Senegal, the Mani Kongo kingship in the kingdom of 
Kongo, the Ngwenyama kingship in the Swazi Kingdom, the Shaka kingship in the Zulu kingdom in the South 
Eastern Africa, and the Nur kingship in the Saloun Kingdom of Senegal among others. See Olaoba et al, ‘African 
Traditional Methods of Conflict Resolution’ (2010) 71; Ayittey G, ‘Indigenous African Institutions’ (2006) 185.  
331 These provisions were in tune with the norms and customs of the Kingdoms which the kings inherited from their 
ancestors. To facilitate peace in his domain, the King was imbued with enduring sense of history of the norms and 
nuances of the kingdom, unwavering wisdom of distilling facts from falsehood in the treatment of issues of conflict, 
high  level  of  epitomising  moral  order,  peace  process  and  classical  demonstration  of  harmony;  and  broader 
legitimisation of the  vital link between the universe  and the supernatural order. SeeAsiwaju A. I., ‘Western 
Yorubaland under European Rule 1889-1945: A Comparative Analysis of French and British Colonialism’ (1976); 
Asiwaju A. I., ‘Partitioned Africans: Ethnic Relations across Africa’s International Boundaries 1884-1984’ (1985).  
332 In pre-colonial times, some African kings were not physically seen or heard; rather they had an interpreter so 
referred to among the Akan speaking people of Ghana as a linguist. Such an interpretation was diplomatically 
couched as typical of the names of the Ilari (royal emissaries) in the Palace of the Alaafin of Oyo Kingdom. It was 
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Kingdoms in Africa were governed by kings in the form of monarchical government. Chiefs 
were second to the kings with chiefdom as their area of jurisdiction. They had of lower 
status and power compared to the kings in African societies. They were leaders whereas the 
kings were rulers and their constitutional rights and duties was their commitment to governance 
and installation of peace and harmony in African societies.
333
 
Judicial, executive and legislative duties were carried out in their various provinces in 
conjunction with the Kings and were mandated to provide solutions to conflicts regularly and 
enabled peace and harmony which boosted development in the society. In the conduct of 
conflict resolution meetings, the chiefs acted as safety verve to the Kings, who, for example, 
with a loss of memory would have missed certain procedure associated with the act of resolving 
conflict.
334
 
It can be seen from the foregoing that chiefs in Africa were influential mediators of conflict 
resolution in traditional African societies as they occupy a transforming role especially with 
making sure that the kings don’t over use their power in the dispensation of justice. They had 
the ability of conflict resolution in the society, as they learnt by heart and knowledge from 
their forebears who transferred the art to them. Some of them (the chiefs) were more practical 
and experienced than the kings who they installed; this is why it was not so easy for the 
kings to underestimate the acumen and intelligence of their chiefs. These chiefs were valued for 
their wealth of knowledge in reconciliation and enduring sense of history of the culture of the 
kingdom.
335
 
The chiefs were the watchdog for the morality and proprietary of manners for the young 
and the aged in the African communities. Importantly, the source of unity, mutuality and 
common understanding was good behaviour and action directed towards social development 
in the society. A lot of the chiefs resided closely with the township people and observed their 
way of life; in fact chiefs had courts in their various residences where parties to conflicts 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
not so much the idea of seeing the King that mattered but the process of resolution which the authority of the royal 
command through the interpreter to the degree that the end of justice was celebrated.  
333 Zartman, I (eds.) ‘Traditional Cures for Modern Conflict: African Conflict’ (2000) 283.  
334 African chiefs provided supporting force of action, enabling spirit and motivation, team spirit and interest, checks 
and balances, validity of verdict; and reconnection points for parties to the conflict. See African traditional Methods of 
Conflict Resolution at 73.  
335 Kaderi Noagah Bukari, ‘Exploring Indigenous Approach to Conflict Resolution: The Case of the Bawku Conflict 
in Ghana’ (2013) 4 Journal of Sociological Research 89. 
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frequently met for the resolution of their conflicts.  
Where a chief could not handle a conflict in his ward/quarter, he will engineer the means of 
transmitting such case to a higher level, where kings with other chiefs will listen and resolve the 
matter.
336
 African chiefs also had the power to issue warnings and institute specific ultimatum 
to Kings where there is no obedience with the norms and customs of the kingdom, shirking 
of chieftaincy and status symbols or refusal to perform sacrificial rites.
337 
The chiefs 
(especially in West Africa) knew and mastered the act of installing their kings and 
dethroning them too therefore, from kingdom to kingdom, we had established rules which 
governed the relationship of the kings with their chiefs.
338
 
For judicial, executive and legislative control of the society, Kings and chiefs were entirely 
depended upon but the situation is no longer the same today as there had been a lot of 
changes which have surpassed the indigenous roles of these traditional ruling elites.
339 
They 
used to be involved in the development of governmental policies and the declaration of 
indigenous laws formed from traditional norms and customs. Colonial authorities came and 
took over such royal responsibilities and stood between the kings and chiefs, to the level 
that some of the kings had their power extended beyond the chiefs while on the other hand, 
some kings became figure head on the throne.
340
 
Looking at the scenarios illustrated above one is left to wonder, whether, that in the structure of 
governance at the grassroot level, why it has been challenging to remove the kings and 
chiefs. The kings and chiefs, although still exists and continuously perform important role 
in governance and conflict resolution, they lack constitutional roles. This is the heart of the 
matter when sympathising with the inability of several indigenous institutions which still 
flourish in today within African societies. 
                                                             
336 Chiefs respected their Kings so well that they held them in great reverence, usually accorded them with utmost 
obeisance, regarded them as representatives of the gods and as such semi-supernatural; upheld their words and 
authority as sacrosanct, expected a reciprocal gestures from them. Thus, Chiefs never expected their kings to be so 
absolute in the expression of rights and privileges.  
337 Olaoba et al (2010) 74.  
338 Crowder, MO Ikime (eds.) ‘West African Chiefs: Their Changing Status under Colonial rule and Independence’ 
(1970).  
339 Such changes include the advent of colonial administrators, the missionary impact, establishment of colonial 
styled courts which practised colonial laws, the introduction of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR), foreign 
pattern of government and cultural traits and in respect of human rights cases, the introduction of human rights court for 
the continent of Africa.  
340 Taiwo B, ‘Government and Politics in West Africa: A Critical Approach Part’ (1982).  
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It is imperative to know that despite the denial of the kings and chiefs to be involved in 
administration within the context of the constitution, the knowledge of conflict resolution never 
diminished. They (kings and chiefs) still operated behind the scene roles and duties in today’s 
conflicts resolution.
341 
This is similar to the fact of the revolution of conflict resolution 
ideal through time, kingdom and space therefore; no need to say that people’s culture can be 
virile and transformative. 
 
Conventional customs and norms gradually engineered good societies through network of 
relationship and as it has been shown above, had been productive in the area of development. 
The motivators of these developments were the kings and the chiefs in Africa as their role 
was so pivotal and undeniable. The examp le demonstrated by the kings with their chiefs that 
made the colonialists recognise their ability and capacity to bring together people as well as 
maintaining law and order. In essence, the British Overseers and colonialist observed and 
authorised the kings, at a representative level, to good governance which at the end of the day 
produced economic prosperity. 
3.6.2 Ancestors and the notion of Justice in Africa 
 
The ancestors had been metaphysically and mystically conceived in the mind of Africans and 
such spiritualism directed the system of belief of the Africans that death will certainly not 
write off the motivation to live and desire of African people as long as there is such perception 
of the cosmos, where spiritual forces interact in the scheme of existence. 
Ancestors were regarded as the living dead enjoying dual presence and the skill attained 
while still alive normally acknowledge the level of reflections of world happenings in the 
spiritual world. This experience was never written off since the blood connecting them 
constantly flows in their descendants, who although, does not have the necessary knowledge, 
                                                             
341 In some African countries, Kings are still recognised and are assigned roles to play. For example, in Lesotho, the 
King retained some political prerogatives part of which includes the right to name one-third of the members of the 
Senate. See Paul Nugent, ‘Africa since Independence: A Comparative History’ (2012) 441. Swaziland is another 
country where the King still partakes in the decision making of the country. Infact it is the last absolute monarchy in 
Africa. The King shares the titles of head of State and head of government and he is not restricted by the 
Constitution or law. Any legislation passed by the Parliament only becomes law when such legislation is passed by 
the King. See Mike Unwin, ‘Swaziland’ (2012) 62. Uganda is another country where the King still plays a role in the 
governance of the country. It has five monarchies within it and although these Kings have little political power on the 
national level, they possess some influence in local and regional administration. See Rebecca Stefoff, 
‘Monarchy’ (2008) 106. In the northern part of Africa, Morocco is another example of where the King still plays a 
pivotal role in the administration of Justice in Africa. Nothing official happens in Morocco without the Kings 
explicit sanction. See Pat Seward & Orin Hargraves, ‘Cultures of the World: Morocco’ (2005) 31.  
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must be directed to attain the necessary life experience. Such an experience is that of 
motivation and coordination in the art of conflict resolution. The belief was that the living dead 
would provide on their ancestral and peaceful community, the art of enabling peace and 
harmony, which certainly, is echoed in modular display of peaceful growth.
342 
The skill of 
resolution of conflict will not have been restricted to earthly living and sojourn but that it 
continued in the ancestral society. The ancestral  community would  have  been  stimulated  
with  a  number  of  well-arranged  deeds contemplative of the physical world; consequently the 
ancestral community is the psychic world hence the next phase of human transformation into the 
spiritual world. 
The transformation of human beings into the divine world is basically a complete one in a way 
that the norms, physical behaviour and customs were remembered as the next stage of sojourn. 
Just like a person travelling to another village and would, on his his way, impact and touch his 
next haven of call and also looking back to check what must have been happening with his 
village of exit. It is enlightening to be informed that life is a constant flow of unending 
activities which but changes form from one person to another and age to age.
343
 
3.6.2.1 The Ancestors in Partnership with the Living 
 
Some form of relationship has existed amid the ancestors and the living and this partnership had 
been very affectionate and common but conceptualised spiritually. This sustained association 
had been clearly described by Fortes as follows: 
When a particular deceased and it is always a particular person- is thus reinstated as an 
ancestor, it is because he has living descendants of the right category. His reinstatement in this 
status established his continued relevance for his society, not as a ghost, but as a regulative 
focus for the social relations and activities and that persist as the deposit, so he speaks of his life 
and career.
344
 
                                                             
342 For example, in Botswana, traditional or spiritual leader may use herbs, animal sacrifices and water to perform 
rituals aimed at resolving a conflict between the living; and between the living and their ancestral. According to 
tradition, chiefs could consult traditional healers to seek their views on various conflicts in the community. See 
KwakuOsei-Hwedie&MorenaRankopo, ‘Chapter 3: Indigenous Conflict Resolution in Africa: The Case of Ghana 
and Botswana’ (2012) 45.  
343 The essence of discussing about this is to propel clearer understanding of a total difficult concept of ancestral 
living and hope that at the end, I would have been able to situate ancestral living within the context of unending 
activities of man in space and time, identify the ancestors as key players in the art of conflict resolution in African 
society, assess the spectacular roles of the living-dead in the life of the living persons especially in the art of conflict 
resolution; and examine the implication of conflict resolution between the ancestors and the living persons. There is no 
doubt that there is a networking of relationships between the ancestors who have been transformed into spiritual 
universe and the living persons who are sojourning in the earthly universe.  
344 Fortes M. and G. Disesten (eds.), ‘Some Reflection on Ancestor Worship in Africa’ in ‘African System of 
https://etd.uwc.ac.za
78 
 
 
 
The connection between the ancestors and the living persons are separately understood between 
the different indigenous groups in Africa but the fact still remains that the living and the dead 
have been in constant touch. The way the relationship between the living and the dead is 
interpreted differs. For example, in Nigeria it is amphibious amid the Irigwe’s but treble among 
the Tirikis in Kenya. With the Sisala of Northern Ghana, the forebearers are conceptualised 
as an image of social associations. They control social relations within the Lojagaa of Uganda. 
The persistent relationship and partnership in the consistent control of the society as revealed 
by the ancestors and the living is characteristic of the Suku of South-western Congo, the Ngas 
and the Sukuma in Tanganyika.
345
 
The constant manifestation of conflict within indigenous Africa is attributable to the strong 
impact of the supernatural in the dealings of the living.
346 
The world is a supernatural place 
that brings to a close, the coming together of many forces and to overlook these forces or undue 
tapping of the forces would always lead to conflicts. To disregard these forebearers as part of 
life sequence can set off conflicts and afflictions within the society, family and lineage.
347 
To 
prevent conflict in indigenous African societies, it was necessary for fear of mystical forces like 
the ancestors.
348 
The responsibility of the ancestors was to make sure there is social evenness 
and justice. Infact, governance was adequately bestowed on them. Noticeable distinction 
between the governance of the ancestors and that of the living persons were identified by 
jurists and it was resolved that the governance of the forebearers is ‘pervasive and absolute’ 
whereas that of the living persons is ‘partial and liable challenge.’349 What this presumes is the 
fact that the living are submissive to the forebearers. 
 
3.6.2.2 Ancestors in Peace-making Process 
 
Ancestors are one of the major characters in dispute resolution in Africa and as pointed out 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
Thought’ (1965) 122.Available at www.afrikaworld.net/afrel/fortes2.html (Accessed on 30th March, 2015).  
345 See Calhoun, CJ, ‘The Authority of Ancestors: A sociological Reconsideration of Fortes Tallensi in Response to 
Fortes critics’ (1980)15 (2) Available at www.lucy.ukc.ac.uk/era/ancestors/calhoun.html. (Accessed on 30th March, 
2015).  
346 Olaoba et al, ‘African Traditional Method of Conflict Resolution’ (2010) 80.  
347 Among the Sukuma of Tanganyika, an offence against the ancestors attracts afflictions which can only be atoned 
for thorough propitiation.  
348 Adewoye  O,  ‘The  Judicial  Systems  in  Southern  Nigerian’  (1977)  147-149;  and  Ojo  J.D.,  ‘The  Place  of 
supernatural powers in the individual law with Particular reference to Nigeria’ (1973) 1 Nigerian Behavioural 
Science Journal 1, were of the view that the supernatural had overwhelming influence on the moral conduct of the 
society through the facilitation of peace and harmony.  
349 See Calhoun CJ, ‘The Authority of ancestors: A sociological Reconsideration of Fortes Tallensi in Response to 
Fortes Critics’ (1980) 15.  
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earlier in this chapter, the ancestors once lived the universe before they transformed into the 
spiritual universe from where they watched over the affairs and activities of the living persons. 
With the transformation, it was believed that the forebearers were gifted with knowledge and 
skill of resolution of conflict beyond the living. Indigenous Africans believed that their 
ancestors transferred the skill of resolution of conflict to the living persons while leaving the 
natural world and this explains the reasoning why they ensure that whatever they left in the 
earthly world was preserved and maintained for the steadiness.
350
 
 
The forebearers have motivational power and determination towards aiding the mechanism 
resolution of conflict as they are very wise, all-knowing and also because they have the 
experience and authority. They are also peace-loving thereby making them facilitators of peace 
and enhancers. According to Kopytoff,
351
 ‘it has ever been the avowed responsibility and rights 
of the ancestors to occupy a prominent invisible and invincible position at the scene of conflict 
resolution in Africa. The living elders, who are physically seen, though standing above all parties 
to the conflict and the evidence, are merely present as lieutenants of the dead elders.’352 
The forebearers are mystically around at the venue of conflict resolution no matter the kind of 
dispute whether lineage, family, clan or town level and the power of the living elders over any 
conflict in rage was endorsed by the dead elders (ancestors). 
 
On the presence of the forebearers in the resolution of conflict process, Calhoun is positive. 
This is a method which appears largely within African societies. He states as follows: 
                                                             
350 Oyedolapo D.B, Olaoba O.B, Anifowose R. &Yesufu A., ‘African Traditional Methods of Conflict Resolution’ 
(2010) Course Code PCR831, National Open University of   Nigeria handbook 19. Available at 
www.nou.edu.ng/NOUN_OCL/pdf/SASS/PCR%20831.pdf (Accessed on 5th August, 2014). See also, Olaoba O.B., 
‘Yoruba Legal Culture’ (2002) 18.  
351 Kopytoff I., ‘Ancestors as Elders in Africa’ (1971) 41 Africa 129-142.  
352 Olaoba et al, ‘African Traditional Methods of Conflict Resolution’ (2010) 78.  
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Alternately, the ancestors may be called upon to resolve a dispute, to put it another way, 
disputants may carry out their arguments in the language of ancestral authority. Specific 
ancestors hold primary authority over groups larger than households (that is, larger than those 
headed by living parents). They are also the prime referents in the definition and 
differentiation of these corporate groups. The primary means of bringing the ancestral voice 
into the affairs of the living, and thus rendering an authoritative decision through 
divination.
353
 
The living elders have a scared responsibility to sustain the doctrines of power and authority of 
the forebearers and they also view the responsibility as a privilege and not as a right that must 
not be abandoned or abused. Where the responsibility is misused, the forebearers could exert 
their power to discipline blundering living elders and what this means is that the ancestors 
enjoy retributory powers that the living elders cannot comprehend. 
Peace making process in indigenous Africa was informed by the existence of the forebearers 
that monitored the process and exercise of resolution of conflict. They are also present during 
council’s inauguration, tribunals and panels accountable for putting social orders in place, 
upkeep of spirit of togetherness (esprit de corps), they also give their blessing and support.
354
 
Peace making and peace building, as earlier discussed, are the creation of founded 
establishments which are the kings, chiefs and priests, part of which claimed heavenly rights, 
and the living elders, who are blessed with ancestral investiture of power and authority to 
make rules and also to design enduring policies important to the growth of the community. 
3.6.2.3 Conflict Generating Traits and Ancestors 
 
Ancestors, like human beings, also have character traits although there is a bit of difference 
among them. Ancestors are invincible to the living but the living are not invincible to the 
ancestors and the space among them is hard to read and quantify. Though it is easy to predict 
the character of human beings, the reverse is the case for ancestors. It is, however, noticeable 
that the ancestors have huge powers to do and not to do; they can display strong sense of 
lenience, could angered over the smallest blunders of their descendants, inflict affliction and 
such other epidemics at the smallest of incitement and can set off conflict when not 
happy with the way the events are being conducted.
355
 The ancestors at all times desire that the 
                                                             
353 Calhoun, C. J., ‘The Authority of ancestors: A Sociological Reconsideration of Fortes Critics’ (1980) Journal of 
the Royal Anthropological Institute 304-19. The ancestors not only know the wherewithal of communicating in the 
language of peace and harmony, but also powerful forces to reckon with in conflict resolution.  
354 David Francis, ‘Peace and Conflict in Africa’ (2008) 18.  
355 Kopytoff I, ‘Ancestors as Elders in Africa’ (1971) 129-142.  
https://etd.uwc.ac.za
81 
 
 
 
society evolve to the highest level of success but they, nonetheless, does not like desertion, 
detestation between kith and kin, greed, pretext, self-aggrandisement, indolence, 
dishonesties, assassination of character, molestation and harassment among others.
356 
When 
one of these is committed, the likelihood of not perpetually incurring the ire of the ancestors is 
in abundant appeasement. 
 
However, the ancestors are not interested in causing wars, bringing about epidemics with 
disease. Fortes
357 
captured this point clearly as follows: 
In short, the persecuting ancestor is not a supernatural being capriciously punishing a 
wrongdoing or rewarding virtue. He is rather to be thought of as an ultimate judge and 
mentor whose vigilance is directed towards restoring order and discipline in compliance with 
the norms of right and duty, amity and piety, whenever regression threaten or occur. When 
misfortune occurs and is interpreted as punitive, or to be more exact, corrective intervention 
by the ancestors, they believed to have acted rightfully, not wantonly, moreover, they are 
subject to the moral constraint that emanates from faithful worship. Though one cannot be 
certain that one’s offerings and attendance will gain benevolence, one can rest that they will 
bind the ancestors to act justly. 
It is important to appreciate the fact that African ancestors have always directed their attention 
on dealings with their offspring in the human world. The notion of creating conflict, an act 
which the ancestors are known for, is not so much a great interest and intention but they could 
want their offspring to maintain an ontological balance with them for the purpose of constant 
reminder of what will ginger the living persons not only to action but also to the right 
direction. No matter the kind of punishment given to them, it is always purposeful and 
corrective therefore the living person cannot take the African ancestors for a ride as a result of 
their physical absence from the worldly universe. 
The ancestors can be called upon in spirit to establish the invincible and spiritual presence at the 
scheme of conflict resolution in African societies. The reconciliators at the scheme could be 
moved and swayed by the concealed forces dictating the scene of conflict resolution. They 
would have been tremendously directed to emphasise the obvious, stress the significant points in 
the issues of conflict and strike the canal of the truth pertaining to the resolution of the 
                                                             
356 AfuaBonsuSarpong-Anane, ‘Globalisation and Indigenous Conflict Management: Experience from Africa’ in 
Akanmu G. A., Jesse J. B. & Brandon D. L. (eds), ‘Indigenous Conflict Management Strategies: Global 
Perspectives’ (2014) 78.  
357 Fortes      M.,      ‘Some      Reflection      on      Ancestor      Worship      in      Africa’      Available      at 
www.afrikaworld.net/afrel/fortes2.html.(Accessed on 30th March, 2015).  
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conflict.
358
 
The consideration of the fact of the conflict by the mediators, disagreeing parties, witnesses 
and the watching viewers could have been made possible by the peaceful atmosphere made 
possible by mystical principle of the ancestors, around the venue of conflict resolution. 
Atmosphere like this is charged with maximum attention, intention and commitment, all 
directed at eradicating falsehoods and misrepresentation but canversing and hammering on the 
truth and nothing but the truth.
359
 
3.6.3 Elders and Family Heads 
 
Elders and family heads, in indigenous African societies, played important roles in conflict 
resolution. Such roles include political, social and at times, religious. They also act as 
important characters when facilitating peace and harmony in their various jurisdictions. 
Family heads are seen as elders in their family compound and in the larger society; there were 
also elders in wards and quarter levels of the society. 
The position of an elder in the indigenous Africa societies was determined with age, 
maturity, wisdom and knowledge posturing like in the Igbo community and the Yoruba 
community in Nigeria;
360
 wealth and stature were not used as a determining factor. Maturity 
needs considerable level of development and extent of responsibility and wisness, without 
these, a man cannot successfully participate in the act of resolution of conflict. They remained 
the focus of attention by the youth and the adolescents for joy and happiness, rewarding vocation 
and association as well as being regarded as repository of knowledge and wisdom and as 
shining examples of projecting a lasting sense of history of the society.
361
 
It is significant to be informed that there is no interim periods in the life’s stages in 
African societies, it is the era defined by the level of mind-set and the interest and passion of 
the youth
362 
and the living elders.
363
 Youth can be exuberant while at the same time, the 
                                                             
358 Tanner E. R.S., Ancestors Propitiation ceremony in Sukuma, Tangayika, (1958) Africa 1. See also Elders, Office 
holders and ancestors among the Sisala of Northern Ghana (1976) Africa.  
359 It is important to note here that truth is the language of the ancestors and the instrument of facilitating peace and 
harmony in African societies. To do otherwise will incur the wrath and anger of the ancestors; whereas it is not easy to 
annoy the ancestors. See, Ancestors as Elders in Africa (1971) 129 – 142.  
360 Uzoma Oyemaechi & Ann Arbor, ‘Igbo Political Systems’ Available at www.umunna.org/politicalsystems.htm 
(Accessed on 6th August, 2014). 
361 Age, sex and status have been adjudged prominent matrices of role play and modelling in African indigenous 
societies and these three have influenced seniority and maturity. They also determined experience and wisdom.  
362 They learn fast and acquire knowledge.  
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elders being unassuming in imparting knowledge; refusing to learn from the elders is not to 
appreciate the method of governance and resolution of conflict for the upcoming generation. 
Therefore, both elders and the youths are development partners in the maintenance of peace 
and harmony in Africa traditional societies
.
364
 
3.6.3.1 Elders and Synergy for Effective Conflict Resolution 
 
The elders in the indigenous African societies had the ability to initiate growths, provided 
anticipation into the future of the society and enabled peace and harmony the preserves of 
law and orderliness, which indicated social engineering. This explains the fact that the 
living elders have been instilled with the skill of resolution of conflict that is, the 
protection of truth and forecast of progress in African societies.
365
 
With sterling attributes, the elders were able to interact perfectly with the members of their 
societies to the extent of notifying the people about the activities of development and thesis of 
companionship and social engineering.
366 
They were so devoted to the growth of the 
community to the extent that the derivative skill of administration had its grip in both 
integrated and headless communities.
367 
Among the centralised societies were the Swazi and 
Zulu of South Africa, the Mossi of Burkina Faso, the Fante of Ghana, the Yoruba of 
Southwest Nigeria and the Hausa of Northern Nigeria while for the acephalous societies were 
the Mbeere of Kenya, the Kokombo of Togoland, the Jie of Uganda and the Fulani of Northern 
Nigeria as well as the Igbo of South-eastern Nigeria.
368368
 
As mentioned earlier, status and age are not factors of defining social classificatory 
models in African communities; the elders thus had the privileges of maturity and experience 
through which they performed their primary functions, particularly the art of resolution of 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
363 They impart sufficient practical knowledge on the youth who will later take over the reign of affairs from them.   
364 The objective behind discussing about this is to bring forth, the wisdom of elders and family heads in the art of 
dispute resolution, to assess the peace making capacity of the elders and the family heads, identify the roles of the 
elders and family heads in conflict resolution and weigh the challenges before the elders and family heads in the 
process of conflict resolution in African societies. Through the discussion on this, I stand at the vantage position of 
appreciating the value of wisdom as applicable to the day to day life activities and how to cope with the challenges of 
the time and so do other people that will have the opportunity to go through my work later in life.  
365 The elders were attributed with sterling qualities which stood them out of the society and these qualities included 
forbearance,  tolerance,  patience,  foresight,  innovative  spirit,  self-control,  forthrightness  and  commitment  to 
development process. 
366 Olaoba O.B., ‘Yoruba Elders and the Control of juristic thought’ (2006) 1 Peace Studies and Practice Journal of 
the society for Peace Studies and Practice 1.  
367 Mendosa E. L., Elders, ‘Office Holders and Ancestors among the Sisala of Northern Ghana’ (1976) Africa 46.  
368 Olaoba et al (2010) 89.  
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conflict. The knowledge and understanding of conflict resolution is obtained from their 
forbears and elders were seen as ancestors in African societies.
369 
What this means is 
simply the understanding and knowledge of elders were transferred to them by their 
ancestors who formerly had the primary understanding and wisdom of the worldly conflict 
resolution model. It is also important to conclude from the ancient transfer of knowledge on 
the living elders that African communities had in existence its own conflict resolution models 
before Western influence came. The living elders, thus, were the mechanisms of transition of 
knowledge and experience of conflict resolution in African societies.
370
 
The attainment of knowledge and wisdom of resolution of conflict by the African elders 
empowered them to own, in excess, the lores (proverbs, maxim and folktales) through 
which they encourage parties to a conflict and the viewers at the venue of the conflict 
resolution.
371 
It is however, not easy to obtain and perfect as well as relate the knowledge lores 
to matters of conflict.
372 
To have been encouraged by the elders in a particular conflicting 
situation means the demonstration of the skill and scope of the sages in the art of conflict 
resolution. The elders had the wealth of power of influence and conviction obtainable from 
wisdom lores.
373
 
The elders in the process of conflict resolution, either at the ward or family or quarter level, 
normally exhibit the belief in the omnipresent of the ancestral spirit, hope in the impartation of 
ancestral knowledge and control of the proceedings, application of the norms and customs of 
African society and the ability to end the feud in focus.
374
 
The elders of the Tiriki from Western Kenya proved the example of the judicial role 
expected of them; thus Sangree analysed the roles of the Tiriki elders in a perfect way as follows: 
The judicial elders who habitually gather at the community centre in the mornings may always 
be prevailed upon by any man in the community to arbitrate a dispute. Boys, girls, and women 
customarily have their grievances presented by an adult brother or father… The plaintiff 
pleads his own case or the case of the aggrieved woman or child he represents, and he may 
bring as many witnesses as he wants to substantiate his story and give supporting evidence. 
The defendant or his or her guardian then presents his own case and names witnesses whom 
                                                             
369 Kopytoff, ‘The Ancestors as Elders in Africa’ (1971) 129-142.  
370 Olaoba O. B., ‘Yoruba Elders and the control of Juristic Thought’ (2006) 1.  
371 Mendosa, E.L. ‘Elders, Office Holders and Ancestors among the Sisala of Northern Ghana’ (1976) 1.  
372 Lores were used at an impromptu manner, thereby suggesting the mental alertness and versatility of the living 
elders.  
373 Townsend N., ‘Age, descent and Elders among the Pokomo Africa’ (1977) 47. 
374 Olaoba et al, ‘African Traditional Method of Conflict Resolution’ (2010) 
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the judicial elders may then summon to give testimony on his behalf. During the entire 
proceedings, all adult men and elderly women may ask the judicial elders for permission to 
express their opinion on the case, or add further evidence, and the elders may themselves 
call on anyone; including women and children to present testimony. The matter on which the 
judicial elder finally pass Judgement is not necessarily that which the plaintiff first presented. 
Indeed, the original accusation may be judged irrelevant to some other question that arises 
during the trial and that is deemed of greater importance by the elders. The original defendant 
may even be acquitted and final Judgement made against someone else, even the plaintiff.
375
 
The above activities amid the Tiriki of Kenya show the element of fair play and justice in the 
course of conflict resolution. The elders will not be able to do otherwise as their obligation was 
focused towards peace and harmony for the parties to the conflict and the society at large. 
3.6.3.2 Family Systems and Conflict Resolution 
 
The family is a social entity and the basis of relationships and development. It remain the entity 
for political culture in Africa and thereby the footing of conflict resolution. The art of conflict 
resolution encouraged peace and harmony for the African population and this presumes the 
fact that the family must first enjoy the joy of peaceful and cordial living be fo r e  it spreads 
to the larger society. 
At the level of the family, peace and harmony had been the basis of a constructive and 
comprehensive political culture and at this level, the coordinators of peace and harmony were 
the family heads, who in their own rights, were considered as elders. Infact, family heads are 
presumed to be the most aged.
376
 
The head of the family had the ability and skill to resolve clashes within the family set up and 
as the eldest in the family and an ancestor in the making they exhibited the art of resolving 
conflicts as bestowed to them by the family ancestors. They had the ability to provide 
solutions to conflicts like marital brawl between co-wives in the family, between wives and 
husbands, between children and mothers as well as quarrels arising from property inheritance. 
Any clashes that the family head was incapable to determine were referred to the ward heads.
377 
They were always cautious of the cord of unity among family members therefore they 
                                                             
375 Cited in Ajayi A. & Buhari L., ‘Methods of Conflict Resolution in African Traditional Society’ (2014) 8African 
Research Review 142.  
376 Bascom, W. R., ‘The Principle of Seniority in the social structure of the Yoruba’ (1942) American 
Anthropologist 44. 
377 Olaoba O. B. ‘Yoruba Elders and the control of juristic thought’ (2006) 1. See also Mendosa E. L., ‘Elders, Office 
Holders and Ancestors among the Sisala of Northern Ghana’ (1976) 1; Ayittey G.B.N, ‘Indigenous African 
Institutions’ (1991) 26; Gluckman M, ‘The Reasonable man in Barotse Law’ in ‘Order and Rebellion in Tribal 
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exercised caution, patience and level headedness when resolving conflicts and this was 
widespread in African indigenous societies. 
3.6.3.3 Elders as Icons of Conflict Resolution 
 
The African elders, as discussed earlier, were representatives of the spiritual forces and also 
symbolised the authority game in them. It is, nevertheless, important to interpret the hero of the 
heavenly beings which assisted the perfect implementation of power behind the conflict 
resolution in indigenous societies in Africa. They were seen as reformers with influence which 
symbolisation led to stronger hold and control in indigenous African societies and the fact 
that representational stance  involve  alot  in  delivery of  service  of  spiritual  guidance  must  
be  understood.  The symbolisation of the ancestral power meant greater impartation of the social 
idea and justice.
378
 
Elders as iconoclasts in Africa submits that the formulation of the ancestral power tremendously 
gave progressive or undesirable consequences based on the level playing ground for 
representation  and  symbolisation  of  power.  They heroic in the growth process as product of 
legitimacy and symbolisation of control and authority.
379 
As models; they were seen as elderly 
persons in the physical domain of the universe and younger persons in the divine arena and 
their influence in resolution of conflict was similar with the physical combined with spiritual 
voice resounded in order to institutionalise peace and organising harmony. They make sure 
of strong sense of justice and good principles equivalent to advanced projection of growth plan 
in indigenous African societies.
380
 
3.6.4 Age-grade Association 
 
As pointed out earlier, age, sex and status have been social phenomena in African societies. They 
have been determinants of identity, social relevance and instruments of development. Africans 
have always been cautious of their birth, status and the manner of identification with their 
societies and this still happens. Age bracket made it possible for people to get along with their 
                                                             
378 Such symbolisation of power conferred on the elders include investiture of authority, capacity for articulating 
norms and customs, ennoblement of personality, awareness of the wellbeing of the society, legitimacy of 
representation, linkage between abstract and sincerity of purpose, enablement to be divinely decisive and firsthand 
knowledge of ritual disposition for resolving conflicts in traditional African societies. See Akanmu Adebayo et al, 
Indigenous Conflict Management Strategies: Global Perspectives (2014) 93.  
379 Ernest Uwazie (ed.), ‘Alternative Dispute Resolution and Peace-building in Africa’ (2014) 88.  
380 Olaoba et al (2010) 89. See also Ann Skelton, ‘Tapping indigenous Knowledge: Traditional Conflict Resolution, 
Restorative Justice and the Denunciation of crime in South Africa’ in Van der Spur, Parmentier S &Dissel A (eds.), 
‘Restorative Justice: Politics, Policies and Prospect’ (2007) 228-246.  
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group peers and companions; it consists of people of roughly the same age while the degree of 
difference depended largely on the nature of social stratification but this differs from community 
to community.
381
 
 
A person was born into a society and within a cultural context, growing up entails that he finds 
relevance and substance within a group germane to his physical growth, where he could find 
succour and social significance. Although, a person’s membership of age-grade association 
changes from time to time, depending on the number of years designed for the association, there 
was  always  the  enthusiasm  and  interest  to  contribute  to  the  association’s  activities  and 
programmes irrespective of the number of years of membership.
382 
Each age-grade association 
recognised active participation, sense of belonging and social relevance towards development. 
 
No matter the pain of belonging to a particular age-grade association might have been on 
indigenous African societies, the mode of mobilisation of the members showed the capacity to 
initiate programmes of development and the acquisition of wisdom to forge ahead, not only as 
members of the association but also as members of the society, was quite in focus.
383 
Graduation 
into levels of organisation suggests the various channels of development and units of challenges 
in African indigenous societies. 
 
3.6.4.1 Age-Grade Association and Task Force Mandate 
 
Age-grade association can be ascribed to a task force which was given a special mandate in 
indigenous African societies. It was an organised labour unit working for the development of the 
society and charged with mandates of building and repairing the roads, tidying up the market 
square, drenching the streams and the rivers, felling of wild trees, clearing palaces and shrines 
and protecting lives and properties.
384 
These mandates ensured the well-being and social welfare 
of the populace thereby making them peaceful and ready to shun chaos and violence. In fact, law 
and order was ascertained and sustained in indigenous African societies.
385
 
                                                             
381 Otite, O &Ogionwo W, ‘An Introduction to Sociological Studies’ (1994) 51. The age grade association in 
indigenous Africa society was not so much of identification with a particular group in the society but for the 
purposeful attention accorded them by members of the society, whose needs as the situation might have been, going 
through the stance of Otite and Ogionwo, the association capably satisfied.  
382 Otite, O &Ogionwo W (1994) 51.  
383 Fajana A., Age-group in Yoruba Traditional Society (1968) 98.  
384 Bona Udeze, Why Africa?: A Continent in a Dilemma of Unanswered Questions (2009) 72.  
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To be a member of the task force was suggestive of the fact that maturity was in vogue and 
mental alertment was par with the taskforce mandate and it was always a thing of joy for a man 
to belong to the task force. Among the Bantu Tiriki of western Kenya, there was a special grade 
of warriors, also with the Swazis and the Zulus.
386 
In many African societies the task force was 
recognised for its military strength and process as well as their intelligent projection and as 
observed that in battle there was conflict and chaos but in peace there was harmony and 
mutuality which signalled development.
387
 
The social engineering in African indigenous societies was such that the integrative force in 
place projected and sustained law and order germane to the progress of the society. The task 
force which the age grade typified in African indigenous societies had been quite instrumental to 
the notion of proper organisation of ideas, duties and functions for which an individual as a 
member of an age grade association and as a member of the entire gamut of the society should 
play and actualise so credibly. Peace process was also anchored on task force mandate and this 
shall be discussed subsequently. 
3.6.4.2 Age-Grade Association and Conflict Resolution 
 
Conflict resolution was tailored towards the restoration of peace and enhancement of harmony in 
African indigenous societies though it was not an easy task. It was desirous of knowledge, 
wisdom and experience, also aligned with social responsibilities of the age grade association. 
The association played significant roles in the process of conflict resolution as members had the 
capacity to ensure mutuality and harmony. 
The age group association were forceful in action, dynamic by mindset, enthusiastic in manners, 
versatile in social engineering, intimidating in the struggle, spectacularly youthful and blunt in 
the pursuit of truth.
388 
These qualities enabled the age grade association to be a power to 
reckon with in the reconciliatory process of restoring peace and harmony back to the 
                                                             
386 Sangree W. H., ‘The Bantu Tiriki of Western Kenya’ (1965) 49-52.  
387 The Swazi, Zulu and Tswana had well organised age-groups noted for their regimentation. Among the Ashanti, 
Bemba and Pondo age-grouping was of lesser degree. Age grade association had its age unit and period when their 
efficiency waned. Among the Turkana and Gusii, the strength of age grade association waned in old age; among the 
Yako of Cross Rivers the diminishing return sets in after the middle age, whereas among the southern Ibo and Ibibio 
groups and some parts of Yorubaland, the military functions of the age-grade association almost always terminated at 
the middle age. According to Udeze, (2009) 72, difference existed among the various ethnic groups concerned age-
grade associations, which can be identified in the different types of activities and tasks performed by them. See Udeze 
(2009) 72.  
388 Townsend N., ‘Age-descent and elders among the Pokomo’ (1977) 4.  
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society. Their existence was one good innovation which proved quite successful in the 
sustainability of law and order in some traditional African societies. 
The involvement of individuals with oratory talents and mediating skills in a given age grade 
association resonated with the fact that conflicts never remained unresolved in traditional African 
societies
389 
and as observed by Glazier
390   
among the Mberee: 
Moots were not standing bodies in the sense that the same group of men had all the cases but 
were situational assemblies which disbanded when any case concluded. Because 
argumentation, persuasion and compromise determined the outcome of a dispute, the 
personal talent of moot members were emphasised and particular men from the pool of elders 
appeared as councillors in case after case. An individual’s ability to serve on such a  moot  was  
not  contingent  on  his  membership  in  a  particular  class  or  set  without exception informants 
stress ability rather than set or class as the major criterion in most participation and 
leadership.
391
 
The age-grade associations were used to perform police duties since they were considered as 
having military prowess. Such duties included summoning offenders to the scene of conflict 
resolution, watching over the behaviour of parties to the conflict at the scene of reconciliation, 
ensuring adherence to and application of the norms and customs governing conflict resolution 
and especially protecting the lives of the crowd of spectators present at the scene of conflict 
resolution in African indigenous societies.
392 
The age-group association, especially the youthful 
sets, played considerable roles in peace process and the actualisation of reconciliation and it was 
challenging for them to ascertain truthful disposition of the audience at the scene of conflict 
resolution. Perhaps more challenging was the fact of compromise among the tribunal or moot to 
reach reasonable conclusion of restoring peace and harmony back to the society. 
 
3.6 Punishment in Traditional African Justice System 
 
The African Indigenous Justice System is process-oriented with the main goal of restoring peace, 
                                                             
389 For example, the Mberee of Kenya had a significant moot proceeding which recognised the capacity of the 
individuals in conflict resolution.  
390Glazier J., ‘Generation Classes among the Mberee of Central Kenya’ (1976) Africa 46 at 313-326.   
391 According to James I. Gibbs, ‘The Kpelle Moot: A Therapeutic Model for the informal settlement of disputes’ 
(1963) African Magazine, 33rd Edition, at 1-11, the moot among the Kpelle of Uganda was a therapeutic model of 
conflict resolution. Similarly, the moot among the Suku of South-Western Congo, recognised the talent of the 
advocate in pleading for a case. The Yoruba of south-western Nigeria had a different approach of the age-grade 
association towards conflict resolution although they recognised talent possession by an individual member of the 
association; it further required maturity, experience and wisdom. See also Kopytoff I, ‘Family and Lineage among 
the Suku of South-western Congo’ in Robert Gray& Gulliver PH, ‘The Family Estate in Africa: Studies in the Role of 
Property in Family’ (2013) 83.  
392 Otite O & Ogionwo W (1994) 51.  
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relationships and the social harmony which has been disrupted by conflict. Sanctions are applied 
as a last resort only after all other efforts have failed to realign the recalcitrant individual. 
Punishment for its sake is viewed as being contradictory to the prevailing principle that human 
beings are inherently good and capable of change in the society. Sanctions, when appropriate, are 
used to restore the victim’s harm and losses and community equilibrium.393 
Despite the restorative goals of the African Indigenous system, punishment was still imposed by 
the community for the maintenance of law and order in the traditional society. It was rationalised 
as a means to an end rather than an end itself and it was necessary in the case of repeat of offence 
by the offenders or those who posed serious threats to life or property. Punishments in that case 
are justified as an attempt to reinforce moral boundaries in punishing the evil-minded and in 
giving reassurance to those who conform to society’s norm. For example, in traditional Tswana 
society, the punishments decreed varied widely. They ranged from admonishment, restitution, 
fines, corporal punishment, banishment and ‘eating up’, to capital punishment. ‘Eating up’ was a 
punishment where the offender’s possessions were forfeited, his lands taken and his huts burned; 
and the offender was usually banished. Such severe punishment was rarely imposed, since chiefs 
relied upon the continuing support of their subjects to strengthen the polity.
394
 
 
Punishments meted out on offenders were applied with utmost care since the offender still 
remained a member of the family, who is expected to contribute to the community’s well-being 
in the future. Therefore, it must not be too debilitating or further alienate the offender and it is 
always fines.
395 
Abominable acts and violent serious cases such as rape, in addition to fines, 
attracted the penalty of ridicule and ostracisation.
396 
Reintegrating alienated individuals into the 
community was always the primary goal of the African justice system and this concept can be 
compared to the Confucian concept of Jen (virtue) and the feminist ethics of care as described by 
Li.
397 
Jen and care societies are non-contractual, unlike Western societies that are based on the 
aggregation of rational individual with self-interests and defined rights. It is also not based on 
                                                             
393 Olaoba et al (2010) 51.  
394 Eileen McCarthy-Arnolds, David R. Penna & Debra Joy Cruz Sobrepena (eds.), ‘Africa, Human Rights, and the 
Global System: The Political Economy of Human Rights in a Changing World’ (1994) 213.  
395 The fines imposed as punishment were always commensurate with the offence committed and it is ensured to be 
what the offender can reasonably afford.  
396 The range of punishments used in the African Indigenous Justice System is extensively discussed by Elechi O. in 
‘Doing Justice without the State: The Afikpo (Ehugbo) Nigerian Model’ (2006) 39.  
397 Li, C. ‘The Confucian Concept of Jen and The Feminist Ethics of Care: A Comparative Study’ (1994), vol. 9(1), 
70-89. He argued that the Confucius Jen and care from the feminist perspective represent the highest ideals for 
society.  
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patriarchal values and male/masculine world. Relationships in Jen and care societies are like 
family relationships that are voluntary and non-contractual. Concepts like morality, fairness and 
justice, for this reason, are not narrowly defined as being limited to the individual’s rights as 
enshrined in law.
398
 
 
Looking at this concept, it can be picked out that it is similar to the concept of Ubuntu where the 
individual is defined in terms of his relations with others. An individual has meaning and 
significance only in relation with others as no individual is self-sufficient.
399
 
Abuses were also evident in charges of witchcraft, which could be brought against any citizen 
whom others felt had succeeded through enhancement. Since the charge could be proven by 
questionable circumstantial evidence, sorcery was a difficult charge to defend 
against.
400
However, more enlightened chiefs discourage charges of sorcery.
401
 
This continued with some exceptions. The colonial administration removed certain cases such as 
homicide, sorcery and treason from the traditional courts
402 
as they were forbidden to impose 
capital punishment. 
 
3.7 Women and the African Indigenous Justice System 
 
To understand the African indigenous justice systems and processes, a review of African pre- 
colonial political organisation is important and this has been discussed in chapter two of this 
thesis. As stated earlier, the social history of Africa falls into three periods to wit: the pre- 
colonial, colonial and the post-colonial periods. The interest in African pre-colonial societies is 
                                                             
398
 Gilligan as cited in Li (1994) 70-89 posits that the construction of moral understanding is not based on the 
primacy and universality of individual’s rights but rather on a very strong sense of being responsible to the world.  
399 According to Shutte , ‘Philosophy for Africa’ (1993) 47, Ubuntu unites the self and the world in a particular web 
of reciprocal relations in which subject and object become indistinguishable, and in which I think, therefore I am, is 
substituted for I participate, therefore I am. He argued that this concept might be somewhat confusing for someone 
with Cartesian orientation whose understanding of individuality now has to move from solitary to solidarity, from 
independence to interdependence, from individuality vis-à-vis community to individuality a la community.  
400 Alec C. Campbell, ‘The Rural Economy: A Sociological Perspective’ (1971) 3 Botswana Notes and Records 193. 
See also Eilen McCarthy et al, (1994) 213. In pre-colonial the Lango of Uganda imposed a mandatory death 
sentence on those caught in the act of witchcraft, incest and sexual aberrations. See Driberg J, ‘The Lango: A Nilotic 
tribe of Uganda’ (1923)9; Roscoe J, ‘The Bagisu and other Tribes of the Uganda Protectorate’ (1924) 39-40, 42, 102 & 
118. Also in pre-colonial Sierra Leone the punishment of witchcraft and cannibalism was death. See the Report of the 
National Coordinator of Sierra Leone, Abdul Tejan-Cole, presented at the First International Conference on the 
Application of the Death Penalty in Commonwealth Africa in Entebbe, Uganda from 10 – 11 May, 2004.  
401 Eilen McCarthy et al, (1994) 213.  
402 Diana Wylie, ‘A Little God: The Twilight of Patriarchy in a Southern African Chiefdom’ (1990) 108-109.  
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because of the relevance of these institutions in African Peoples’ life today403 and the 
indigenous justice systems in Africa reign in the rural areas where majority of African resides. 
According to Elias
404 
and as already pointed out in chapter two of this thesis, African pre- 
colonial political organisation are categorised into two broad groups wherein the societies in the 
first group had a centralised political authority, ‘administrative machinery’ or ‘judicial 
institution’. Societies in this group are generally heterogeneous but differ to one political 
superior, usually the ‘paramount chief’ or ‘the King in Council.’405 
Busia Jr. noted further that the King did not rule for life and that he remained in the office for as 
long as he enjoys the good will of his people. Any of his subjects has constitutional rights to 
institute impeachment proceedings against him and the case succeeds if the applicant is able to 
convince the majority of the councillors that the king has breached his oath of office and where 
such applicant fails with his case, he could pay with his life.
406
 
The other category of the African pre-colonial political organisation is the African societies with 
a decentralised political authority.
407 
These societies, Elechi said, were erroneously believed to 
possess no laws or leaders and to be strongly individualistic and societies in this group include 
                                                             
403 Anita Kalunta-Crumpton & Biko Agozino (eds.) ‘Pan-African Issues in Crime and Justice’ (2004) 164.  
404 Elias T. O. ‘British Colonial law: A Comparative Study of the Interaction between English and Local Laws in 
British Dependency’ (1962) 9.  
405 Societies in this group are the Zulus of South Africa, the Bembas of Zambia, and the Banyankole of Uganda 
among others. These African societies comprise several ethnic groups, which explain the necessity for the use of 
force to hold them together. There are class distinctions based on wealth, privilege and status and the incidence of 
organised force which is principal sanction in a society based upon cultural and economic heterogeneity. See Anita K 
& Biko A (eds.) (2004)164. Another example of a pre-colonial African society with a hierarchical political 
arrangement is the Ashanti of Ghana. Busia Jr., ‘The Status of Human Rights in pre-colonial Africa: Implications for 
Contemporary Practices’ in McCarthy-Arnolds et al. (eds.) ‘Africa, Human Rights and the Global System’ (1994) 
213; observed that the social organisation of the Ashanti was and remains based on Kinship lineage networks. The 
political body was centred around the kinship system and the heads of the various lineages. They operated a federal 
system of government that comprised about twenty-two Chiefs (petty Kings), their political authority rested on the 
King, together with other paramount Chiefs who constituted the Ashanteman council. According to him, the Head of 
the council remained the king whose headquarter was in Kumasi. The Council, as the major authority, had power to 
maintain law and order and it also had the authority to declare war and also enter into treaties with other tribal 
groups. Each member of the Council had a different role. Next to the King who had executive powers was the Prime 
Minister while each of the councilors managed a portfolio like finance, public relations and so on. Two other offices 
worthy of note were the head of all women within the federal system known as the Queen-mother and the head of 
the youth whose office had no political significance. The office of the King was an elective one and eligibility was 
limited to members of the royal family. The Prime Minister acts in the event that the incumbent dies, abdicates his 
office or is deposed from power. The Queen-mother, as the head of the royal family, is constitutionally empowered to 
nominate a candidate for the office of the King.  
406 Busia  Jr.  (1994)  213.  See  also  Elechi  O.O.,   ‘Women  and  African  Indigenous  Justice  Systems’  in 
KaluntarCrumpton & Agozino B (eds.), ‘Pan African Issues in Crime and Justice’ (2003) 165.  
407 Elechi O. ‘Women and African Indigenous Justice Systems’ (2003) 165.  
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the Logoli of Western Kenya, the Tallensi of Northern Ghana, the Nuer of Sudan and the Igbos 
of Southern Nigeria.
408 
The participatory democracy and egalitarian outlook of the people were 
not affected by the hierarchical socio-political arrangement. It is noted, however, that certain 
levels of political discourse, women and children were not allowed full participation.
409
 
This system had certain internal mechanism for the maintenance of law and order and also for 
the enforcement of political decisions and the Igbo people of Nigeria are said to be good 
example.
410 
Everybody, including the villages, has equal rights and privileges; decisions reached 
at these general meetings were through consensus which was essential as sanctions against 
recalcitrant persons or groups were rarely enforced by force. All had a voice in these meetings, 
even though the elders, especially the ruling age grade, wielded a lot of influence.
411
 
At the village level, what obtains can be said to be direct democracy; all adults, including men 
and women, are represented though talks are dominated by men.
412 
Women are not allowed to 
talk except when they are directly involved, either as a witness, plaintiffs or defendants, and they 
can also initiate the proceedings as a group or make a representation as a group.
413
 
According to Elias,
414
 the role of the individual in a given society depends in the last resort upon 
his place in the society. How he fits into the society is majorly conditioned by the nature of the 
particular society and the reason why it is necessary to determine the exact position of an 
individual in the social structure is because it is only through the assessment that we can 
understand the extent of his rights and duties, the range of social activities in which he may or 
must participate and his opportunities for personal differentiation within his community.
415 
The 
legal aspects of the individual’s social relations which affect his/her acts or omissions with 
                                                             
408
Onitsha, Agbaja and the Aro-Chukwu according to Uchendu V.C. in ‘The Igbo of Southeast Nigeria’ (1965), are 
few of the Igbo societies that were not completely acephalous. He said however, that the villages in these communities 
remained autonomous and leadership was exercised through the Council of Elders.   
409 Elechi O., ‘Women and African Indigenous Justice System’ (2003) 165.  
410 The Igbos had no political arrangement that could be called a federation, a confederacy or state. Whenever there is 
a case or matter that affects the whole village groups, representatives of the villages will meet in a general 
assembly. Where a person is not available at a decision making meeting, such person cannot and will not be bound by 
the decision(s) taken from such meetings. See Elechi O.O, ‘Doing Justice without the State: The Afikpo 
(Ehugbo) Nigerian Model’ (2006) 69.  
411 Elechi O.O. (2006) 69.  
412 Elechi O. O., ‘Women and African Indigenous Justice System’ (2003) 166.  
413 Elechi (2006) 69. The setup is aptly summed up by Uchendu V.C., ‘The Igbos of South-West Nigeria’ (1965) 46 
as follows: The picture of the Igbo political community which emerges from these settings is one that is territorially 
small enough to make direct democracy possible at the level; and in which there are leaders rather than rulers, and 
political cohesion is achieved by rules rather than by laws and by consensus rather than by dictation.  
414 Elias T.O., The Status of African Customary Law (1972) 76.  
415 Elias (1976) 76.  
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regard to all others within his/her world daily activity tend to create a concern. 
Social control in society is achieved through formal and informal mechanisms.
416 
To understand 
the status of African women under the community’s traditional justice system, an examination of 
the institutions of marriage and family as well as the laws and customs of the people is 
important. Marriage systems and the African extended family system, aside from both reflecting 
the social and economic conditions of societies, they also have implications for the status of 
women. Customary laws also have been known to reproduce oppressive patriarchal values and 
practices.
417 
Informing this viewpoint is the belief that modern state by its nature and agenda has 
a better view of the rights of women and other minority groups.
418
 
 
Understanding the way women coped with the African indigenous justice system will lead to a 
review of the women’s organisation and this is important and as mentioned earlier, pre-colonial 
Africa is categorised into two political structures which are centralised and decentralised. The 
Igbos people of Nigeria had a centralised, hierarchical political structure
419 
and pre-colonial Igbo 
political culture has been described as ‘dual sex.’420 This is because women operate separate 
social and political organisations through which they exercise power over their membership. It 
has been argued that there is no generic or universal woman. Women under the African system 
operated a parallel social and political institution as that of the men.
421
 
 
 
                                                             
416 Formal social control methods are coercion-oriented, as in the functions of criminal justice officials while 
informal mechanisms of social control tend to be persuasion-oriented and relate to the controls exercised by the 
institutions of marriage, family and peer groups. See Elechi O.O. on ‘Women and the African Indigenous justice 
system’ (2006) 70.  
417
 Recent  experiences  of  Aboriginal  women  with  customary  laws  confirm  customary  sanctioning  of  sexual 
offenders in particular has been ineffective in curbing sexual violence against women and children. Besides, certain 
customary cultural values of kindness, reconciliation and family cohesiveness may infact prevent Aboriginal women 
from officially reporting violence in the home. See Richard Tewksbury & Matthew Lees, ‘Perceptions of 
Punishment: How Registered Sex Offenders View Registries’ (2007)53 Crime & Delinquency Journal 380-407.  
418 The institutions of marriage, family, divorce and African feminist theories has being extensively dealt with by 
Elechi in his book ‘Doing Justice without the State: The Afikpo (Ehugbo) Nigeria Model of Conflict Resolution’ 
(2006) 164.  
419 An example is the Onitsha Igbos.  
420 See Rose Uchem, ‘Overcoming Womens Subordination in the Igbo African Culture and in the Catholic Church: 
Envisioning an Inclusive Theology with Reference to Women’ (2001) 46.  
421 According to Nzegwu, under this dual-symmetrical structure, women had their own Governing Councils- Ikporo- 
Onitsha, Ndinyom- to address their specific concerns and needs as women. The councils protected womens social 
and economic interests, and guided the communitys development. This dual-symmetrical structure accorded immense 
political profile to women both in communities with monarchies (on the western side and some parts of the eastern 
banks of the River Niger- Onitsha, Ogbaru and Oguta), and in the non-centralised democracies of the eastern 
hinterland. See Nzegwu (1995) 445- 446.  
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3.8 Conclusion 
 
The primary goal of African Indigenous Justice System is the restoration of victims, the 
community and also the offenders since it is justice centred. To resolve the conflict, it is 
important that the physical, emotional, psychological and financial losses suffered by the victim 
are restored. Conflicts cannot be considered fully restored until the peace, relationships and 
social harmony damaged by the conflict is restored also. Victim vindication is very important 
and also empowering to the victim, as all stakeholders including the offender and the community 
members acknowledge the suffering of the victim. 
Ubuntu is the basis of African communal cultural life and it expresses Africa’s principle of 
caring for one another and the spirit of mutual support. Offender accountability includes taking 
personal responsibility to repair the harm caused the victim and atoning to the community for 
disrupting their peace and violating societal norms.
422
 
It is also a very important goal of the African Indigenous Justice System to reintegrate offenders 
into the community. The belief is that human beings are by nature good but are capable of 
making mistakes. Offenders’ needs and competence must be looked into because of the 
understanding that people are capable of change and responsible behaviour under the right 
conditions. On the part of the community, it is its responsibility to provide mechanisms to 
address the harm caused and prevent future harm from occurring since justice making is a 
community responsibility. Community members, including the victim, offender, their family 
members and well- wishers and all persons with a stake in the well-being of the community are 
involved in the definition of the harm caused and the search for a resolution acceptable to all. 
The community also shared in the responsibilities of the behaviour of one of their own. The trial 
of an offender is invariably a review of the role played by the individual’s family and community 
in his life. Justice making presented opportunities for the examination and restoration of 
important values such as humanism, empathy and economic justice; it is also an opportunity to 
teach and reinforce important communitarian values of love, respect and connection with other 
community members. 
                                                             
422 A major lesson from the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission based on the principle of Ubuntu is 
that we learn to forgive even our adversaries. The open airing of conflicts has a cathartic effect and educational 
value.  
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African Indigenous Justice System reflects the social, cultural and economic systems of 
traditional Africa. African economy is agrarian which is labour demanding and for the 
community’s economy to survive every hand must be used in the planting and harvesting of 
crops. No one is considered a surplus labourer and therefore expendable since success in agrarian 
economy is determined by the number of hands involved to work. It is important to note also that 
one’s well-being in Africa is tied to the individual’s relationship with his or her family and 
significant  other;  this  is  different  from  what  obtains  in  the  Western  societies  where  ones’ 
relationship with banks and other social and economic institutions is often considered more 
important for the individual’s wellbeing.423 
African communities play a very dominant role in conflict resolution as justice in Africa is 
restorative and transformative, contextualised and negotiated. When communities rely on 
themselves to solve problems, both individual and collective accountability improve as a result. 
Effective informal social control and participatory justice making are keys to a stable social 
order.
424
 
This chapter also examined the relationship between Women and the African Indigenous Justice 
System as it addressed the concerns often expressed regarding community based justice systems 
in a patriarchal society. Findings showed that individual and group rights are better protected and 
advanced within groups. Women conscious of their relative weaker economic and political 
position in the society, have employed their superior social organisation, group identification and 
solidarity capabilities to protect and promote their common interests. Bringing their marital 
problems to the public institutions of conflict resolution for adjudication was also encouraged 
since the belief of the community is that what affects the individual also affects the community. 
The use of culturally and constitutionally enshrined sanctuary powers to counteract the 
oppressive policies and powers of men is done by women. Participation in the indigenous 
institutions of conflict resolution is voluntary as it is difficult to assume that the litigant’s gender 
affected the outcome of a case in the African Indigenous Justice System. Litigants are supported 
                                                             
423 Lisa Suzuki & Joseph Ponterotto, ‘Handbook of Multicultural Assessment: Clinical, Psychological and 
Educational Applications’ (2008) 301.  
424 Confucius has observed: Lead the people with government and regulate them by law and punishment, and they 
will avoid wrongdoing but will have no sense of honour and shame. Lead them with virtue and regulate them by the 
rules of prosperity, and they will have a sense of shame, set themselves right (as cited in Jiang S. and Lambert E.G., 
Views of formal and informal crime Control and their Correlate in China (2009) 19 International Criminal Justice 
Review 5-24.  
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by their friends, relatives and well-wishers. All participants in the justice process are equal and 
they actively participate in principle thereby giving no reason to believe that women lack 
confidence in the African Indigenous Justice System. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
OAU AND THE AFRICAN CHARTER 
 
 
4.1 Historical Overview of Human Rights in Africa (OAU/AU) 
 
Human rights institutions and organs that were created by the instruments were for many years 
on the periphery of the political institutions under which they fell. This is despite the fact that the 
manner in which they are formulated and structured requires them to rely on these political 
institutions for their funding, nominations and appointments to their own organs and in some 
cases, enforcement of their decisions.
425 
Just as there has been a closer relationship between the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the European Union (EU), so the African 
political organisation, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU),
426 
which has now been 
transformed into the African Union (AU), illustrates this closer attention to human rights as 
falling within its remit.
427 
While a separate instrument was adopted under the auspices of the 
OAU in 1981 specifically to deal with human rights,
428 
human rights remained largely on the 
periphery of the OAU’s attention until recently. The OAU Charter does not appear to attach a 
particular significance to human rights in a more comprehensive way, with no particular way of 
focusing on making African governments accountable for the fundamental rights of their 
subjects.
429 
This lack of significant protection was suggested not to be criticised because the 
other constitutional instruments of the other regional organisations and the United Nations also 
contain relatively few references to human rights.
430 
It is also agreed that these other 
organisations take further steps in constructing a system for the promotion and protection of 
human rights, supported by legal binding instruments which was not the case for the OAU.
431
 
The Charter placed emphasis on the right of the people to self-determination and struggle 
against racial discrimination in response to the ravages of colonialism.
432
 
 
                                                             
425 Rachel Murray, ‘Human Rights in Africa: From OAU to the African Union’ (2004)2.  
426 The OAU came about on 25 May, 1963 as the first pan-African intergovernmental organization taking the form 
of a loose association (a United Africa of independent states). See Frans Viljoen, ‘International Human Rights Law 
in Africa’ 2012) 162.  
427 Rachel Murray (2004) 4.  
428 The African Charter on Human and Peoples Right.  
429 Vincent Orlu Nmehielle, ‘The African Human Rights System: its Laws, Practice and Institutions’ (2001)75.  
430 See BirameNdiaye, ‘The Place of Human Rights in the Charter of the Organisation of African Unity in The 
International Dimensions of Human Rights’(1982)601.See also Viljoen (2012) 213.  
431 See BirameNdiaye (1982) 601. 
432 Birame Ndiaye (1982) 601.  
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The background to the creation of OAU can be traced back to a series of developments in 
various regions across the continent, with the various groupings among French-speaking 
countries,
433 
East and Central Africa
434 
and others pulling in slightly different directions.
435 
A 
number of All-African Peoples’ Conferences were held in the late 1950s and early 1960s with 
the aim of encouraging those who were not yet liberated to liberate themselves and to organise 
non-violent revolution in Africa. Even at this stage, the seed of human rights issues that would 
find their way into the OAU can be discerned with condemnation of racism in South Africa, the 
call for the need for universal vote and concern about religious separatism, among others.
436
 
Human rights provide an external common standard of achievement for all nations and peoples, 
according to the Preamble of the UDHR. The road that Africa has travelled with regards to 
emphasising principles of international human rights has been a very slow one.
437 
Despite the 
reiteration of the principles contained in the United Nations Charter and the reference to human 
rights in the OAU Charter,
438 
the OAU’s agenda for human rights implementation at the 
inception of the Organisation was very limited. The agenda gave priority to self-determination 
and the st ruggle against  racism, both generally and part icular ly.
439 
By self-
determination, reference is being made to the struggle against colonialism and if looked at 
critically, the problem of colonialism could have been used by African leaders to 
emphasise the elaborate principles of human rights.
440
 
                                                             
433 Groupings included the Brazzaville powers of the twelve French-speaking African states which are Cameroon, 
Central African Republic (CAR), Chad, Congo, Dahomey, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Malagasy, Mauritania, Niger, 
Senegal, Upper Volta) meeting first in 1960.  
434 The Pan-African Movement of East and Central Africa (PAFMECA).  
435 In July 1959 the Sanniquellie Conference was held bringing together the governments of Liberia, Guinea and 
Ghana who pledged to work to set up a Community of Independent African States and decided to hold a conference in 
1960. In August 1959 a Conference was held in Monrovia of nine independent states (Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, 
Liberia, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia and United Arab Republic) to look specifically at the Algerian question- to 
stop the war there and assist the nationalists, many of these states having recognised the Algerian provisional 
government. The first Conference of Independent African states took place in Accra, Ghana, in 1958 and it had in 
attendance, Ethiopia, Ghana, Liberia, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia and United Arab Republic. See Micheal Anda, 
‘International Relations in Contemporary Africa’ (2000) 87. 
436 Resolutions of the first All African Peoples Conference held in Accra, 8-13 December, 1958. See Carol Johnson, 
‘International Organisation’ (1962) vol.16 No.2, 426-429.  
437 Vincent Orlu Nmehielle, ‘The African Human Rights System: Its Laws, Practice and Institutions’ (2001) 67. 
438 Paragraph 8 of the OAU Charter.  
439 This is exemplified in the apartheid policy of the old South Africa. Some African scholars have attributed this 
lack of interest in international promotion and protection of human rights to the effect of colonialism. The fact that 
colonialism denied Africans the right to rule themselves and consequently the right to organise their economic, 
cultural, political and social affairs, coupled with inherent racism of colonialism, drove African governments to 
emphasise certain human rights as worthy of primary concern at the international level. Eze, ‘Human Rights in 
Africa: Some selected problems’ (1984)193 reiterated this point.  
440 Imbibing the notion/culture of human rights would not benefit the colonial powers but Africans who should enjoy 
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Before the coming into existence of the OAU, advocates of Pan Africanism, Nmehielle, had 
shown concern for human rights among the colonised peoples.
441 
It was at the Fifth Pan African 
Congress held in Manchester in 1945 that the first conscious effort was made to establish a link 
between human rights and the fight against colonialism and human rights on one hand and 
between Pan Africanism and human rights on the other. They called for the abolition of all racial 
discrimination, freedom of expression, assembly and of the press, and free compulsory education 
up to age sixteen, the same rights that are still demanded today in all African States.
442 
With the 
establishment of the OAU, two decades after the formation of the United Nations and the 
adoption of the UDHR, one would have thought that the ideals that drove Pan Africanism would 
have also concretised the promotion of human rights. This is so because those that founded OAU 
were persuaded that ‘the charter of the United Nations and the UDHR, the principles of which 
they affirm adherence to, provide a solid foundation for peace and positive cooperation among 
States.’443 
Before the adoption of the OAU Charter, the Congress of African Jurists,
444 
at a time when more 
African colonies had joined the ranks of independent States, adopted a resolution on human 
rights that was to lay down the basis for future efforts for the establishment of rules and 
mechanisms for African regional promotion and protection of human rights.
445
 
 
The adoption of the African Charter by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the 
OAU
446 
made human rights discourse in the continent to assume a new dimension. African 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
every right denied during the colonial period in a dispensation of African self-rule. This situation has rather been the 
reverse. Africa has witnessed orchestrated human rights violations almost on the scale experienced during the 
colonial era but the only difference is that the perpetrators are Africans. See Eze (1984) 195.  
441 Vincent Orlu Nmehielle, ‘The African Human Rights System: Its Laws, Practice and Institutions’ (2001) 68. 
442
 Eze (1984) 193.  
443 Paragraph 8, Preamble to the OAU Charter. Particularly the activities that preceded the formation of the OAU 
would have given one the reason to reach the above conclusion.  
444 The congress took place in Lagos, Nigeria between the 3rd and 7th of January, 1961. It was at this meeting that the 
famous Law of Lagos was drafted. The congress stated that in order to give full effect to the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, a suitable tribunal should be set up, to which all persons within the jurisdiction of Africa should 
have recourse. And that to this effect, an African Convention on Human Rights was needed, as only that would 
permit the realisation of the dual aspirations of independent Africa to wit: liberty and unity. See Fatsah Ouguergouz, 
‘The African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights: A Comprehensive Agenda for Human Dignity and Sustainable 
Democracy in Africa’ (1993) 20.  
445 Eze (1984) 195.  
446 African  Charter  on  Human  and  Peoples  Rights  adopted  27  June  1981  in  Nairobi,  Kenya,  OAU.  Doc. 
CAB/LEG/67/3, Rev. 5 reprinted in (1981) 21 I.L.M. 59. The charter entered into force on October 21, 1986. It was 
drafted pursuant to Decision 115 (XVI) Rev. 1 by which the Assembly of Heads of State and Government requested 
the Secretary-General of the OAU at its Sixteenth Ordinary Session held in Monrovia, Liberia, from July 12-20, 
1979, to organise as soon as possible, in as African capital, a restricted meeting of highly qualified experts to 
prepare a preliminary draft of an African Charter of Human and Peoples Rights.  
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States were convinced of the need to have home-grown regional human rights commitment in 
line with international standards put in place by the UDHR and other international human rights 
instruments including the experience of other regions. Also, African States which were always 
engrossed with struggles against colonial domination realised that with over two decades of the 
end of colonialism, there was the need to organise for the protection of the rights of Africans 
against violations by their home governments.
447
 The coming into force of the Charter, 
according to commentators, is seen as impressive and distinct in its rich provisions, and as 
breaking new grounds in the area of ‘Peoples’ rights’, and the incorporation of economic, 
social and cultural rights and other impressive provisions.
448 
The Charter did not explicitly 
include human rights as part of the mandate of the OAU, member states were only required 
to have ‘due regard’ for human rights set out in the Universal Declaration.449 
 
With the adoption of the OAU Charter, the place given to human right became limited to African 
unity, decolonisation and the elimination of racism, all of which have been referred to as the 
spirit of Addis Ababa.
450 
Article II (1) of the Charter enumerates the purpose of the 
organisation as: 
(a) To promote the unity and solidarity of the African States, 
 
(b) To coordinate and intensify their cooperation and efforts to achieve a better life for the 
peoples of Africa. 
(c) To defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity and independence, 
 
(d) To eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa; and 
 
(e) To promote international cooperation, having due regard to the United Nations and the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
                                                             
447 See Vincent O. Orlu Nmehielle, ‘Towards an African Court of Human Rights: Structuring and Empowering the 
Court’ (2000) 27 Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law 33.  
448 Ramcharan B.G., ‘The Travaux Preparatoires of the African Commission on Human Rights’ (1992) 13 Human 
Rights Journal 307. It must be pointed out that the state of human rights in many African countries before the 
adoption of the Charter was unremarkable. There was the air of totalitarianism, either in the form of military 
governments or one-party dominated autocracy, which attracted much of regional and international outcry and the 
need for action.  
449 OAU Charter, Article 2(1)(e); the preamble of the OAU Charter also recognises the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and the UN Charter as the foundation of peaceful and positive cooperation between states. See 
Viljoen, ‘International Human Rights Law in Africa’ (2012) 162.  
450 Cervenka, ‘The Organisation of African Unity and its Charter’, note 169, at 13, referring to the speech of the then 
president of Algeria, Ahmed Ben Bella, against colonial rule at the Addis Ababa Summit Conference of Heads of 
State and Government of Independent African States in May, 1968. See also T.O. Elias, ‘African and Development of 
International Law’ (1988) 121-127.  
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Taking a deep and critical look at the Charter revealed that the mechanism created under it 
lacked adequate authority to effectively realise the mandates enshrined in it. Also, the lack of 
provision for a judicial organ under it (a court) compounds the ability of the African human 
rights mechanism to effectively achieve its mandate under the charter. 
 
Article III makes provision for principles that would govern Member States in achieving the 
purposes stated in Article II, one of which is the non-intervention in the internal affairs of 
Member States.
451 
It has been opined that this provision was drafted into the Charter to appease 
the basic concern of the founders of the OAU to the effect that no outside body should deal with 
matters within the domestic jurisdiction of Member States.
452 
Issues that have to do with human 
rights were regarded as the internal affairs of Member States, and therefore, must not be 
interfered with, as has been stressed by African States over the years. 
 
The international law principles of national sovereignty and territorial integrity, as affirmed by 
the Charter of the United Nations, does not permit redress for human rights violations except 
through the State. But it must be observed that the realities of post-colonial Africa 
necessarilyrequired that attention should be given to the use of human rights in a more 
elaborate fashion before it became too late. Colonialism was not going to last forever, 
neither was apartheid as happenings have shown.
453 
Bolstered by this principle of ‘non-
interference’, the OAU in subsequent years after the adoption of the Charter turned a blind 
eye to allegations of human rights violations in member states. In a commentator’s view, the 
OAU could be regarded as ‘a club of presidents, engaged in a tacit policy of not inquiring into 
each other’s practices’.454 This gap was not only substantive but also institutional. None of the 
specialist commissions provided for under article 20 of the Charter or those established later, 
was devoted to human rights.
455
 
                                                             
451 Article III (2) of the Charter.  
452 Eze at 199.  
453 The OAU could not, for example, afford to ignore African refugee problems. That is why the assistance and 
protection of refugees is seen as one of the positive activities of the OAU at the regional level in the field of human 
rights. Efforts in that direction culminated in the adoption of the OAU Convention on Refugees by Heads of State 
and Governments in September, 1969.  
454 Welch C. E., ‘Protecting Human Rights in Africa: Strategies and Roles of Non-governmental Organisations’ 
(1995) 151 and 288 wherein the OAUs policy was criticised.  
455 The Charter established five specialised Commissions, (i) Economic and Social; (ii) Educational and Cultural; 
(iii) Health, Sanitation and Nutrition; (iv) Defence; (v) Scientific, Technical and Research Commission. At the first 
Ordinary Session of the OAU in 1964, a Commission on Transport and Communications, and one on Jurists, were 
added. The last one was designed as an instrument for legal research but was disbanded after only one year. See 
Mbaye and B Ndiaye, ‘The Organisation of Africa Unity’ in Vasak K and Alston P (eds), ‘The International 
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The Charter
456 
is a fundamental instrument in the African regional system created under the 
auspices of the OAU.
457
 It established the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights (the Commission),
458
 an independent body of eleven experts nominated and with its 
headquarters in the Gambia. Very little was known of the Commission’s work in the early 
years when it was established, only in 1994 did it start to make public its decisions on 
communications brought before it.
459 
Chapter four of this thesis is dedicated to the 
Commission and issues such as the composition, seat, functioning and its protective mandate 
among others will be discussed. 
 
Other instruments making up the regional system are the OAU Convention Governing the 
Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa of 1969,
460 
the African Charter on the Rights 
and Welfare of the Child,
461
 the Protocol to the African Charter on the Rights of Women in 
Africa,
462
 and the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
Dimension of Human Rights' (1982)583; AE EL-Obaid&Appiagyei-AtuaA.,‘Human Rights in Africa: A New 
Perspective on Linking the Past to the Present’ (1996) 42 McGill LJ 819-27.  
456 The African Charter was enacted pursuant to the Charter of the Organisation of African Unity which stipulates 
that freedom, equality, justice and dignity are essential objectives for the achievement of the legitimate aspirations of 
the African Peoples. The African Charter came into force on October 21, 1986 upon ratification by a simple 
majority of Member States of the OAU (OAU was replaced with the African Union (AU) on July10, 2002).  
457 Now known as the ‘African Union.’ 
458 The African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights is the implementing arm of the charter which was 
established in 1987. It did not have a permanent secretariat after its inauguration and only became fully functional in 
June 1989.  
459 Obiora Chinedu Okafor, ‘The African Human Rights System, Activist Forces and International Institutions’ (2007) 
85. See also Faustin Ntoubandi, ‘Amnesty for Crimes against Humanity under International Law’ (2007) 130.  
460 The Convention was adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Governments of the OAU at its sixth 
Ordinary session held in Addis Ababa on 10th September, 1969. It entered into force on 20th June, 1974 in 
accordance with Article XI.  
461 OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (1990). It entered into force on the 29th November, 1999. I will like to point out 
here that Africa is the only region that has a region-specific instrument for child rights.  
462
 OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/24.9/49 was adopted on the 11
th 
of July, 2003 during the Second Ordinary Session of the 
AU help in Maputo, Mozambique and it entered into force on 25th November, 2005. The adoption of the Protocol 
was pushed by the widespread sentiments that African women continued to suffer human rights violations simply 
because they were women and the existing guarantees for the protection of their rights were felt to be inadequate. 
The adoption of the Protocol was therefore a landmark step in enhancing the promotion and protection of women’s 
human rights on the continent through providing a comprehensive legal framework for holding African governments 
accountable for their violations. See Anthony Kuria Njoroge, ‘The Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa to the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights.’ A paper presented at Thematic Session II during the Sub- Regional 
Conference on Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) held in Djibouti from the 2nd -3rd February, 2005. Available at  
www.emmabonino.it/campagne/stopfgm/djbouti/njoroge.pdf (Accessed on 28th March, 2014). See also, Martin 
SemaluluNsibirwa, ‘A Brief Analysis of the Draft Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights on 
the Rights of Women’ (2001) 1 African Human Rights Law Journal 40; Jamil DdamuliraMujuzi, ‘The Protocol to 
the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa: South Africa’s Reservations 
and Interpretative Declarations’ in Law, Democracy and Development (2008)2, 41-61; Viljoen, ‘An Introduction to 
the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa’ (2009-2010) 16 
Wash. & Lee J. Civil Rts. & Soc. Just. 11; Julia Sloth-Nielsen, ‘Childrens Rights in Africa’ in ManisuliSsenyonjo (ed.) 
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Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights463 (the African Human Rights 
Court Protocol) which created the regional Human Rights Court. 
Regarding other areas of human rights as stated earlier, there was a necessity for reginal 
African human rights mechanism after an attempt of African jurists in 1961 failed in Lagos, 
Nigeria. This call was made at several seminars on human rights organised by the United 
Nations 
464  
and  some  other  African  institutions  such  as  the  colloquium  organised  by  
the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) and the Senegalese Bar Association. The 
colloquium recommended the establishment of a Human Rights Commission as one of the 
means of tackling the fundamental and urgent problems of human rights in Africa.
465
 
States have the international legal obligation to provide for the protection of human rights under 
their own national constitutions, legal systems and other official measures
466 
as it is concerned 
with the relationship between citizens of a State and their political authority. It raises questions 
as to the responsibility of a political authority with respect to the protection of an individual and 
the scope of claims that such an individual can make from its sovereign. According to Lauren,
467 
the issue of human rights addresses age-old and universal questions about the relationship 
between individuals and their larger society, and thus is one that has been raised across time and 
across culture. 
 
The African continent provides a clear reminder that human rights is a dynamic concept and that 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
‘The African Regional Human Rights System: 30 years after the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ 
(2012) 155.  
463 The Protocol was adopted in June, 1998 in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso and it entered into force on the 25th of 
January, 2005. See Viljeon, ‘International Human Rights Law’ (2007) 419; see also Fatsah Ouguergouz, ‘The 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: A Comprehensive Agenda for Human Dignity and Sustainable 
Democracy in Africa (2003) 688; Murray, ‘Human Rights in Africa: From OAU to the African Union’ (2004) 68 
and www.africa-court.org/index.php/2-home/2-institutional-background (Accessed on 28thMarch, 2012).  
464 For example, the seminar on Human Rights in Developing Countries held in Dakar, Senegal in February, 1966; 
the Cairo Conference of 1969, which was devoted to the establishment of regional human rights commissions with 
special reference to Africa based on a proposal to UN Human Rights Commission for the establishment of regional 
commissions on human rights in those part of the world where they did not exist; the Economic Commission for 
Africa Conference on Legal Process and the Individual held at Addis Ababa in 1971; the Seminar on the Study of 
New Ways and Means for promoting Human Rights with Special reference to the Problems and Needs of Africa, 
held in Dar-es Salaam, Tanzania from October 23 to November 5, 1973; and the UN Seminar on the  Establishment of 
Regional Commissions on Human Rights with Special Reference to Africa, held in Monrovia, Liberia from 
September 10 to 21, 1979. See History of the African Charter available at www.achpr.org/instruments/achpr/history/ 
(Accessed on 12th July, 2014).  
465 Eze at 203.  
466 Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im, ‘Expanding Legal Protection of Human Rights in African Context’ in ‘Human 
Rights under African Constitutions: Realising the Promise for Ourselves’ (2003) 29.  
467 Paul Gordon Lauren, ‘The Evolution of International Human Rights: Visions Seen’ (2003) 13.  
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it cannot be seen in isolation from the context and environment in which it operates.
468 
The 
protection of human rights, according to Okere
469
consists in the attribution of certain rights to, 
and imposition of certain duties on, the individual to enable him to lead a full and meaningful 
existence in, and to contribute as a useful member of, society is not strange to Africa. 
 
Rights can either be negative or positive. The belief is that the active and meaningful 
participation in the affairs of the community is only achieved when the individual is not 
constrained by hunger, poverty, illiteracy, diseases and fear. 
 
The Charter highlights the cultural dimension of human rights; it is a regional initiative for the 
promotion of human right that is relevant to Africa, it is developed as a regional initiative for the 
promotion of human rights which is relevant to Africa’s need. It reflects the region’s world- 
outlook, legal philosophy, collective development needs and peculiar circumstances and 
autonomy. It laid more emphasis on the protection of national rights than individual rights
470 
and 
reason(s) for this has been highlighted by numerous scholars in the field on human rights in the 
continent. 
 
4.2 The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and its features 
 
The purpose here is to identify the general characteristics of the Charter through an examination 
of its content. The Charter is a multilateral convention elaborated and adopted in the framework 
of the OAU.
471 
The Charter consists of a Preamble of ten paragraphs and a text of sixty-eight 
articles and a close examination of the preamble to the Charter will reveal the broad principles of 
the Charter. Focus will be on the operative part of the Charter and in particular, on the norms and 
the system of safeguards to which it devotes attention.
472 
The Preamble deals majorly with the 
                                                             
468 Heyns & Stefiszyn (eds.), ‘Human Rights, peace and justice in Africa: A reader’ (2006) 1.  
469 Obinna Okere, ‘The Protection of Human Rights in Africa and the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights: A 
Comparative Analysis with European and American Systems’ (1984) 6 Human Rights Quarterly 141.  
470 Rights listed for protection by the Charter include the rights to self-determination, liberation, and equality of all 
peoples; the right to international peace and security; the right to use ones resources; the right to development; the 
right to satisfactory environment and the right of national minorities. Reasons have been adduced by scholars as 
regards the reasons for the choice of national to individual rights and to development. According to Robertson R. E., in 
‘Measuring State Compliance with the Obligation to Devote Maximum Available Resources to Realising Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights’ (1994) 16 Human Rights Quarterly 694, the economic development of 
underdeveloped countries is necessary for their social well-being and political stability, without which they cannot 
ensure effectively, the civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights announced in the major international texts 
and that therefore the right to development is a human right.  
471 Article 63 (1) African Charter.  
472 Part I of the Article deals with rights and duties and it is covered by Articles 1 to 29. Part II dealt with measures 
of safeguard and it is covered by Articles 30 to 33 while part III of the Charter deals with the General Provisions. 
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conception of human rights enshrined by the African Charter. The indivisibility of rights, the 
concept of ‘Peoples’ rights, individual duties and the lack of a derogation clause are some of the 
features of the Charter that will be looked into here. 
 
The African Charter by adding all rights from the three generations of rights in one 
document 
473  
undid  the  division  of  rights  into  first  generation,  second  generation  and  
third generation. These rights are also provided for in the UDHR except the third 
generation of rights.
474 
Notwithstanding the slightly different formulation of the rights and 
the lack of total similarity in the African Charter and the UDHR, it can be said that there 
is a remarkable resemblance between the two documents. What they have in common is 
greater than their difference. 
 
One of the consequences of having the three generations of rights together in one document as 
done by the African Charter is that socio-economic rights are unambiguously actionable just 
like any other rights in the Charter.
475 
The justiciability stands as a reaction to the prevalent 
condition of severe scarcity and manipulation by kleptocratic elites.
476 
A close look at the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
Articles 64 to 68 took care of this. It should be noted that Article 63 which dealt with Signature and Ratification and 
which is found under Part II, would normally belong to Part III. See Ouguergouz, ‘The African Charter on Human 
and Peoples Rights: A comprehensive Agenda for Human Dignity and Sustainable Democracy in Africa’ (2003) 55.  
473 The Preamble proclaims that civil and political rights cannot be dissociated from Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights. This situation can be distinguished from the dichotomy at the global level between civil and political rights in 
the ICCPR and socio-economic rights in the ICESCR and at the regional level (in the European Convention of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the European Social Charter, as well as the American Convention on 
Human Rights (American Convention) and the Protocol of San Salvador). First generation rights in the African 
Charter are for example, the right to equality before the law (Art. 3), the right to have ones case heard (Art. 7), and 
the right to freely associate (Art. 10). Socio-economic rights or Second Generation rights include the right to work 
under adequate and satisfactory conditions (Art. 15). This provision does not grant a right to work rather it deals 
with conditions of work and introduces the principle of equal pay for equal work, the right to enjoy the best 
attainable state of physical and mental health (Art.16 (1) A) and the rights to education (Art. 17(1)). The right to a 
generally satisfactory environment (Art.24) and the right to international peace and security (Art. 23(1) included in 
the Charter as peoples’ rights have been characterised as Third Generation Rights. See Umozurike U. Oji, ‘The 
African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights’ (1997) 51; Vasak K, ‘The Third Generation of Human Rights: The 
Rights of Solidarity,’ Inaugural lecture at the 10th Study Session of the International Institute of Human Rights, 
Strasbourg, July 1979.  
474 Right to life is provided for under Article 3 of the UDHR; rights to respect for human dignity and the prohibition of 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment are provided for under Article 4 and 5 of the UDHR, right to 
liberty and security is provided for under Article 9 of UDHR, the right to fair hearing and the principles of non- 
retroactivity of criminal legislation is under Article 8, 10 and 11 UDHR, the freedom of conscience and religion 
(Article 18 UDHR), the right to information and freedom of expression (Article 19 UDHR), freedom of association 
(Article 20 UDHR), freedom of movement and residence (Article 13 UDHR), the right to seek asylum (Article 14 
UDHR), freedom to take part in the government of his country and of equal access to public service (Article 21 
UDHR), the right to property (Article 17 UDHR), and the traditional principles of the entitlement to the rights set out 
in these instruments, including the right to non-discrimination (Article 2 UDHR) and the right to equality of all before 
the law (Article 7 UDHR). See Ouguergouz (2003) 55-56.  
475 Viljoen F., ‘International Human Rights Law in Africa’ (2012) 237.  
476 The justiciability of socio-economic rights was not only an exhortation for things to be different but also an 
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African Charter reveal that civil and political rights are indissociable from economic, social and 
cultural rights, in both conception and universality, and that the satisfaction of the economic, 
social and cultural rights guarantees enjoyment of civil and political rights.
477 
This is a 
clarification of Article 28 of the UDHR which states that everyone is entitled to a social and 
international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration may be fully 
realised.
478 
This provision of the UDHR can be said to contain ‘right to development’479 
which the African Charter attach much importance to.
480 
It is in this regard that the African 
Charter sets itself apart from the universal standard and the collective nature of these rights 
and of some others makes the African Charter so original. 
The African Charter has remained silent on some of the most pressing socio-economic needs of 
Africa’s majorly rural communities such as safe and accessible drinking water, adequate housing 
and sustained food supplies as most of the communications submitted to the African 
Commission dealt with the right to fair trial.
481 
Some touched on issues like ousting of courts’ 
jurisdiction by military decrees
482 
access to legal counsel,
483 
the presumption of innocence
484 
and the right to a trial within a reasonable time.
485 
Findings on the rights to personal 
liberty and security and the prohibition against torture and cruel, inhuman, degrading 
treatment or punishment also featured regularly.
486
 The Commission has found some States to 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
acknowledgement that accountability through the law was part of the solution. This position was contained in the 
initial draft of the African Charter. See Viljoen F., ‘International Human Rights Law in Africa’ (2012) 215.  
477 Par. 7, Preamble to the African Charter.  
478 Ouguergouz (2003) 57.  
479 Article 22 of the UDHR states: Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled to 
realisation, through national effort and international co-operation and in accordance with the organisation and 
resources of each state, of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free 
development of his personality.  
480 Par. 7 of the Preamble to the African Charter states thus: Convinced that it is henceforth essential to pay 
particular attention to the right to development […]. See Article 22 of the African Charter which is more explicit in 
this respect. See also Fatsah Ouguergouz, ‘The African Charter on Human and peoples’ Rights: A Comprehensive 
Agenda for Human Rights and Sustainable Democracy in Africa’ (2003) 297.  
481 Christof Heyns, ‘Civil and political Rights in African Charter’ in Evans MD and Murray R (eds.), ‘The African 
Charter on Human and Peoples Rights: The System in Practice, 1986-2000’ (2002) 137.  
482 See Communications 105/93, 128/94, 152/95, 150/96 (joined), Media Rights Agenda and Others v Nigeria 
(2000) AHRLR 200 (ACHPR 1998) 12th Annual Activity Report Paragraphs 63 and 78-82. 
483 See Communication 87/93, Constitutional Rights Project (in respect of Lekwot and Others) v Nigeria (2000) 
AHRLR 183 (ACHPR 1995) 8th Annual Activity Report Paragraph 13.  
484 Communications 37/94, 139/94, 154/96, 161/97 (joined), International PEN and others (on behalf of Saro-Wiwa) v 
Nigeria (2000) AHRLR 212 (ACHPR 1998) 12th Annual Activity Report (Saro-Wiwas case) Paragraph 96. 
485 See Communication 103/93, Abubakar v Ghana (2000) AHRLR 124 (ACHPR) 10th Annual Activity Report, 
paragraphs 11 & 12. See also Communication 225/98, Huri-Laws v Nigeria (2000) AHRLR 273 (ACHPR 2000) 
14th Annual Activity Report paragraphs 45 & 46.  
486 Violations of Article 6 which deals with personal liberty and security were found in 24 of 42 cases finalised up 
till 2002. See Killander, ‘Communications before the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights 1988- 
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be in violation of these rights despite not being specifically mentioned in the Charter. 
On the concept of Peoples’ rights, the Charter recognises not only individual rights but also those 
of Peoples’.487 According to the Charter, peoples have the right to existence, to self- 
determination, to freely dispose of their natural resources, to development, to international peace 
and security and to a generally satisfactory environment.
488 
Though the concept of Peoples’ right 
was omitted from the initial proposal, it was mentioned in the resolution of the OAU Assembly 
calling for the elaboration on the Charter
489 
as Guinea and Madagascar pressed for the inclusion 
of the term ‘Peoples’ rights’ alongside ‘human rights’490 and it is through this (their insistence) 
that the continent’s human rights instrument was able to achieve one of its distinctive 
characteristics.
491
 
 
The African Charter incorporates the new generation of rights as mentioned earlier. With these 
rights, the people are the principal beneficiary. The Charter devoted six Articles
492 
to these rights 
in general which reflect a very special conception of human rights according to which the reality 
and respect of Peoples’ rights should necessarily guarantee human rights.493 
Another outstanding feature of the African Charter is ‘individual duties.’494 An individual has 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
2002’ (2006) 10(1) Law, Democracy and Development 103.  
487 Kiwanuka R.N., ‘The Meaning of People in the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights’ (1988) 82 AJIL 
80.  
488 Article 19-24 African Charter.  
489 MBaye K, ‘Les Droits de lHomme en Afrique’ (1992) Pedone 150.  
490 MBaye K, (1992) 150; also Viljeon (2007) 242.  
491 During his address to the Senegal meeting, Sengor added  a cultural justification to the ideological one, 
explaining the reference to peoples’ rights as follows: We simply meant… to show our attachment to economic, 
social and cultural rights, to collective rights in general, rights which have a particular importance in our situation in 
a developing country. He added that, in Africa, the individual and his rights are wrapped in the protection of the 
family and other communities. See address delivered by Leopard Sedar Senghor, President of the Republic of 
Senegal at the opening of the Meeting of Africa Experts preparing the Draft African Charter in Dakar, Senegal from 
28th November to 8th December, 1979. A copy of the speech can be found in, Christof Heyns (ed.), ‘Human rights 
Law in Africa’ (1999) 49. 
492 Articles 19 to 24. Out of these six Articles, only three are devoted to the third generation of rights and these are 
Article 22 which deals with Right to development, Article 23 which deals with Right to Peace and Article 24 which 
deals with right to satisfactory environment.  
493 Paragraph 5, Preamble to the African Charter; human rights never the less remain attributes inherent to human 
nature, as the same paragraph acknowledges that fundamental human rights stem from the attributes of human 
beings. This wording should be likened to that of the two United Nations Covenants of 1966 which directly stem 
from the UDHR and which state, in their Preamble (para.2) recognising that these rights derive from the inherent 
dignity of the human person.  
494  The primary duty under the Charter is the duty of state parties to recognise the rights therein and to adopt 
legislative or other measures to give effect to them. Except for the mention in Article 10, individual duties are not 
mentioned in the European Convention, and are barely mentioned in the American Convention, making the African 
Charter the first to elaborate the duties of individuals. See Umozurike U.O., ‘The African Charter on Human and 
Peoples Rights’ (1997) 64; Mutua M, ‘The Banjul Charter and the African Cultural Fingerprint: An Evaluation of 
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duties towards other individuals, his or her family, towards the community, towards the state 
whose national he or she happens to be and to her African and international community.
495 
The 
Committee of experts that drafted the African Charter were motivated by the speech delivered by 
the then Republic of Senegal’s president at the opening of the meeting of African Expert held 
in Senegal
496   
who called for the inclusion of ‘individual duties’ contrary to what has been 
done in other regions of the world as at that time.
497 
He stressed the interrelated nature of 
traditional African society where the individual and his rights are bound in the protection of the 
family and other communities. This is in contrast with the European tradition which allows 
human rights to be used as a ‘weapon’ with which the individual can defend himself against the 
group or entity representing it.
498
 
The African Commission so far has not dealt with this either in its communications or in its state 
reporting procedures. What this means is that no case involving individual duties had been 
submitted to the Commission.
499 
According to Umozurike, these duties require states to 
‘instil them in their subjects.’500 It is important to note that duties themselves cannot confer 
upon State Parties jurisdiction over individuals while complaints about individuals cannot be 
brought before the Commission for the simple reason that the Charter is open for ratification 
only to states. The inclusion of duties should not serve as a pretext for the curtailment of 
individual rights by repressive governments.
501
 
The concept of duties was able to find its way into domestic constitutions, something the concept 
of individual was not able to do and this inclusion in domestic constitutions underscores the 
reciprocity of rights and duties.
502 
This is an aspect that is hailed as part of the African 
understanding of rights. There is no provision for individual duties in the European Convention 
and the American Convention on its part barely mentioned it where it says: ‘Every person has 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
the Language of Duties’ (1995) 35 Virginia Journal of International Law 339-354.  
495 Articles 27-29 African Charter.  
496 Heyns C, ‘Human Rights Law in Africa’ (1999) 65-77. 
497 Viljeon (2007) 248.  
498 Senghors speech (Note 237) 79. 
499 The Guidelines for National Periodic Reports shed some light on the content of these duties by indicating that 
states should provide particulars about legislative measures, administrative regulations and court decisions 
establishing the atmosphere for enforcement and effectuation of these duties. See Paragraph IV.7 of the Guidelines, 
Second Activity Report, Annex XII. See also Paragraph IV.8 of the Guidelines noting the need to establish 
programmes because some of these valuable traditional duties might have been treated lightly… because of the 
overwhelming Western influence in the past colonial days.  
500 Umozurike U. O., ‘The African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights’ (1997) 65.  
501 Article 24 (4) African Charter which require the individual to preserve and strengthen national security.  
502
 Christof Heyns, ‘Where is the Voice in our Constitution?’ Centre for Human Rights, Pretoria, Occasional Paper 8   
www.chr.up.ac.za/test/images/files/about/archive/occassional_paper_8.pdf (Accessed on 1st April, 2014).  
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responsibilities to his community and mankind.’503 Individual duties were included in the 
UDHR
504 
and also in the fifth paragraph of the Preamble to the Covenants of Human Rights.
505
 
 
The African Charter, unlike other international treaties, does not make provision for derogation 
of rights.
506 
This omission has been said to put the Charter at odds with the domestic 
constitutional law of sub-Sahara African states
507 
as well as with some other international law 
obligations. Under the ICCPR,
508 
derogations are allowed but states are required to inform the 
UN Secretary-General immediately of the provisions from which they have derogated. They 
must also state the reason for the derogation and when it is expected to end. Whenever the 
derogation ends, the same kind of communication that was made when the derogation was to 
start must be made. 
 
It must be pointed out here that rights like the right to life, the prohibition of torture, slavery, 
forced labour, and on retroactive penal laws as well as freedom of conscience and religion, may 
under no circumstances be suspended or derogated from.
509 
This should be seen as one of the 
shortcomings of the Charter. 
 
Another shortcoming of the Charter is the lack of qualification of the restrictions on the rights. 
The exercise of many rights is limited by these ‘claw-back’ clauses such as ‘within the law,’510 
‘provided that the individual abides by the law,’511 ‘in accordance with the law of those countries 
and international conventions,’512 ‘in accordance with the provisions of the law.’513 With these, 
                                                             
503 Article 32(1) American Convention.  
504 Article 29 of the UDHR states that Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full 
development of his personality is possible. 
505 Paragraph 5 of the Declaration state thus: whereas the peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter 
reaffirmed their faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and in the equal 
rights of men and women and have determined to promote social progress and better standard of life in larger 
freedom. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  
506 The Charter does not contain a derogation clause in terms of which certain selected rights may be suspended 
temporarily during times of national emergency. See Viljoen (2007) 251.  
507 Some African Constitutions allow for derogation under circumscribed circumstances. For example, the 1973 
Constitution of Angola, Article 52; 1966 Constitution of Botswana, Article 16; 1994 Constitution of Ethiopia, 
Article 93; 1992 Constitution of Ghana, Article 31; 1990 Constitution of Mozambique, Article 828 to mention a 
few. In the Constitution of Northern African states, there are no such clauses observed. See Frans Viljoen (2012) 
333. See also, Abdi Jibril Ali, ‘Derogation from Constitutional Rights and its Implication under the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples Rights’ (2013) 17 Law, Democracy and Development 78.  
508 Article 4(3) International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.  
509 Article 4(2) International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.  
510 Article 9 of the African Charter dealing with freedom of expression.  
511 Article 10 of the African Charter dealing with freedom of Association and Article 12 African Charter dealing with 
freedom of movement.  
512 Article 12(3) African Charter dealing with right of Asylum.  
513 Article 13 African Charter dealing with right to participate in government.  
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the legislative authority of each State party to the African Charter has broad powers which 
should have been precisely defined or limited, for example, by making the requirement of 
legality subject to the requirement that such restriction should be expedient.
514 
Article 9(2) of 
the African Charter states that ‘every individual shall have the right to express and 
disseminate his opinions within the law.’ The term ‘within the law’ has been interpreted by 
many experts to mean that no domestic legal provision limiting the right in question could be 
challenged under the African Charter. This, the Commission has rectified in one of its 
Communications when it found that the term ‘within the law’ was to be interpreted to refer to 
international law and not domestic law.
515
 
To allow national law to take precedence over the international law of the Charter will defeat the 
purpose of the rights and freedoms which are enshrined in the Charter. International human 
rights standards must always prevail over contradictory national law and any limitation on the 
rights of the Charter must be in conformity with the provisions of the Charter.
516
 
4.3 Culture and African Values 
 
It will be wrong to argue that culture has no place in the human rights discourse. Africa’s 
struggle for liberation was a struggle for its identity and cultural heritage as well as respect for 
human rights. This is because the goal of colonialism in Africa, among others, was to undermine 
African cultures and the rights of the African people.
517 
To ensure the protection of these cultures 
in Africa, the OAU adopted the African Cultural Charter.
518 
Today, the continent is again faced 
with having to defend its cultural heritage against the impacts of globalisation and Western 
lifestyles on traditional modes of living and social values. 
 
For cultures to stand the test of time they must interact with other cultures and change and also 
maintain their own unique characteristics. In 2006, the AU adopted the Charter for the Cultural 
                                                             
514 For example, ‘provided it is for the protection of national security, law and order, public health or morality or is 
enacted in the interest of national security, the safety, health, ethics and rights and freedoms of others.’ The Second 
UN Convention (Article 22(2)), the European Convention (Article 9 for example) and the American Convention 
(Article 16(2)) only permit restrictions on rights if they are established by law and are necessary in a democratic 
society, in the interest of national security, public safety or order, or to protect public health or morality or the rights 
and freedom of others.  
515 See Civil Liberties Organisation (in respect of Nigerian Bar Association) V Nigeria; Communication 101/93. 
516 See Media Rights Agenda and Constitutional Rights Project V Nigeria Communication 105/93-128/94-130/94- 
152/96.  
517 Anton Bosl & Joseph Diescho (eds.), ‘Human Rights in Africa: Legal Perspectives on their Protection and 
Promotion’ (2009)141.  
518 CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev 5. Also called Banjul Charter, the African Charter was adopted in Nairobi, Kenya on 28 
June, 1981 and entered into force on 21 October, 1986.  
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renaissance of Africa
519
 recognising that the birth of the AU brought in a new African 
consciousness captured in the African Renaissance which is intended to inform, inspire and 
allow Africans to search for and discover their true African identity. The AU also adopted 
various instruments on culture such as the Nairobi
520 
and the Algiers
521 
Declarations with 
the Algiers Declaration reiterating that culture represents a set of ways and means through 
which the people of Africa, individually and collectively, affirm their identity, and protect 
and transmit such identity from generation to generation.
522
 
Culture has also been understood to be the foundation of society and development, integrating 
the values, customs and characteristics of a people. It also promotes interaction and dialogue 
among people therefore it should serve the cause of holding the African people together and 
strengthening their unity in diversity whether within families, public life, communities or 
organisations.
523 
It should help the region to make sense of itself in order to assert its root, 
reflect on its troubled past and forge a better, safer and prosperous way forward through a 
shared African vision.
524
 
The Charter places emphasis on Peoples’ rights because African culture is firmly grounded in the 
age-long  traditions  of  the  supremacy  of  collectivism,  sense  of  belonging  to  a  community, 
humanism and Ubuntu.
525 
Its languages, history and traditions remain fundamental to the 
                                                             
519 The Charter of the African Cultural Renaissance was formally adopted at the ordinary session of the Assembly 
held in Khartoum, Sudan on the 24th January, 2006. The Charter is a cultural tool which will empower Member 
States to promote Pan-Africanism, cultural renewal and identity as well as strengthen their national policies and 
other cultural instruments which will in turn contribute to the achievement of the continent socio-economic and 
cultural integration, build sustainable peace and winning the fight against poverty. See Africa Cultural Renaissance 
Campaign 2010-2012 Strategy for Implementation:  Promoting Together the African Renaissance.Available at  
www.africa-union.org/root/ua/Conferences/2010/mai/SA/23-25mai/AFRICAN CULTURAL RENAISSANCE  
CAMPAIGN-2010-2012finaldraft2.doc (Accessed on 4th April, 2014).  
520 Adopted at the AU Conference of Ministers of Culture in 2005 and endorsed by the AU Executive Council and 
the Assembly.  
521 Adopted at the AU Conference of Ministers of Culture in 2008 and endorsed by the AU Executive Council and 
the Assembly.  
522 Bience Gawanas, ‘The African Union: Concepts and Implementation Mechanisms relating to Human Rights’ in 
‘Human Rights in Africa’ (2009) 143. The declaration reaffirmed the role of culture for sustainable development, 
continental integration and the realisation of the African Union Renaissance with a view to building a united, 
peaceful and prosperous Africa.  
523 Agbakwa S.C., ‘Reclaiming Humanity: Social, Economic and Cultural Rights as the Cornerstone of African 
Human Rights’ in Heyns, C & Stefisyun K. (eds),‘Human Rights, Peace and Justice in Africa: A Reader’ (2006) 70.  
524 Gawanas B., ‘The African Union: Concepts and Implementation Mechanisms relating to Human Rights’ in 
Bosl & Diescho, ‘Human Rights in Africa’ (2009) 142.  
525 Gawans B., ‘The African Union: Concepts and Implementation Mechanisms relating to Human Rights’ in 
Bosl & Diescho, ‘Human Rights in Africa’ (2009) 143. This means that we exist as people only in relationships with 
others. 
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coexistence of its people. 
 
4.4 Human Rights within OAU 
 
The provisions of the OAU Charter made little express mention of human rights but rather, it 
reflects the dominating concerns of Africa during that period,
526 
it centred on issues such as 
the non-interference in internal affairs,
527 
sovereign equality of states,
528 
the fight against neo- 
colonialism,
529 
self- determination in the state context
530 
and peaceful settlement of 
disputes.
531 
The OAU’s focus was on protection of the state, not the individual,532 and any 
concept of human rights within the OAU went little beyond the notion of self-
determination in the context of decolonisation and apartheid in South Africa.
533
 
 
There are other aspects of human rights mentioned in the Charter which are broad and general 
and related to the relationship among states 
534 
and ethnic divide: ‘inspired by a common 
determination to promote understanding among our people… in a larger unity transcending 
                                                             
526 The concern of Africa during this period was to ensure the independence of those African people who were still 
colonised, condemnation of apartheid regime in southern Africa, and protecting the newly acquired statehood. 
Furthermore, it has been suggested that the OAU was not initially willing to consider human rights, labelling them 
one of the main elements in the ideological armoury of imperialism. See Rachel Murray, ‘Human Rights in Africa: 
From OAU to AU’ (2004) 7. See also, Shivji Issa, ‘The concept of Human Rights in Africa’ (1989) 43; Naldi, G.J. 
‘Documents of the Organisation of African Unity’ (1992) 3.  
527 Article 3(1) (2) Elias, as one of the drafters of the Charter, notes that the desire to be left alone, to be allowed to 
choose its particular political, economic and social systems and to order the life of its community in its own way, is a 
legitimate one for large and small states alike, Elias, The Charter, at 248. See also Akinyemi A. B., ‘The 
Organisation of African Unity and the concept of Non-Interference in Internal Affairs of Member States’ (1972 – 
1973) 46 BYIL393-400 at 393-5.  
528 Article 3 (1).  
529 Preamble, Article 2(1) (d), Article 3(6).  
530 Preamble, Article 3(3).  
531 Article 3(4).  
532 For example, assassination is condemned in respect of subverting the state, unreserved condemnation…of 
political assassination as well as of subversive activities, Article 3(5). See also El-Ayouty Y. (ed.), ‘The 
Organisation of African Unity after Thirty Years’ (1994) 15-26, at 17.  
533 Murray (2004) 8.  Mathews in The organization of African Unity (1989) 79 noted that the OAU Charter, for 
instance, does not contain any provision for the protection of the right of the African masses… evidently the 
emphasis in 1963 was on the state rather than the people. As President Nyerere of Tanzania, one of the founding 
fathers of OAU has pointed out, the OAU Charter spoke for the African peoples still under colonialism or racial 
domination, but once the countries emerged to nationhood, the Charter stood for the protection of their heads of state 
and served as a trade union which protected them. In other words, the OAU appears to be an institution of the 
African heads of state, by the heads of state and for the heads of state. See also Akindele R.A. &Akinterinwa B. A., 
‘Reform of the United Nation: Towards Greater Effectiveness, Enhanced Legitimacy Profile and Equitable 
Regionally Balanced membership in an Enlarged United Nations Security Council’ in Obiozor G. A. &Ajala A. 
(eds.), ‘Africa and the United Nations System: The First Fifty Years’ (1998) 200-31 at 206. 
534For example, in the preamble, it notes that states are conscious of the fact that freedom, equality, justice and 
dignity are essential objectives for the achievement of the legitimate aspirations of the African peoples. Also, 
persuaded that the Charter of the UN and the UDHR, to the Principles of which we reaffirm our adherence, provide a 
solid foundation for peaceful and positive co-operation among states; to promote international co-operation, 
having due regard to the African Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; Article 2(1)(e).   
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ethnic and national differences’, this is stressed in respect of African unity as a whole, rather than 
from the perspective of the impact upon the individual.
535 
Any threat to human rights appeared to 
be reflected in the OAU Charter as coming from outside the continent, a thing which African 
unity may help to prevent.
536 
These influences during the 1960s were to define the OAU’s 
approach to human rights issues for many years and from the point of view of human rights, it 
was the two issues of self-determination and apartheid in South Africa that were central to the 
OAU at its formation and which appear to have guided its approach to human rights throughout 
its later years.
537
 
4.5 Transformation of OAU to AU 
 
The Assembly of Heads of State and Government at their Fourth Extraordinary Summit 
538
 
adopted the Sirte Declaration proposing an Inter-African Union.
539
 Legal experts and 
parliamentarians met in Ethiopia in April and in Tripoli at the end of May 2000. Their report was 
considered by the first OAU Ministerial Meeting on the Implementation of the Sirte 
Declaration
540 
and in July, 2000, in Lomé, Togo, the Constitutive Act 
541 
of the Union was 
                                                             
535 Murray (2004) 8.  
536 Desirous that all African states should henceforth unite so that the welfare and well-being of their people can be 
assured… [and] to co-operate and intensify their co-operation and efforts to achieve a better life for the people of 
Africa, Article 2(1) (b). With this in mind states should thus coordinate their efforts, according to Article 2(2), 
specifically in the political, diplomatic, economic, educational and cultural, health, science and defence and security 
fields.  
537 Rachel Murray (2004) 8.  
538 This was held in Libya on the 9th of September, 1999.  
539 It was by acclamation that the Assembly of Heads of State and Governments in July 1999 in Algiers accepted an 
invitation from Colonel Muammar al- Gaddafi to the 4th Extraordinary Summit in September in Sirte. The purpose 
of the Extraordinary Summit was to amend the OAU Charter to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
OAU. The theme of the Sirte Summit was Strengthening OAU capacity to enable it to meet the challenges of the 
new millennium. This Summit concluded on 9 September 1999 with the Sirte Declaration aimed at effectively 
addressing the new social, political and economic realities in Africa and the world; fulfilling the peoples aspirations 
for greater unity in conforming with the objectives of the OAU Charter and the Treaty Establishing the African 
Economic Community; revitalising the Continental Organisation to play a more active role in addressing the needs of 
the people; eliminating the scourge of conflicts; meeting global challenges; and harnessing the human and natural 
resources of the continent to improve living conditions. To achieve these aims, the Summit, inter alia, decided to 
establish an African Union in conformity with the ultimate objectives of the Charter of our Continental Organisation 
and the provisions of the Treaty establishing the African Economic Community. Accelerate the process of 
implementing the Treaty establishing the African Economic Community, in particular shorten the implementation 
periods of the Abuja Treaty, ensure the speedy establishment of all the institutions provided for in the Abuja Treaty; 
such as the African Central Bank, the African Monetary Union, the African Court of Justice and in particular, the 
Pan-African Parliament, strengthening and consolidating the Regional Economic Communities as the pillars for 
achieving the objectives of the African Economic Communities (RECs) and realising the envisaged Union, convene an 
African Ministerial Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in the continent as soon as 
possible. See www.au2002.gov.za/docs/background/oau_to_au.htm. (Accessed on 18th August, 2014). 
540 The report of the Ministerial Conference on the Establishment of the African Union and Pan-African Parliament, 
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adopted. 
 
Since the entry into force of the Abuja Treaty
542 
establishing the African Economic Community 
(AEC), the OAU has been operating on the basis of two legal instruments. The Abuja Treaty 
came into force after the requisite number of ratification in May 1994. It provided for the African 
Economic Community to be set up through a gradual process, which would be achieved by 
coordination, harmonisation and progressive integration of the activities of existing and future 
regional economy. 
 
With the AEC, the AU is taking a wider political and economic view than the European Union 
(EU) now encompasses, in fact, the AU was modelled on the EU. People have argued that the 
EU was not the only regional influence and models from the Association of South East 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) were also of use.
543 
A look at the treaty leaves no doubt that the 
architect of the Abuja treaty hoped to replicate the EU’s structure, policies and success, but 
on an African Landscape.
544
 
Libya played a major role in the establishment of the AU and this generated a lot of concerns and 
criticisms
545 
because of the way the country treated black Africans. It is important to stress that 
though Libya was in the forefront of the transformation, even though it was not the only State 
that played a key role, the transformation is a result of a long process of OAU/AEC initiatives.
546
 
The provisions of the resulting Constitutive Act suggest that human rights will indeed play a 
greater role in the work of the Union than they did in the OAU. Thus, the Preamble to the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
CM/2162 (LXXII).  
541 The Act provides for transitional arrangements whereby the OAU Charter remains operative for one year for the 
purpose of enabling the OAU/AEC to undertake the necessary measures regarding the devolution of its assets and 
liabilities to the Union and all matters relating thereto. See Article 13 of the Constitutive Act.  
542 The Abuja Treaty is an International Agreement signed on June 3, 1991 in Abuja, Nigeria which created the 
African Economic Community. The treaty called for an African Central Bank to follow by 2028. The current plan is to 
establish an African Economic Community with a single currency by 2023.  
543 See Inter-Africa Group/Justice Africa, The Architecture and Capacity of the African Union. Africa Development 
Forum (ADF III) Economic Commission for Africa, Issue Paper for the African Union Symposium, at 3. 
544 Babarinde O.A., ‘Analysing the Proposed African Economic Community: Lessons from the Experience of the 
European Union,’ paper for the Third ECSA-World Conference on The European Union in a Changing World, 
sponsored by the European Commission, D-G X, Brussels, 19-20 September, 1996. The author went ahead to argue 
that there are limits to the parallels that can be drawn between the EU and the proposed AEC… the stated goals may be 
too ambitious, albeit not impossible, to achieve, given the recent socio-political and economic trends which 
predominate in Africa.  
545 For example, allegation of racist attacks against sub-Sahara Africans, see Libya, Amnesty International, Annual 
Report 2001, AI Index: POL 10/0001/2001.  
546 Ali Abdullatif Ahmida, ‘The Making of Modern Libya: State formation, Colonisation and Resistance’ (2009) 
163.  
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Constitutive Act recalls ‘the heroic struggles waged by our people and our countries for 
economic independence, human dignity and economic emancipation.’ Human rights are 
mentioned specifically with states being ‘determined to promote and protect human and Peoples’ 
rights, consolidate democratic institutions and culture and to ensure good governance and the 
rule of law.’547 
 
It is also recognised that there is a need to ‘encourage international co-operation, taking due 
account of the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights’ 
and ‘promote and protect human and Peoples’ rights in accordance with the Africa Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights and other relevant human rights instruments.548 States must respect 
the need for ‘peaceful coexistence of member states and their rights to live in peace and 
security,
549 
promote gender equality, have ‘respect for democratic principles, human rights, the 
rule of law and good governance’, respect the sanctity of life and condemn unconstitutional 
changes of government.
550 
The requirements to ‘promote co-operation in all fields of human 
activity to raise the living standards of African Peoples’ and to ‘work with relevant international 
partners in the eradication of preventable diseases and the promotion of good health on the 
continent are also relevant.’551 
 
4.6 STRUCTURE OF THE OAU/AU 
 
The OAU Charter provided for four (4) principal institutions, the Assembly of Heads of State 
and Government (AHSG), the Council of Ministers, the General Secretariat and the Commission 
on Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration.
552 
The Constitutive Act of the AU on its parts listed 
the organs of the Union to be the Assembly of the Union, the Executive Council, the Pan-African 
Parliament, the Court of Justice, the Commission, the Permanent Representatives Committee, the 
Specialised Technical Committee, the Economic, Social and Cultural Council and the Financial 
Institutions.
553 
Of all these above listed organs, the Assembly of the Union, the Executive 
Council, the Commission and the Specialised Technical Committees are equivalent to the 
                                                             
547 Rachel Murray (2004) at 32. The central objectives, in Article 3, and Principles, in Article 4, of the Union noted 
that the Unions aims include not only achieving greater unity and solidarity between the African countries and the 
peoples of Africa and accelerating development but also the need to promote peace, security and stability on the 
continent. See Article 3(f).  
548 Article 3(e)(h).  
549 Article 4(i).  
550 Article 4(l),(o) and (p).  
551 Article 3(k) and (n).  
552 Article 7.  
553 Article 5 of the Constitutive Act.  
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Assembly of Heads of State and Governments, the Council of Ministers, General Secretariat and 
Specialised Commissions in the OAU institutional structure. 
 
4.6.1 The Assembly of Heads of State and Governments/the Assembly 
 
The Assembly of Heads of State and Government is a composition of the Heads of State and 
Governments of member states of the African Union or their representatives
554 
which meets at 
least once in a year.
555 
The Assembly being the supreme organ of the Organisation, determines 
the common policies of the Union, monitors their implementation, establishes any organ of the 
Union, and receives, considers and takes decisions on reports and recommendations of other 
organs of the Union. What this means is that it has final decision making powers.
556
 
 
4.6.2 The Court of Justice of the African Union 
 
The Court of Justice of the African Union was established by the Constitutive Act of the African 
Union
557 
with jurisdiction mainly on the interpretation of the Constitutive Act of the AU and 
other treaties.
558 
AU organs and Member States are eligible to file cases before the court
559 
and 
as at February 2019, eighteen Member States
560 
has ratified the Protocol as against the 
required fifteen ratification needed for it to come into effect.
561 
The African Court on Human  
and Peoples’ Rights with the African Court of Justice were to be established as two separate 
institutions, as a treaty body and as an organ of the AU respectively but in July, 2004, the 
Assembly decided to ‘integrate’ the African Court and the Court of Justice of the African Union 
into one Court.
562
 The merger protocol was adopted in 2008. The African Court was set up to 
                                                             
554 Article 9.  
555 Article 9. It infact rarely met more than twice though there are provisions in Article 9 for extra-ordinary sessions 
to be held. See Philippe Sands & Pierre Klein, ‘Bowett’s Laws of International Institutions’ (2001) 246.  
556 Article 8.  
557 Article 5 Constitutive Act. 
558 Article 19 of the Court of Justice Protocol.  
559 Article 18 of the Court of Justice Protocol.  
560 www.au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/7784-sl-protocol_of_the_court_of_justice_of_the_african_union_1.pdf 
(Accessed 18 March, 2017).  
561 See www.au.int/en/treaties/status (Accessed on 7th March, 2014).  
562 During the discussion on the recommendation of the Executive Council to postpone the election of Judges of the 
African Court due to insufficient candidates, the then chairperson of the Assembly, President Olusegun Obasanjo, 
expressed concern about the proliferation of organs of AU, and the danger of not having enough funds to support 
them. In his comment, he said why shouldn’t the Court of Justice take along with it the Court on Human and Peoples 
Rights so that we can have a Court of Justice which will have a division, if you like, for border issues, a division for 
human rights issues, a division for cross-border criminal issues or whatever. See ‘Report on the Decision of the 
Assembly of the Union to Merge the African Court on Human and Peoples Rights and the Court of Justice of the 
African Union’, Executive Council, Sixth Ordinary Session, 24-28 January, 2005, Abuja, Nigeria, Ex.CL/162, pp.1 
& 2. See also Evans & Murray (eds), ‘African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights: The System in Practice, 1986- 
2006’ (2008) 406.  
https://etd.uwc.ac.za
118 
 
 
 
deal with allegations of human rights abuses against AU Member States while the Court of 
Justice was expected to deal mainly with contentious matters of a political and economic 
nature.
563 
The mandate of the Court of Justice related to disputes about the common policies of 
the AU
564 
and arising issues from accelerated political and economic integration.
565 
The merger 
will be extensively discussed in chapter six of this thesis. 
 
4.6.3 The Commission 
 
The Commission is another organ of the AU which operates as the functional heart of the AU 
and it operates as the secretariat of the Union.
566 
It is saddled with the day to day operations of 
the AU. It is headed by a Chairperson who is elected by the Assembly and assisted by eight 
Commissioners who are appointed by the Assembly, with each in charge of a Department while 
regional   and   gender   representation   are   ensured   during   the   appointment   of   these 
Commissioners.
567 
This led to the appointment of five female Commissioners thereby making it 
the first AU organ to achieve gender equality.
568 
The Commission is equivalent to the General 
Secretariat in the OAU Charter and the Abuja Treaty. 
 
4.6.3 The Permanent Representative Committee 
 
The Permanent Representatives’ Committee (PRC) can be said to be the most active of the AU 
organs and it is made up of ambassadors or the representatives of Member States to the AU. It 
has been described as the ‘hands-on’ body engaged continuously in negotiations on a variety of 
issues.
569
 It is where the political deals were decided which turned technical drafting into 
official policy
570 
and this was demonstrated during the drafting of the Protocol merging the 
African Human Rights Court and the African Court of Justice.
571 
Its sub-committee on 
Refugees, Returnees and Internally Displaced Persons has also taken a leading role in the 
elaboration of a ‘legal framework for the protection and assistance of internally displaced 
                                                             
563 Viljoen, International Human Rights Law in Africa (2007) 225.  
564 Article 9(1)(a) Constitutive Act.  
565 Article 3 Constitutive Act.  
566 Article 20(1) Constitutive Act.  
567 Article 6(2) (3) Statutes of the AU Commission.  
568Stefiszyn K, ‘The African Union: Challenges and Opportunities for Women’ (2005) 5 AHRLJ 358, 365.  
569 Viljoen (2007) 183.  
570 See, ‘African Network on Debt and Development, Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa’. See also, Oxfam 
GB,   ‘Towards   a   People-Driven   African   Union:   Current   Obstacles   and   New   Opportunities’ Available 
atwww.soros.org/resources/articels_publications/publications/people_20070124/a-people-20071101-english.pdf. 
(Accessed on 7th March, 2014).  
571 AU Doc. EX. CL.237 (VIII) Decision on the merger of the African Court on Human and Peoples Rights and the 
Court of Justice of the African Union.  
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persons in the continent.’572 This was evidenced in its advocacy for the ratification, 
domestication and implementation of the Kampala Convention by States. The humanitarian 
mission conducted by the PRC to countries affected by displacement provides unique 
opportunities to promote the Kampala Convention with relevant authorities.
573
 
4.6.4 The Economic, Social and Cultural Council 
 
The Economic, Social and Cultural Council is an advisory body of the AU aimed at giving civil 
society organisations a voice among AU institutions.
574 
It is composed of different social 
and professional groups of Member States
575
 
 
as its composition and functioning was left to be 
determined by the Assembly.
576 
It was the last of the organs of AU to be established, this is 
reinforcing the belief that the AU gives low priority to the inclusion of ordinary African people 
in its structure and no provision was made for it in the OAU Charter. The Abuja Treaty provided 
for an organ named the Economic and Social Commission.
577 
It aimed at fostering a partnership 
between the AU and civil societies, it is not treated as a ‘legislative’ organ because the outcomes 
of the partnership will only take the form of ‘advice’ to the organs with decision-making powers 
and there is no stated intention that the AU will ever change this position. It provides civil 
societies in Africa with the opportunity to participate in dialogues and debates about AU policies 
and programmes since they were excluded from participating meaningfully in the formation of 
the AU. The ECOSOCC statute is silent on how the outcome of debates may be brought to the 
attention of other AU organs. It is also silent on the relationship between ECOSOCC and other 
AU organs. This is because of its limited advisory powers and the possibility of state elites 
controlling its membership, the danger is that ECOSOCC may not constitute a vibrant ‘fourth 
branch’ where participation of African citizens will be secured. 
 
The Constitutive Act of the AU gives an important place to human rights and an indication that 
they will play a significant role in the AU. However, there have been serious concerns that the 
                                                             
572 AU Doc. Ex.CL/Dec.284 (IX) para.9.  
573 See the Report of the Workshop organized by the Norwegian Refugee Council in conjunction with Internal 
Displacement Monitoring Centre and the African Union titled ‘The Natural Responsibility to Protect Internally 
Displaced People: The Kampala Convention’ held at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia from 8-10 December, 2014 at 7.  
574 Article 3(1) ECOSOCC Statutes.  
575 It is composed of one hundred and fifty (150) civil society organisations including those representing women, 
children, elderly, disabled, professional groups, NGOs, workers, employers, traditional leaders, academics, religious 
and cultural organisations. There are two civil society organisations from each member state, ten with sub-regional 
and eight with regional (continent- wide) focus; twenty representing the Diaspora; and another six nominated by the 
AU Commission. See Article 4, Statute of ECOSOCC.  
576 Article 22 Constitutive Act.  
577 Heyns (eds.) (2006) 102.  
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Commission and the Court do not feature in the Act as they were not previously mentioned. 
While it is feared that these two bodies were being sidelined or forgotten under these new 
structures,
578
 it perhaps indicates the lack of coherence in the Act as a whole when other 
organs, such as the Central Organ, were also omitted. For example, the Council of Ministers 
asked the Secretary to take measure to assure the place of the African Population 
Commission and the OAU Labour and Social Affairs Commission in the AU.
579 
Despite 
being mentioned in the substantive provisions of the Act, in relation to the mandates of the 
various institutions, within the Union, it is disturbing that human rights are not listed under 
any of them expressly. The Assembly, as the supreme body of the Union, seems to reflect the 
AHSG under the OAU.
580
 The relationship between the ACJ and the Court will be examined in 
greater detail in chapter six of this thesis. 
 
4.7      Conclusion 
 
A clear understanding of the background to the human rights regime in Africa is a requirement 
for a full appreciation of how the African human rights regime came into existence and this is 
what this chapter has tried to do. The chapter has traced the historical development of human 
rights in Africa thereby laying a foundation for the exploration of the relationship between 
human rights and culture in Africa as it sets the tone of the study generally. 
 
The concepts dealt with in this chapter are merely introductory as it is dedicated to inquiring 
whether law existed in pre-colonial Africa/traditional African society and this was done via two 
                                                             
578 See Rachel Murray, ‘Human Rights in Africa: From the OAU to the African Union’ (2004) 33. The Sirte 
Declaration went further with the AHSG noting the violations of human and peoples rights that continued on the 
continent and specifically stated: We also recommit ourselves to ensure the early establishment of the African Court 
on Human and Peoples Rights, Draft Sirte Declaration, Fourth Extraordinary Summit of the Assembly of Heads of 
State and Government, 8-9 September 1999, Sirte, Libya, EAHG/Draft/DECL. (IV) Rev.1, para. 14.  
579 Decision on the place of the African Population Commission (APC) in the African Union, AHG/Dec.176 
(XXXVIII); Decision on the place of the OAU Labour and Social Affairs Commission in the African Union, 
AHG/Dec.177 (XXXVIII). The OAU/AU organs have continually stressed that it is for the Commission first to 
consider its place within the Union and to inform the AU organs accordingly. 
580 The functions of the Executive Council in Article 13 provide that ‘ it should coordinate and take decisions on 
policies in areas of common interest and list environmental protection, humanitarian action and disaster response 
and relief, education, culture, health, nationality, residency and immigration, social security… child care policies as 
well as policies relating to the disabled and handicapped.’ See Article 13 (e), (h), (j), (k) of the Constitutive Act 
respectively. Similarly,  the Act  establishes a number of  Specialised Technical  Committee such as the  Rural 
Economy and Agricultural Matters; Monetary and Financial Affairs; Trade, Customs and Immigration; Industry, 
Science and Technology, Energy, Natural Resources and Environment; Transport, Communications and Tourism; 
Health, Labour and Social Affairs; Education, Culture and Human Resources. See Article 14. It is possible that the 
committee on Health, Labour and Social Affairs, and on Education, Culture and Human Resources, may cover 
human rights.  
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inquiries. First, the chapter looked into the existence of human rights in pre-colonial or 
traditional African society then followed it up with human rights debates. The historical 
development of the African Charter was also examined by critically analysing its content, 
application, enforcement and implementation. 
 
The point remains that colonialism relegated African tradition and values; it arrested and 
destroyed the internal dynamics of the evolution of Africa societies and there is no doubt that by 
abolishing certain objectionable traditional practices that were prevalent in pre-colonial Africa 
which were carried over to colonial Africa, the colonialist did contribute to selective progressive 
development of human rights. It was not only founded on racism and naked exploitation, it also 
denied and prevented fundamental human rights, and was essentially against the promotion and 
protection of human rights in Africa. 
 
The consequences of colonialism can still be seen in the high handedness and authoritarian 
nature of many African regimes, which have adopted the oppressive mechanisms of the colonial 
masters against their own people. 
 
The next chapter will seek to explore the concepts of justice and relate them to human rights 
from an African perspective. It will demonstrate that human rights are the rationale for the quest 
for justice, peace, reconciliation and democracy in the society. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
THE AFRICAN COMMISSION 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The African Charter
581 
provides for the establishment of the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (the Commission) within the OAU (now AU). The Commission has the mandate 
to promote and protect human and Peoples’ rights in Africa.582 The African Charter is regarded 
as one of the comprehensive human rights treaties presently in existence.
583 
The Commission 
was the sole supervisory body of the African Charter before the establishment of the African 
Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights which came into existence with the adoption of the 
Protocol to the African Charter on the Establishment of the African Court on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights.584 This positioned the Commission at the very core of the African human rights 
system.
585
 
The Commission is made up of 11 members 
586 
that are elected by secret ballot by the 
Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU/AU
587 
for a period of six renewable 
years.
588 
The candidates are drawn from a list by the States Parties to the African Charter and 
chosen from among African personalities of the highest reputation, known for their high 
morality, integrity, impartiality and competence in human and Peoples’ rights.589 The candidate 
must also have the nationality of one of the State Parties to the Charter.
590
 
                                                             
581 Adopted by the Assembly of Heads of States and Government of the Organisation of African Unity on 28 June, 
1981. It entered into force on 21 October, 1986. See OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3, Rev. 5.  
582 Article 30 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights.  
583 Udombana N.J., ‘Between Promise and Performance: Revisiting States Obligations under the African Charter’ 
(2004) 40 at 105. 
584 Adopted by the Assembly of Heads of States and Government of the OAU on 9th of June, 1998 andit entered into 
force on 25
th 
January, 2004. See OAU/LEG/AFCHPR/PROT (III).  
585 Malcolm Evans & Rachel Murray (eds.), ‘African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights: The System in 
Practice1986-2006’ (2008) 317.  
586 Article 31 (1).  
587 Article 33 of the African Charter.  
588 Article 36.  
589 Article 31. The AU Assembly in May, 2013 elected Lawrence Mute as Commissioner for a term of six years. 
Commissioner Mute has previously served as a Commissioner of the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights 
and he replaced former Chairperson of the Commission, Dupe Atoki from Nigeria, who did not stand for re-election. 
Yeung Kam John Yeung Sik Yuen from Mauritius (elected 2007), SoyataMaiga from Mali (elected 2007) and Lucy 
Asuagbor from Cameroon (elected 2010) were re-elected for six year terms. See Assembly/AU/Dec. 483. (XXI). 
Other Commissioners are Faith Pansy Tlakula (elected 2005) from South Africa, Dr. Solomon AyeleDersso 
(elected2015) from Ethiopia, Jamesina Essie L. King (elected 2015) from Sierra Leone, Madam Reine Alapini-
Gansou (elected 2005) from Benin, Maya SahliFadel Ms (elected 2011) from Algeria, Med. S.K. Kaggwa (elected 
(2011) from Uganda and Mrs. Zainab Sylvie Kayitesi (elected 2007) from Rwanda. See www.achpr.org/about/ 
(Accessed 15th August, 2016).  
590 Article 34. It should be noted that the initial version of this Article did not lay down this condition, whose effect is 
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In order for the Commission to execute its mandate, it is essential that its members meet. To 
achieve this, provision has been made for members to meet at least twice a year during the 
ordinary session.
591 
The ordinary session of the Commission normally lasts for a period of two 
(2) weeks
592 
and it is divided into public and private sessions.
593
 
 
The Executive Council in its decisions on the Commission’s Activity Reports, has repeatedly 
called on the AU Commission to ‘expedite recruitment for the Secretariat in order to enable the 
ACHPR to effectively deliver on the mandate entrusted to it.’594 A staffing structure was 
approved by the AU for the Secretariat in 2009 but the Commission has not expedited action for 
the recruitment of staff.
595
 
On the financial allocation to the Commission, the Commission’s budget in the AU has increased 
significantly. The total budget for the Commission for 2019 is about $681.5 million,
596 
in 2008 
the Commission presented and successfully defended a budget of $6million
597 
while in 2007 the 
Commission was allocated a budget of $1.2million
598 
but the Commission has expressed concern 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
to limit the choice of States in this field. The American Convention, for example in Article 36 simply requires that 
candidates should be nationals of a Member State of OAS. The European Convention also in its previous Article 36 
required members of the Commission to have the nationality of a country party or the nationality of a Member State 
of the Council of Europe. The same rule applies to members of the European Court in which a judge of Swiss 
nationality proposed by Liechtenstein and a judge of Italian nationality proposed by San Marino currently sit. See 
also Fatsar Ouguergouz, ‘The African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights: A Comprehensive Agenda for Human 
Dignity and Sustainable Democracy in Africa’ (2003) 486.  
591 See Rules 1 and 2 of the Rules of Procedure of the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights. The 
Commission may also hold Extraordinary Sessions where necessary. See Rule 3 of the Rules of Procedure of the 
African Commission. The Commission held two ordinary sessions in 2014 and 2015, the Commission held one 
ordinary session between the 28th of April (55th Ordinary Session) and 12th of May in Angola and a joint session 
between the 16th and 19th of July, 2014. But due to the backlog of complaints and state reports, the Commission has 
held three Extraordinary Sessions; the 15th Extraordinary Session from 7th  - 14th March, 2014 in The Gambia, 
the 16th Extraordinary Session from 20th - 29th July 2014 in Rwanda and the 17th Extraordinary Session between 
the 19th and 28th February, 2015 in The Gambia. See www.achpr.org/sessions (Accessed 4th April, 2015). 
592 Rule 2 of the Rules of Procedure of the African Commission.  
593 The Commission during its public session reports on its promotional activities and receives reports from 
government representatives, national human rights institutions, international organisations, inter-governmental 
organisations and non-governmental organisations about human rights situations in Africa. Matters relating to the 
protective mandate of the Commission as well as the administrative and financial situation of its secretariat are 
handled during the private sessions. Members of the Commission also discuss and adopt decisions and resolutions or 
make recommendations aimed at improving the situation of human rights on the continent during private sessions. 
See Evans & Murray (eds.) (2008) 317.  
594 See Decision on the 34th Activity Report of the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights Doc 
Ex.CL/796 (XXIII) para 24 of 2013.  
595 35th Activity Report of the African Commission at para 30.  
596 www.au.int/en/pressrelease/20180706/financial-reforms-african-union-lead-massive-cuts-union’s-budget (Accessed 8 
March, 2019)  
597 See Par. 38, 23rd& 24th Activity Report.  
598 See Par. 113, 23rd Activity Report.  
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that no funds for programme activities as allocated in the AU budget were released to the 
Commission.
599
 
Article 45 of the Charter provides the various functions of the African Commission and the 
relevant provisions are to promote human and Peoples’rights, protect humanrights as laid down 
in the Charter, interpret the provisions of the Charter, and carry out other functions assigned to it 
by the Assembly of Heads of State.
600 
In carrying out its functions, the Commission shall not 
only co-operate with other human rights organisations, but have regard for the international law 
of human rights and other treaties in its interpretation of the Charter, especially those of which 
African states are parties.
601
 
 
The African Commission was established as a quasi-judicial supervisory body under the African 
Charter whose findings are not legally binding as such.
602 
The Commission issues 
‘recommendations’ to state parties, rather than ‘orders.’ In fulfilling its protective mandate, the 
African Commission has developed a well-established practice of receiving and considering 
individual complaints alleging violations by state parties of the African Charter.
603 
When it has 
found such a violation, the Commission has further developed a practice not only of listing the 
articles violated by the state party concerned, but also of recommending remedial measures to be 
adopted by that state.
604
 
 
In contrast to the individual complaints procedure, what follows once the Commission has made 
                                                             
59935th Activity Report of the African Commission para. 31. The budget for 2014 was also reduced to $4 million as 
an operational budget from member States and $1, 5 million as programme budget from partners. SeeKillander M & 
Nkrumah B,‘Human Rights Developments in the African Union during 2012 and 2013’ (2014) 14 African Human 
Rights Law Journal 275-296.   
600 Article 45, African Charter.  
601 Article 60 and 61, African Charter.  
602 See the introductory comments to Mbaye draft which formed the basis of the Charters travaux préparatoires, 
highlighting this omission of judicial institution but explaining that it was thought premature to [establish one] at 
this stage. Introduction to Mbaye Draft, 4th par.; OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/1 (1979). See also Christof Heyns (ed.) 
‘Human Rights Law in Africa’ (2002) 65. See also, Yemi Akinseye-George, ‘New Trends in African Human Rights 
Laws: Prospect of an African Court on Human Rights’ (2002) 10 University of Miami International & Comparative 
Law Review 162-3. 
603 Frans Viljoen & LiretteLouw, ‘State Compliance with the Recommendation of the African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights, 1994-2004’ (2007) 101 American Journal of International Law 1. 
604 The Commission’s practice in this regard is well documented. See Malcolm Evans & Rachel Murray, ‘The 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: The system in Practice 1986-2000’, Evelyn Ankumah, ‘The African 
Commission on Human and Peoples Rights: Practice and Procedure’ (1996); Rachel Murray, ‘The African 
Commission on Human and Peoples Rights and International Law’ (2000); Inger Osterdahl, ‘Implementing Human 
Rights in Africa: The African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights and Individual Communications’ (2000), 
Nasila Rembe, ‘The System of Protection of Human Rights under the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights’ 
(1997). 
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its findings is not well recorded as little is known about the status of state compliance with the 
Commission's recommendations.
605 
Both the African Charter and the Rules of Procedure of the 
African Commission did not make provision for what happens to communications once a finding 
has been made.
606
 There are also no follow-up mechanisms or policy put in place by the 
Commission to monitor state compliance with its recommendations.
607 
Although some attempts 
were made in the past by the Commission to monitor compliance of its recommendation by 
states, these efforts were few and far apart.
608
 
 
According to Viljoen and Louw, commentators on the African regional human rights system 
have often cited its absence of ‘teeth’ when it comes to the enforcement mechanisms provided 
for in the African Charter.
609 
The African Commission, in reflecting on its activities, has 
indicated that the lack of state compliance with its recommendations was ‘one of the major 
factors of the erosion of the Commission's credibility.’610  However, in the absence of 
                                                             
605 This is not a phenomenon peculiar to the Africa system. Paulson in analysing compliance with final Judgements 
of International Court of Justice (ICJ) quoted Judge Robert Y. Jennings of the ICJ who stated that it is ironic that the 
Courts business up to the delivery of Judgement is published in lavish details, but it is not at all easy to find out what 
happened afterwards. See Colter Paulson, ‘Compliance with Final Judgements of the International Court of Justice 
since 1987’ (2004) 98 AJIL 434.  
606 Frans Viljoen & Lirette Louw (2007) 2. 
607 According to Robert Eno, Unlike other regional and global human rights bodies, the Commission has not 
developed any follow up mechanism to ensure implementation of its recommendation…This has been very 
frustrating especially for the victims who have to pursue the execution of the decisions on their own. Because there 
is no pressure from the Commission, states have tended to turn a blind eye to the recommendations and a deaf ear to the 
victims pleas for compliance. See Robert Eno, ‘The Place of the African Commission in the New Dispensation 
(2002)11 African Security Review 63, 67. See also Rachel Murray, ‘The African Commission on Human and 
Peoples Right and International Law’ (2002)21; Dankwa E.V.O., ‘The African System for the Protection of Human 
Rights: The Task Ahead’ (1998) 4. Document prepared for the National Human Rights Commission of Nigeria, 
African Human Rights day celebration by the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Lagos, Nigeria.  
608 Viljoen & Louw (2007) 2.  
609 They cited the work of Claude E. Welch, Protecting Human Rights in Africa: Roles and Strategies of Non- 
Governmental Organisations (1995)  151-153 as an example  in their article  titled State  Compliance with the 
Recommendations of the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights 1994-2004 (2007) American Journal of 
International Law 3. 
610 See the discussion document entitled Non-Compliance of State Parties to Adopt Recommendations of the African 
Commission: A Legal Approach, DOC/OS/50b (XXIV) Para.2 (1998) [hereinafter Non-Compliance: A Legal 
Approach]. This document has been reprinted in Documents of the African Commission on Human and Peoples 
Rights (Rachel Murray & Evans Malcolm eds. 2001). In this document, the secretariat highlighted the absence of 
compliance, save for a case, Pagnoulle (on behalf of Mazou) v. Cameroon, Communication [Comm.] No. 39/90, 
2000 African Human Rights Law Report 55. The first time that the Commission noted that State parties were not 
complying with its recommendations had been at its twenty-second Ordinary session in November, 1997 where the 
Secretariat also raised the issue. In the Eleventh Annual Activity Report, covering the November 1997 session, the 
Commission observed not only that non-compliance affected its credibility but also that it could probably be to 
blame for the reduction of Communications to it. See section VIII, Protective Activities, 11th Activity Report, 1997- 
1998 (see www.achpr.org ). Later in September, 2003 at a retreat organized by the  office of the UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights in Addis Ababa to evaluate the functioning of the African Commission, problems of 
non-compliance by State parties were highlighted once more. The retreat also identified the lack of a follow-up 
system to ensure that decisions and recommendations of the Commission are complied with as one of the challenges 
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accumulated data and any policy on follow-up, the commissioners' critical observations about a 
lack of compliance with their findings remain speculative.
611
 In order to provide a solution to 
this problem, the Commission, at its 50
th 
Ordinary Session established the Working Group on 
Communications
612 
with the mandate to consider Communications at the level of seizure and 
inform  the  Commission;  to  consider  the  Communications  on  Admissibility  and  formulate 
recommendations to the Commission and where necessary, consider Communications on merit 
among others.
613
 
 
This chapter will analyse and appraise the African Commission as an organ for the enforcement 
of human rights in Africa. This will necessitate a scrutiny of its structure, mandate, and rules of 
procedure.  It will also determine whether the Commission reflects the African system of justice. 
 
5.2 The Secretariat of the African Commission 
 
The African Commission is a permanent organ of the OAU/AU which is assisted in its work by 
the Secretariat.
614 
The Secretariat is headed by a Secretary who is appointed by the 
Secretary-General
615 
of the OAU
616 
and the Secretary is responsible for the day to day 
activities of the Commission under the supervision of the Chairman.
617 
The Secretariat’s 
main function is to assist members of the Commission and the Commission in the exercise of 
their functions while it also serves as the intermediary for all the correspondence 
concerning the Commission. The Secretary is also placed in charge of the archives of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
facing the Commission. The report of the Retreat of Members of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights (ACHPR) at 4 (September 24-26, 2003) Available at www.nhri.net.   
611 During the twenty-second Session of the Commission, the Chairman stated that none of the decisions on 
individual communications taken by the Commission and adopted by the Assembly had ever been implemented 
Rachel Murray, Report on the 1997 Session of the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights, 21st and 22
nd 
Session: 15th -25th April and 2nd – 11th November, 1997; 19, (1998) Human Rights Law Journal 169-170. 
612 Resolution 194 adopted at the 50th Ordinary Session of the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights 
held in Banjul, Gambia from the 24th October to the 5th November, 2011. Available at  
www.achpr.org/sessions/50th/resolutions/194.(Accessed 5th April, 2015).  
613 Resolution 212 adopted at the 11th Extraordinary Session of the African Commission on Human and Peoples 
Rights held in Banjul, The Gambia from the 21st February to 1st March, 2012. Available at  
www.achpr.org/sessions/11th-eo/resolutions/212.(Accessed 5th April, 2015).  
614 Malcolm & Murray (2008)13.  
615 The Secretary-General of the OAU is now the Secretary under the AU.  
616 Article 41 of the African Charter. The Secretary-General also provides the necessary staff and funds for the 
operation of the Secretariat. This appointment is made in consultation with the Chairperson of the African 
Commission. See Rule 22(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the African Commission.  
617 Rule 23, Rules of Procedure of the African Commission.  
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Commission.
618
 
 
Furthermore, the Secretary drafts summary minutes of the public and private sessions of the 
Commission and its subsidiary bodies and distributes them immediately to members of the 
Commission and other participants in the session.
619 
The Secretary along with the other members 
of   the   Secretariat   provides   all   the   technical   assistance,
620   
financial   assistance
621   
and 
administrative assistance.
622 
Aside these functions, the Secretary is also responsible for keeping 
‘a special record with a reference number and initialled’ wherein dates of registration of each 
petition and communications and that of the procedures relating to them before the Commission 
are entered.
623 
The Secretary also records and keeps tape recordings of the various sessions of the 
Commission and where the Commission so decides, of its subsidiary bodies.
624
 
Explaining the function of the Secretariat of the Commission, the African Charter did not 
explicitly say what the functions of the Secretariat should be but Article 41 states that it shall 
assist the African Commission in discharging its duties, while the Rules of Procedure which 
ought to have defined the task of the Secretariat of the African Commission are also unclear. 
The lack of description on the role of the Secretariat always creates confusion within the 
African Commission as it relates to what the Secretariat is expected to do in relation to the 
mandate of the African Commission.
625
 
An action plan was developed by the Secretariat of the African Union for the period 2003-2006 
wherein it attempted to define its role. 
626
The action plan stated that the Secretariat should 
provide administrative, technical and logistical support to the members of the Commission and it 
                                                             
618 Rule 23 (c) Rules of Procedure of the African Commission.  
619
 Rule 39 Rules of Procedure of the African Commission.  
620 This include processing communications, preparation for missions, undertaking missions and writing up reports 
thereto, preparing periodic reports of States, preparing the applications for affiliated status of National Human 
Rights Institutions and applications for observer status of NGOs.  
621This include mobilisation of the necessary funds for their activities.  
622 Arranging their work, organising trips and any other administrative activities.  
623 Rule 27 Rules of Procedure of the African Commission.  
624 Rule 38 Rules of Procedure of the African Commission. The Secretary, for some years now, has had the human 
and material resources required for actually making sound recordings and also for making summary records of 
sessions. See Fatsah Ouguergouz (2003)493.  
625 Evans & Murray (2008) 318 provided instances where members of the African Commission have taken decisions on 
matters and issues which are purely administrative and which fall within the scope of the Secretariat.  
626 This was developed by the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights in order to effectively execute its 
mandate. The strategic plan aimed at meeting the specific challenges of the time and ensuring the effective 
protection of human rights. The current strategic plan covers the period 2008 -2012. See ‘Concept Notes on the 
Working Method Workshop of the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights’ held at Ouagadougou, 
Burkina Faso between the 26th and 27th of September, 2008.  
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went further to break down the support provided by the Secretariat to the Commission into three 
which are: 
1. Support to the Commission as an institution 
2. Support to the Bureau of the Commission627 
3. Support to the individual Commissioners in order to facilitate them in performing the 
various tasks assigned to them.
628
 
 
The task of carrying out all the above enumerated functions is conferred on the Secretariat. It 
brings to fore, the important role the Secretariat plays in making sure the Commission discharges 
its mandates as spelt out in the Charter.
629 
The legal section of the Secretariat is relied upon by 
the Commission to provide it with the necessary technical assistance needed by it to discharge its 
mandate of promoting and protecting human and Peoples’ rights.630 
 
With the provision of technical support for the monitoring and advisory functions of the 
Commission, reports of human rights violations and situations in State Parties are sent to the 
Commission through the Secretariat by NGOs and other sources. The Secretariat keeps the 
Commission up-to-date with the situation of human rights on the continent.
631 
Undertaking 
missions to monitor the human rights situations in State Parties and adherence by State Parties to 
international human rights standards is a way of acting on the reports received by the 
Secretariat.
632 
Although the Commission may adopt resolutions or issue recommendations to the 
State Parties concerned, through its communication or complaint procedures,
633
 issuance of 
urgent appeals or request for provisional measures,
634
 the Commission is able to advise State 
                                                             
627 This composed of the Chairperson of the African Commission, its Vice-Chairperson and the Secretary to the 
Commission who is an ex-officio member.  
628 This is achieved by (1) providing technical support for the monitoring and advisory functions of the African 
Commission and any other necessary assistance in the fulfilment of its mandate; (2) disseminating the work of the 
Commission  and  facilitating  the  promotion  of  the  African  Charter;  (3)  networking  with  other  human  rights 
organisations, and facilitating networking activities among them; and (4) procuring the necessary resources for the 
fulfilment of the African Commissions mandate. See Strategic Plan of the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples Rights 2003-2006.  
629 See the Strategy Plan of the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights 2003-2006, p.3. 
630 Nsongurua Udombana, ‘So Far, So Fair: The Local Remedies Rule in the Jurisprudence of the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples Rights’ (2003)97 American Journal of International Law 1. The bulk of the 
work and activities of the members of the Commission is carried out with the assistance of legal officers who are 
responsible for carrying out research, drafting decisions on communications, reports and other legal documents, as 
well as undertaking any other tasks that would facilitate the members of the Commission in carrying out their duties.  
631 These reports are what legal officers studied and analysed, carry out research to verify the veracity of the 
complaint and thereupon make recommendation to the Members of the Commission as to the step to be taken.  
632 Under Articles 45(3) and 45(4) of the African Charter, the Commission is also mandated to interpret the 
provisions of the African Charter and perform any other tasks entrusted to it by the OAU/AU.  
633 Articles 47-54 of the African Charter which relate to inter-state communications.  
634 Rule 111, Rules of Procedure of the African Commission. It is important to note that in order to ensure effective 
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Parties on how they can make sure rights enshrined in the Charter are enjoyed by all. 
 
Furthermore, by the provision of Article 62, the Commission is mandated to receive reports from 
States Parties outlining the legislative or other measures taken in order to give effect to the rights 
guaranteed under the Charter. The State reports are examined by the Commission while 
concluding observations which contain recommendations to the reporting State Party are also 
adopted by it too.
635
 
 
5.3 Mandate of the African Commission 
 
In the light of Article 30 of the African Charter which provides for the establishment of the 
Commission, the Commission has two principal functions for which it was established: to 
promote and to protect human and Peoples’ rights within the region of Africa. Article 45 of the 
Charter enumerates the functions of the Commission to be: 
 
i. the promotion of human and Peoples’ rights; 
ii. the protection of human and Peoples’ rights; 
iii. interpretation of the provisions of the Charter; and  
iv. any other task assigned to it by the OAU Assembly.636 
 
5.3.1 Promotional Mandate of the Commission 
 
Article 45 details the functions of the Commission. It sets out the framework for the promotion 
of human rights that would in the long run, if properly applied, have the effects of 
forestalling violations. This framework includes the dissemination of information, research and 
formulation of normative standards and cooperation with national and international institutions 
for purposes of promoting respect for human rights.
637
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
monitoring of human rights in Africa, the Commission assigned a specific number of State Parties  to each 
Commissioner and a legal officer is also assigned to assist one or two members of the Commission to carry out their 
task. What this means is that each of the legal officers is responsible for monitoring human rights in at least six 
States Parties and in some cases even more. See Fiona Adolu, ‘A View from the Inside: The Role of the Secretariat 
in African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights,’ Evans & Murray (eds.) (2008) 316-343.  
635 Fiona Adolu (2008) 320.  
636 OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982) entered into force 21 October, 1986. Available at  
www.achpr.org/files/instruments/achpr/banjul_charter.pdf (Accessed 6th April, 2015).  
637 In theory, the Commission has demonstrated a perfect understanding of this mandate in stating that within the 
framework of its promotional role, it has, inter alia, an information and education function, a quasi-legislative 
function, an institutional cooperation function and an examination of state reports functions. See 
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In carrying out its promotional mandate, the Commission carries out activities like organising 
seminars and workshops on various human rights topics in conjunction with different 
organisations.  Its Commissioners conduct promotional missions to states depending on the 
availability of funds during which they engage stakeholders in dialogue on appropriate ways of 
enhancing the promotion and protection of human and Peoples’ rights in the specific state.638 
They also partake in conferences, seminars and expert meetings on various issues related to 
human rights in Africa. These activities are what the Commission usually includes in its activity 
reports under the heading ‘promotional activities.’639 These activities are carried out in a 
piecemeal basis instead of a well-coordinated continental effort which the Commission is well 
placed to create. It is also unlikely that participation of Commissioners in high level conferences, 
workshops and seminars on human rights would have a direct impact on the knowledge of the 
ordinary public about the human and peoples’ rights protected by the Charter. 
Like in other human right systems, it is clear that under the African human rights system an 
interest in protection mechanisms overshadows efforts of promoting human rights, but it has 
been discovered that the protection of human rights through ‘blaming and shaming’ governments 
or states does not yield much fruit.
640 
What this means is that the promotion of human rights 
should be given more attention.
641 
Promotion of human rights is more effective than 
deterrence strategies which involve sanction by human rights instruments,
642 
extensive 
promotion of human rights has special importance for African states where violations of 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
www.achpr.org/english/_info/mandate_en.htm. (Accessed 6th April, 2015).  
638 There have been instances where Commissioners were unable to conduct scheduled promotional missions due to 
lack of funding. See Twentieth Annual Activity Report of the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights, 
9th Ordinary Session of the Executive Council, 25th -29th June, 2006 held in Banjul, The Gambia Ex.CL/279/(IX) 
para 22.  
639 The promotional role of the Commission would be enhanced by the fact that it meets in different African states 
and is thus able to open dialogue and cooperation with a variety of African governments on a face-to-face basis. See 
Doebbler CFJ, A ‘Complex Ambiguity: The Relationship between the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights and other African Union Initiatives Affecting Respect for Human Rights’ (2003) 13 Transitional Law and 
Contemporary Problems 7 at 15.  
640Rosemann N, ‘Human Rights Education: Towards the end of the UN Decade’ (2003) 4 Nordic Journal of Human 
Rights 4. Available at www.hrea.org/erc/Library/rosemann03.pdf (Accessed 6th of April, 2015).   
641 For example, promoting human rights through education targeted at state officials, professionals, students and the 
public at large, the violation of human rights can be curbed while officials and professionals would be required to 
work in accordance with accepted norms of human rights, as informed citizens would put them under pressure to 
respect the same. See Sisay Alemahu, ‘Utilising the Promotional Mandate of the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples Rights to Promote Human Rights Education in Africa (2007) 7 African Human Rights Law Journal 191-205. 
642 Barnhizer D, ‘Human Rights Strategies for Investigation and shaming, Resisting Globalisation Rhetoric and 
Education’ in Barnhizer D (ed.), ‘Effective Strategies for Protecting Human Rights: Prevention and Intervention, 
Trade and Education’ (2001) 1.  
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human rights have been prevalent and where many people do not have functional knowledge 
of human rights.
643
 
People need to be enlightened through radio and television programmes about the activities of 
the Commission; they should also be able to read about the Commission in the newspapers, 
magazines and other publications in their states about what the Commission does and about its 
relevance to their lives. Students and pupils need to be taught about the usefulness of the 
Commission to their careers and life generally. The Charter should be integrated into the 
curriculum of schools in Africa at all levels of education while journalists, lawyers and other 
professionals should enlighten people more about their rights and duties. 
In the indigenous African Justice System, information about the existence of a law, duties or 
rights of the people are easily disseminated to the people by going around the community with a 
bell to attract attention before delivering the message. In order to be able to pay particular 
attention to specific human rights issues, special mechanisms were set up by the Commission 
with mandates and activities on all member States to the African Charter.
644
 
 
Although there is no specific Article in the Charter which provides for the establishment of these 
special mechanisms under the Commission, it can be said that the legal basis for the 
establishment of the special mechanisms is located in Article 45 of the Charter. Article 45(1) of 
the Charter which provides for the promotional mandate of the Commission further elaborate this 
mandate to include: 
 
(a) to collect documents, undertake studies and research on African problems in the field of human 
and Peoples’ rights, organise seminars, symposia and conferences, disseminate information, 
encourage national and local institutions concerned with human and Peoples’ rights and give 
its views or make recommendations to governments; 
(b) to formulate and lay down principles and rules aimed at solving legal problems relating to human 
rights and fundamental freedoms upon which African governments may base their legislations; 
(c) co-operate with other African and international institutions concerned with the promotion and 
                                                             
643 Addo M.K.‘Implementation by African States of the Plan of Action for the United Nations Decade for Human 
Rights’ (2000) 44 Journal of African Law 96 at 104.  
644 Michelo Hansungule, ‘The African Court and the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights’ in Antol 
Bosl & Joseph Diescho (eds.) ‘Human Rights in Africa: Legal Perspectives on their promotion and Protection’ (2009) 
233.  
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protection of human and Peoples’ rights.
645
 
This provision can be said to be in line with the terms of reference, mandate and working 
methods of most of the special mechanisms under the Commission, therefore it will be 
reasonable to say that Article 45(1) is the foundation upon which the setting up of these special 
mechanisms of the Commission are based. Furthermore, looking at the Rules of Procedure of the 
Commission,
646 
Rule 23 can also be said to be another basis for the creation of these 
special mechanisms. It provides that: 
 
1. The Commission may create subsidiary mechanisms such as special rapporteurs, committees 
and working groups.
647
 
2. The creation and membership of such subsidiary mechanisms may be determined by 
consensus, failing which, the decision shall be taken by voting.
648
 
3. The Commission shall determine the mandate and terms of reference of each subsidiary 
mechanism. Such subsidiary mechanism shall present a report on its work to the Commission 
at each ordinary session.
649
 
Working groups such as the Working group on Communications have been set up by the 
Commission pursuant to Rule 97, Rules of Procedure which provides as follows: 
1. The Commission shall appoint a rapporteur for each Communication from its members. 
2. The Commission may also establish one or more working groups to consider questions of 
seizure, admissibility and the merits of any Communication(s) and to make Recommendations 
to the Commission. 
3. The Commission shall consider the recommendations of the Rapporteur and or the working 
group and make a decision.
650
 
In line with the provisions of Rules 23 and 97 of the Rules of procedures and Article 45(1) 
African Charter, the Special Rapporteurs established by the Commission are Special Rapporteurs 
                                                             
645 See Article 45 (1) (a) (b) (c) African Charter.  
646 The Rules of Procedure were adopted by the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights during the 
second Ordinary Session held in Dakar, Senegal from 2nd to 13th February, 1988. They were revised during the 18th 
Ordinary Session held in Praia, Cape-Verde from 2nd to 11 October, 1995.With the coming into existence of the 
African Court on Human and Peoples Rights the African Commission developed new Rules of Procedure which 
were approved by the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights during its 47th Ordinary Session held in 
Banjul, The Gambia from 12-26 May, 2010.The rules entered into force on 18 August, 2010.  
647 Rule 23 (1) Rules of Procedure of the African Commission.  
648 Rule 23 (2) Rules of Procedure of the African Commission.  
649 Rule 23 (3) Rules of Procedure of the African Commission.  
650 Rule 97 Rules of Procedure of the African Commission.  
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on Prison and Conditions of Detention,
651  
Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Women, 
652
 
Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and Access to Information,
653 
Special Rapporteur 
on Human Rights Defenders,
654 
and Special Rapporteur on Refugees, asylum Seekers, Migrants 
and Internally Displaced Persons.
655 
The Special Rapporteur on Extra-Judicial, Summary and 
Arbitrary Executions
656 
was created in April, 1994 and was the first special mechanism to be 
established within the Commission. Aside these Special Rapporteurs there are also working 
groups and follow up committees on the implementation of the Guidelines and Measures for the 
Prohibition and Prevention of Torture, Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Punishment and 
Treatment in Africa,
657 
Advisory Committee on Budgetary and Staff Matters, and Committee on 
the Protection of the Rights of People living with HIV and those at risk, vulnerable to and 
affected by HIV (only few of these will be discussed in details as they relate to the African 
notion of justice). 
 
The working groups are the Working Group of Experts on Indigenous Populations/Communities 
in Africa; 
658
the Working Group on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Africa; 
659
the 
Working Group on Specific Issues Relevant to the Work of the African Commission on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights,660 the Working Group on the Question of the Death Penalty,661 Working 
Group on the Rights of Older Persons and people with Disabilities, Working Group on 
                                                             
651 This was established in October, 1996. See Final Communique of the Twentieth Ordinary Session of the African 
Commission, 21-31 October, Grand Bay, Mauritius, Par. 18.  
652 This was established in April, 1998. See Final Communique of the Twenty-third Ordinary Session of the African 
Commission, 20-29 April, Banjul, The Gambia at Par. 11.  
653 Established in December, 2004. See Resolution on the Mandate and Appointment of a Special Rapporteur on 
Freedom of Expression in Africa, ACHPR/Res. 71 (XXXVI) 04.  
654 Established in June 2004. See Resolution on the Protection of Human Rights Defenders in Africa, ACHPR/Res.69 
(XXXV) 04.  
655 This was established in December, 2004. See Resolution on the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on Refugees, 
Asylum Seekers and Internally Displaced Persons in Africa, ACHPR/Res.72 (XXXVI) 04.  
656 See the Final Communique of the Fifteenth Ordinary Session of the African Commission, 18-27 April, 1994 
Banjul, The Gambia at paragraph 20.  
657 See the Resolution on Guidelines and Measures for the Prohibition and Prevention of Torture, Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment in Africa, ACHPR/Res.61 (XXXII) 02 at Par. 2. The follow up committee was 
established in 2002 and its members were nominated at the African Commissions Thirty-fifth Ordinary Session held 
between the 21st May and 4th June, 2004 in Banjul, The Gambia. See Seventeenth Activity Report 2003-2004 
particularly paragraph 35.  
658 Established in November 2003, see the Resolution on the Adoption of the Report of the African Commissions 
Working Group on Indigenous Populations/Communities, ACHPR/Res.65 (XXXIV) 03.  
659 Established in December 2004, see Resolution on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Africa, ACHPR/Res. 
73 (XXXVI) 04.  
660 Established in May 2005, see the Resolution on the Creation of a Working Group on Specific Issues relevant to 
the Work of the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights, ACHPR/Res.77 (XXXVII) 05.  
661
 Established in December 2005, see the Resolution on the Composition and the Operationalisation of the Working 
Group on the Death Penalty as adopted at the 38th Session, December 2005.  
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Extractive Industries and Human rights Violations and the  Working  Group  on 
Communications.
662 
Members of these working groups and the follow up committees are 
members of the African Commission and experts from outside the African Commission 
membership.
663 
The Secretariat is expected to provide support and assistance to these special 
mechanisms established by the Commission in fulfilling its mandate.
664
 
5.3.1.1 Special Rapporteurs of the African Commission 
 
The African Commission has six Special Rapporteurs
665 
on thematic issues which are: Special 
Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and Access to Information in Africa, the Special 
Rapporteur on Prisons and Conditions of Detention in Africa, the Special Rapporteur on 
Refugees, Internally Displaced Persons and Migrants in Africa, the Special Rapporteur on 
Human Rights Defenders in Africa, the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or 
Arbitrary Killings and the last one is the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Women.
666 
The 
practice of appointing Special Rapporteurs to explore the human rights situations in States has 
become a feature of the UN human rights machinery.
667
 It has been described as the most 
innovative achievement of the United Nations on human rights.
668
 
                                                             
662 Established in November, 2011. See Resolution 194 on the Establishment of a Working Group on 
Communications available at www.achpr.org/sessions/50th/resolutions/194. (Accessed on 7th April, 2015).  
663 The legal basis for the establishment of the working groups derives from the Rules of Procedure of the African 
Commission which was adopted under Article 42(2) of the African Charter. Nowhere is the term working group 
used in the African Charter but the concept can be justified under Article 46 of the African Charter which gives the 
African Commission broad latitude in the application of appropriate method of investigation in the discharge of its 
work. See Bahame Tom Mukirya Nyanduga, ‘Working Groups of the African Commission and their Role in the 
Development of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ in Evans & Murray (eds.) ‘The African Charter 
on Human and Peoples Rights: The System in Practice, 1986-2006’ (2008) 379. Rule 28 (1) of the 1995 Rules of 
procedure of the African Commission provides that subsidiary bodies may be authorized to hold their sessions after 
the Commission has had consultations with the Secretary-General (now the Chairperson of the African Union 
Commission), this replaced the 1988 Rules of Procedure which required committees and working groups to be 
established in consultation with the Secretary-General of the OAU, whose prior consent was needed to hold 
sessions.  
664 Fiona Adolu (2008)322.  
665 In 1994 the African Commission established a number of Special Rapporteurs to provide focal points for the 
Commission on issues arising from the African Charter. See Harrington J, ‘Special Rapporteurs of the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ (2001)1 African Human Rights Law Journal 247, Frans Viljoen, ‘State 
Reporting under the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: A Boost from the South’ (2000) 44, J. AFR. L. 
110; Dinah Shelton, ‘Regional Protection of Human Rights’ (2008) Vol. 1.  
666 See www.achpr.org/mechanisms (Accessed on 16th August, 2016).  
667 The UN human rights system has special rapporteurs on adequate housing; the sale of children; child prostitution 
and pornography; the right to education; food; the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and 
expression; freedom of religion or belief among others. Regional human rights organisations including the African 
regional human organisations have also adopted this method of human rights protection. See Tomasevski K., ‘The 
Right to Education: The Work of the Special Rapporteur, 1998-2001’ (2000) 13Interights Bulletin 81-82.  
668 Rachel Murray, ‘The Special Rapporteurs in the African System’ in ‘The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights: The System in Practice 1986-2006’ (2008) 344.  
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In African regional human rights system, Special Rapporteurs can be said to be tied to the special 
procedures available to the African Commission and they are tasked with investigating important 
human rights issues.
669 
According to Viljoen, the inadequate achievement of the state reporting 
procedure in the region can be tied to the establishment of special rapporteurs by the African 
Commission.
670 
He added though state reporting is nearly solely reliant on the enterprise of 
states to submit reports; the status of Special Rapporteur permits the Commission to take the 
enthusiasm and to be more pro-active.
671
 
The decision of the Commission to establish Special Rapporteurs came as a result of lobbying by 
Non-Governmental Organisations, the impact of particular sets of circumstances and the African 
Commission’s desire to be seen as working rather than as the product of any well-thought-out 
programme. A distinguishing factor of the Special Rapporteur mechanism of the African 
Commission is the fact that all mandate holders are serving members of the African 
Commission.
672
 
5.3.1.1.1 Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions in Africa 
 
The Commission, at its 15
th 
Ordinary Session,
673 
agreed to appoint a Special Rapporteur 
on Extrajudicial, Summary and Arbitrary Execution because of the genocide in Rwanda
674 
as at 
that time. In 1993, Amnesty International proposed the creation of this Special Rapporteur 
but the Commission deferred making a decision to its next session but rather instructed its 
members to engage in discussions with the UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial 
Executions.
675 
Before the next Ordinary Session of the Commission could be held, the 
genocide in Rwanda had started thereby giving the Commission another reason besides the 
pressure from the international organisations, to take action.
676
 
Looking at the background to the setting up of this Special Rapporteur, the legal basis for its 
                                                             
669 See Special Rapporteurs Available at www.ishr.ch/african-commission/special-rapporteurs (Accessed on 16th 
August, 2016).  
670 Viljoen (2007) 392.  
671 Viljoen (2007) 392.  
672 Murray (2008) 345.  
673 The Ordinary Session was held from 15-18 April, 1994 in Banjul, The Gambia. 
674 This was based on Resolution 8 adopted at the 15th Ordinary session and Resolution 12 adopted at the 16th 
Ordinary Session of the African Commission. See www.achpr.org/mechanisms/extrajudicial-summary-or-arbitrary-  
execution (Accessed on 16th May, 2012).  
675 Harrington (2001) 251. 
676 Harrington (2001) 151. 
https://etd.uwc.ac.za
204 
 
 
 
creation can be found in Chapter VI of the Rules of Procedure of the African Commission. 
Rule 28 gives power to the Commission to set up ‘committees or working groups composed of 
members of the Commission and send them any agenda or item for consideration and 
report.’677 The rule provides further that the Commission ‘may establish sub-commissions of 
experts and determine the functions and composition of each sub-Commission unless the 
Assembly of Heads of States and Government of the OAU decide otherwise.
678 
This legal 
background together with a belief that there is nothing more irremediable and more 
irrevocable than the taking, outside the law, of the human life, a right clearly defined under the 
African Charter,
679 
the Commission nominated Commissioner Hatem Ben Salem as the Special 
Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions.
680
 
The mandate
681 
of the Special Rapporteur was to, 
 
1. propose the implementation of a reporting system on cases of extrajudicial, summary or 
arbitrary executions in the continent, specifically by keeping a register containing all 
information as to the identity of the victims; 
2. to follow up, in collaboration with government officials, or failing that, with international, 
national or African NGOs, all enquiries which could lead to discovering the identity and extent 
of responsibility of authors and initiators of extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions; 
3. to suggest the ways and means of informing the Commission in good time of the possibility of 
extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions with the goal of intervening before the OAU 
summit; 
4. to intervene with states for trial and punishment of perpetrators of extrajudicial, summary or 
arbitrary executions and rehabilitation of the victims of these execution; and 
                                                             
677
 Rule 28, Rules of Procedure of the African Commission adopted 13
th 
February, 1988.  
678 Rule 29, Rules of Procedure of the African Commission adopted 13th February, 1988.  
679 Article 4 of the African Charter.  
680 This was at the 16th Ordinary Session of the Commission which was held from 25 October – 03 November, 1994 
in Banjul, The Gambia. The mandate for determining the missions of this special Rapporteur was only approved at 
the 18th Ordinary Session of the Commission held in Praia, Cape Verde in October 1995. The delay was due to the 
yearning of the Commission to base the function on solid grounds, both in terms of giving it specific role and adequate 
resources in order for it to play an effective role in the promotion and protection of human rights in the continent. 
See Background Information on the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary 
Executions of the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights. Available at  
www.achpr.org/mechanisms/extra-judicial-summary-or-arbitrary-execution/about  
681 The mandate of the first Special Rapporteur was located in Article 4 of the African Charter which talks about 
Right to life. Procedurally, the expansion of the Commission’s mandate could also be based on Articles 45(1) (a), 46 
and 66 of the African Charter. The mandate of subsequent rapporteur has been located in Article 45 suggesting a 
preference for a legal basis not constrained by the confidentiality requirements of protective measures applicable to 
Article 46 investigations. See Frans Viljoen (2007) 392.  
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5. to examine the modalities of the creation of a mechanism of compensation for the families of 
victims of extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, which might be done through 
national legal procedures, through an African  compensation fund.
682
 
The Special Rapporteur was able to produce a report which was submitted to the Commission at 
its 20
th 
Ordinary Session in October, 1996
683
. This was supplemented by general comments 
which were made at subsequent sessions of the Commission.
684 
The Special Rapporteur was not 
given a guideline as regards what he was expected to do or how to go about carrying out his task 
but the Special Rapporteur did set up ideas concerning his mandate and this was what was 
approved by the Commission at its 17
th
 
Ordinary Session.
685
 
 
One of the problems of the Special Rapporteur is the lack of clarity as regards the work. This 
became glaring with the content of the Report
686 
submitted to the Commission on Extrajudicial, 
Summary or Arbitrary Executions with reference to Burundi and Rwanda.
687 
Another defect is 
noticed in the working methods of the Special Rapporteur and also in the work of the 
Commission.
688 
The Special Rapporteur, during his tenure, was not able to conduct any state 
visit even though he planned to visit Chad. 
                                                             
682 See www.achpr.org/mechanisms/extra-judicial-summary-or-arbitrary-execution/about The Special Rapporteur’s 
priority then was to produce a report on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary  execution of women, children, 
demonstrators and human rights activists/political opponents. (Accessed on 16th August, 2016). 
683 The   20th     Ordinary   Session   was   held   from   21-31   October,   1996   in   Mauritius.   Available   at 
www.achpr.org/sessions/20th/intersession-activity-reports/extra-judicial-summary-or-arbitrary-execution (Accessed on 
16th August, 2016). The report also considered the nature of information that was to be collected in the course of the 
fulfilment of the mandate especially in terms of the credibility of the sources of information.  
684 Murray (2008) 347.  
685See the Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Executions in Africa, Eight Annual Activity Reports 
1994-1995. Available at http://www.achpr.org/files/activity-reports/8/achpr16and17_actrep8_1994_eng2.pdf 
(Accessed 15th August, 2016). Emphasis is laid on paragraphs 17-19 of the report. The Commission also tried to 
avoid duplicating the work of the UN thereby agreed to concentrate on two particular aspects which are (a) 
compensations to the families of victims of such executions; and (b) the responsibility of instigators and authors of 
such executions. See paragraph 18 of the Activity Report.   
686 Progress Report on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Execution.  
687 See the Progress Report on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Tenth Activity Report covering 
October 1996 till April, 1997, Annex VI. Available at http://www.achpr.org/files/activity-  
reports/10/achpr20and21_actrep10_19961997_eng.pdf (Accessed on 16th August, 2016). Looking at section III, A of 
the report, it states that ‘ If in the first place the case of Rwanda and Burundi will be a priority for the 
collection of information and creation of the computer database, as a matter of course all available information on 
extrajudicial executions in other African countries will be registered, especially for Liberia. To do so, and collect 
more testimony, the reports submitted by the organs of the UN as well as the OAU will be taken in to consideration’. 
What this means is that there was no consistency in the work of the Special Rapporteur as at these times in his report it 
would appear he was focusing on certain groups such as women and children but the lists are not consistent 
throughout the report. Also in relation to the countries that merit particular attention, the report went beyond 
Rwanda and Burundi; it included Zaire, Nigeria, Liberia and Sudan. This was against the initial motivation for 
establishing the mandate of the Special Rapporteur.  
688 Rachel Murray (2008) 351.  
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Although the intention of the Commission when it set up the Special Rapporteur on 
Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions was to show its resolve to forget about its 
failure to react to the genocide in Rwanda, the delay in the appointment of the Special 
Rapporteur and the Special Rapporteur’s failure to produce result means the Commission failed. 
The lack of co-operation and support from states too did not help the Special Rapporteur in 
achieving its mandate and this led to the resignation of the Special Rapporteur. The mandate 
received little attention and was poorly implemented thereby making it unattractive for 
Commissioners to take up. This can be said to be a waste of opportunity by the Commission and 
it will be right to say that this is the reason for the drawback which has prevented the 
Commission from utilising the Special Rapporteur system. 
 
5.3.1.1.2 Special Rapporteur on Prisons and Conditions of Detention in Africa 
 
Among the Special Rapporteurs created by the Commission is the Special Rapporteur on Prisons 
and Conditions of Detention in Africa (SRP).
689 
This can be said to be in response to the 
request by the Penal Reform International
690
and some other NGOs.
691
 
The setting up of the office of the SRP was not that easy as there was difficulty in deciding 
whether the Commission should appoint an expert who was not already a member of the 
Commission  to  work  under  a  Commissioner  but  this  was  eventually  rejected.
692  
This was 
                                                             
689 At its 19th Ordinary Session of the African Commission held from the 26th of March to the 4th of April, 1996 at 
Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, the Commission agreed in principle to appoint a Special Rapporteur on Prison 
Conditions in Africa. See Ninth Activity report of the Commission which covered the period October 1995 till April 
1996 particularly paragraph 18. Available at http://www.achpr.org/files/activity-   
reports/9/achpr1819eo2_actrep9_19951996_eng.pdf.(Accessed on 15th August, 2016.) See also, Frans Viljoen, The 
Special Rapporteur on Prisons and Conditions of Detention in Africa: Achievements and Possibilities (2005) 
27Human Rights Quarterly 125-171.  
690 An International NGO with its headquarters in Paris. The approach PRI used was to organise the Pan-African 
Seminar on Prison Conditions in Africa in conjunction with the Commission and some other NGOs thereby firmly 
positioning the hitherto neglected issue of prisoners’ rights on the agenda of the Commission and NGOs in the 
continent. The fight for the establishment of the Special Rapporteur was further pushed by the NGO in the Kampala 
Declaration on Prison Conditions in Africa. This was adopted at the end of the conference. See Viljoen Frans, ‘The 
Special Rapporteur on Prisons and Conditions of Detention in Africa: Achievements and Possibilities’ (2003) 27 
HRQ 125.  
691 For example, at the 18th Session of the Commission, a draft resolution was presented which had been adopted at 
the International Court of Justices 9th Workshop for NGOs. The workshop was held prior to the session concerning 
the appointment of Special Rapporteurs on both prisons and women’s rights. See Final Communique of the 18th 
Ordinary Session held in Praia, Cape Verde from 2-11 October, 1995, ACHPR/FIN/COMM/XVIII at 457, 
particularly paragraphs 22-23.  
692 9th Activity Report of the Commission, 1995-1996, paragraph 18.  
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eventually resolved with the appointment of Commissioner Dankwa 
693  
at the 20
th
 
Ordinary 
Session.
694 
His mandate was initially to run for a period of two years but this was eventually 
extended for another period of one year
695 
at the 25
th
 
ordinary Session of the Commission held in 
Burundi in 1995. 
Dankwa’s tenure as a Special Rapporteur is said to be the golden period in the life of Special 
Rapporteurs due to his level of commitment to undertake activities agreed to. Despite the 
challenges of having to always travel and his constant writing as a professor he still ensured that 
detailed reports of the prisons visited, officials met and the legal background was published 
regularly. His reports also contained recommendations to governments as well. Copies of these 
reports were made available at sessions of the Commission both in French and English.
696 
His 
tenure expired on the 31
st
 
October, 2000 and Commissioner Chirwa
697 
was appointed to take 
over
698 
and presently Med S.K. Kaggwa is the Special Rapporteur.
699
 
From the start, Penal Reform International (PRI) assisted the SRP by providing administrative 
                                                             
693 Before he was appointed the Special Rapporteur he served as the Deputy Chairperson of the Commission.  
694 The 20th Ordinary Session was held in Mauritius from 21-31 October, 1996. Following the practice of the UN 
Commission on Human Rights and due to the fact that they hold full-time employment outside while they participate at 
the Commission on part-time basis, the argument was strongly in support of an expert outside the Commission. But 
due to the point raised that the Commission would not be able to control an outsider and the impression that the 
Commission was inadequate, the Commission had to do away with the idea of looking outside for expert to appoint as 
a SRP. See Frans Viljoen (2007) 394.  
695 See Resolution on the Extension of the Mandate of the Special Rapporteur on Prisons and conditions of 
Detention in Africa, 12th Activity Report, October 1998 - May, 1999, Annex IV (AHG/215 (XXXV)) Available at  
http://www.achpr.org/files/activity-reports/12/achpr24and25_actrep12_19981999_eng.pdf.(Accessed  16th   August, 
2016).  
696 Among the prisons he visited are Zimbabwe, Mali (both in August, 1997), Mozambique in December, 1997, 
Madagascar in February, 1998, Mali again in December, 1998, The Gambia I June, 1999, Benin in August, 1999 and 
Central African Republic in June, 2000. His reports on these entire mission aside the one on Madagascar, are 
available in English, French and Portuguese. See Julia Harrington, ‘Special Rapporteurs of the African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights’ (2001) 2 AHRLJ 247-267. 
697 Commissioner Chirwa brought to use her personal experience as a political prisoner under the Banda 
government. This is reflected in Achutan and Another (on behalf of Banda and others) v Malawi (2000) AHRLR 144 
(ACHPR 1995) 18th Annual Activity Report.  
698 At the 28th Ordinary Session of the Commission held at the Republic of Benin from 23rd October to 6th 
November, 2000, Commissioner Chirwa was appointed the Special Rapporteur on Prisons and Conditions of 
Detention in Africa. See the Final Communique of the Twenty-eighth Ordinary Session, Cotonou, Benin Republic, 
ACHPR, FIN.COMM/XXVIII, Rev. 2. Commissioner Chirwa held the post till July, 2005 when she was not re- 
elected to the Commission. The post was subsequently awarded to Commissioner Mumba Malila. See 19th Activity 
Report of the African Commission 2005 at paragraph 8. Available at http://www.achpr.org/files/activity-  
reports/19/achpr38_actrep19_2005_eng.pdf.(Accessed on 16th May, 2012). 
699 He was reappointed at the 57th Ordinary Session held in Banjul, The Gambia from 4 – 18 November, 2015. See  
www.achpr.org/mechanisms/prisons-and-conditions-of-detention/ (Accessed 16th August, 2016).  
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and secretarial assistance to the Secretariat of the African Commission, and the individual 
SRP. PRI also achieved financial support from the Norwegian Agency for Development 
(NORAD) to assist the sustained functioning of the SRP.
700
 
Deliberations were embarked on in 1996 to determine the SRP’s mandate. The 
Commission’s Secretariat developed a document with a proposed mandate which was used as a 
preparatory framework. This was refined by a working group meeting in Banjul, in January 
1997. The following mandate was eventually submitted to the Commission’s 21st session, and 
was adopted: 
The Special Rapporteur is empowered to examine the situation of persons deprived of their 
liberty within the territories of States Parties to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights.
701
 
The Special Rapporteur was expected, when setting out its task, to examine the state of prisons 
and conditions of detention in Africa and make recommendations with a view to improving them 
and advocate adherence to the Charter and international human rights norms and standards 
concerning the rights and conditions of persons deprived of their liberty, examine the relevant 
national law and regulations in the respective States Parties as well as their implementation and 
make appropriate recommendations on their conformity with the Charter and with international 
law and standards among others.
702
 Under the African Indigenous Justice system, the 
chiefs’ courts aimed at holding wrongdoers answerable for their action by emphasising on 
the human impact of crime. They gave wrongdoers the chance to be accountable for their 
actions by facing their victims and reconciling, encouraging active victim-community 
                                                             
700 About the Special Rapporteur on Prisons and Conditions of Detention in Africa Available at  
http://www.achpr.org/mechanisms/prisons-and-conditions-of-detention/about/.(Accessed 16
th 
May, 2012).  
701 The 21st Ordinary Session of the Commission was held in Mauritania from 15-24 April, 1997. The mandate was 
set out as an appendix to the Report of the Special Rapporteur on Prisons. The text of the Special Rapporteurs report 
states that these were based on an earlier draft, and were revised at the request of the Commission at its 20th Session 
in October, 1996. This would appear to refer to the outcome of a consultation that was held in The Gambia in 
January 1996 and which was circulated at the 20th Ordinary Session later in the year. A copy of the report is 
available at http://www.achpr.org/sessions/21st/intersession-activity-reports/prisons-and-conditions-of- 
detention/.(Accessed on 16th August, 2016).  
702 Murray (2008)  355.  See  also  http://www.achpr.org/mechanisms/prisons-and-conditions-of-detention/about/ 
(Accessed on 16th August, 2016). To be able to carry out these tasks, the Special Rapporteur is empowered to seek 
and receive information from States Parties to the Charter and from individuals and other bodies on cases or 
situations falling within the scope of its mandate. See paragraph 7 of the Report of the Special Rapporteur on 
Prisons submitted at the 21st Ordinary Session held in 1997. Furthermore, the Special Rapporteur is expected to be 
given all the necessary assistance and cooperation needed to be able to carry out visits and receive information from 
detained persons, their families or representatives, governmental or non-governmental organisations and others. See 
Paragraph 8 of the Report of Special Rapporteur on Prisons submitted at the 21st Ordinary Session held in 1997.  
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participation in the justice process and improving the quality of justice by which the 
victims and offenders are reunited and the offenders reintegrated back into the society.
703 
In 
the reintegrating and rehabilitating of these offenders back into the society, the underlying 
principles was that firstly, the offender takes liability for the crime, face the repercussion of 
their deed and see the victim as a person with feelings and needs, with the intention to 
make it possible for the community to resolve and reconcile the parties.
704
 
 
Secondly, the attention was on resolving inequality which came up because of the commission 
of the offence. The chiefs’ courts insist on restoration of the relationship among the parties and 
their various communities.
705 
And thirdly, the Chief’s court will decide on an appropriate and 
concrete solution acceptable by all parties.
706
 
 
The Special Rapporteur is expected to publish and submit an annual report to the Commission 
which should be published and widely disseminated in accordance with the relevant provisions 
of the Charter.
707 
The Special Rapporteur carried out some country visits since establishment 
even though the countries visited varied from the ones listed to be visited in its work plan 
submitted to the Commission.
708 
The SRP nonetheless visited Zimbabwe (23 February to 3 
March, 1997),
709 
  Mali (20 -30 August 1997),
710 
 Mozambique (4-24 December, 1997),
711 
Madagascar (10-20 February, 1998), Mali (27 November to 8 December 1998),
712
 The Gambia 
                                                             
703 Umbreit M, ‘Victim meets Offender: The Impact of Restorative Justice and Mediation’ (1994) 5.  
704Umbreit  (1994) 5.  
705 Umbreit (1994) 5.  
706 Amanda Dissel, ‘Restoring Harmony: Piloting Victim-Offender Conferencing in South Africa’ A paper presented at 
De Monfort University, Leicester (20 – 21 March, 2002) 5. See also, Kayitare Frank, ‘Respect of the Right to a Fair 
Trial in Indigenous African Criminal Justice Systems: The Case of Rwanda and South Africa,’ (unpublished LLM 
thesis submitted to the Faculty of Law, University of Pretoria) (2004) 28.  
707 Paragraph 5 of the Report of Special Rapporteur on Prisons, 1999.  
708 Report of the Special Rapporteur to the 21st Session of the African Commission, 1997 part 1, Document of the 
African Commission at page 518. The countries listed by the Special Rapporteur to visit are Senegal or Mali 
between May and October 1997; Uganda or Mauritius between November 1997 and March 1998; Mozambique or 
Sao Tome between May and October 1998; Tunisia and South Africa between November 1998 and January, 1999.  
709 Chirwa EVO, ‘Prisons in Zimbabwe: Report on a Visit, 23 February-3 March, 1997’, Series IV No. 01 Available at 
www.achpr.org/files/sessions/23rd/mission-reports/prisons-1997/misrep_specmec_priso_zimbabwe_1997_eng.pdf 
(Accessed on 16th August, 2016).  
710 Dankwa EVO, Prisons in Mali: Report of the Special Rapporteur on Prisons and Conditions of Detention, Report on 
a Visit 20-30 August 1997, Series IV, No.2, Document of the African Commission, page 625. Available at  
www.achpr.org/files/sessions/22nd/mission-reports/mali/achpr22_misrep_specmec_priso_mali_1997_eng.pdf, 
(Accessed on 16th August, 2016).  
711See Dankwa EVO, ‘Prisons in Mozambique: Report of the Special Rapporteur on Prisons and Conditions of 
Detention’, Report on a Visit, 14-24 December 1997, Series IV, No. 3, Documents of the African Commission at 
page 645. Available at www.achpr.org/files/sessions/23rd/mission-  
reports/mozambique/achpr23_misrep_specmec_priso_mozambique_1997_eng.pdf, (Accessed on 16th August, 2016).   
712 Dankwa EVO, ‘Mali Prisons Revisited: Report of the Special Rapporteur on Prisons and Conditions of Detention in   
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(21-2 June, 1999),
713
 Benin (23-31August, 1999),
714
 Central African Republic (19-29 June, 
2000),
715
  Mozambique  (4-14  April  2001),
716
  Malawi  (17-28  June,  2001),  Namibia  (17-28 
September, 2001),
717
 Uganda (11-22 March 2001),
718 
 Cameroon (1-14 September, 2002),
719 
 
Benin (23 January – 5 February, 2003), Ethiopia (15-29 March 2004)720 and South Africa (14-30 
June, 2004).
721  
Between  the  6
th
  
and  10
th
  
of  October,  2008,  Special  Rapporteur  went  on  a 
promotional mission to the United Republic of Tanzania.
722 
He also carried out a sample visit to 
prisons in Swaziland in May, 2008 where he visited three prisons
723 
even though it was not a 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
Africa’, Report on a  Visit 27  November  to  8  December, 1998, Series IV,  No. 4. Available  at  
www.achpr.org/files/sessions/25th/mission-reports/mali/achpr25_misrep_specmec_priso_mali_1998_eng.pdf, 
(Accessed on 16th August, 2016).  
713 Dankwa EVO, ‘Prisons in ‘The Gambia: Report of the Special Rapporteur on Prisons and Conditions of Detention in 
Africa’, Report on a Visit 21- 26 June, 1999 Series IV, No. 5. Available 
at  www.achpr.org/files/sessions/26th/mission-reports/gambia/achpr26_misrep_specmec_priso_gambia_1999_eng.pdf, 
(Accessed on 16th May, 2012).  
714 Dankwa EVO, ‘Prisons in Benin; Report of the Special Rapporteur on Prisons and Conditions of Detention in 
Africa’, Report on a Visit 23-31 1999, Series IV, No. 6.  Available at www.achpr.org/files/sessions/26th/mission-  
reports/benin/achpr26_misrep_specmec_priso_benin_1999_eng.pdf, (Accessed 16th August, 2016).  
715 Dankwa EVO, ‘prisons in the Central African Republic: Report of the Special Rapporteur on Prisons and 
Conditions of Detention in Africa’, 19-29 June 2000, Series IV, No. 7. 
Available at www.achpr.org/files/sessions/28th/mission-
reports/centralafricanrepublic/achpr28_misrep_specmec_priso_car_2000_fra.pdf, (Accessed on 16th August, 2016). I 
will like to point out here that this report is only available in French.  
716 Chirwa V.M., ‘Prisons in Mozambique: Report on a Second Visit,’ April 4-14, 2001, Series IV, No.08. Available 
at www.achpr.org/files/sessions/30th/mission-
reports/mozambique/achpr30_misrep_specmec_priso_mozambique_2001_eng.pdf,   (Accessed   on   16th     August, 
2016). 
717 DOC/OS (XXXIII) 324c/I, Prisons in Namibia Report of the Special Rapporteur on Prisons and Conditions of 
Detention in Africa on a Visit 17-28 September, 2001. Available at www.achpr.org/files/sessions/33rd/mission-  
reports/namibia/achpr33_misrep_specmec_priso_namibia_2001_eng.pdf, (Accessed 16th May, 2016).  
718 Chirwa V.M., ‘Report on the Mission of the Special Rapporteur on Prisons and Conditions of Detention in Africa’ 
(Item 10) Visit 11-22 March 2001, DOC/OS(XXXIII)324c/II. Available at www.achpr.org/files/sessions/33rd/mission-
reports/uganda/achpr33_misrep_specmec_priso_uganda_2001_eng.pdf, (Accessed 16th May, 2012).  
719 Chirwa V.M., ‘Prisons in Cameron: The Report of the Special Rapporteur on Prisons and Condition of Detention 
in Africa,’ Visit 2-15 September, 2002, ACHPR/37/OS/11/437. Available at 
www.achpr.org/files/sessions/37th/mission-reports/cameroon-  
prisons/misrep_specmec_priso_cameroon_2002_eng.pdf, (Accessed on 16th May, 2016). 
720 Chirwa V.M, ‘Report of the Mission of the Special Rapporteur on Prisons and Condition of Detention in Africa to 
the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia,’ Visit 15-29 March, 2004. Available at  
www.achpr.org/files/sessions/37th/mission-reports/ethiopia/misrep_specmec_priso_ethopia_2004_eng.pdf 
(Accessed on 16th May, 2016).  
721 Chirwa V.M., ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on Prisons and Conditions of Detention in Africa Mission to the 
Republic of South Africa,’ Visit 14-30 June, 2004. Available at http://www.achpr.org/files/sessions/37th/mission-  
reports/prisons-2004/misrep_specmec_priso_southafrica_2004_eng.pdf (Accessed on 16th May, 2016).  
722 See, Report of Promotional Activities by Commissioner Mumba Malila on Promotional Activities during the 
Intersection period May to November, 2008 particularly at paragraph 5. Available at  
www.achpr.org/files/sessions/44th/inter-act-reps/mumba-malila/achpr44_comrep_2008_malila_eng.pdf (Accessed 
16th August, 2016).  
723 During the 43rd Session held in May 2008 in Ezulwini, Swaziland, an arrangement was made for the members of 
the African Commission to visit and see some prisons in Swaziland. The prisons visited were Mawelawela Female 
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scheduled activity for the Special Rapporteur. According to the Activity Report of the 
Commission, between 2005 and 2009 the Special Rapporteur was only able to carry out one 
country mission to Liberia in 2008 and this was carried out jointly with the Follow-up 
Committee on the Robben Island Guidelines.
724 
It should be noted that between 2010 and 
now, several seminars, workshops and trainings have been organised by the SRP especially 
during the tenure of Commissioner Dupe Atoki and Med Kaggwa. These were organised for 
law enforcement officers comprising prison officials with other stakeholders on prison reforms 
with the objective of reviewing the prison and criminal justice with intention of urging State to 
work together more closely in order to make minimal use of imprisonment.
725 
Till date, more 
than 25 visits to 23 countries have been conducted by the Special Rapporteur on Prisons at the 
rate of two per year wherein meetings with Government authorities are held. Press conferences 
are also held prior to visits to police holding cells, prisons and reform schools for approximately 
10 days.
726
 
After every visit, the Special Rapporteur is expected to come up with a report which must 
contain the number of prisons visited and their population. The report must also contain 
background information of the country involved. There is no particular format to be followed in 
writing this report but it must demonstrate a particular interest in and awareness of, issues 
concerning overcrowding, whether females are housed with males, and children with adults, the 
number   of   remand   prisoners,   discipline   and   disappearances   as   well   as   the   judicial 
process.
727 
These reports used to be published with the assistance of PRI and the financial 
assistance of the Norwegian Agency for Development Corporation (NORAD)
728 
but this has 
since stopped. Reports are now being presented by the Special Rapporteurs with increased 
financial support from Member States.
729
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
Prison, a Juvenile male prison and adult male prison. See Report of the Activities by Commissioner Mumba Malila 
on   Promotional   Activities   during   the   Inter   Session   Period   May   to   November,   2008.   Available   at 
www.achpr.org/files/sessions/44th/inter-act-reps/mumba-malila/achpr44_comrep_2008_malila_eng.pdf (Accessed on 
7th April, 2015).  
724 Long D & Muntingh L, ‘The Special Rapporteur on Prisons and Conditions of Detention in Africa and the 
Committee for the Prevention of Torture in Africa: The Potential for synergy or Inertia?’(2010) 13 International 
Journal on Human Rights 99.  
725 See Report presented by Hon. Commissioner Med Kaggwa at the 52ndOrdinary Session of the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples Rights held in Yamoussoukro, Cote dIvoire, from 9 – 22 October, 2012.  
726 See Report of Hon.  Commissioner  Med  Kaggwa  delivered  at  the  52nd   Ordinary  Session  of  the  African 
Commission on Human and Peoples Rights held in Yamoussoukro, Cote d Ivoire, 9 – 22 October, 2012.  
727 Murray (2008) 357.  
728 Viljoen (2007) 396.  
729 Viljoen, ‘The Special Rapporteur on Prisons and Conditions of Detention in Africa: Achievements and Possibilities’ 
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The success of the Special Rapporteur on Prisons and Conditions of Detention in Africa can be 
attributed to the support given by Member States and the efforts of the Special Rapporteurs too 
but the full realisation of the potentials of the SRP was also hindered by the states too. SRP need 
the consent of the state to be able to carry out visits. These states are also required to grant 
unrestricted access to all detention facilities in the country but states where allegations of 
maltreatment of detainees regularly fall outside the jurisdiction of the SRP.
730
 
5.3.1.1.3 Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Women in Africa 
 
The Resolution on the appointment of a Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Women in Africa 
was adopted at the 25
th
 
Ordinary Session of the African Commission.
731 
The early motivation for 
the appointment of this Special Rapporteur came from a Seminar on the Rights of Women in 
Africa and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.732 Recommendations from the 
Seminar suggested that whoever is to be appointed as a Special Rapporteur on the Rights of 
Women will be responsible for the protection of women’s rights.733 
The mandate of the Special Rapporteur was directed more at general studies and collaboration 
with non-governmental organisations with less emphasis on visits
734 
compared to the mandates 
of the other earlier Special Rapporteurs of the Commission already discussed in this thesis. It 
demanded for the expansion of guidelines to help States in developing their report on the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
(2005) Human Rights Quarterly vol. 27 No. 1 at 125-171. 
730 States like Egypt, Algeria, Libya and Tunisia.  
731 The 25th Ordinary Session of the Commission was held at Bujumbura, Burundi for 26 April to % May, 1999. See 
ACHPR/res.38 (XXV) 99. The Resolution appointed the Special Rapporteur retroactively as from October 1998. 
See Mandate and Biographical Note, Available at www.achpr.org/mechanisms/rights-of-women/about/ (Accessed 
16th August, 2016).  
732 The  Seminar  was  organized  by  the  African  Commission  in  conjunction  with  the  Women  in  Law  and 
Development in Africa (WILDA). See the Final Communique of the 17th Ordinary Session of the African 
Commission held in Togo from 13 to 22 MARCH, 1995.  
733 See Paragraph 28 (3) of the Communique to the 17th Ordinary Session of the African Commission. Though the 
Commission did not initially take a decision as regards this recommendation not until the 19th Ordinary Session 
where the creation of the mandate of the Special Rapporteur was approved. See 9th Activity Report of the African 
Commission (1995-1996), particularly at paragraph 19.  
734 The Special Rapporteur embarked on some mission visits to States Parties like Djibouti from 14 to 17 September, 
2002 and Sudan from 30 March to 4 April 2003. These visits were termed promotional visits. See 19th Annual 
Activity Report 2005, paragraph 19(c). The Special Rapporteur also went to Angola from 27 September to 2 
October 2002 (See Activity Report by Commissioner Anela Melo, Special Rapporteur on the Right of Women in 
Africa to the 33rd Ordinary Session of the African Commission 15-19 May 2003 at paragraph 6-8), to Democratic 
Republic of Congo (see 20th Activity Report January – June 2006 at paragraph 14 (b)) and to Cape Verde (See 21st 
Activity Report May-December 2006 at paragraph 65 (c).   
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situation of women and for the finalisation of the protocol on the rights of women.
735
 
This mandate was expected to terminate after 4 years with the Special Rapporteur expected to 
submit an interim report addressing the substance of the subject-matter of the mandate within 
two years and a proposal for the future.
736 
Furthermore, the Special Rapporteur was required to 
submit progress reports to the Commission at every Ordinary Session and also present an annual 
report to the Assembly as an Annexure to the report of the Commission.
737
 This mandate has 
been  renewed  on 4 occasions  with  the  adoption  of  Resolution  63  at  the  34
th
  Ordinary  
Session, Resolution 78 of the 38
th
 Ordinary Session, Resolution 112 at the 42nd Ordinary 
Session and 154 at the 46
th
  Ordinary Session of the African Commission.
738
 
 
The adoption of the Protocol to the African Charter on the Rights of Women in Africa was 
termed as the major achievement of the Special Rapporteur.
739 
After the adoption of this treaty, 
the focus of the Special Rapporteur shifted to the ratification and domestication of it by State 
parties.
740 
The Special Rapporteur Angela Melo
741
 was able to persuade Mozambique to ratify 
the Protocol.
742 
The Special Rapporteur, during the examination of state reports, raised 
questions pertinent to the position of women and the status of ratification of and 
reservations to the Women’s Protocol.743 ‘Urgent Appeals’ were also issued by the Special 
Rapporteur in response to specific situations affecting women. At the 40
th
 
Ordinary Session 
of the Commission, the Commission adopted a resolution asking DRC to guarantee the right to 
security of young women in the country that were suffering from sexual abuse. The resolution 
urged the state to ratify and domesticate the African Women’s Protocol and effectively 
                                                             
735 A   copy   of   the   mandate   of   the   Special   Rapporteur   on   the   Rights   of   Women   is   available   at 
www.achpr.org/mechanisms/rights-of-women-about/ under the caption About: Mandate and Biographical Notes. 
(Accessed on 19th May, 2015).  
736 Draft Terms of Reference, Section 1, Paragraph 1. See also Murray (2008) 362.  
737 Section I paragraph 4 of the Draft Terms of Reference. 
738 See www.achpr.org/mechanisms/rights-of-women/ (Accessed 16th August, 2016). 
739 Murray (2008) 364. See also Viljoen (2007) 398.  
740 See 20th Activity Report at paragraph 30. In 2005, the Special Rapporteur sent a Communication to the 
Chairperson of the Pan-African Parliament persuading her to set in motion a process of domesticating the Womens 
Protocol in National laws.  
741 Appointed at the 34th Ordinary Session and reappointed at the 38th Ordinary Session of the African Commission. 
Her tenure expired at the 42nd Ordinary Session which was held in November, 2007.  
742 Letters to the relevant government officials of Mozambique were sent by the Special Rapporteur in July 2003 and by 
December, 2005 Mozambique ratified the Womens Protocol. See 17th Annual Activity Report, para.30 Available at 
www.achpr.org/files/activity-reports/17/achpr34and35_20032004_eng.pdf (Accessed on 7th April, 2015).  
743 Viljoen (2012) 375.  
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implement a new law on sexual violence.
744 
This was as a result of the inaction of the 
Government to whom an appeal was earlier directed. 
 
The Special rapporteur had some challenges along the way as the ‘preliminary’ report presented 
six months after her appointment and the ‘activity report’ at the 25
th
 
session did not find their 
way into the activity report of the African Commission. By the 26
th
 
session the Special 
Rapporteur reported receiving a printer and a computer from the International Centre for Human 
Rights and Democratic Development situated in Canada. She also embarked on an ‘information 
and awareness’ mission to Liberia, a trip which was funded by Women in Law and Development 
in Africa
745 
despite not receiving any budget from the Commission.
746 
Although the Special 
Rapporteur presented her activity report at the 26
th
 
ordinary session of the Commission; the 
report did not make its way into the 13
th
 
Annual Activity report of the Commission thereby 
making it a restricted document. 
5.3.1.1.4 Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and Access to Information  in 
Africa 
This Special Rapporteur was initially referred to as the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of 
Expression and was established by the Commission at its 36
th 
Ordinary Session held in Dakar, 
Senegal.
747 
It represents an institutional continuation of the working Group on Freedom of 
Expression and was established to monitor state compliance with the Declaration of Principles 
on Freedom of Expression in the continent.
748
 
The initial mandates of the Special rapporteur are: 
 
i. analyse national media legislation, policies and practice within Member States; 
ii. monitor their compliance with freedom of expression standards and advise Member States 
accordingly; 
iii. undertake investigative missions to Member States where reports of massive violations of the 
right to freedom of expression are made and make appropriate recommendations to the 
                                                             
744 See AU Doc. ACHPR/Res. 103 (XXXX) 06, Resolution on the Situation of Women in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, adopted on 29 November, 2006.  
745See Report of Activities of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Women in Africa 26th  Ordinary Session, 
DOC/OS/(XXVI)/124.   
746 Julia Harrington, ‘Special Rapporteur of the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights’ (2001) vol. 1 
No. 2 AHRLJ 247-267.  
747 Resolution 71 adopted at the 36th Ordinary Session of the Commission.  
748 Viljoen (2007) 399.  
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African Commission; 
iv. undertake country missions and any other promotional activity that would strengthen the full 
enjoyment of the right to freedom of expression in Africa; 
v. make public interventions where violations of the right of freedom of expression have been 
brought to his/her attention; keep a proper record of violations of the right of freedom of 
expression and publish this in his/her reports submitted to the African Commission; and 
vi. submit reports at each ordinary session of the African Commission on the status of the 
enjoyment of the right to freedom of expression in Africa.
749
 
These mandates were renewed at the 42
nd
 
Ordinary Session
750 
of the Commission by amending 
the title with the addition of ‘Access to Information in Africa’. The Special Rapporteur was 
allowed to proceed further with the mandate to: 
i. analyse national media legislation, policies and practice within Member States, monitor their 
compliance with freedom of expression and access to information standards in general and 
the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression in Africa in particular, and advise 
Member States accordingly; 
ii. undertake fact-finding missions to Member States from where reports of systemic violations of 
the right to freedom of expression and denial of access to information have reached the 
attention of the Special Rapporteur and make appropriate recommendations to the African 
Commission; 
iii. undertake promotional country Missions and any other activities that would strengthen the 
full enjoyment of the right to freedom of expression and the promotion of access to 
information in Africa; 
iv. make public interventions where violations of the right to freedom of expression and access 
to information have been brought to his/her attention, including by issuing public statements, 
press releases, and sending appeals to Member States asking for clarifications; 
v. keep a proper record of violations of the right to freedom of expression and denial of access 
to information and publish this in his/her reports submitted to the African Commission; and 
vi. submit reports at each Ordinary Session of the African Commission on the status of the 
enjoyment of the right to freedom of expression and access to information in Africa.
751
 
 
Commissioner Faith Pansy Tlakula is the Special Rapporteur as she has just been re- 
appointed.
752 
Whenever a report of massive violation of the rights to freedom of expression is 
received by the Special Rapporteur, it undertakes an investigative mission to the state in question 
and when any other relevant complaint is forwarded or received by the Special Rapporteur, it 
makes intervention publicly through press releases and ‘urgent appeals.’753 The Special 
                                                             
749 See http://www.achpr.org/mechanisms/freedom-of-expression/ (Accessed on 20th May, 2015).  
750 The 42nd session of the African Commission was held in Brazzaville, Republic of Congo in November 2007.  
751 See www.achpr.org/mechanisms/freedom-of-expression/ (Accessed on 20th May, 2015). 
752 She is a Commissioner from South Africa and was re-appointed as the Special Rapporteur at the 57th Ordinary 
Session of the Commission held in Banjul, The Gambia from 4 – 18 November, 2015.  
753 Viljoen (2007) 399. Promotional activities such as country missions can also be undertaken by the special 
rapporteur.  
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Rapporteur embarked on a promotional mission to the Kingdom of Swaziland in 2006.
754 
At the 
48
th
 
Ordinary Session of the Commission
755 
by Resolution 167, the Commission decided to 
begin the process of drafting a model access to information legislation for Africa and the Special 
Rapporteur was mandated to lead the process. This process was coordinated by the Centre for 
Human Rights, University of Pretoria under the auspices of Special Rapporteur and several 
experts meetings were held. The first of these meetings resulted in the establishment of a ten-
member working group of access to information experts who were tasked with developing an 
initial draft model law.
756
 
The first draft was presented to the Commission at its 49
th
 
Ordinary Session held in Banjul, The 
Gambia on 29
th
 
April 2011
757 
and between June 2011 and June 2012, four sub-regional 
consultations were held in Mozambique, Kenya, Senegal and Tunisia and additional call for 
comments from the public was also made by the Commission. The feedback from these 
consultations and the public call made were considered by the working group and informed the 
final text of the Model law. 
The aim of the Model law is to ensure that legislative drafters and policy makers address all 
issues relevant to the African context in their adoption and review of access to information 
legislation. The Model law is framed as an ‘Act’ in order to serve as a ‘ready-made’ example 
which could constitute the basis of national legislation.
758
 
5.3.1.1.5 Special Rapporteur on Human Rights Defenders in Africa 
 
The Special Rapporteur on Human Rights Defenders
759 
was established by the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights with the adoption of Resolution 69 at the 35 th 
                                                             
754 The promotional mission took place between 21st and 25th of August, 2006 and the recommendations of the 
Special Rapporteur are available at www.achpr.org/states/swaziland/missions/promo-2006/ (Accessed on 7th April, 
2015).  
755 The 48th Ordinary Session was held between the 10th and 24th of November, 2010 in Banjul, The Gambia.  
756See Model Law on Access to Information for Africa prepared by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights. Available at www.achpr.org/files/news/2013/04/d84/model_law.pdf (Accessed 8th April, 2015).  
757 The aim of this consultation was to introduce the Draft Model Law, developed in accordance to Resolution 167 
(XLVIII) 2010 of the Commission.  
758 See, Model Law on Access to Information for Africa. Available at 
www.achpr.org/files/news/2013/04/d84/model_law.pdf (Accessed7th April, 2015). 
759 The current Special Rapporteur is Reine Alapini-Gansou from Cotonou, Benin and was appointed at the 50th 
Ordinary session of the Commission held in Banjul, The Gambia from the 24th October-7th November, 2011.  
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Ordinary Session held in Banjul, The Gambia760 and it functions on the substantive basis of the 
UN Declaration on the Rights and Responsibilities of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society 
to Promote and Protect Universally Recognised Freedoms. The mandate of the Special 
Rapporteur is to seek, receive, examine and act upon information on the situation of human 
rights defenders in Africa.
761
 
Aside its promotional mandates, the Special Rapporteur also receives, examines and acts upon 
information about human rights defenders and engages government in dialogues.
762 
In 
responding to information, the Special Rapporteur will either send urgent appeals
763 
to heads of 
state or might decide to issue an allegation letter.
764 
The visibility of the work of the Special 
Rapporteur’s  intervention  has  not  always  been  possible  because  of  their  sensitivity  and 
confidential nature. 
 
Looking at all the Special Rapporteurs as discussed above, it is clear that they are all members of 
the Commission at one point or the other. This can be said to be one of the reasons why the 
Commission has not been able to achieve much progress with the Special Rapporteurs. I 
believe the Commission will achieve more where people to be appointed Special 
Rapporteurs are not members of the Commission. The lack of state consent for visit, lack of 
resources and insufficient publicity assigned to the activities of these Special Rapporteurs 
                                                             
760 The Ordinary Session was held from 4th of May to 4th of June, 2004 in Banjul, The Gambia. The call for the 
appointment of a Special Rapporteur on Human Rights Defenders was as a result of the adoption of the Declaration 
on Human Rights by the UN in 1998. See the Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups 
and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognised Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom, 
UN General Assembly Resolution A/Res/53/144 of 8th March, 1999. The NGOs that participated in the African 
Commission session urged the Commission to adopt something similar. After the appointment of the Special 
Representative under the UN system ( Resolution E/CN.4/RES/2000/61 of 26 April 2000 on Special Representative 
of the UN Secretary General on Human Rights Defenders) and the raising of high cases like the death of human 
rights activist in Burkina Faso the Commission took a step towards the actualisation of the call by the NGOs with its 
inclusion on its agenda and the eventual decision to appoint a focal point on Human Rights Defenders in Africa in 
November 2003 for a period of two years.  
761 See Special Rapporteur on Human Rights Defenders at http://www.achpr.org/mechanisms/human-rights-  
defenders/ (Accessed on 20th May, 2016). This mandate has however being renewed through Resolutions adopted at 
the 38th Ordinary session in 2005, 42nd Ordinary Session in 2007, 46th Ordinary Session in 2009 and 49th Ordinary 
Session in 2011.  
762 Resolution on the Protection of Human Rights Defenders in Africa adopted at the 35th Ordinary Session of the 
African Commission, 21 May-4 June, 2004.  
763 This procedure is reserved for cases where there are sufficient and reliable allegations that a human rights 
defenders right might be violated and time is of the essence as loss of life might occur, life threatening situation is 
imminent or on-going.  
764
 An example is the Appeal sent by Commissioner John Jainaba to the presidents of Sudan and Zimbabwe. This is 
reported in the 18th Annual Activity Report of the African Commission. (AU Doc EX/CL.199 (VII) at paragraph 27. 
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has also constrained the effectiveness of the mechanisms. 
 
5.3.1.2 Working Groups 
 
Working groups, established by Rule 28,
765 
differ from Special Rapporteurs. Working Groups 
are more investigative and research-directed,
766 
focusing on evolving issues or matters core to 
the Commission’s functions. A number of these Working Groups were established by the 
African Commission in order to enable it address important issues under its mandate since there 
are inadequate human and material resources at the African Commission’s disposal.767 As 
pointed out earlier in this chapter, members of the working groups consist of NGOs and 
individual experts as against members of Special Rapporteurs. The seven Working Groups 
established by the Commission have been mentioned earlier in the above sub-paragraph but few 
of them will now be discussed in order to understand the reason(s) behind their establishment, 
composition, the way they work, their achievements and their failures in relation to the 
objectives of enhancing the Commission’s mandate of promotion and protection of human and 
Peoples’ rights. A link will also be established between these working groups and the indigenous 
justice system. 
 
5.3.1.2.1 Working Group of Experts on Indigenous Populations/Communities in 
Africa 
 
This was the first Working Group to be established by the African Commission.
768
 This was 
a follow-up on the Commission’s deliberation on the human rights issues of indigenous 
peoples and minorities at the 26
th 
Ordinary Session held in Rwanda where the Commission 
appointed three Commissioners to form a committee to extra deliberate the issue of indigenous 
peoples in Africa and advise accordingly.
769 
This Working Group consists of two 
Commissioners and four experts in the field of human rights or indigenous issues and with a 
mandate to examine the concept of indigenous people and communities in Africa; study the 
implication of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the wellbeing of 
                                                             
765 Rules of Procedure of the African Commission on human and Peoples’ Rights.  
766 Viljoen (2007) 400.  
767 Mukundi Wachira & Kealeboga N Bojosi, ‘Protecting Indigenous Peoples in Africa: An Analysis of the 
Approach of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ (2006) 6 AHRLJ 382.  
768 This was established during the Commissions 28th Ordinary session which was held between the 23rd October and 
6th November, 2000 in The Republic of Benin. See 14th Annual Activity Report, Annex IV October 2000 – May, 
2001.  
769 Bahame Tom Mukirya Nyanduga (2008) 390.  
https://etd.uwc.ac.za
219 
 
 
 
indigenous communities especially with regards to the right to equality,
770 
the right to 
dignity,
771 
protection against domination,
772 
on self-determination,
773 
and the promotion of 
cultural development and identity;
774 
and consider  appropriate  recommendations  for  the  
monitoring  and  protection  of  the  rights  of indigenous communities.
775 
The Working Group 
is expected to report back to the African Commission with its findings. 
 
This Working Group was established to fill a major gap in the protection of the human rights 
of indigenous populations and minorities in Africa
776 
and it, like the other Special 
Mechanisms of the African Commission, derived its presence and mandate from Article 
45 of the African Charter, which expounds on the promotion and protection mandates of the 
Commission. Nonetheless, the Working Group owe its existence and mandate to several of the 
African Charter such as Article 2,
777
 3,
778
 5,
779
 19,
780
 20
781 
and 22
782 
unlike most special 
mechanisms of the African Commission.
783 
 
The first task of the Working Group was to produce the report on indigenous peoples in 
                                                             
770 Article 2 and 3 of the African Charter. 
771 Article 5 of the African Charter.  
772 Article 19 of the African Charter.  
773 Article 20 of the African Charter.  
774 Article 22 of the African Charter.  
775 Resolution on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’ Communities in Africa, 2000, ACHPR/Res.51(XXXVIII)00. 
The group was finally constituted during the 29th Ordinary Session which was held in Tripoli, Libya between 23rd 
April and 7th May, 2001. Three Commissioners and four experts were named as members of the Working Group, 
three of whom were members of indigenous and marginalized communities from Kenya, Niger and Rwanda and the 
fourth was an independent expert with long- standing experience on indigenous and minority population issue. See 
the Final Communique of the 29th Ordinary Session of the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights, 
Paragraph 9. The members of the Working Group then were Commissioner Nyameko Barney Pityana, Convenor; 
Commissioner Kamel Rezag-Bara; Commissioner Andrew Chigovera; Ms Marianne Jensen; independent expert 
(International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs [IWGIA]); Naomi Kapuri; indigenous expert; Mr Muhammed 
Khattali, indigenous expert; and Mr ZephyrinKalimba, indigenous expert. See Report of the African Commissions 
Working Group of Experts on Indigenous Populations/Communities, ACHPR/IWGIA 2005 at page 11. 
776 Bahame Tom MukiryaNyanduga (2008) 392.  
777 Enjoyment of rights and freedoms recognised and guaranteed under the Charter without distinction to race, ethnic 
group, colour, sex, language, religion, political or any other opinion, national or social origin, fortune, birth or other 
status.  
778 Equality before the law and the right to equal protection of the law.  
779 Right to the respect of human dignity and the recognition of man’s social status.  
780 Equality before the law as nothing shall justify the domination of a people by another.  
781 Right to existence and self-determination.  
782 Right to Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.  
783Soyata Maiga, ‘Historical Development, Mandate, Activities and Future Perspectives of the Working Group on 
Indigenous Populations/Communities in Africa;’ a paper presented at a Regional Sensitisation Seminar on the 
Rights of Indigenous Populations/Communities in Central and East Africa held from 22 to 25 August, 2011 in 
Brazzaville, The Republic of Congo.   
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Africa.
784 
This involved extensive consultations with African human rights experts and 
indigenous peoples’ own organisations.785 The final report was submitted to the Afr ica n 
Commission and same was adopted by the Commission in 2003.
786 
The report, among 
other things, provides an analysis of the human rights situation of indigenous peoples in Africa 
seen in the light of the provisions of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and 
includes solid recommendations to the African Commission. The report was published by 
the African Commission and IWGIA in 2005 in a book form and it is considered as a major 
accomplishment of the Working Group.
787
 The report has afforded the indigenous peoples 
in Africa with arguments and a strong advocacy tool to demand their governments to 
recognise their rights particularly in relation to their economic and social development, 
their environment and land rights.
788
 
 
In furtherance of the discharge of its mandate, the Working Group has visited 14 African 
countries and in its reports on these country visits, the Working Group pointed out, among other 
challenges, the socio-economic environment and land related challenges that are being faced by 
indigenous peoples in these countries.
789
 
                                                             
784 ACHPR Working Group on Indigenous Populations/Communities, Article published by International Work 
Group for Indigenous Affairs, Available at www.iwgia.org/human-rights/regional-bodies-and-mechanisms/african- 
commission-on-human-and-and-peoples-rights/working-group-on-indigenous-populationscommunities (Accessed on 2nd 
May, 2015).  
785 The Working Group first met prior to the 30th Session in October 2001 in Banjul, The Gambia. It then convened 
aroundtable meeting prior to the 31st Session in April 2002 in Pretoria, South Africa, and then a consultative meeting 
in January, 2003 in Nairobi, Kenya. See Resolution 65 on the Adoption of the Report of the African Commissions 
Working Group on Indigenous Populations/Communities Available at 
www.achpr.org/sessions/34th/resolutions/65/ (Accessed on 6th June, 2016). 
786 The  Report  of  the  Working  Group  was  adopted  in  November,  2003  by  the  African  Commission  at  the 
Commissions 34th Session held in Banjul, The Gambia. See 17th Annual Activity Report, paragraph 41. Adopting the 
Report of the Working Group, the Commission reaffirmed the need to promote and protect more effectively the 
human rights of indigenous populations and communities in Africa, taking into account the absence of a mechanism 
within the African Commission that has a specific mandate to monitor, promote and protect the respect and 
enjoyment of human rights of these marginalised or minority indigenous groups and communities. See Resolution 
on the Adoption of the Report of the African Commissions Working Group on Indigenous Populations/Communities, 
ACHPR/Res.65 (XXXIV) 03.  
787See www.iwgia.org.publications/search-pubs?_id=116 (Accessed on 17th August, 2016).  
788 An example of this can be traced to Kenya where the indigenous civil society has actively used the report to 
advocate for legal and policy indigenous reforms such as the new Constitution and the new Land Policy. See 
Maurice Odhiambo Makoloo, ‘Kenya: Minority, Indigenous People and Ethnic Diversity,’ a report published by 
Minority Rights Group International in February, 2005. 
789 The countries visited by the Working Group are Burundi in April, 2005; Botswana in June, 2005; Namibia 
between July and August, 2005; Congo Brazzaville in September, 2005 and March 2010; Niger in February, 2006; 
Uganda in July, 2006 and Central African Republic in January, 2007. Others are Gabon which was visited in 
September 2007, Rwanda in December, 2008, Democratic Republic of Congo in August 2009 and Kenya in March 
2010. In its report on these visits, the Working Group recommended ways of improving the lives and wellbeing of 
the indigenous population. See ‘About’ Available at www.achpr.org/mechanisms/indigenous-populations/about/ 
(Accessed 17th August, 2016). In October, 2010 the Working Group launched a report on the Constitutional and 
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The specific acknowledgment by the African charter, of Peoples’ rights has also eased the work 
of the African Commission in the establishment of this Working Group hence; all the 
mandates lined out in the resolution creating the Working Group speak to and are linked to the 
earlier cited provisions of the Charter.
790
 The resolution providing for the adoption of the 
report on indigenous peoples in Africa also provided for the continuation of the Working 
group with a renewed and extended mandate as the Working Group was not disbanded after the 
submission of its report.
791
 
 
The Working Group has recorded some achievements so far and also faced with challenges. The 
major challenge the Working Group is faced with is the absence of cooperation and response 
from State Parties. The Working Group has conducted various promotional missions, 
sensitisation conferences and seminars with the consent of states
792 
but normally when request 
are sent to the state parties by the Working Group they always fail to give any response and at 
times when they decide to give response, it is always a negative one.
793
 
 
Also is the absence of networking and co-operation with various stakeholders such as non- 
governmental organisations, national human rights institutions and international actors such as 
the UN Special Rapporteur.
794 
Due to this, exercise of the Working Group has been 
duplicated thereby compromising its effectiveness. Another challenge being faced by the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
legislative protection of indigenous people in 24 African countries in conjunction with the International Labour 
Organisation and the University of Pretoria. In the report, socio-economic conditions, land and natural resources, 
environmental, cultural, linguistic and educational rights of indigenous peoples were extensively covered and 
assessed. The report also made recommendations to African States, concerned organs of the United Nations, AU and 
other international organisations. Civil society and the media were also included. See Soyata Maiga (2011) 5. 
790 Soyata Maiga (2011) 4.  
791 The Working Group was tasked to raise funds for further promotion and protection work, co-operate with other 
regional and international mechanisms, gather information, and engage various stakeholders, including governments 
and indigenous communities. It was also required to undertake country missions to study the human rights situation 
of the indigenous populations/communities and submit recommendations and measures to prevent and remedy 
situations. The Working Group was also required to report to every Ordinary Session of the African Commission. 
See ACHPR/Res.65 (XXXIV) 03 Resolution on the Adoption of the Report of the African Commissions Working 
Group on Indigenous Population/Communities.  
792 An example is the Regional Sensitisation Seminar conducted on the Rights of Indigenous 
Populations/Communities in Central Africa. The Seminar was held in Yaoundé, Cameroon from 13-16 September, 
2006. Available at  
www.achpr.org/english/Special%20Mechanisms/Indigenous/Rpt_seminers/seminer_cameroon.pdf (Accessed on 17th 
August, 2017) See also Kipuri Naomi, ‘The Working Group of the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights 
on the Situation of Indigenous Populations and Communities in Africa,’ paper presented at the IFAD 
Governing Council meeting held on 15 -16 February, 2005. The author is one of the founding members of the 
African Working Group. 
793 Soyata Maiga (2011) 6. 
794 Felix Mukwiza Ndahinda, ‘Indigenousness in Africa: A Contested Legal Framework for Empowerment of 
Marginalised Communities’ (2011) 205.  
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Working Group is that of finance
795 
therefore NGOs have been instrumental in the Working 
Group mechanism, in the initiation of thematic issues to be pursued by the Commission and in 
their activities.
796 
Absence of finance has stopped the Working Group from carrying out as 
many promotional and fact finding missions, seminars and conferences as possible to 
sensitise and discuss with stakeholders.
797
 
 
The establishment of the Working Group represented an important moment in the African 
Commission and the African human rights system. It signified a break from a past where the 
concentration on nation building prevented any serious discourse on the rights of ethnic groups 
in post-colonial Africa. The problem with the Working Group is that it was essentially the 
product of the African indigenous Peoples’ movement;798 the movement itself was not a product 
of a broad-based conscious self-identification by certain ethnic groups in Africa as indigenous 
peoples rooted on the widely-held belief that they shared similar experiences with the people of 
the international indigenous movement. Rather, the movement was a long enduring external 
mission to apply the concept of indigenous Peoples’ to certain predetermined peoples in Africa. 
 
5.3.1.2.2 Working Group on Death Penalty 
 
Article 4 of the African Charter guarantees the right to life. At its 26
th 
Ordinary Session,
799 
the Commission adopted a resolution calling for a moratorium on the death penalty
800 
wherein it urged States Parties to the African Charter which still retain the death penalty to 
                                                             
795 For a discussion of the Working Groups of the African Charter, see Nyandunga B.T.M., ‘Working Groups of the 
African Commission and their Role in the Development of the Africa Charter on Human and Peoples Rights in 
Context’ in Evans M & Murray R, ‘The African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights: The System in Practice,’ 
1986-2000 (2002) 379.  
796Mbelle N, ‘The Role of non-governmental Organisations and National Human Rights Institutions at the African 
Commission’ in Evans & Murray (2002) 289-292. The Working Group has been relying on funding made available by 
the Danish International Development agency (DANIDA) through the International Working Group on Indigenous 
Affairs (IWGIA) and this has made the continuity and sustainability of its activities and project very uncertain. See 
Soyata Maiga (2011) 8.  
797 Kealeboga Bojosi, ‘Protecting Indigenous Peoples in Africa: An Analysis of the Approach of the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ (2006) 2 AHRLJ 382-406.  
798 Kealeboga Bojosi, ‘The African Commission Working Group of Experts on the Rights of Indigenous 
Communities/Populations: Some Reflections on its Work so Far’ in Solomon Dersso (ed.) ‘Perspectives on the 
Rights of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples in Africa’ (2010) 95-137.  
799 The Session was held in Kigali, Rwanda from the 1-15, November, 1999 and was presided over by Commissioner 
Isaac Nguema.  
800 See the Final Communique of the 26th  Ordinary Session of the African Commission on Human and Peoples 
Rights held in Kigali, Rwanda.  
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comply with their obligations under the treaty.
801 
It further urged them to ensure that 
persons accused of crimes for which the death penalty is a competent sentence are afforded all 
the guarantees in the African Charter.
802 
The preamble to the resolution notes that Article 4 
of the African Charter ‘affirms the rights of everyone to life’. The preamble also made 
reference to resolutions of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights and the Sub-
Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human rights calling for a moratorium on the 
death penalty.
803
 
Furthermore, it also pointed out that some African States have ratified the Second Optional 
Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights while some States have 
abolished the death penalty either de facto or de jure.
804
 
The African Commission had not paid much attention to the death penalty or addressed the issue 
of death penalty in any of its resolutions by 1999. However, the situation changed in November 
when the Commission passed the ‘Resolution Urging the State to Envisage a Moratorium on 
Death Penalty.’805 The resolution was adopted because non-governmental organisations had 
expressed concern about recent death sentences carried out in the continent. In view of this and 
international development towards the abolition of death penalty, Ben Salem
806 
proposed that the 
African Commission should make a statement on the subject and call for a moratorium. He 
agreed with a request from the Chair to prepare the draft text and during debate, representatives 
from Sudan and Rwanda opposed the resolution thereby adopting positions similar to the one 
they took in the United Nations Commission on Human Rights.
807
 
                                                             
801 Resolution Urging States to Envisage a Moratorium on the Death Penalty, 13th Activity Report of the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples Rights, OAU Doc. AHG/Dec.153 (XXXVI), Annex IV.  
802 The resolution further called upon State Parties to the African Charter to limit the imposition of the death penalty 
only to the most serious crimes, consider establishing a moratorium on execution of the death penalty and reflect on 
the possibility of abolishing the death penalty. See Resolution ACHPR/Res.42 (XXVI) 99 adopted in Kigali, 
Rwanda and available at http://www.achpr.org/sessions/26th/resolutions/42/ (Accessed on 6th June, 2012). 
803 See UN Commission on Human Rights Resolution 2005/59 (Question of the  death penalty)  Available  at  
www.legislationline.org/documents/action/popup/id/4184 (Accessed on 8th April, 2015).  
804See OAU Doc. AHG/Dec.153 (XXXVI) Annex IV.  
805 Jon Yorke (ed.), ‘Against the Death Penalty: International Initiatives and Implications’ (2008) 80.  
806 Ben Salem was appointed a Special Rapporteur on Summary, Arbitrary and Extra judicial Execution in 1994 and he 
resigned from his position in 2001.  
807 See William Schabas (2002) 358. A year after the debate Rwanda was targeted by a resolution of the African 
Commission with respect to its proposed execution of twenty-three persons convicted of genocide. The schedule 
executions coincided with the 23rd Ordinary Session of the African Commission being held at Banjul, The Gambia 
in April 1998. The Commission issued an urgent appeal to the government of Rwanda for postponement of the 
executions, stating that it would violate the provisions of Article 4 of the African Charter which guarantee the right to 
life. The Commission called for a proper investigation of the allegations against the accused and a new trial with 
adequate legal assistance. But these people were later executed; they were the only formal executions carried out in 
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At the 35
th
 
Ordinary Session of the African Commission
808 
Vera Chirwa
809 
introduced an item 
on the agenda of the Commission on the question of the death penalty in Africa. The paper 
also pointed out a trend within some African countries where the question on death penalty was 
being carried out especially in the context of constitutional review processes.
810 
The draft 
paper was debated at a public session of the African Commission during its 36
th
 
Ordinary 
Session held in Dakar, Senegal in November, 2004 wherein the opinions of human rights 
actors and other participants including national Human rights Commissions, States and non-
Governmental Organisations on the issue of death penalty were requested for to improve the 
document the more. 
 
During the 37
th
 
Ordinary Session,
811 
the Commission, after a lengthy debate, decided to set 
up a Working Group on the Death Penalty.
812 
It appointed two Commissioners to work 
with the Special Rapporteur on Prisons and Conditions of Detention in Africa, to expand on the 
question of the death penalty in Africa and propose ways of tackling this question.
813     
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
connection with Genocide trials. See Amnesty International, Africa Update October 1998, AI Index: AFR 01/05/98 at 
2. Although some other people were sentenced to death for Genocide too, their sentences were commuted when 
Rwanda abolished the death penalty in 2007. 
808 The 35th Ordinary Session of the African Commission was held from 21st of May to 4th of June, 2004 in Banjul, 
The Gambia. 
809 Vera Chirwa was then the Special Rapporteur on Prisons and Conditions of Detention in Africa. She had before, 
commissioned the Secretariat to prepare a concept paper on the question of the death penalty in Africa which looked 
at State practice in Africa and human rights issues. It looked at the practice in some African States and discovered 
that there was no uniformity of State practice on the continent as regards the death penalty. The paper identified the 
States that had abolished the death penalty and those that had not carried out any execution in the last 10 years 
before the presentation of the paper, these she referred to as the abolitionists. Those that continued to execute the 
death sentence were referred to as the retentionists. As at 2014, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra 
Leone and Chad in West Africa; Congo DR, Equatorial Guinea in Central Africa; Burundi, Kenya, Tanzania, 
Uganda in East Africa; Lesotho, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe in Southern Africa and Algeria, Djibouti, Egypt, 
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Libya, Sudan, Somalia and Tunisia Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic are countries that have 
retained the death penalty. Benin Republic, Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Togo, Central African Republic, 
Congo-Brazzaville and Morocco have moratorium on execution while Angola, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, 
Seychelles, South Africa, Rwanda, Gabon, Sao Tome et Principe, Cape Verde, Cote dIvoire, Guinea-Bissau, and 
Senegal have all abolished the death penalty. See www.se2009.eu/polopoly_fs/1.17106!menu/s (Accessed 9th May, 
2014). It is worthy to note here that Liberia, after abolishing death penalty later reintroduced it and by 2009, courts 
in the country started pronouncing death sentence again. See, Jamil Mujuzi, ‘High Crime Rates Forces Liberia to 
Reintroduce Death Penalty and put International Treaty Aside: What the Critics Missed?’ (2009) 17 African Journal 
of International and Comparative Law 343-344.  
810 Evans & Murray (2008) 398.  
811 The 37th Ordinary Session of the Commission was held from 27th April - 11th May, 2005 at Banjul, The Gambia.  
812 Japhet Biegon & Magnus Killander, ‘Human Rights Developments in the African Union during’ 2009 (2010) 1 
Africa Human Rights Law Journal 212-232. 
813 See www.achpr.org/mechanisms/death-penalty (Accessed on 10th May, 2014). See also Catherine Dupe Atoki 
(2009) 7, Evans & Murray (2008) 398.  
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The Working Group was composed of two members of the African Commission
814 
and five 
experts chosen from the different legal systems and the different regions in Africa.
815 
At the first 
meeting of the group,
816 
it analysed a draft position paper on the death penalty and decided on 
the need to include the public in debating the issue as it appeared there was much work left to 
be done. The Working Group recommended to the Commission that the composition be 
increased and at the 38
th
 
Ordinary Session of the Commission, the Commission adopted a 
resolution to expand the composition of the Working group.
817
 
Resolution 79 adopted by the Commission at the 38
th
 
Ordinary Session put into use, the 
mandate of the Working Group on the Death Penalty. The mandate requested the Working 
Group to further expand a Concept Paper on the Death Penalty in Africa; design a Strategic 
plan comprising of a practical and legal framework on the abolition of the Death Penalty, 
gather information and continue to monitor the situation of the application of the Death 
Penalty in African States develop a funding proposal; and submit a progress report at every 
ordinary session of the Commission.
818
 
Furthermore, it further encouraged the Working Group to cooperate with other partners 
comprising international, national government and non-governmental institutions for an 
                                                             
814 These Commissioners were Commissioner Yasser El Hassan who was the Chair and Commissioner Tom 
Nyanduga. See Jon Yorke, ‘Against the Death Penalty: International Initiatives and Implications’ (2008) 80. 
Commissioner Kayitesi Zainabo Sylvie, in 2007 was appointed the new Chair of the Working Group. See ‘Resolution 
on the Renewal of the Mandate and Appointment of the Chairperson of the Working Group on the Death Penalty,’ 
adopted at the 42nd Ordinary Session of the African Commission held in Brazzaville, Republic of Congo from 15-28, 
November, 2007. ACHPR/Res.113 (XXXXII) 07. 
815 Jon Yorke (2008) 80. 
816 The first meeting of the group was held on 20th November, 2012 in Banjul, The Gambia and it was financed by 
Federation Internationale des Droits de L Homme and it was held prior to the 38
th 
Ordinary Session of the African 
Commission. See Lilian Chenwi, ‘Towards the Abolition of the Death Penalty in Africa: A Human Rights 
Perspective’ (2007) 8.  
817 The 38th Ordinary Session took place in Banjul, The Gambia between 21 November and 5 December 2004. It 
adopted the Resolution on the Composition and Operationalisation of the Working Group on the Death Penalty. See 
ACHPR/Res. 79 (XXXVII) 05. The nomination of the independent experts was solicited from the public and at the 
40th Ordinary Session of the Commission it appointed the independent experts thereby completing the composition 
of the Working Group. See Bahame Tom Mukirya Nyanduga (2008) 398. The experts were drawn from African 
personalities with expertise in human rights in general and the death penalty in particular and were appointed for a 
renewable term of two years. They represented the different legal, religious, gender and geographical makeup of the 
continent. See Dupe Atoki (2009) 7. The composition of the Working Group was also expanded and the following 
experts were named as Members of the Working Group: Ms Alya Cherif Chammari (Tunisia), Ms Alice Mogwe 
(Botswana), Mr Mactar Diallo (Senegal), Philip Francis Iya (Uganda), Carlson E. Anyagwe (Cameroon) and 
Mohammed S. El-Awa (Egypt). See Resolution on the Extension and Appointment of Members of the Working 
Group on the Death Penalty, ACHPR/Res. 101 (XXXX) 06, 15-29 November, 2005, Banjul, The Gambia. The 
Commission extended the number of experts to six in order to cater for gender balance. 
818 www.achpr.org/mechanisms/death-penalty/ (Accessed on 11th May, 2014).  
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effective implementation of its mandate. 
In the African traditional justice system, the acceptance of the death penalty depended on three 
principal factors, the first is insignificant value attached to human life, the second being the 
individual and tribal vengeance which was seen as just and necessary; and the third, the 
sovereign was both the only source of justice and the guardian of peace or public security, with 
the right to inflict death in the name of the organised society which the sovereign incarnated.
819
 
In Africa, the death penalty can be said to have been in use in the Colonial period in some 
African societies. The penalty for offences like sorcery or witchcraft, wilful murder, treason and 
certain types of political offences was death by shooting, spearing, hanging, drowning or 
impalement of the convicted person(s).
820 
The offences were seen in pre-colonial African 
societies as threatening the security of the community and beyond redress by the payment of 
compensation to the victim.
821
 
The Working Group organised two regional conferences on the death penalty; the first was 
in Kigali from the 23
rd
 
to the 25
th
 
September, 2009 for Central and Southern African States 
and the second was held in Cotonou, Benin from the 12-15 April, 2010 for West and North 
African States.
822 
These conferences helped with the drafting of the Kigali
823 
and Cotonou
824 
                                                             
819 Ancel A, ‘The Problem of the Death Penalty’ in Sellin Thorsten (ed.) ‘Capital Punishment’ (1967) 4-5.  
820 Elias Teslim, ‘The Nature of African Customary Law’ (1956) 260.  
821 For example, in pre-colonial Uganda, the Lango imposed a mandatory death sentence on those caught in the act 
of witchcraft, incest and sexual aberrations. These offences fell under criminal offences, which were considered 
offences against the society generally and not compoundable. Homicide whether accidental, deliberate, immediate 
or protracted, was classified under civil offences, which are offences against individuals and not the society and 
therefore compoundable by a compensatory payment. See Driberg Jack Herbert, ‘The Lango: A Nilotic Tribe of 
Uganda’ (1923) 209. The Baganda imposed death penalty for murder and adultery, the Bagisu on their part imposed 
the death penalty on whoever murdered or caused the fatal sickness of another; the Basoga imposed death penalty on 
a confirmed thief and the Bakyiga for murder. Compensation was also an option with regard to the above offences. 
Among the Basoga, the thief was put to death by being speared while with the Bakyiga, a murderer was either 
strangled to death or buried alive in the grave and beneath the body of his victim. See Roscoe John, ‘The Bagesu and 
other Tribes of Uganda Protectorate: The Third part of the Mackie Ethnological Expedition of Central Africa’ 
(1924) 39-40, 42, 102 & 108. See also Elias Teslim (1956) 135-136. In Nigeria, among the Yoruba of the Southern 
part of the country, death was the penalty for adultery with Chiefs’ wives and also for murder in the Western part of 
the country. Also, under the Sotho traditional law, notorious stock thieves were sometimes put to death. See Lilian 
Chenwi, ‘Towards the Abolition of Death Penalty in Africa: A Human Rights Perspective’ (2007) 18.  
822 See What Strategies towards the Abolition of the Death Penalty in West Africa? Report of the Symposium held in 
Dakar, Senegal from12-14 November, 2012.  
823 The  framework  is  available  at  www.achpr.org/files/special-mechanisms/death-penalty/kigali_framework.pdf 
(Accessed on 8th April, 2015). The framework was adopted by the First Sub-Regional Conference for Central, 
Eastern and southern Africa on the Question of the Death Penalty in Africa on the 25th of September, 2009.  
824
 The Framework is available at www.achpr.org/files/special-mechanisms/death-penalty/cotonou_framework_pdf 
(Accessed on 8th April, 2015).The framework was adopted by the Second Regional Conference for North and West 
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framework documents which provide detailed recommendations on the issue of the abolition of 
the death penalty, the strategies put in place and the need to adopt a protocol to the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the abolition of the death penalty in Africa. 
This Protocol is to address the shortcomings of the African Charter regarding the 
inviolability of the right to life.
825
 
The Working Group, in addition to the strategies already adopted and put into practice by the 
Commission, proposed some strategies which can further strengthen the suggestions already 
suggested at the conferences held in Kigali and Cotonou.
826 
Among the suggestions that were 
made was the abolition of the death penalty by either constitutional route or ratification of a 
treaty, unremitting efforts by the Commission to demonstrate the need for abolition, continued 
dialogue and consultation, organisation of public debate on the need for the abolition of the death 
penalty, encouragement for states to ratify the Second Optional Protocol, close co-operation with 
strategic partners and lastly, drafting of an Additional Optional Protocol on Abolition of death 
penalty.
827
 
 
5.3.1.2.3 Working Group on Specific Issues Relevant to the Work of the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
This Working Group was established by Resolution 77
828 
which was adopted at the 37
th
 
Ordinary 
Session of the African Commission.
829 
It was established to meet the specific needs of the 
Commission like the need to expressly finalise a number of issues that the Commission had been 
considering over a long period of time.
830
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
Africa on the Question of the Death Penalty in Africa on the 15th of April, 2010.  
825 Religion, culture and public opinion emerged during these conferences as obstacles to any progress in the 
abolition of the death penalty in some countries.  
826 See Report of the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights Working Group on Death Penalty in Africa 
presented by Commissioner Kayitesi Zainabo Sylvie at the 52nd Ordinary Session of the African Commission held on 
the 22nd of October, 2012 at Yamoussukoro, Cote DIvoire. Available at www.achpr.org/sessions/52nd/intersession-   
activity--reports/death-penalty (Accessed 0n 17th August, 2016). 
827 See, What Strategies towards the Abolition of the Death Penalty in West Africa. A report of the symposium in 
Dakar, Senegal held from12-14 November, 2012.  
828 See Resolution ACHPR/Res. 77 (XXXVII) 05 adopted at the 37th Ordinary Session of the African Commission 
on Human and Peoples Rights available at www1.umn.edu/humanrts/africa/resolutions/rec82.html (Accessed 14th 
May, 2012). 
829 The 37th Ordinary Session of the African commission was held between 27 April and 11 May, 2004 in Banjul, 
The Gambia. 
830 www.achpr.org/mechanisms/specific-issues (Accessed on 14th May, 2012).  
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The Working Group was constituted to deal with the following questions: 
 
1. review the Rules of Procedure of the Commission831 
2. deal with the mechanism and procedure on follow-up decisions and recommendation of the 
African Commission; 
3. deal with the structure of different reports of the African Commission; 
4. deal with the modalities for the establishment of a Voluntary Fund for Human Rights in Africa; 
and 
5. deal with the follow-up on the implementation of the recommendation of the Retreat of the 
African Commission in Addis Ababa of September 2003, the evaluation report on the work of 
the African Commission and the UPPSALA consultation of June 2004. 
The Preamble to Resolution 77 of the Commission raised three issues of concern which the 
Working Group is expected to tackle. The first issue is the need to deal with the relationship 
between the Commission and the various organs and institutions established by the AU. The 
second being the Commission’s relationship with the African Court following the entry into 
force of the Protocol to the African Charter establishing the African Court on Human Peoples’ 
Rights and the third issue was on the delay in the finalisations of a number of issues like the 
follow-up mechanisms for it is the Commission’s recommendations and decisions.832 
The Working Group was initially composed of three Commissioners and three experts from 
NGOs with observer status with the Commission. The NGOs were the Institute for Human 
Rights and Development in Africa, Interights (which no longer exists as a legal entity) and Open 
Society Justice Initiative.
833 
The Commission, in 2013, at an Extra-Ordinary Session held in 
Banjul, The Gambia, passed a Resolution on the Reconstitution of the Working Group on 
Specific Issues Related to the Work of the African Commission
834 
wherein four Commissions 
                                                             
831 The working Group review the Rules of Procedure by ensuring the inclusion of items concerning the relationship 
between the Bureau and the Secretariat, the relationship between the African Commission and its various partners, 
the relationship between the African Commission and the various organs and institutions of the African Union, and 
other relevant issues. See ACHPR/Res.77 (XXXVII) 05 at Paragraph 08.  
832 The Summit of the AU had severally called on the Commission to complete the exercise of rationalising its 
relationship with its organs and institutions. See Assembly /AU/Dec.56 (IV) particularly at paragraph 3 which dealt 
with the adoption of the 17th Activity Report. This was also repeated in Assembly/AU/Dec.77 (V) at paragraph 4 on 
the adoption of the 18th Activity Report of the Commission. Also Assembly/AU/Dec.101 (V) in paragraphs 8 and 9 on 
the adoption of the 19th Activity Report specifically requested the Commission to submit appropriate 
recommendations on its relationship with the African Court and to take part in its operationalisation. 
833 See Resolution on the Appointment and Composition of the Working Group on Specific Issues Relevant to the 
work of the Commission ACHPR/Res.150 (XLVI) 09 adopted at the 46th Ordinary Session of the African 
Commission held from 27th April to 11th May, 2005 in Banjul, The Gambia. Available at  
www.old.achpr.org/English/resolutions/resolution150_en.htm (Accessed on 14th May, 2014).  
834 See Res. 233 (EXT. OS/XIII) 2013. Available at www.achpr.org/mechanisms/specific-issues/ (Accessed 17th 
August, 2016). 
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were appointed as the members of the Working Group.
835 
The mandate of the Working Group 
has  been  renewed  on  three  different  occasions  through  Resolutions  80  adopted  at  the  30
th
 
Ordinary Session of the Commission,
836 
Resolution 127 adopted at the 42
nd
 
Ordinary 
Session
837
and Resolution 150 adopted at the 46
th
 
Ordinary Session.
838
 
 
With regards to the mandate of reviewing the Rules of Procedure of the Commission, the 
Working Group submitted a draft of the rules which contained rules on the composition, 
membership and incompatibility of members o f  the Commission.
839 
This was eventually 
approved by the Commission at its 47
th
 
Ordinary Session and it is what the Commission is using 
today.
840 
I will not delve into the details of the content of the rules of procedure as it is outside 
the scope of this thesis. 
 
5.3.1.2.4 Working Group on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
 
This Working Group was established by the Commission with the adoption of Resolution 
73
841 
which was adopted at the 36
th
 
Ordinary Session.
842 
The Working Group is made up of 
members of the Commission and NGOs and was given the mandate to develop and propose to 
                                                             
835 The  Commissioners  are  Commissioner  Faith  Pansy  Tlakula,  Commissioner  Med  Kaggwa,  Commissioner 
Soyata Maiga and Commissioner Lucy Asuagbor. The Resolution further appointed Commissioner Faith Pansy 
Tlakula as the Chairperson of the Working Group. 
836 The Ordinary Session was held from 21 November -5 December, 2005 at Banjul, The Gambia. See 
ACHPR/Res.80 (XXXVIII) 05. Available at www.achpr.org/sessions.38th/resolutions/80 (Accessed on 14th May, 
2014). The Working Group was initially given six month within which to work but this was later extended at the 
Ordinary Session. See Bahame Nyanduga (2008) 401. 
837 The 42nd Ordinary Session was held from 15-28 November, 2007 in Brazzaville, Republic of Congo. See  
www.achpr.org/sessions/42nd/resolutions/127 (Accessed on 14th May, 2012). 
838 The Ordinary Session was held from 11-25 November, 2009 in Banjul, The Gambia. See  
www.achpr.org/sessions/46th/resolutions/150 (Accessed on 14th May, 012). 
839 With the advent of the African Court on Human and Peoples Rights, the Commission, through the working 
Group on Specific Issues Relevant to the Work of the African Commission developed new Rules of Procedure. 
These rules were approved by the Commission at its 47th Ordinary Session held in Banjul, The Gambia from 12-26 
May, 2010 and it entered into force on 18th August, 2010. See www.achpr.org/instruments/rules-of-procedure-2010 
for the rules of procedure of the African Commission. (Accessed on 14th May, 2012).  
840 See Rules of Procedure of the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights revised by the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples Rights during its 47th Ordinary Session held in Banjul, The Gambia. Copy is 
available at www.chr.up.ac.za/images/files/documents/ahrdd/theme02/african_commission_rules_procedure_2010_new.pdf 
(Accessed on 15th May, 2012). 
841
 ACHPR/Res.73 (XXXVI) 04.  
842 The session was held from the 23rd November – 7th December, 2004 in Dakar, Senegal. 
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the African Commission, draft Principles and Guidelines on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights; to elaborate a draft revised guidelines for State reporting; undertake studies and research 
on specific economic, social and cultural rights; and make a progress report to the African 
Commission at each Ordinary Session.
843
 
A compilation of Principles and Guidelines on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Africa
844 
and a compilation of Reporting Guidelines on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Africa 
were developed by the Working Group and were subsequently adopted by the Commission with 
amendments in 2010.
845 
These Guidelines consolidate the jurisprudence of the Commission on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and are expected to guide States in complying with their 
reporting obligations on the Economic Social and Cultural Rights under the Charter.
846 
The 
Working Group undertook promotional missions to Angola, The Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Central African Republic and Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic.  During these visits, the 
Working Group implored States to vigorously consider the details of the Nairobi Principles 
while developing their economic, social and cultural policies and programmes; and to also look 
into the Tunis Guidelines while putting together their reports under Article 62 of the Charter.
847
 
Despite its achievements, the Working Group has been faced with challenges among which, is 
the problem of meeting among the Group. Members of the Group are based across Africa 
thereby making it difficult for them to meet to discuss themes as they relate to the Group. This 
has greatly affected the effectiveness and functioning of the Group.
848 
Another obstacle which 
the Working Group has faced so far is the lack of human and financial resources. This has 
handicapped the Working Group as the budget assigned to it prevent it from fully conducting 
                                                             
843 www.achpr.org/mechanisms/escr/ (Accessed on 8th April, 2015).  
844 The aim of drafting these principles was to define in clear and precise terms the nature of the obligations of States 
Parties regarding the promotion and protection of the economic, social and cultural rights enshrined in the African 
Charter and the content of these rights. See Report of the Working Group on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
since its Establishment by Mr. Mohamed Bechir Khalfallah, Commissioner, Chairperson of the Working Group and 
presented at the 52nd  Ordinary Session and 25th  Anniversary of the African Commission on Human and peoples 
Rights held at Yamoussoukro, Cote dIvoire from the 9th -22nd October, 2012. 
Available at  www.achpr.org/files/sessions/52nd/inter-act-reps/181/activity_report_ecosoc_eng.pdf (Accessed 10th 
April, 2015). 
845 Report of the 48th Ordinary Session of the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights, 10th -24th 
November, 2010, Banjul, The Gambia at para. 244.  
846 Manisuli Ssenyonjo, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the African Charter in Manisuli Ssenyonjo (ed.), The 
African Regional Human Rights System: 30 years After the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (2011) 
80.  
847 See Report of the Working Group on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights since its Establishment (2012) 5. 
848 See Report of the Working Group on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights since its Establishment (2012) 8. 
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its activities.
849 
Since the launch of the Guidelines and principles on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, it has been difficult organising any other activity to promote them because of 
lack of finance. These documents are to be made available to the populace through 
dissemination strategies like making it available in English, French, Portuguese languages and 
also to be translated into African languages in addition to disseminating them via the several 
avenues of communication. These have not been able to be achieved due to the lack of finance.
850
 
The lack of human resources has also hampered the proper functioning of the Working Group as 
there is no permanent staff at the Secretariat of the Commission working for the Working Group 
since the Senior Legal Officer, that was designated to the Group left. 
The culture of Traditional African society made them distinct from other human societies in the 
family of humanities. These cultures along with their value system and belief of traditional 
African societies are close although they vary from one another; it embraces the totality of the 
African way of life in all its ramifications. 
5.3.1.2.5 Working Group on Rights of Older Persons and People with disabilities 
 
This Working Group started as a Focal Point which was created by the adoption of 
Resolution 118 by the Commission.
851 
The Focal Point was with the view to initially consider 
developing a Protocol to the African Charter to deal with the rights of older persons in Africa.
852 
A consultative meeting held in Mauritius in 2008 by the Focal Point on the rights of older 
persons led to the foundation for a co-ordinated approach towards the promotion and protection 
of the rights of older persons. The conclusion reached at this consultative meeting was that the 
principle of non-discrimination and equality before the law requires that States adopt special 
measures to protect older persons and persons with disabilities.
853
 
                                                             
849 See Intersession Report delivered by Honourable Commissioner Mohamed BechirKhalfallah, Chairperson of the 
African Commission Working Group on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Africa at the 56th Ordinary 
Session of the Africa Commission on Human and Peoples Rights held in Banjul, The Gambia from 21 April to 7th 
May, 2015. See also, Intersession Report delivered by Honourable Commissioner Jamesina Essie. King, 
Chairperson of the Working Group on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights In Africa at the 58th Ordinary Session 
of the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights held in Banjul, The Gambia from 6 to 20 April, 2016. 
850 Inter-Session Report of the Working Group on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (2016) 7.  
851 The Resolution was adopted at the 42nd Ordinary Session of the Commission held from15-28November, 2007 at 
Brazzaville, Republic of Congo. See Resolution ACHPR/Res.118 (XXXXII) 07.  
852 Yeung Kam John Yeung Sik Yuen, ‘The Rights of Older Persons and Persons with Disabilities in Africa’ in 
Manisuli Ssenyonjo (ed.) ‘The African Regional Human Rights System: 30 Years after the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples Rights’ (2011) 228.  
853 See Report on the Activities of the Commissioner Yeung Sik Yuen of the Working Group on the Rights of Older 
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By 2009, at the meeting of experts which was held in Accra, Ghana,
854
 the first Draft Protocol on 
the Rights of People with Disabilities in Africa was produced by including standards in the 1983- 
1992 UN Decade for people with disabilities, the 1993 Standard Rules on Equalisation of 
Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities
855 
and the Kigali Declaration.
856 
The Focal Point, at 
the 45
th 
Ordinary Session of the Commission,
857 
was transformed into a Working Group on 
the Rights of Older Persons and People with Disabilities 
858  
with an extended mandate to 
hold comprehensive brainstorming sessions to articulate the rights of older persons and peoples 
with disabilities.
859
 
The ‘Accra Draft’ has been criticised for having been formulated without the participation of 
persons with disabilities and it also presented a diluted version of international standards, most 
notably the Convention for Rights of People with Disabilities, without adequately introducing an 
‘African-specific’ perspectives.860 This led to the suspension of the Accra draft and it has been 
proposed that the existing potential of the African human right system to realise the rights of 
people with disabilities should be explored more fully. This may entail the adoption by the 
African Commission thematic resolutions that could act as guidelines to the interpretation of the 
African Charter.
861
 
Traditional African society was closely attached with deep-rooted cultural facts. Elders and older 
persons played a major role in problem solving in these African societies; they also created 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
Persons and People with Disabilities, November 2009. Available at www.achpr.org/files/sessions/46th/inter-act- 
reps/129/achpr46_specmec_older_actrep_2009_eng.pdf (Accessed 10th April, 2015). 
854 Expert Seminar on the Rights of Older Persons and People with Disabilities, held in Accra, Ghana from 26-28 
August, 2009. 
855 Article 18(4) African Charter. 
856 Yeung Sik Yuen (2011) 229.  
857 The Ordinary Session was held in Banjul, The Gambia from 13-27 May, 2009. 
858 The Resolution was as a result of the recognition by the Commission that people with disabilities are entitled to 
the rights guaranteed for all in the African Charter and that mainstreaming disability in the development agenda of 
States Parties is an appropriate strategy for achieving equality for people with disabilities and older people. See 
Draft Report of Commissioner Y.K.J. Yeung Sik Yuen, Chairperson of the Working Group on the Rights of Older 
Persons and People with Disabilities in Africa Inter-Session period, May 2009-November 2009. Available at 
www.achpr.org/files/sessions/46th/inter-act-reps/129/achpr46_specmec_older_actrep_2009_eng.pdf (Accessed 10th 
April, 2015). 
859 See www.achpr.org/mechanisms/older-disabled/ for the mandate of the Working Group. (Accessed 10thApril, 
2015). 
860 Kamga S A, ‘A Call for a Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities in Africa’ (2013) 21 African Journal of International and Comparative Law 219-237. 
861 Secretariat of the African Decade on Persons with Disabilities The Architecture for an African Disability Rights 
Mechanism (2011)32-35. See also Helen Combrinck, ‘Disability Rights in the African Regional Human Rights 
System During 2011 and 2012’ (2013)1 African Disability Rights Yearbook 361-368.  
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strategies and shaped local visions based on skills and wisdoms. In achieving these, they used 
their experience which they acquired over time and their knowledge which transmit from 
generation to generation. These knowledge are indigenous knowledge acquired from their local 
community and applied to development planning as well as social problems in the community.
862
 
Conflict resolutions in the African Traditional societies through indigenous institutions perform a 
healing function. It provides opportunity for examination of alternative positive decision to 
resolve differences and as a result elders in the community are major players because they have 
wisdom and knowledge. They are also respected as trustworthy mediators;
863 
they are associated 
with the cultural norms and beliefs of the peoples. They gain their legitimacy from the 
community values instead of state. What this means is that traditional dispute resolution 
mechanisms function on the basis of local customary practices or cultural norms based on 
indigenous knowledge embedded in the elders.
864
 
The African Traditional Justice system is inclusive, democratic, open and welcoming to the 
people who seek it. The traditional courts tried to promote harmony, reconciliation, 
compensation to the aggrieved, easy and inexpensive access to justice and the restoration of 
the wrongdoer. It also promoted the spirit of communalism where an individual exist for the 
benefit of the greater community. Establishment of the Special mechanisms by the 
Commission can be said to be a reflection of what indigenous Africans perceived as Justice. 
They seek to foster harmony, reconciliation and an easy access to justice for the aggrieved. 
5.3.2 Protective Mandate of the African Commission 
 
Another mandate conferred on the Commission is to ensure the protection of human and 
Peoples’ rights as laid down by the African Charter.865 Article 45(2) specifically provide for the 
protective mandate of the Commission as ‘ensuring the protection of Peoples’ right under 
conditions laid down by the present Charter’. This power can be assessed based on the nature of 
the rights being violated, the place of their violation and the status of their subjects, whether 
active or passive. Unlike the promotional mandate, the protective mandate of the Commission 
covers the whole Charter in terms of specific rights, duties and obligations as laid down by the 
                                                             
862 Tasew Tafese, ‘Conflict Management through African Indigenous Institutions: A Study of the Anyuaa Community 
(2016) vol. 3 No. 1 World Journal of Social Science 22. 
863 Tasew Tafese (2016) 22. 
864 Tasew Tafese (2016) 22.  
865 Article 45(2) African Charter.  
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Charter. 
To be able to carry out this protective mandate effectively, the Commission identified two major 
areas which are the examination of State Reports and the examination of complaints or 
communications. The examination of Communications was further divided into State 
Communications and non-State communications. The protective mandate enables the 
Commission to take measures which will ensure the enjoyment of individual’s rights as spelt out 
in the Charter and this includes making sure that Member States do not violate individual’s rights 
as contained in the Charter and where a violation occurs, the right of the victim(s) are re- 
instated.
866
 
The objectives of State Reporting as a protective mandate of the Commission, as summarised by 
the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, can be said to be to ensure that a 
complete review of national legislation, administrative rules, procedures and practices is 
undertaken in order to ensure a strict adherence of the provision to the African Charter.
867 
Other 
objectives of State reporting as a protective mandate of the Commission includes, among others, 
to ensure that States Parties measure the actual situation of each and every rights on a regular 
basis thereby being aware of the level at which each and every rights are, whether the rights are 
being enjoyed or not by individuals within their jurisdiction.
868
 
Other objectives of State Reporting is to enable a government to demonstrate that principled 
policy making has infact been undertaken; also to facilitate public scrutiny of government 
policies with respect to the right in question and to encourage the involvement of the relevant 
sectors of the society in the formulation, implementation and review of the relevant policies. 
Another objective is to provide a basis on which the State Party itself, as well as the Committee, 
can effectively evaluate the extent to which progress has been made towards the realisation of 
the obligations contained in the Covenant. It is also to enable the State Party to develop a better 
understanding of the problem and shortcomings encountered in an effort to realise progressively 
the full range of economic, social and cultural rights.
869
 
                                                             
866 See African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights, Establishment Information Sheet No.1 at page 13. 
867 Takele Soboka Bulto, ‘Africa’s Engagement with the Universal Periodic Review: Commitment or Capitulation’ in 
Hilary Charlesworth & Ema Larking (eds.) ‘Human Rights and the Universal Periodic Review: Ritual and Ritualism’ 
(2015) 239.  
868 Morris Mbondenyi, ‘Human Rights in Africa’ (2011) 431. 
869 Kofi Quashigah, ‘The African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights: Towards a more Effective Reporting 
Mechanism’ (2002) 2 AHRLJ 261-300. 
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Despite all the above listed objectives of state reporting, States have shown a lack of appreciation 
of the importance of putting together their reports and submitting as at when due
870 
and a s a 
result of the frustration being experienced by the Commission delay in the submission of these 
reports, the Commission, in its 5
th 
Activity Report, made a recommendation to the Assembly 
of Heads of State and Government of OAU asking it to adopt a resolution on overdue reports 
that was drafted by the Commission.
871
 The Assembly, at its 29
th 
Ordinary Session held in 
Cairo, Egypt, adopted a resolution urging States Parties to the African Charter that are yet 
to submit their reports to do so as soon as possible.
872
 
Limited legal framework providing for reporting, lack of political will and irregular submission 
of reports, lack of seriousness on the part of the Commission and States Parties during reporting 
process and budgetary constraint among others, can be identified as the constraint of state 
reporting.
873 
The onus to make the state reporting procedure effective is not on the Commission 
alone, State Parties too do have an obligation to make it effective likewise NGOs. They provide 
‘shadow’ reports to the reporting system and the benefit of this shadow report is that they 
provide the requisite information that will enable the Commission to engage in constructive 
dialogue with State representatives when periodic reports are considered.
874
 
5.3.2.1 Inter-State Communications before the African Commission 
 
Articles 47 to 54 of the African Charter make provision for Inter-State Communications and 
chapter  III  Section  2  of  the  Rules  of  Procedure  of  the  African  Commission.  Inter-States 
Communications enables a State to petition the African Commission where there is a violation of 
the Charter. Where a State Party feels that there is a breach of the Charter by another State Party 
such State can call the attention of the Commission to such a breach by sending a comprehensive 
statement of facts as well as the provisions of the Charter alleged to have been violated to the 
                                                             
870 The first report was submitted by Libya in 1990. See Paragraph 23 of the 3rd Activity Report of the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples Rights 1990. Only nine States have submitted their reports to date, 16 States are 
late by either one or two reports; 22 State are late by three or more reports while seven States have never submitted 
any reports. See State Reports and Concluding Observations. Available at www.achpr.org/states/reports-and-  
concluding-observations/ (Accesed on 18th August, 2016).  
871 5th   Activity  Report  of  the  African  Commission  on  Human  and  Peoples  Rights,  1991-1992.  Available  at  
www.achpr.org/files/activity-reports/5/achpr10and11_actrep5_1991992_eng.pdf (Accessed on 18th August, 2016). 
872 AHG/Res.(XXVIII). 
873 Crawford J, ‘The UN Human Rights treaty System: A System in Crisis’ in Alston P & Crawford J (eds) ‘The 
Future of UN Human Rights Treaty Monitoring’ (2000) 1-7.  
874 Anette Faye Jacobson, ‘Human Rights Monitoring: A Field Mission Manual’ (2008) 25.  
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Chairperson of the Commission.
875
 
The Procedure for Inter-State Communications under the Charter, unlike the American System, 
is not optional. Under the American system, the Inter-American Commission may only deal with 
inter-state complaints where the parties, that is, the complaining states and the state being 
accused have both made a declaration accepting the inter-state jurisdiction of the Inter-American 
Commission. Aside this, they must have ratified the American Convention on Human Rights.
876 
This is also the case under the African Charter although all African countries are State Parties. 
Looking at the procedures of bringing communications from the states to the Commission, 
Article 47 of the Charter states that where a State noticed a violation of the African Charter, such 
State can write to the infringing state bringing the attention of the state to the infringement. A 
copy of the communication will also be sent to the Commission and the Secretary of the AU. On 
receipt of the communication, the infringing State has three months to give a written reply and 
this must be supported with documents on relevant rules and legislation and the available redress 
and actions taken. 
877
 Also, disputes that may arise between State Parties as a result of the 
violation of the Charter can also be resolved amicably by parties without making recourse to the 
African Commission.
878
 The amicable settlement of disputes is in line with international 
norms and African tradition where clashes are determined in order to get the truth and 
attaining harmony. In the African Tradition Justice System, there are no winners and 
losers.
879
 
Furthermore, Article 49 gives a State party the right to approach the Commission with a 
communication against a State Party where it feels there has been a breach of the provision of the 
African Charter without making recourse to the infringing State as specified under Articles 47 
                                                             
875 Rule 86 (2) Rules of Procedure of the African Commission, 2010. 
876 See Article 45 of the American Convention on Human Rights.  
877 Article 47 states that if a State Party to the Present Charter has good reasons to believe that another State Party to 
this Charter has violated the provisions of the Charter, it may draw, by written communication, the attention of that 
State to the matter. This communication shall also be addressed to the Secretary-General of the OAU and to the 
Chairman of the Commission. Within three months of the receipt of the communication, the state to which the 
communication is addressed shall give the enquiring State, written explanation or statement elucidating the matter. 
This should include as much as possible relevant information relating to the laws of procedure applied and 
applicable, and the redress already given or course of action available. 
878 Article 48 states that: If within three months from the date on which the original communication is received by 
the state to which it is addressed, the issue is not settled to the satisfaction of the two States involved through 
bilateral negotiation or by another peaceful procedure, either State shall have the right to submit the matter to the 
Commission through the Chairman who will notify the other State involved.  
879 Kennedy Maranga, ‘Indigenous People and the Roles of Culture, Law and Globalisation: Comparing the Americas, 
Asia-Pacific and Africa’ (2013) 74. 
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and 48.
880
 
In filing a complaint against a state, there is a Guideline which must bestrictly adhered to.
881 
The 
Commission can only look into a communication where it is satisfied that all legal remedies have 
been exhausted. The only exception to this is that unless the Commission feels that the procedure 
of achieving these remedies would be unduly prolonged.
882 
Where the Commission finds the 
need for additional information, it can ask the States concerned for more relevant information 
and where possible, it may even invite States for oral presentation.
883 
Where an amicable 
settlement cannot be reached between parties to an inter-State dispute, the Commission will 
therefore present a report to the Assembly of Heads of State and Government and will attach to 
the report, its recommendations.
884
 
The inter-State communication procedure is seldom used and neither the Charter nor the Rules of 
Procedure of the Commission tells us the kind of dispute or violations that are been envisaged 
under Article 47 and 49. The Commission has only received one complaint that can actually be 
classified as an inter-State complaint under the Charter. The complaint was received from the 
Democratic  Republic  of  Congo  against  Burundi,  Rwanda  and  Uganda 
885  
where  it  claimed 
                                                             
880 Article 49 states as follows: Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 47, if a State Party to the present Charter 
considers that another State Party has violated the provisions of the Charter, it may refer the matter directly to the 
Commission by addressing a communication to the Chairman, to the Secretary-General of the Organisation of 
African Unity and the State concerned. It is important to note here that there is no time limit for the exchange of 
information here as compared to the other procedures under the Inter-American and European Commission wherein a 
period of three months is required for exchange of information. But practically, the Commission always gives a 
period of three months as time limits to ensure that the states involved would still have sought resolution of their 
disputes diplomatically. See Rules 91, 92 and 97, Rules of Procedure of the African commission. 
881 See The African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights, Guidelines on the submission of Communications: 
Information Sheet 2, 14. Under the Guidelines, the complaining State must state in writing, its name, official 
language and the year in which it ratified the Charter; it must state the name of the accused State, its official 
language and year it ratified the Charter; it must state the facts constituting the violation. This must be explained in as 
much factual detail as possible in terms of what occurred, specifying place, time and dates of the violation if 
possible. It must also indicate measures that have been taken to resolve the matter amicably; why the measures if 
any, failed or why no measure was used at all. Along this line, the state must also indicate measures taken to exhaust 
local remedies. All relevant documents in this regard must be attached. The State must also point out the domestic 
legal remedies that have not been pursued yet , giving reasons why this has not yet been done; it must also state 
whether the case has also been referred to other international avenues, such as referral to other international 
settlement bodies like the UN or within the OAU/AU system and finally, it must show complaints submitted to the 
Secretary-General of the OAU and to the accused State, accompanied by any response from the accused State and 
the Secretary-General of the OAU/AU.  
882 See the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights Communication Procedure: Information Sheet 3, 18 
(1998), also Rule 97, Rules of Procedure of the African Commission.  
883 See Information Sheet No. 3 at 18. See Rule 100, Rule of Procedure of the African Charter. 
884 See Rule 101(5) Rules of Procedure of the African Charter.   
885 Communication 227/99, Democratic Republic of Congo v. Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda. The Communication 
was admitted on merit by the Commission wherein the Respondent States were found to be in violation of Articles 2, 
4, 5, 12(1) & (2), 14, 16, 17, 18(1) & (3), 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23 of the African Charter. It urged them to abide by their 
obligations under the Charters of United Nations, OAU, African Charter, UN Declaration on Principles of 
https://etd.uwc.ac.za
238 
 
 
 
violation of human rights as a result of their unlawful invasion of the Congolese territory.
886 
The 
reluctance of States to condemn violations by other states simply mean they also are not far from 
committing the same violation thereby putting them at risk of being condemned in return.
887
 
5.3.2.2 Non-State or Individual Complaints (Other communications) 
 
The Charter also gives power to the Commission to receive other communications aside inter- 
state communications. ‘Other communications’ is not a specifically defined phrase by the 
Charter but the only link to it is in the provision of Article 55.
888 
Looking at the provision of 
Article 55 what it means is that a person, a group of persons or even an NGO can file a 
complaint before the Commission against a State party to the Charter where such State Party has 
violated the Charter. This is close to what obtains in the Inter-American Commission
889 
where 
access by individuals to the Inter-American Commission is mandatory rather than optional. The 
African Charter is more generous when it comes to allowing individual access to the 
Commission unlike other regional human rights regimes as there is no prerequisite for 
organisations in the African system.
890
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States and other applicable international 
principles of law and withdraw its troops immediately from the complainant’s territory. Available at  
www.hrlibrary.umn.edu/africa/comcases/227-99.html (Accessed 19 August, 2016). 
886 The Communication filed by Sudan against Ethiopia alleging violation by the Ethiopian troops during the 
invasion of Kunnuk and Gissan in Sudan on January 12, 1997 will not pass as an inter-State Communication. The 
matter was referred to the OAU Secretariat by the Commission while it also advised Sudan to file a complaint to the 
OAU Secretariat because Ethiopia was not a State Party to the Charter which makes it not to be bound by the 
decision of the Commission. Libya also in 1987 filed a complaint against the United States after the Administration of 
Reagan bombed Libya. The complaint was declared unreceivable because the United State is not a party to the 
African Charter. See The African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights, Tenth Anniversary Celebration, 2nd 
November, 1987 - 2nd November, 1997: One Decade of Challenge (1998) 3 ACHPR 19. 
887 Citing examples from the European system, it took two years after the election of members of the European 
Commission on Human Rights before it received an inter-state complaint. See Application No. 176/56, Kingdom of 
Greece v. United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, dated 7 May 1956, in connection with the 
violation of the European Convention by the Administration of Cyprus (1958-1959) 2 yearbook of the European 
Convention on Human Rights 182-186. 
888 Article 55 states that before a session, the secretary shall make a list of the communications other than those of 
State Parties to the present Charter and transmit them to the members of the Commission who shall indicate and 
transmit them to the members of the Commission, who shall indicate which communications should be considered by 
the Commission Sub-paragraph two of Article 55 state further that a communication shall be considered by the 
Commission if a simple majority of its members so decides. 
889 Article 44 of the American Convention on Human Rights.  
890 Vincent Orlu Nmehielle (2001) 204. The African Charter does not contain any primary requirements that 
petitioners must be the actual victims of the Charter violations. The Charter does  not also require that the 
complainants or petitioners must be within the jurisdiction of the respondent State. This provision is the same with 
the American Convention on Human Rights but different from the provision of the First Optional Protocol to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and also the European Convention on Human Rights. See 
Article 1 and 2 of the First Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Article 34 
of the Old European Convention on Human Rights. 
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Looking at Article 55 (2), the Commission can also consider a communication where a simple 
majority of its members agree to do so. What this means is that where a simple majority of its 
members decide, the Commission can decline the receipt of a Complaint. In declining 
jurisdiction in line with this provision of the Charter, there is no place either in the Charter or the 
Rules of Procedure of the African Commission where the conditions that must be met before 
refusal of a complaint are written. 
Before an individual communication is considered by the Commission on merit, there are some 
conditions which must be met and they are as follows:
891
 
1. the complaint must indicate the author(s) even if the author request anonymity;892 
2. the complaint must be compatible with the African charter;893 
3. it must not be written in disparaging or insulting language against the State concerned and its 
institutions or the OAU/AU;
894
 
4. the complaint must not be based exclusively on news disseminated through the mass 
media;
895
 
5. the complaint must be submitted to the African Commission only when local remedies have 
already been exhausted unless it is obvious that the procedure is unduly prolonged;
896
 
                                                             
891 Article 56 of the African Charter highlight the conditions under which Communications received by the 
Commission will be considered. 
892 Where the complainant wishes to remain anonymous he should indicate so and the Communication will be given 
a letter alphabet like A, B or C and thereafter be addressed by the State party concerned. The author does not need to 
give reason(s) why he wants to remain anonymous. Where the author of a communication is an NGO, the names of its 
representatives would be required likewise their contact addresses as it makes correspondence between the 
Commission and the author easier. Where this information is left out in a communication, such communication will 
not be considered by the Commission. 
893 The communication should invoke the provisions of the Charter alleged to have been violated and the principles 
enshrined in it. Where a communication does not illustrate a prima facie violation of the Banjul Charter or some 
basic principles of the OAU Charter like freedom, equality, justice and dignity, it will not be examined. See, 
Communication 57/91, Tanko Bariga v Nigeria, Seventh Activity Report, 1993-1994, Annex IX and Communication 
1/88, Frederick Korvah V Liberia Seventh Activity Report 1993-1994 Annex IX where failure to prove a prima 
facie violation rendered the communication inadmissible, an allegation in a general manner is not enough. See also 
Communication 63/92 Congress for the Second Republic of Malawi v Malawi, Seventh Activity Report, 1993-1994, 
Annex IX. 
894 The author should state the facts of his case without insulting anyone. Political rhetoric and vulgar language is 
not necessary as insulting language will render a communication inadmissible irrespective of the seriousness of the 
complaint. See Communication 65/92, Ligue Camerounaise des droits de lhomme v Cameroon Tenth Activity 
Report1996-1997, Annex X, where the communication was declared inadmissible for using words such as regime 
of torture and a government of barbarism. 
895 In Communications 147/95 and 149/96 (joined), Sir Dawda KJawara v The Gambia (2000) African Human 
Rights Law Report 107, the government alleged that the communication should be declared inadmissible because it 
was based exclusively on news disseminated through mass media. The Commission however declared it admissible. 
896 The author must have taken the matter to all the available domestic local remedies. What this means is that he 
must have taken the case to the highest court of the land. Where such remedies are not available or they are available 
but the procedure is unduly prolonged, the complainant is allowed to submit his complaint to the Commission. See 
Communications 43/90, Union des Scolaires Nigeriens, Union Generale des Etudiants Nigeriens au Benin v Niger, 
Seventh Activity Report 1993-1994, Annex IX and 45/90, Civil Liberties Organisation v Nigeria, Seventh Activity 
Report 1993-1994, Annex IX where a non-exhaustion of local remedies rendered communication inadmissible. See 
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6. the complaint must be submitted within a reasonable period from the time local remedies are 
exhausted or from the date the commission is seized with the matter; and 
7. the complaint does not deal with cases which have already been settled by the States 
involved in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the UN
897 
or the African 
Charter.
898
 
A non-state complaint, which has to be written and which has passed through the above listed 
requirements is sent to the Secretary of the Commission who in turn, transfers it to the 
Commission where it will be looked into to see if it will be declared admissible or not.
899 
Where 
a complaint is declared to be admissible, the Commission is entitled to bring the complaint to the 
notice of the State concerned.
900 
Such State has three months within which to file a response.
901 
Where a communication is declared inadmissible from the beginning, it will be declared closed. 
The Commission has the power to revive a communication already declared inadmissible where 
the complainant can provide more information to the point that the ground on which the 
Commission stood on in declaring the complaint inadmissible, can no longer withstand the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
also Communication 59/91, Embga Mekongo Louis v Cameroon, Eight Activity Report, 1994-1995 Annex VI, where 
the communication was declared admissible because an appeal was pending before the local court for 12 years. This 
was considered to be unduly prolonged.  Some communications can also be  declared  admissible  without  the 
exhaustion of local remedies where the remedy is at the discretion of the executive or if the jurisdiction of the 
ordinary  courts  has  been  ousted  due  to  a  decree  or  through  the  establishment  of  a  special  tribunal.  See 
Communications 60/91, Constitutional Rights Projects (in respect of Akanmu and others) v Nigeria (2000) African 
Human Rights Law Report 180; 64/92  and 78/92 (joined), Achutan& Another (on behalf of Banda and others) v 
Malawi (2000) African Human Rights Law Report 144. 
897 The communication must not be one which has already been settled through another international body like the 
UN Human Rights Committee or even some of OAU organs. See Communication 15/88, Mpaka-Nsusu Andre 
Alphonse v Zaire, Seventh Activity Report, 1993-1994, Annex IX, where the UN Human Rights Committee had 
decided the case in favour of the victim and he submitted the same communication to the Commission. The 
communication was declared inadmissible. However, the submission of a complaint to an NGO or an Inter- 
Governmental Organisation like the European Economy Community does not render a communication inadmissible. 
See Communication 59/91, Emgba Mekongo Louis v Cameroon, Eighth Activity Report, (2000)African Human 
Rights Law Report 56. However, a communication already being examined under Rule 1503 of the UN (which deals 
with procedures of dealing with communications relating to violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms) 
will be rendered inadmissible see Communication 69/92 Amnesty International v Tunisia, Seventh Activity Report, 
1993-1994, Annex IX. The whole purpose of this is to avoid usurpation of the jurisdiction of the bodies that may 
provide a solution or relevant information. 
898 See Information Sheet 2, Guidelines on the Submission of Communications at page 10; Information Sheet 3, 
Guidelines on the Submission of Communications at page 7-10; Rule 116, Rules of Procedure of the African 
Commission. See also Article 56 of the African Charter.  
899 Article 56 of the African Charter.  
900 Article 57 of the African Charter, see also Article 47 of the African Charter; Rule 112, Rules of Procedure of the 
African Commission. 
901 See Rules 117 (4) Rules of Procedure of the African Commission. It is pertinent to note that despite the fact that 
the Commission gives 3 months to States within which to file their response, the States Parties always have more 
time to respond to communications. See Hamidu Mariam, The Open-door Approach to locus standi by the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples Rights in Respect of its non-state Complaints Procedure: In need of Reform? 
(2006) LLM dissertation, Centre for Human Rights, University of Pretoria. . See for example, Nos. 25/89, 47/90, 
56/91, 100/94 (joined), Free Legal Assistance Group, Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Union Interafricaine 
des Droits de lHomme, Les Temoins de Jehovah v Zaire (2000) AHRLR 74. 
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strength of the new facts being supplied by the complainant.
902 
The author of a communication 
can also withdraw it at any stage. The Commission in such a case will discontinue proceedings 
on it without taking any written decision.
903
 
When the Commission become seized of a communication, decision as to the admissibility of 
such communication will have to be taken. Article 56 of the Charter sets out seven conditions to 
be met for a communication received pursuant to article 55 to be considered. The seven 
conditions are already listed above in this chapter. 
After studying the arguments presented by both parties, and bearing in mind the principles of 
international human rights law, which are basically aimed at protecting the individuals from 
State's infringement, the Commission may then make a decision. When a decision on 
admissibility is taken on a communication, this is transmitted to both the complainant and the 
State concerned. In principle, a decision on admissibility is final. If a communication is declared 
inadmissible, the reasons for inadmissibility will be stated and this will automatically bring the 
consideration of the communication to an end. However, a communication declared inadmissible 
could be reviewed at a later date where the complainant is able to provide information to the 
effect that the grounds for inadmissibility no longer exist.
904
 
However, the Commission does not have a laid down procedure to supervise the implementation 
of its recommendations. What it does is that the Secretariat will send letters of reminders to 
States that have been found to have violated provisions of the Charter calling upon them to 
honour their obligations under Article 1 of the Charter which reads ‘… to recognise the rights, 
duties and freedoms enshrined in this Charter and (…) adopt legislative and other measures to 
give effect to them.’ The first letters are sent immediately after the adoption of the Commission's 
Annual  Activity  Report  by  the  OAU  Assembly  of  Heads  of  State  and  Government  and 
                                                             
902 Rule 118 Rules of Procedure of the African Commission.  
903 See Communications Procedure African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights. Available at 
www.achpr.org/communications/procedure/ (Accessed 30th May, 2016). 
904 After a careful deliberation of the facts and arguments submitted by the parties, that is, the complainant and the 
respondent State Party, the Commission makes a decision on whether or not it finds a violation of the Charter. 
Where the Commission observes that a violation has occurred it will issue recommendation to the State Party 
concerned. The Commissions decisions are recommendations which are not legally binding on the States concerned. 
By including the recommendations in its Annual Activity Report which it submits to the Assembly of Heads of State 
and Government of the AU, the Commission tends to add some binding power to its recommendations. See Rule 
120 (1) Rules of Procedure of the African Commission. The adoption of the Report by the Assembly is believed to 
make the decisions binding on the State Parties but the question that has continued to be asked is how 
recommendations can be made binding. The implementation of recommendations ordinarily is subjective because 
the State party to which the recommendation is made can either choose to implement them or not. 
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subsequent letters are sent as often as necessary.
905
 
The Commission, on many occasions, has used its ability to take interim provisions to protect a 
victim in line with the provision of Rule 111 of its Rules of Procedure.
906 
It has also called on 
State Parties to make sure victims of violations are adequately remedied.
907 
The main aim of 
putting in place interim or provisional measures is basically to prevent irreparable damage to 
victims during the period their complaint is being considered. This measure is appreciated more 
in places where there are serious violations of human rights. The Inter-American Commission 
has laid a very strong foundation on the interim measures unlike the European system.
908 
These 
provisional measures also play a great role in the African human rights system as a result of the 
character of most of the human rights claims which are brought before the Commission and the 
realities of human rights violation in the continent.
909
 
The power to request for provisional measures vested in the Commission as a body or in the 
Chairperson of the Commission where the Commission is not in session and in emergency 
cases,
910 
may be made before the commission makes its recommendation.
911
 With this, the 
                                                             
905 Communication Procedure, The African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights. Available at  
www.achpr.org/communications/procedure/#sdfootnote6sym     (Accessed     31st        May,     2016).     See     
also DOC/OS/50b (XXIV) 1, Non-Compliance of State Parties to Adopted Recommendations of the African 
Commission: A Legal Approach. 
906 Rule 111 provides that before making its final views known to the Assembly on the Communication, the 
Commission may inform the State party concerned of its views on the appropriateness of taking provisional 
measures to avoid irreparable damage being caused to the victim of the alleged violation. In  so doing, the 
Commission shall inform the State Party that the expression on its views on the adoption of those provisional 
measures does not imply a decision on the substance of the communication. In Communication Nos. 83/92, 88/93 
and 91/93, Jean Y. Degli (on behalf of N. Bikagni), Union Interafricaine des Droits de lHomme, Commission 
Internationale de Juristes v. Togo, the Commission brought into play, these measures towards ensuring the security of 
Corporal Bikangi in order to avoid any irreparable prejudice inflicted on the victim of the alleged violations. The 
Commission also sent letters to Nigeria requesting it not to execute individuals until the Commission had the 
opportunity to consider the case which was pending before it. See Letter dated 1 November, 1995 in ‘Human Rights 
Report on the Situation in Nigeria,’ ACHPR/COMMU/A044 (6).  
907 Rachel Murray, ‘African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights & International Law’ (2000) 20.  
908 Jo Marie Pasqualucci, ‘Practice and Procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ (2013) 268.  
909 The preventive function of provisional measures, when lives and physical security of persons concerned is more 
valuable than the compensatory function of a final decision. See Jo Marie Pasqualucci (2013)268. 
910 Rule 111(3) of the Rules of Procedure of the African Commission. This is similar to the power vested in the 
Commission in Article 58 of the African Charter which deals with cases of serious and massive violations of human 
rights under which the Commission or the Chairman of the Commission, when the Commission is not in session, 
would draw the attention of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, or its Chairman to those cases. The 
difference between the power in these two provisions is that while under the Rules of Procedure the Commission 
can request for interim or provisional measures, its power to deal with special cases of serious and massive 
violations of human rights depend on the AHSG or its Chairman requesting the Commission to undertake an in- 
depth study of the cases. See Rachel Murray, ‘Serious or Massive Violations under the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples Rights: A Comparison with the Inter-American and European Mechanisms’ (1999) 3 Netherlands 
Human Rights Quarterly 118-119.  
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question that readily comes to mind is that at what point can the Commission make this request 
for provisional measures? This was put to test when the Commission issued provisional 
measures against Libya in the armed conflict in its territory.
912 
The absent of AU’s political will 
and effective follow-up procedures made these orders remain without much force.
913
 
5.3.3 Interpretation of the Charter as a mandate of the African Commission 
 
The task of interpreting the provisions of the African Charter was bestowed on the Commission 
by the Charter itself.
914 
As stated in the Charter, the Commission can interpret the Charter at the 
request of State Parties, the OAU or NGOs.
915 
The interpretative power of the Commission is 
similar to an advisory opinion jurisdiction and looking at the provisions of Articles 60 and 61 of 
the African Charter, it takes into account other international and African laws and customs. With 
this it gives the Charter a touch of Africa and is rare in its addition of non-binding concepts and 
the jurisprudence of other bodies.
916 
A number of recommendations and resolutions have 
been adopted by the Commission and these have interpreted so many rights in the Charter.
917
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
911 Rule 111 Rules of Procedure of the African Commission. 
912 In Re African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights v Great Socialist Peoples Libya Arab Jamahiriya, 
Application No. 004/2011, Order for Provisional Measure 23 African Court on Human and Peoples Rights, March 
25, 2011. Available at www.en.africa-court.org/images/Cases/Decision/DECISION_Application_004-  
2011_AfricanCommission_v_Libya_Struck_outEngl.pdf (Accessed 19th August, 2016).  
913 Dan Juma, ‘Provisional Measures under the African Human Rights System: The African Courts Order Against 
Libya’ (2012) Wisconsin International Law Journal 344. 
914 Article 45(3) of the African Charter … Interpret all the provisions of the present Charter at the request of a State 
Party, an institution of the OAU or an African Organisation recognized by the OAU. This power of interpretation 
did not exist in the draft of the African Charter but was added by an amendment aimed at reformulating Article 45 
with the view to including a separate Article on the Commissions mandate regarding the interpretation of the 
Charter. See OAU DOC Amendment No. 6.  
915 Although the Commission is not expressly included on the list of parties which can request the interpretation of 
the Charter, it can on its own make such interpretation on the initiative of any of the parties listed under Article 
45(3) of the Charter. It can also do so when considering a communication and it has on many occasions made 
generous use of this power of interpretation both as it relates to the rights enshrined in the Charter and the 
procedure. In its decision relating to Communication 74/92, Commission Nationale des Droits de lHomme et des 
Libertes v. Chad where it gave a broad interpretation of the general obligation undertaken by the States parties under 
Article 1 of the Charter of the notions of violation of a guaranteed right, of derogation or of the content of the 
economic, social and cultural rights guaranteed by the Charter, it indicated that since Article 1 specifies that the 
States Parties shall not only recognise the rights, duties and freedoms adopted by the Charter, but that they should 
also undertake measures to give effect to them. (19th Annual Report of the African Commission, 1995/1996) See 
Fatsah Ouguergouz (2003) 563. 
916 Frans Viljoen, ‘International Human Rights Law in Africa’ (2012) 325. See also, Rachel Murray, ‘The African 
Commission on Human and Peoples Rights and International Law’ (2000) 25; ChalokaBeyani, ‘Protection of the 
Rights to Seek and Obtain Asylum under the African Human Rights System’ (2013) 28; Dinah Shelton, ‘Advanced 
Introduction to International Human Rights Law’ (2014) 107. 
917 See Resolution on the Right to Recourse Procedure and Fair Trial and Resolution on the Freedom of Association, 
in: The Participation of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in the Work of the African Commission on 
Human and Peoples Rights, A Compilation of Basic Documents by the International Commission of Jurists October 
1991-April 1994) 40-42. 
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Among these rights is the right to fair trial and freedom of association.
918 
Documents like the 
Additional Protocol on Rights of Women
919 
and Guidelines for National Periodic Reports
920 
among others further developed the African Charter. In the case of the Guideline for National 
Periodic Reports, it is clear that the better part of the advancement as regard Articles 15 to 18 
of the Charter is a straight reference to provisions of the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights and also that of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
921 
The 
purpose of the various resolutions is to shed light on the unclear and confusing provisions of 
the Charter in a way to give it its maximum effect.
922
 
Taking a look at the provision of Article 45 (3), the Charter does not state categorically (define) 
an ‘African Organisation’ recognised by the OAU, this leaves us to wonder if NGOs fit into this 
class as their presence in the region has been recognised by the fact that they have observer 
status before the Commission.
923 
It is also not clear if what the provision is trying to say is that it 
is only inter-governmental organisations or national organisations which have in one way or the 
other been endorsed by the OAU that can apply for the interpretation of the provisions of the 
Charter. The fact is that neither the OAU nor a State Party has approached the Commission for 
an interpretation of any of the provisions of the Charter instead; NGOs have succeeded through 
draft resolutions, in obtaining the interpretation of some of the provisions of the Charter. This is 
directed at giving clarity to the confusing provisions.
924
 
Comparing this interpretative mandate of the African Commission to what obtains in the other 
                                                             
918 Resolution on the Rights to Freedom of Association, 5th Annual Activity Report of the African Commission on 
Human and Peoples Rights (1991/1992), ACHPR/RPT/5th Annex VII. See also Resolution on the Right to Recourse 
Procedure and Fair Trial, 5th Annual Activity Report of the African Commission, ACHPR/RPT/5th Annex XI; 
Resolution on the Integration of the Provisions of the Charter into national Laws of States, 2nd Annual Activity 
Report of the African Commission (1988/1989) ACHPR/RPT/2nd Annex XI; Resolution on Electoral Process and 
Participatory Governance, Ninth Annual Activity Report of the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights 
(1995/1996) ACHPR/RPT/9th Annex VII. 
919 See DOC/OS/34c (XXIII) produced by the Working Group on the Additional Protocol to the African Charter on 
Women’s’ Rights. This document has eventually been amended by the Dakar Draft Protocol on Womens Rights, June 
1999. 
920 Guidelines for National Periodic Reports, 2nd Annual Activity Reports of the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (1988/1989) ACHPR/RPT/2nd Annex XII.  
921 Paragraph 10 to 16 of the Guidelines for National Periodic Reports (2nd  Annual Activity Report of the African 
Commission) clearly repeat Article 8 of the ICESCR. Furthermore, the order in which the rights are dealt with in the 
Guidelines follows the sequence of the Arts in the Covenant. 
922 Evelyn Ankumah (1996) 26.  
923 Vincent Orlu Nmehielle (2011) 181. 
924 Information Sheet 1, African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights, Establishment at page 16. 
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human rights regions, the Inter-American Commission may only provide advisory opinions to 
Member States of the OAS 
925 
whereas in the European system, prior to its reformation by 
Protocol No. 11, only the Court was entitled to provide advisory opinions at the request of the 
Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers and on very strictly limited questions.926 What this 
means is that the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the 
Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights927 gives the Court very 
wide autonomy in relation to advisory opinions where these may relate to any other relevant 
human rights instrument including the African Charter.
928
 
 
5.3.4 ‘Other Task’ as a mandate of the African Commission 
 
Article 45 (4) of the African Charter gave the Commission the mandate to perform any other task 
as may be referred to it by the Assembly of Heads of State and Governments. This mandate is 
yet to be utilised as no other task outside the ones specified in the African Charter has been 
entrusted to the Commission by the Assembly.
929 
Because of its broad mandate, this makes it 
needless for it to seek approval from the Assembly for important initiatives; it appeared that many 
of the issues of human rights within Africa fall under the Commission thus giving hope that the 
Commission might still, in the nearest future, be called upon to take up some roles which 
presently are not assigned to it.
930
 
 
                                                             
925 Article 41 (e) of the American Convention and Article 18 (e) of the Status of the Inter-American Commission, as 
approved by Resolution 447 of the General Assembly of the OAS at its 9th Ordinary Session, held at La Paz 
(Bolivia) in October 1979; Article 64 of this Convention also authorises the Inter-American Court to provide 
advisory opinions regarding that Convention and at the request of any Member state of the OAS or of one of the 
organs listed in Chapter X of the OAS Charter, which include the Inter-American Commission. 
926 Article 1 (2) of Protocol No. 2 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, conferring upon the European Court of Human Rights competence to give advisory opinions, adopted in 
Strasbourg on 6 May, 1963. See also the subsequent Articles 47, 48 and 49 of Protocol No. 11 to the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, restructuring the control machinery 
established by it, signed on 11 May, 1994 and entered into force on 1 November, 1998. See Fatsah Ouguergouz 
(2003) 566. 
927 Adopted in 1998. 
928 Article 1 of the Protocol provides that At the request of a Member State of the OAU, the OAU, any of its organs, 
or any African organisation recognised by the OAU, the court may provide an opinion an any legal matter relating to 
the Charter or any other relevant human rights instruments, provided that the subject matter of the opinion is not 
related to a matter being examined by the Commission. 
929 See Information Sheet 1 at page 17. 
930 Cees Flinterman & Evelyn Ankumah, ‘The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ in Hurst Hannum 
(ed), ‘Guide to International Human Rights Practice’ (1992) 165. 
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Chapter 6 
 
The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The coming into existence of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights as a result of the 
adoption and ratification of the Protocol to the African Charter on the Establishment of the 
African Court marked a landmark development in the field of international human rights law.
931 
The adoption of the Protocol has been said to have placed the continent’s human rights system 
on the same level with the European and the Inter-American human rights systems when it 
comes to providing judicial guarantees at the regional level for the protection of human and 
Peoples’ rights in the continent.932 
The Protocol can be termed as an end result of the collective effort of the civil society at the 
national, regional and international levels; this was in order to ensure that there is more effective 
human rights protection in Africa. The breakthrough can be attributed to the result of four years 
of hard work, intense negotiations and compromise to reach a common position
933 
and the fact 
that the continent is in serious need of a court to handle human rights violations cannot be 
denied. 
Uncountable human rights violations have taken place in the continent in the past, with 
minorities and indigenous peoples particularly affected.
934 
As some of the underprivileged and 
most vulnerable communities on the continent, minority and indigenous people experience 
multiple human rights violations on a daily basis. Yet, due to their marginalised position, states 
are often unmoved by their predicament. A strong legal mechanism is therefore essential if the 
rights of Africa’s minorities and marginalised peoples are to be realised. 
A lot of progress has been made since the adoption of the Protocol by Member States; some 
important steps towards the actualisation of the dream of the continent having a human rights 
                                                             
931 The Protocol was adopted at the summit organised by the Organisation of African Unity which was held in 
Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso in June, 1998. 
932 Udombana N.J, ‘Towards the African Court on Human and Peoples Rights: Better Late Than Never’ (2000) 3 
Yale Hum. Rts& Dev. L.J. 45 at 46. 
933 George Mukundi, ‘African Court on Human and people’s Rights: Ten Years on and Still No Justice’ a report 
published by the Minority Rights Group International, 2008.  
934 George Mukundi (2008).  
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court of its own have been taken, such as, the appointment of judges of the Court, 
development of the Rules of procedure for the Court and above all, the Court itself is 
located in Arusha, Tanzania where the Government of Tanzania has provided a building to 
house it. But looking at the Court’s achievements so far, there has been more work on 
logistics than on the real issues therefore the goal of a functioning, effective Court is 
threatened to be derailed by bureaucracy. This chapter being the heart of this thesis will 
therefore introduce the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Right on 
the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights. It will critically 
analyse its provisions with particular focus on the constitution, jurisdiction and enforcement 
of the entity. 
Furthermore, the chapter will attempt to examine the relationship between the Court and 
the Commission and also look at situations where cases already reviewed by the 
Commission can be sent back to the Court for review. The retention or abolishment of the 
Commission will at this point be debated. 
6.2 The ‘Birth’ of the Protocol 
 
The Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of 
the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights established the African Court on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights (The African Human Rights Courts or the Court).935 The 
establishment of the Court brings in an era whereby Judgements delivered are made 
binding on states, as opposed to the mere recommendations of the African Commission.
936 
The binding legal force behind these Judgements might be the missing impetus to secure 
compliance, although this aspect alone will, in all likelihood, not guarantee improved 
compliance.
937
 
 
The African Charter provided room for the establishment of special protocols or 
agreement where they are deemed necessary to supplement the provisions of the Charter.
938 
This provision of the African Charter was what was activated by State Parties in 1998 
                                                             
935 The Protocol was adopted on the 10th of June, 1998 and it entered in to force on the 25th of January, 2004. A 
lot of literature has been written and published as a result of the adoption of this Protocol. 
936 Tarisai Mutangi, ‘An examination of Compliance by States with Judgments of the African Court on Human 
and People’s Rights: Prospects and Challenges’. An unpublished LLD Thesis submitted at the Centre for Human 
Rights, Faculty of Law, University of Pretoria, September, 2010. 
937 Tarisai Mutangi (2007) 2. 
938 Article 66 of the African Charter.  
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and which led to the establishment of the African Court by virtue of a Protocol.
939 
The 
conference on the Rule of Law which was organised by the International Commission of 
Jurists
940 
is said to be the place where the idea for the creation of the African Human Rights 
Court was first debated.
941 
It was proposed by participants at the conference that a Court 
should be created to handle human rights matters in the continent with the possibility of 
individuals making individual appeals.
942 
At the end of the conference a resolution urging 
African Governments to ‘study the possibility of adopting an 
African Convention on Human Rights’ and ‘the creation of a court of appropriate 
jurisdiction’ was adopted by the delegates but this effort of the African jurists brought 
out nothing as the OAU Charter was adopted without either a framework for human 
rights or any human rights mechanism.
943
 
The idea of establishing a Court for the continent never received the much needed 
support despite the fact that it was revived on several occasions;
944 
this can be attributed to 
the attachment of African leaders to the principle of sovereign equality and also to the 
principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of States especially States where human 
rights violations are reported.
945 
The OAU, being an inter-State organisation with the 
principal objectives of co- ordination and harmonisation of the general policies of its 
members, would not perform well with the existence of a judicial body because it 
would mean that the organisation would be giving out its power of sovereignty. The 
                                                             
939 State Parties to the African Charter created the African Court, a judicial body with the intention of reinforcing 
the African Commission in 1981. The establishment and effective operation of the Court is expected to 
complete the metamorphosis of the system for the protection of human and Peoples’ rights in the continent which 
was created in 1981. See Fatsah Ouguergouz (2003)687. 
940 The International Commission of Jurists is a non-governmental organization based in Geneva, Switzerland. 
941
 The Conference was held in Lagos, Nigeria in 1961 and it was attended by African Jurists. See Law of 
Lagos paragraph 4, text in African Conference on the Rule of Law, Lagos (Nigeria) 3-7 January, 1961- 
Report of the Conference, Geneva International Commission of jurists (1961) 9. See also Fatsah Ouguergouz 
(2003) 688, Viljoen (2007) 420, Vincent Orlu Nmehielle (2001)249. 
942 International Commission of Jurists, African Conference on the Rule of Law (1961) 11. 
943 Frans Viljoen (2007) 421. 
944 The proposal for a similar system to that of the European Convention on Human Rights which was made 
during the Seminar organised by the United Nations in Dakar, Senegal in 1966 on Human Rights in Developing 
Countries gave some degree of support to the idea of the creation of the Court in Africa. See UN DOC 
ST/TAO/HR 25 at 53. Seminar on Human Rights in Developing Countries, Dakar, Senegal, 8-10 February, 
1966, United Nations, New York, 1966. More significant is the amendment proposed at the second Ministerial 
Conference in Banjul calling for (a) the creation of a Court whose task would be to rule on crimes against 
mankind and safeguard the protection of human rights. 
945According to Borella on the issue of equality between States, at a deeper level, it reveals the fragility of African 
States, whose artificiality has to be camouflaged by the constant assertion that they exist and that they 
have exclusive jurisdiction over their population and territory see Borella F, Le systemejuridique de IO.U.A 
(1971) AnnuaireFrançaise de Droit International 233-254 particularly at 236.  
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organisation’s lack of any supranational dimension is exposed by looking at Article II, 
paragraph 1(b) and 2 and Article VIII of the Constituent Charter.
946 
The Commission 
of Jurist of the OAU
947 
also suffered the same fate as the Commission of Mediation, 
Conciliation and Arbitration despite the fact that they were both set up at the same time. 
The Commission of Jurists of the OAU was raised to the rank of a specialised 
Commission of the OAU. This Commission, even though harmless, was given the power 
among others, to study the legal problems of common interest and any other problems 
referred to it by any Member State or the OAU and to make recommendations that will be 
useful to them.
948 
The composition of this Commission is of great interest as each Member 
State has to be represented by a delegation headed by the competent minister, another 
minister or a plenipotentiary which is assisted by experts.
949 
This can be said to be a 
reproduction of Article XXI of the OAU Charter which gave political powers to the 
Commissions. 
 
It is interesting to note that the Commission of Jurists only existed for a year as a 
specialised Commission of the OAU as it was abolished. The reasons given then for its 
abolition were financial, practical as well as political reasons.
950 
With this, it only showed 
the unwillingness of African leaders then not to assign the resolution of their conflict to a 
third body which is not a judicial body. 
                                                             
946 See also Rule 3 of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government. The experience 
of the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration which was created by protocol on July 21, 1964 at 
the First Ordinary Summit of the Assembly of Heads of States and Government held in Cairo, Egypt from 17-
21 July 1964 is revealing in this connection. See AHG/Res. 22 (I). This Commission, although did not escape the 
control of African States, did not function at all. Looking at Article 4 of the Protocol which established the 
Commission, it states that Members of the Commission shall not be removed from office except by the 
decision of the Heads of State and Government, by a two-third majority of the total membership, on the grounds 
of inability to perform the functions of their office or of proved misconduct. This provision which appears to 
protect the members of the Commission by limiting their removability is another example of the suspicion of the 
African leaders as regards any wholly independent institution for the resolution of conflicts. Boutros-Boutros-
Ghali, when giving reasons for the failure of the Commission said that the Commission failed because its 
jurisdiction competed with that of the Assembly of Heads of States and Government of the African Union and 
of the Committee of Ministers. He said: It looked to us as if Africa cannot carry the burden of more than one 
body for the settlement of international disputes. See Les difficulties institutionelles du panafricanisme, 
(I.U.H.E.I, Collection Conferences, No. 9, Geneva, 1971 at 31. 
947 See AHG/Res. 4 (I) First Ordinary summit of the Assembly of Heads of States and Government, Cairo, 
Egypt, 17-21 July 1964. 
948 Bedjaoui M. Le reglement pacifique des differends africains (1972) Annuaire Français de Droit 
International (AFDI) 85-99 particularly at 87. 
949 Doc OAU Jur/3 Annex 1. 
950 Borella F (1971) 241. Borella opined that through the Commission of Jurists the OAU seemed to be setting 
the official stamp on the Commission of African Jurists set up on the initiative of the International 
Commission of Jurists […] which is distinctly Western in outlook. See pages 241-242. 
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At the various deliberations held before the adoption of the African Charter in 1981, the 
issue of the continent having its own judicial mechanism came up severally. The coming in 
of democracy in Africa also played a major role in the discussion on a regional human 
rights instrument in the continent. Young
951 
identified three major waves of democratisation 
in Africa with the first being embodied in the constitutional changes dictated by colonial 
powers that were leaving.
952 
The second ‘wave’ according to him came in the period 
just before the adoption of the African Charter and it was the handing over of power to 
a democratically elected leader. Ghana and Nigeria serve as good examples of this wave 
even though the gains were not for long.
953
 
Before the adoption of the OAU Charter, a proposal was submitted by Keba M’Baye954 to 
the meeting of Experts in Senegal but instead of supporting the establishment of the 
implementation mechanism, he chose to leave out the establishment of a Court. He 
explained the reason for his omission of a Court in his draft to be the fact that it is 
‘thought premature to do so at that stage’955  even though he admitted in the same draft 
that the idea of having a court in the continent was not a bad idea, he believed that it 
could be introduced in the future by a protocol to the Charter.
956 
Some critics even argued 
that the introduction of the Court does not conform with African traditional ways of dispute 
                                                             
951 Young C, Africa: ‘An Interim Balance Sheet’ (1996) 7 Journal of Democracy 53-54. 
952 This wave according to him had little momentum because immediately after independence democratic 
governance largely ceased to exist and was replaced by one-party rule which was what was in vogue then, 
military dictatorship and Afro-Marxism. See Heyns C (ed), ‘Human Rights Law in Africa’ (2004) vol.2, at 904; 
1311-1313; 1444-1446. 
953 The military, in 1979 in Ghana agreed to full democratisation. In Nigeria, former President, Olusegun 
Obasanjo, in 1979 handed over power to a democratically elected government. Broad public participation in 
establishing the second republic in Nigeria which led to the adoption of the 1979 Constitution which was 
described by Akande J.O. in his book ‘Introduction to the Nigerian Constitution’ (1982) as Nigerias first 
autochthonous Constitution was overthrown by a coup détat by General Buhari followed by General Ibrahim 
Babangida. 
954 Introduction of MBaye Draft African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights, OAU Doc CAB/LEG/67/1. 
The document was prepared for the Meeting of Experts held in Dakar, Senegal from 28th  November to 8th  
December,1979. 
955 Introduction of MBaye Draft African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights, paragraph 4. See also Heyns C 
(ed), ‘Human Rights Law in Africa: 1999’ (2002) 65-77. 
956 Introduction of Mbaye Draft African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights, OAU Doc CAB/LEG/67/1.  At 
the Ministerial meeting held in Banjul, The Gambia from the 7-19 January, 1981; the establishment of a 
Tribunal to preside over crimes against humanity and to protect human rights was proposed by Guinea. See 
Ouguergouz Fatsah, La Charte Africaine des Droits de lHomme et des peuples (1993) 75. This was as a result of 
the uprising in Soweto, South Africa then. MBaye who was the Rapporteur at the Ministerial meeting, reported 
as follows: It should be mentioned that a delegation proposed an amendment according to which the meeting was 
to draft a text establishing an African Court on Human and Peoples Rights to judge crimes against mankind and 
violations of human rights. The participants took note of this amendment but were of the opinion that it was 
untimely to discuss it. See OAU Doc CM/1149 (XXXVII) (1981), 37th Ordinary session of the Council of 
Ministers held in Banjul, the Gambia particularly at paragraph 117. 
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resolution. They suggested that mediation and conciliation would be better for dispute 
resolution in Africa since they are rooted in the tradition of Africa.
957 
With this, the 
question that readily comes to mind is: should tradition play a major role in the issue of 
human rights considering the fact that domestic legal institutions were not designed in line 
with African traditional way of dispute resolution? In resolving this, AdamaDieng stated that 
‘the delights of traditional anthropology should not lull us to the point of obscuring 
reality. Today, the time has come to accede to the demand of Africans who feel it 
indispensable for the victims of human rights violations, or their representatives, to have 
recourse to judicial process on demand.’958 
 
In the 1980s, changes were witnessed and this could be associated with the 
determination of African States to allow disputes which arouse between them to be 
settled by the International Court of Justice.
959 
This was evidenced by the number of cases 
filed at the Court from Africa.
960 
Between 1982 and 1997, the International Court of Justice 
received 26 cases out of which 10 had an African State as a party.
961
 
Furthermore, the increase in the number of judicial bodies set up by the various regional 
integration agreements can also be said to have played a major role in helping to change 
the attitude of African States in relation to settlement of their disputes since the coming into 
existence of the African Charter.
962 
Examples include Courts and Tribunals established by 
                                                             
957 See the Address by Adama Dieng, Secretary-General of the International Commission of jurists at the meeting 
of Government Experts on the question of the creation of an African Court on Human and Peoples Rights held in 
Cape Town, South Africa, September 6-12, 1995. 
958 Dumas, Nanette, ‘Enforcement of Human Rights Standards: An International Human Rights Court and 
Other Proposals’ (1990) 13 Hastings International and Comparative Law Review 593. 
959
 This is the principal organ of the United Nations. See Higgins R, ‘The International Court of Justice and 
Africa’ in Yakpo E & Boumedra T (eds.) Liber Amicorum Judge Mohammed Bedjaoui (1999) 343-369. See 
also Bedi S, ‘African Participation in the International Court of Justice: A Statistical Appraisal’ (1946-1998) 
(1998) 6 African Yearbook of International Law 181-222; Mubiala M., La contribution des Etatsafricains a la 
renaissance de la Cour international de Justice (1994) 2 African Yearbook of International Law173-180. 
960 Out of the 75 contentious cases referred to the Court between 1947 and 1998, 15 of these cases involved 
African States while the ratio of these cases as compared to the number of contentious cases submitted to the 
Court was put at 20 per cent. See Ouguergouz F ‘The African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights: A 
Comprehensive Agenda for Human Dignity and Sustainable Democracy in Africa’ (2003) 690. 
961 Out of the 13 disputes brought before the International Court of Justice by a Special Agreement, four 
involved two African States as parties. The States were Tunisia and Libya Arab Jamahiriya with special 
agreement notified on 1 December 1978; Burkina Faso and Mali with special agreement notified on 20 
October, 1983; Libya Arab Jamahiriya and Chad with special agreement notified on 31 August, 1990 to 3rd 
September, 1990 and also Botswana and Namibia special agreement notified on 29 May 1996. See Ouguergouz F 
(2003) 690. 
962 Kamto M, Les cours de justice des communautés et des organisations dintégration économique africaines 
(1998) 6 African Yearbook of International Law 107-150. 
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the treaty establishing the Economic Community of Central African States,
963 
the treaty 
establishing the Union of the Arab Maghreb,
964 
the treaty establishing the African 
Economic Community,
965 
the treaty establishing the African Development Community,
966 
the revised treaty of the Economic Community of West African States,
967 
the treaty 
relating to the Harmonisation of Business Law in Africa,
968 
the Treaty establishing the 
West African Economic and Monetary Union,
969 
the treaty establishing the Economic and 
Monetary Union of Central Africa
970 
and the Treaty establishing the Economic Community 
of the Countries of the Great Lakes.
971
 
However, the process of formulating the protocol on the Establishment of the African 
Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights began when the Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government of the OAU adopted a resolution to ‘ponder over ways and means of 
strengthening the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights...’972 and it 
continued up till the formal adoption in 1998.
973 
In adopting the Protocol, the Assembly of 
Heads of State and Government of the OAU requested the OAU Secretary-General: 
 
to convene a meeting of government experts to ponder in conjunction with the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights over the means to enhance 
the efficiency of the Commission in considering particularly the establishment of an 
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights.
974
 
6.1.1 Cape Town Draft 
 
As a result of this, a meeting of Government Legal Experts was organised and held in 
                                                             
963 The treaty was signed at Libreville, Gabon on 18th October, 1983. 
964 This was signed in Marrakech, Morocco on the 17th of February, 1989. 
965 Signed in Abuja, Nigeria on the 3rd of June, 1991. 
966 Signed at Windhoek, Namibia on the 11th of August, 1992. 
967 This was signed in Cotonou the Republic of Benin on the 24th July, 1993. 
968 It was signed at Port-Louis, Mauritius on the 17th October, 1993. 
969 Signed at Dakar, Senegal on 10th January, 1994. 
970 Signed in NDjamena, Chad on the 16th of March, 1994. 
971 Signed at Gisenya, Zaire on the 5th of November, 1996. 
972 Resolution AHG/Res.230 (XXX), the resolution was adopted on the 15th June, 1994 in Tunis, Tunisia 
973 The protocol was adopted on the 9th of June, 1998 in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso. 
974 Resolution AHG/Res.230 (XXX). 
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Cape Town, South Africa
975 
at which the text of a Draft Protocol to the African Charter 
was adopted. This Draft Protocol was prepared by the Secretary-General of the OAU 
along with the African Commission and International Commission of Jurists.
976 
This 
meeting also had in attendance, fifty six (56) delegates from twenty three (23) OAU 
Member States, national and international observers, legal experts and representatives of 
international organisations.
977 
At the end of the meeting, a Draft Protocol with thirty two 
Articles which can be referred to as the first draft Protocol was adopted (Cape Town 
draft).
978 
A notable provision of this first adopted draft was the provision on access to 
the Court. The Draft Protocol gave direct access to the Court to individuals by making 
it an automatic consequence of ratification.
979
 
At the 64
th
 Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers of the OAU,
980 
the Cape Town 
draft was to be considered as it was distributed to the OAU Members States for their 
comments and observations along with the report of the group of government legal 
experts,
981 
but unfortunately the Council had to defer the consideration of the draft due to 
insufficient comments and observations from Member States.
982 
This led to the Council 
directing the Secretary-General to redistribute the Draft Protocol to Member States and 
asking for their comments and observations but this time around, with a clause that the 
                                                             
975 The meeting was held from the 6th to the 12th of September, 1995. 
976 The International Commission of Jurists played a major role here as it recommended the establishment of 
an African Court. It also played an active role in raising awareness for the need to establish a Human Rights 
Court among African States. Examples can be found in the conclusions and recommendations of a number of 
workshops on NGO participation in the work of the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights which 
were organised by the International Commission of Jurists in conjunction with the Africa Commission on 
Human and Peoples Rights in Banjul, The Gambia between October, 1991 and 1992; at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia 
in March 1993; Banjul, The Gambia in November 1993 and October 1994. See The Participation of Non-
Governmental Organisations in the Work of the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights - A 
Compilation of Basic Documents International Commission of Jurists (1996) 22, 31, 36, 41 and 55. 
977 DOC OAU/LEG/EXP/AFC/HPR/RPT (I) Rev.1, Report of the Meeting of Government Experts on the 
Establishment of an African Court of Human and Peoples Rights, 6-12 September, 1995, Cape Town, South Africa. 
978 DOC OAU/LEG/EXP/AFC/HPR/PRO (I) Rev. 1, Draft Protocol to the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples Rights adopted by the 
Meeting of Government Legal Experts on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples Rights, 
6-12 September, 1995 in Cape Town, South Africa.  For an in-depth discussion draft protocol see Naldi 
G. J. & Magliveras K, ‘The Proposed African Court of Human and Peoples Rights: Evaluation and 
Comparison’ (1996)8 African Journal of International and Comparative Law 944. 
979 Article 6 Cape Town draft allowed individuals, non-governmental organisations and groups of individuals 
to bypass the African Commission on exceptional ground. See Kioko B (1998) 7. See also Viljoen (2012) 412. 
980 The 64th Ordinary Session was held in Yaounde, Cameroon from 1 -5 July, 1996.  
981 Report of the Meeting of Government Experts on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and 
Peoples Rights held from 6-12 September, 1995.  
982 Only Burkina Faso, Lesotho and Mauritius submitted their comments. See Kioko Ben, ‘The Road to the 
African Court on Human and Peoples Rights’ in African Society of International and Comparative Law – 
Proceedings of the Tenth Annual Conference held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia from the 3- 5 August, 1998 at 77. 
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comment and observations should be submitted within a reasonable time.
983 
This 
eventually yielded positive response as by the 65
th
 Ordinary Session
984 
the General-
Secretary had received comments and observations from ten Member States of the OAU 
including the earlier three comments from Member States thereby making the Draft Protocol 
to be considered at the session.
985 
It is important to point out here that as at this time, 
Ethiopia was not yet a State Party to the African Charter but despite this it was 
participating actively at every activity that had to do with the amendment of the 
Charter to establish a human rights court in the continent.
986
 
The Council of Ministers at the 65
th
 
Ordinary Session agreed that another meeting of 
legal experts should be convened in order to finalise the Draft Protocol having in mind the 
comments and observations received from Member states.
987 
The meeting was scheduled for 
April, 1997.
988
 
6.1.2 The ‘Nouakchott draft’ 
 
The Nouakchott meeting of government legal expert which was also the second 
meeting of government legal experts led to the adoption of the “Nouakchott draft”.989 The 
adopted draft was made up of thirty four Articles and it amended the Cape Town 
draft
990 
in two ways, first, it increased the number of ratifications required for the entry 
into force of the Protocol from 11 to 15
991 
and made state acceptance of the Court’s 
competence to receive petitions directly from individuals dependent on an optional 
                                                             
983 Resolution CM/Res. 1674 (LXIV).  
984 The 65th Ordinary Session was held in Tripoli, Libya from 24-28 February, 1997. 
985 Mauritius, Lesotho, Burkina-Faso, Senegal, Tunisia, Sierra Leone, Benin, Cote dIvoire, Madagascar and 
Ethiopia all submitted their comments and observations to the Secretary-General of the OAU before the 
65th Ordinary Session of the OAU. See ‘The Secretary-Generals Report on the Conference of Ministers of 
Justice/Attorneys General on the Draft Protocol on the Establishment of the African Court on Human and 
Peoples Rights’ DOC.CM/2051 (LXVII). See also Kioko Ben (1998) 78. 
986Ethiopia only ratified the Charter on the 5th of June, 1998.  
987 Resolution CM/Res. 326 (LXV). 
988 This meeting was held in Nouakchott, Mauritania from 11-14 April, 1997 at the invitation of the Government 
of Mauritania and it had in attendance thirty-three delegates from nineteen OAU Member States and members of 
the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights. See Report of the Second Meeting of Government 
Legal Experts on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples Rights, 11-14, Nouakchott, 
Mauritania, DOC OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHPR/RPT (2).  
989 Draft Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights on the Establishment of the African Court 
on Human and Peoples Rights, OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHPR/PROT(2). 
990 Frans Viljoen (2007) 422. 
991 Article 33 Nouakchott Draft. 
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declaration as opposed to the automatic consequence of ratification.
992
 
 
The plan was that the Nouakchott draft will be submitted for consideration and formal 
adoption at the 66
th
 
Ordinary Session
993 
of the OAU but unfortunately this could not be 
achieved as the Council of Ministers of the OAU deferred the presentation because they 
wanted more comments and observations from Member States.
994 
The Council of Ministers 
at this session (66
th
 
 
Session), adopted a resolution wherein Member States of the OAU 
were requested to submit their further comments and observations before the 31
st 
of 
August, 1997.
995 
The resolution furthermore requested the General Secretariat to convene 
in Addis Ababa, a third Government Legal Experts Meeting enlarged to include diplomats 
to examine and finalise the Draft Protocol to be submitted to the Conference of Ministers of 
Justice/Attorneys General which will follow immediately at the same venue for 
consideration and submission to the Council of Ministers.
996
 
6.1.3 Addis Ababa Meeting 
 
As a result of Resolution mentioned above, the third meeting of the Government Legal 
Expert took place in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia between the 8
th 
and 11
th 
December, 1997. This 
meeting was expanded to accommodate diplomats while forty five (45) OAU Member 
States representatives were also in attendance.
997 
At this third meeting, the Nouakchott draft 
along with the comments received from Member States was deliberated on
998 
with the 
                                                             
992 Article 6 Nouakchott Draft.  
993 The 66th Ordinary Session was held in Harare, Zimbabwe from the 26th  to the 30th of May, 1997. 
994 As at this period, only twenty (20) States had submitted their comments and observations. The States 
were Algeria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, The Gambia, Benin, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ivory Coast, Lesotho, Madagascar, 
Mauritius, Namibia, Niger, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, Tunisia, Togo and Swaziland. 
See Kioko Ben (1998)79. 
995 Resolution CM/Dec. 348 (LXVI). See also Report of the Secretary-General on the Conference of Ministers 
of Justice/Attorneys General on the Draft Protocol on the Establishment of the African Court on Human and 
Peoples Rights to the Council of Ministers, Sixty-Sixth Ordinary Session, 26-30 May, 1997, Harare, 
Zimbabwe, CM/2020(LXVI); Ibrahim Ali Badawi El-Sheikh, ‘Draft Protocol to the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples Rights on the Establishment of the African Court on Human and Peoples Rights: Introductory 
Note’ (1997) 9 African Journal of International and Comparative Law 943-952. This article gave a brief and 
pointed history of the Protocol of the African Court. 
996 Resolution CM/Dec. 348 (LXVI) paragraph B. The Council of Ministers further requested all Member 
States especially those not represented in Addis Ababa to ensure they are duly represented at the Conference of 
Ministers slated for Addis Ababa. See paragraph D of the Resolution. 
997 Report of the Third Government al Legal Experts Meeting (enlarged to include diplomats) on the 
Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples Rights, 8-11 December, 1997, Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia DOC OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHPR/RPT (III) Rev. 1 particularly paragraphs 6 & 7. 
998 See Comments and Observations Received from Member States on The Draft Protocol on The Establishment 
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changes made in the Nouakchott draft retained.  Aside the comments which were 
received from Member States, addit ional amendments were submitted and distributed 
during this meeting.
999 
At the end of the meeting, an amended draft with thirty five 
Articles was adopted 
1000 
and this draft was unanimously recommended by the Legal 
Experts and the Diplomats present at the meeting for adoption by the Conference of 
Ministers of Justice and Attorneys-General which was to be held the following day, the 
12
th
 
of December, 1997.
1001
 
At the Conference of Ministers of Justice and Attorneys-General,
1002 
the Addis Ababa draft 
was adopted and subsequently recommended to the Committee of Ministers and OAU 
Assembly of Heads of States and Government for adoption.
1003 
The Addis Ababa Draft 
Protocol was thereafter approved by the OAU Council of Ministers at its 67
th 
Ordinary 
session
1004 
while the Assembly of Heads of states and Government of the OAU at their 
34
th 
Session held in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso
1005 
approved the Protocol to the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of the African 
Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (hereinafter called ‘the Protocol’).1006 The very day 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
of The African Court on Human and Peoples Rights, OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHPR/Comm.(3) with addendum 1. 
See also Badawei El-Sheikh (1997) 944. 
999 The comments received were from Namibia, South Africa, Egypt, Senegal, Burkina Faso, Swaziland, The 
Gambia, Tanzania, Algeria, Burundi, Niger and Togo. See, ‘The Secretary-Generals Report on the Conference 
of Ministers of Justice/Attorneys General on the Draft Protocol’ DOC.CM/2051 (LXVII). 
1000 Draft Protocol to The African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights on the Establishment of an African 
Court on Human and Peoples Rights (hereinafter referred to as Addis Ababa Draft Protocol) adopted at 
the Third Government Legal Experts Meeting (enlarged to include diplomats) on the Establishment of an 
African Court on Human and Peoples Rights, 8-11 December, 1997 DOC OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHPR/PROT (III) 
Rev. 1 
1001 Paragraph 38, Report of the Third Government Legal Experts Meeting (enlarged to include Diplomats). 
1002 The conference was held on the 12th of December, 1997 at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Though the conference 
was scheduled for two (2) days, it was able to conclude its work in a day with minor amendments to the Addis 
Ababa Draft Protocol (Article 34(3) & (6) of the Draft Protocol). The Conference had nineteen (19) Ministers of 
Justice/Attorneys General, Vice Ministers, Solicitors-General, Judges, Ambassadors, Public Prosecutors and 
senior government officials from forty-five (45) Member States in attendance. 
1003 Gina Bekker, ‘The African Court on Human and Peoples Rights: Safeguarding the Interests of African 
States’ (2007) 51Journal of African Law 151-172. 
1004 The OAU Council of Ministers 67th Ordinary Session was held in Addis Ababa from 23-27 February, 1997. 
1005 The Session was held between the 8th and 10th of June, 1998.  
1006 See Naldi G.J & Magliveras K, ‘Reinforcing the African System of Human Rights: The Protocol on 
the Establishment of a Regional Court of Human and Peoples Rights’ (1998) 16 Netherlands Quarterly Human 
Rights 431. See also OAU Doc OAU/LEG/MIN/AFCHPR/PROT (I) Rev. 2 adopted on the 10thof June, 1998; 
Quashigah E.K., ‘The African Court of Human Rights: Prospects in Comparison with the European Court on 
Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ (1998)10 Proceedings of the African Society of 
International and Comparative Law (Proceeding 59); Mutua M, ‘The African Human Rights Court: A Two-
Legged Stool?’ (1999) 21 Human Rights Quarterly 342; Udombana N.J., ‘Towards the African Court on 
Human and Peoples Rights: Better Late than Never’ (2000) 3 Yale Human Rights Development Law Journal 
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the Protocol was adopted by the Assembly of Heads of States and Government of the OAU 
it was signed by thirty (30) Member States
1007 
of the OAU. What this means simply is that 
the Member States at that point became aware of the fact that for the African Charter’s 
objectives to be realised it was important for there to be in existence an African Court. 
They also felt when the Court comes into existence; it would reinforce and 
complement the work on the African Commission.
1008 
To date, twenty six (26) 
States have ratified the Protocol.
1009
 
 
Having successfully traced the historical birth of the Protocol which established the 
African Human Rights Court, I will now proceed to look at the Protocol itself to see if it is at 
par with the African notion of Justice. Furthermore, I will also try to compare the 
Court with the Inter- American Court of Human Rights and the European Court of 
Human Rights which are Courts established by the other regions to tackle human rights 
issues. 
6.2      The Protocol 
 
The process towards the establishment of the African Human Rights Court, started in 1994 
and the fight for it was led by NGOs with the support of the African Commission on 
Human Rights. The demand for it also got some high-level political support
1010 
even 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
45; Fatsah Ouguergouz, ‘The African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights: A Comprehensive Agenda for 
Human Dignity and Sustainable Democracy in Africa’ (2003) (Ouguergouz: African Charter) 687-754; 
Harrington J, ‘The African Court on Human and Peoples Rights’ in Evans M.D. and Murray R (eds.) ‘The 
African Charter on Human Rights: The System in Practice 1986- 2006’ (2008) 39, Frans Viljoen, ‘African 
Human Rights Court for Africans’ (2004)30 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 1; Frans Viljoen, 
‘International Human Rights Law in Africa’ (2007) 418-475.  
1007 International Commission of Jurists, African States Establish Supranational Human Rights, press  release, 
Geneva, 12 June, 1998. The Member States that signed were Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, 
Comoros, Congo, Ethiopia, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Liberia, 
Libya Arab Jamahiriya, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Namibia, Rwanda, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South 
Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Zambia and Zimbabwe. See Report of the Progress made towards the 
establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples Rights, OAU Ministerial Conference on Human 
Rights, 12-16 April, 1999, Grand Bay, Mauritius. OAU DOC MIN/CONF/HRA/4 (I), Paragraph 1.  
1008 See ‘ The preamble to the Protocol on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights’ particularly at paragraph 7. 
1009 The Member States that have ratified the Protocol are Algeria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, CotedIvoire, 
Comoros, Congo, Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Libya, Lesotho, Mali, Malawi, Mozambique, 
Mauritania, Nigeria, Niger, Rwanda, South Africa, Senegal, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia and Uganda. See 
www.african-  
court.org/images/Basic%Documents/Statuts_of_the_Ratification_Process_of_the_Protocol_Establishing_the_Africa 
n_Court.pdf (Accessed 20th August, 2016).It also contains the list of Member States which have signed, 
Ratified/Acceded to the Protocol. 
1010 Example of this political support can be seen in the speech of the then Secretary-General of the OAU, 
Salim Ahmed Salim which he made at the 14
th Session of the African Commission held in Ethiopia from the 
1st- 10th December, 1993 where he stated that the time has come for an African Human Rights Court. See 
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though this support was with caution from OAU Assembly. The idea of establishing an 
African Court to handle human rights  matters  in  the  region,  which  was  conceived  and  
driven  by  NGOs  and  the  African Commission, was eventually taken over by the OAU 
with its adoption of the Protocol on the Establishment of the Protocol.
1011
 
The adoption of the Protocol has been described as ‘the breaking of further grounds in 
African Human Rights discuss.’1012 It is also seen as an advancement of the emerging 
idea, within the modern African state which its conduct towards its citizens is no longer 
an internal, domestic matter.
1013 
According to Mukundi
1014 ‘the adoption of the Protocol 
is seen as a result of solid years of hard work, intense negotiations and compromise to 
reach a common position.’ 
 
Looking at human rights violations in the continent, the coming into existence of the 
African Court can be said to be a great move and a welcome development towards putting 
an end to these violations. It is also expected to strengthen the regional human rights 
system and support it in order for it to bring to fulfilment, its promise.
1015 
According to 
Mutua, the court must as much as possible, try to avoid the pitfall that trapped the African 
Commission if the purpose of its coming into existence is to be achieved.
1016
 
The Protocol empowers the African Court to enforce the provisions of the African Charter 
and other human rights instruments that are in existence for the African states
1017 
as this 
Preamble puts it ‘in the wider context of a natural progression’1018 which links the 
fundamental objectives of the OAU with establishment of the African Court. It also 
reaffirms the commitment of the OAU to the principles of “freedom, justice, peace and 
dignity” and to the fundamental rights and duties contained in the declarations, conventions 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
Ankumah E, The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Practice and Procedure (1996) 70. 
1011 Frans Viljoen (2007) 170. 
1012 Vincent Nmehielle (2001) 259. 
1013 Makau Mutua, ‘The African Human Rights Court: A Two-Legged Stool?’(1999)21 Human Rights 
Quarterly342 at 349. 
1014 George Mukundi, ‘African Court on Human and Peoples Rights: Ten Years and Still No Justice’ (2008) 2. 
1015 Vincent Nmehielle (2001)258. 
1016 Makau  Mutua,  ‘The  African  Human  Rights  Courts:  A  Two-Legged  Stool?’(1999)  21  Human  
Rights Quarterly342 at 353. 
1017 Nsongurua Udombana, ‘Towards the African court on Human and Peoples Rights: Better Late than Never’ 
(2000) 3 Yale Human Rights & Development Law Journal 45 at 82. 
1018 Naldi G.J & Magliveras K, ‘Reinforcing the African System of Human Rights: The Protocol on the 
Establishment of a Regional Court of Human and Peoples Rights’ (1998) 16 Netherlands Human Rights 
Quarterly 431 at 433. 
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and other instruments adopted by OAU along with other international organisations.
1019
 
The Protocol is made up of thirty-five (35) Articles and many of its provisions are similar to 
the statutes of the European Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights. Despite these similarities, there are still some features which distinguish the 
African Court from the European and Inter-American Courts on Human Rights. 
6.2.1   Common Features 
 
Under the regional systems, only States may be held accountable for human rights 
violations simply because each system was created on the basis of a regional inter-
governmental agreement which establish specific obligations of signatory States, a 
minimum code of conduct for States in the region. What this means is that States have 
agreed to abide by certain standards in their actions and to ensure the enjoyment of 
certain guarantees by those within their jurisdiction, hereby establishing individual rights 
through the State. Accordingly, States may be held liable for a particular violation where 
such violation is attributable to the action of State agents, to those acting with the 
knowledge and acquiescence of State agents, or the failure of State to protect individuals 
from the actions of non-State actors.
1020
 
Furthermore, the principles of subsidiarity and complementarity limit international human 
rights adjudication. What this means is that the relevant international decision-making 
organs are meant neither to replace nor form part of domestic judicial systems. Rather, 
those alleging human rights violations before an international tribunal must first have 
exhausted the appropriate, available domestic remedies.    Also, the international tribunal 
will not review domestic judicial decisions which are fair procedurally.
1021
  A State will 
only be considered internationally responsible for a violation where recourse is unavailable 
locally, unduly delayed, or inadequate at the domestic level. But where on the other hand, 
the violation was remedied by the State
1022 
there is no violation for which the State may be 
                                                             
1019 Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights on the Establishment of an African Court 
on Human and Peoples Rights OAU Doc. OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHPR/PROT(III) particularly paragraphs 1, 2 and 7. 
1020 For example, such a duty may be found due to knowledge of a specific threat to protected rights. 
1021 See Regional Systems published by   the International Justice Resource Centre. Available at 
www.ijrcentre.org/?s=Regional+Systems (Accessed 20th August, 2016).  
1022 An example is where police officer(s) are prosecuted for extra-judicial killing or discriminatory practices 
on time and the damage which may have been caused repaired as appropriate.  
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held internationally responsible. 
In addition to individual complaints as regards contentious cases, the regional human 
rights systems engage in varying degrees of general human rights monitoring and 
promotion. In this vein, the Inter-American Commission and African Commission have 
established various thematic rapporteurs, and the Council of Europe on its part established 
the Commissioner for Human Rights.
1023
 
6.3 Structures, Mandate and Composition of the African Court on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights 
A solution to the problem of enforcement of human rights in Africa in the form of a 
structure, was for a long time been looked for by many in the form of an African Court 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights whose Judgement would be binding1024 on state parties and 
this was what led to the establishment of the African Court.
1025
 
6.3.1 Composition 
 
The composition of the court is crucial to its ability to function as an effective body for 
the protection of human rights. The way the judges of the court are nominated and 
eventually elected, their status as part-time and full-time judges and their independence 
from political pressures are all important and critical factors that will determine whether 
or not the structural deficiencies which have plagued the African Commission will be 
overcome by the Court.
1026
 
The Court is expected to be an impartial arbiter between individuals and states which 
violate their fundamental human rights therefore the judges of the Court must be 
individuals of impeccable ethical character, they must be independent and competent.
1027
 
                                                             
1023 www.achpr.org (Accessed 5th September, 2016). 
1024 Harrington J, ‘The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ in Evans & Murray (eds.) ‘The African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: The System in Practice 1986-2000’ (2002) 305-334. 
1025 Adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the AOU in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, 
on9 June, 1998. See OAU/LEG/MIN/AFCHPR/PROT (111). It came into force on the 25th January, 2004. But 
at the 3
rd Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the AU it was decided that the 
Court will be integrated with the African Court of Justice of the AU whose protocol was adopted at the 2nd 
Ordinary Session of the Assembly of AU in Maputo, Mozambique on the 11th of July, 2003. See 
Assembly/AU/Dec. 45 (111). 
1026 Nsongurua J. Udombana, ‘Towards the African Court on Human and Peoples Rights: Better Late than 
Never’ (2000) 3 Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal 45 at 82.  
1027 Mukundi Wachira,‘Structure, Mandate and Composition of the African Court on Human and Peoples 
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The Court is made up of eleven (11) judges
1028 
who are nationals of Member States of the 
AU
1029 
and are elected in an individual capacity from among jurists of high moral 
character and of recognised practical, judicial or academic competence and experience in 
the field of human and Peoples’ rights. There cannot be more than one national from the 
same state at the same time as a judge of the court.
1030 
The judges only need to be 
nationals of member states that have ratified either the African Charter or the Protocol just 
like what obtains under the Inter-American Court system.
1031 
What this means is that there 
is the opportunity for competent Judges to be appointed to the Court even though they are 
nationals of Member States of AU that have not ratified the African Charter.
1032
 
6.3.2 Nomination and Election of Judges 
 
Membership of the Court is by election which is preceded by nomination. States Parties to 
the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the 
Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights may propose up to 
three candidates two of whom at least shall be nationals of that State.
1033 
In nomination, the 
Protocol further emphasise that due consideration must be given to gender representation.
1034
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
Rights’ in ‘African Court on Human and Peoples Rights: Ten Years and still no Justice’ (2008) Minority 
Rights Group International. 
1028 Article 11 Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights.  
1029 Article 34 of the African Charter lays down that candidates must have the nationality of a State Party to 
the charter. The American Convention for example, in Article 53 merely requires candidates for the office of judge 
to be nationals of an Organisation of American States (OAS) Member State. The European Convention, as 
amended by Protocol No. 11 (Article 20-22) also does not require candidates to have nationality of a State 
Party or even of a Member State of the Council of Europe.  
1030 Article 11(2) Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights. This is also adopted by 
the American Convention (see Article 52) and the International Court of Justice (see Article 3 (1) of the Statute). 
In the case of the European Convention, the situation is different as it does not lay down any condition as 
regards nationality. This is why the Convention speaks of Judge elected in respect of the state concerned (see 
Article 27 (2) for example). On the 1st of January, 2001, the Court elected two Italians as Judges in respect of 
Italy and San Marino and two Swiss Judges in respect of Liechtenstein and Switzerland respectively. See 
generally, Gino Naldi & Konstantinos Magliveras, ‘Reinforcing the African System of Human Rights: The 
Protocol on the Establishment of Regional Court of Human and Peoples Rights’ (1998) 16 Netherlands 
Quarterly on Human Rights 431 at 443, Davidson Harris, ‘Regional Protection of Human Rights: The Inter-
American Achievement’ in Davidson J. Harris & Stephen Livingstone (eds.) ‘The Inter-American System of 
Human Rights’ (1998) 123. 
1031 Article 52 of the American Convention. 
1032 Vincent Nmehielle, ‘The African Human Rights System: Its Laws, Practice and Institutions’ (2001) 284, 
said that two common examples that are usually given in this regards are the nomination of Thomas 
Beurgenthal, a citizen of the United States of America, who later became the president of the Inter-American 
Court, as a judge of the Inter-American Court by Costa Rica even though the United States had not ratified the 
American Convention. Also is the election of R. St. John MacDonald, a national of Canada as a judge of the 
European Court of Human Rights in the early 1990s. See also Gino Naldi and Magliveras (1998) 444. 
1033 Article 12(1) Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights. 
1034 Article 12(2) protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights. 
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The provision of Article 14 (3) Protocol to the African Charter on the Establishment of 
an African Court simply reflects the development observed over the past 60 years in 
terms of the fight over gender equality and also expresses concern coming from the 
experience with the African Commission.
1035 
This balance in the sexes has also to be 
ensured during election and not only during nomination of candidates by Member 
states.
1036 
There exist presently at the Court, three (3) female judges
1037 
from Cameroon, 
Rwanda and Uganda.
1038
 
Election of the judges is by secret ballot by the Assembly of Heads of States and 
Government from the list of nominees prepared by the Secretary General
1039 
for a term of 
six years which is renewable once by the AU General Assembly.
1040 
Even though the 
Protocol does not indicate the margin of vote required for the election of judges to the Court, 
it is presumed that it will require a two-third majority of members present and voting in the 
Assembly.
1041 
The provision for two- third majority of the Assembly of Heads of States 
and Government is harsh when compared to provisions in the European and American 
Conventions which require majority of votes cast and an absolute majority votes 
respectively.
1042 
Aside the fact that the two-third majority might prove problematic, where 
                                                             
1035 The African Commission, until its 14th session, held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia from 1-10 December, 1993 
had no single female member. Mrs Vera Duarte from Cape Verde was actually elected at the 29th Ordinary 
Session of the OAU Assembly held in Cairo, Egypt from the 28th to the 30th June, 1993. At the 18th 
Ordinary session of the African Commission held in Cape Verde from 2-11 October, 1995, the Commission 
included two women, Mrs Vera V. Duarte Martins and Mrs Julienne Ondziel-Gnelenga from Congo. At the 
elections held during the 35th Ordinary Session of the OAU Assembly, Mrs Vera Martins term of office was 
renewed. Three other women; Mrs Florence Butegwa from Uganda (completed the remaining two years of the 
late Mr BlondinBeyes term), Mrs Vera Mlangazuwa Chirwa from Malawi and Mrs JainabaJohm from The 
Gambia were appointed for a six (6) year term of office. 
1036
 Article 14(3) Protocol to the African Charter on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and 
Peoples Rights. 
1037 Lady Justice Ntem Ondo Mengue (Cameroon) and Lady Justice Marie Therese Mukamulisa (Rwanda) were 
both elected to a term of six years at the 27th AU Summit held in Kigali, Rwanda while Justice Solomy 
Balungi Bossa from Uganda was elected a Judge of the Court in June, 2014 for a term of six years. See 
en.african-  court.org/index.php/judges (Accessed 24thSeptember, 2016). 
1038 See en.african-court.org/index.php/judges. (Accessed 24th September,2016). 
1039 Article14(1) The Protocol.  
1040 Article15(1)The Protocol. 
1041 In the Cape Town Draft, Article 13(1) provided for Judges to be elected by two-third majority of votes of 
the members present and voting but this provision was removed in the Nouakchott Draft which still forms part 
of the final Protocol. It has also been argued that in spite of the amendment to the Cape Town Draft the effect of 
the two- third majority of vote still remain unchanged. This is because Rule 25 of the Rules of Procedure of the 
Assembly of Heads of States and Government states that a two-third majority of all Members present and 
voting is required for votes on resolutions and decisions of the Assembly. It is therefore presumed the same 
rule will be applied to the election of Judges. See further Gino Naldi & Magliveras (1998) 445. 
1042 Gino Naldi & Magliveras (1998) 445 where they referred to Article 22(1) of the European Convention 
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no general consensus can be reached on the candidates to be elected, insisting on such 
stringent voting requirement due to an existing provision in the Rules of Procedure of 
the Assembly Heads of States and Government appears to be an approach too formal as 
it will raise suspicion that the Assembly of Heads of States and Government may put undue 
influence on the Court.
1043 
Even though this concern is genuine, it is expected that the 
Assembly of Heads of States and Government will not frustrate any particular election 
most especially since the same procedure is used in electing members of the African 
Commission.
1044 
So far in all the elections of Judges of the Court carried out there has 
not been any frustration either witnessed or complained of. 
 
A balanced representation of the main regions of Africa and of their principal legal 
traditions is also required in the election of judges to the Court.
1045 
It is believed that this 
provision is aimed at accommodating the various African geographical divides and principal 
legal traditions so as to maintain equitable representation. Issues bordering on customary 
Law or Native Law and Custom, Islamic Law, Common Law and Civil Law as legal 
traditions are prominent in various African legal systems and will in one way or the other 
find their way in the Court’s proceedings.1046 The question which readily comes to mind 
is whether the provision of Article 14(2) can be observed like Article 14(3) since in the 
process of nomination it is not required that Member States should take the geographical 
regions and legal traditions into consideration.
1047 
To this, my view is that since 
geographic regions and legal traditions were not listed as part of the requirements that 
must be put into consideration when nominating candidates by States Parties, it will 
not defeat the intention of the drafters of the Protocol towards achieving a balanced 
geographical representation and legal traditions.
1048
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
and Article 53(1) American Convention.  
1043 Vincent Nmehielle (2001) 286. 
1044 Article 13 of the African Charter provides that the members of the African Commission shall be elected 
by secret ballot by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government from the list of persons nominated by the 
State Parties to the Charter. While it may be an easier mode of election to adopt a simple majority in electing 
members of the Court, it must be observed that till date, there had not been any known case where by the use 
of the two-third majority rule in the Rules of Procedure of the AHSG had resulted in an impasse in the election 
of members of the African Commission. 
1045 Article 14(2) The Protocol. 
1046 Vincent Nmehielle (2001) 287. 
1047 Gino Naldi & Magliveras (1998) 445 - 446. 
1048 The belief is that the nomination process will cut across the continent of Africa and the election process 
will harmonise the requirement in Article 14(2). Furthermore, the experience the region has had with the 
African Commission is expected to also guide the Court. 
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Presently there are eleven Judges in the Court with the inaugural Judges sworn in on the 2
nd
 
of July, 2006 by the AU Assembly in Banjul, The Gambia. Justice Sylvain Ore from Cote 
d’ Ivoire was elected president of the Court on the 5th of September, 2016 for a two year term 
and he was elected as a judge of the Court for the first time in 2010 for a four year term and 
was re-elected in 2014 for a second term of six years.
1049
  
Concerns about the competence of the Judges of the Court have also been raised by the 
Coalition for an Effective Human Rights Court
1050 
and the procedures under which they 
were selected. The Coalition noted that the Judges do not have demonstrable human 
rights experience.
1051 
The Coalition also criticised the nomination process of most member 
states as flawed as it failed on account of not being open, transparent and inclusive of 
civil society.
1052 
Although one of the qualifications to be appointed as a judge of the 
Court is to have experience in human rights matters, the lack of this experience will not 
be disastrous where their competence is in focus. Looking at their profiles one can see 
that they are all experienced lawyers and academics who have served or qualified to be 
appointed as senior judges in their respective domestic courts and vast in matters of law.
1053
 
6.3.3 Term of Office 
 
Judges of the African Court are elected for a term of six years and they may also be re-
elected for another one term once more.
1054 
This provision is similar to what obtains in the 
                                                             
1049 www.african-court.org/en/index.php/judges/current-judges (Accessed 20 march, 2019). 
1050 The Coalition is a network of non-governmental organisations and independent human rights institutions 
formed during the first conference for the promotion of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples Rights establishing the African Court on Human and Peoples Rights in Niamey, Niger in May 2003. 
The purpose for its establishment is to have an effective and independent African Court in order to provide 
redress to victims of human rights violations and strengthen the human rights protection system in Africa. The 
Coalition was formally registered as an NGO in Tanzania in September 2007 and it has observer status with the 
African Commission. See  http://www.africancourtcoalition.org/ (Accessed 20thAugust, 2016). 
1051 Motala A, ‘Election of Judges Marks Historic Step in Establishment of the African Coalition for an 
Effective African Court,’ Newsletter, No. 5 at page 10.Available at 
www.africancourtcoalition.org/images/docs/newsletters/accnewsletteredition5.pdf.(Accessed 20thAugust, 2016). 
1052 Motala A, ‘Election of Judges Marks Historic Step in Establishment of the African Coalition for an 
Effective African Court’ Newsletter, No. 5 at page 10. Available at 
http://www.africancourtcoalition.org/images/docs/newsletters/accnewsletteredition5.pdf (Accessed 20thaugust, 
2016). 
1053 See Current Judges of the African Court on the official website of the Coalition for an Effective African 
Court Available at 
www.africancourtcoalition.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&layout=blog&id=14&Itemid=30&   
Lang=en (Accessed on 20thAugust, 2016). 
1054 Article 15(1) The Protocol. 
https://etd.uwc.ac.za
265 
 
 
 
European and Inter-American systems
1055 
with the only difference being that the American 
Convention Protocol made room for just one term of office for judges.
1056 
The European 
system on its part does not have a particular number of re-election as it adopted the 
system in place under the International Court of Justice (ICJ).
1057
 
In order to ensure a gradual renewal of the composition of the Court, the term of office of 
four of the judges elected at the first election expires at the end of two years and the term 
of four more judges expires at the end of four years.
1058 
In arriving at the Judges whose 
tenure will expire either after two years or four years, the names of members concerned 
are chosen by lot by the Secretary-General of the AU immediately after the first election 
of Judges.
1059 
Where a judge is elected to replace a judge whose term of office has not 
expired, such judge will complete the remainder of the predecessor’s term.1060 
Where a vacancy is created at the Court either by the death of a judge or by resignation, 
the President of the Court shall immediately inform the Secretary General of the AU 
who shall declare the seat vacant from the date of death or from the date on which the 
resignation takes effect.
1061 
Where a seat is declared vacant, such seat must be replaced 
unless the remaining period of the term of office is less than 180 days
1062 
and in replacing 
such a judge, the procedure and considerations set out in Articles 12, 13 and 14 as regards 
nomination of candidates by State Parties, compilation of list by the Secretary general and 
election by secret ballot shall be followed.
1063
 
                                                             
1055 Article 23(1) European Convention as amended by Protocol 11. See also Article 54(1) of the American 
Convention.  
1056 Gino Naldin& Magliveras (1998) 446. 
1057 Article 23(6) & (7) of the European Convention provides that the term of office of judges shall expire when 
they reach the age of 70 years or until replaced. 
1058 Article 15(1) The Protocol. 
1059 Article 15(2) The Protocol. This similar practice exists also in the European and Inter-American systems 
as provided by Article 23(2) of the European Convention and Article 54(1) of the American Convention. 
Under the European Convention, the choice by lot is made by the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe 
while under the American Convention, the choice is determined in the General Assembly of the Organisation 
of American States (OAS) after the election. Furthermore, Article 37 of the African Charter as regards the 
election of members of the African Commission states that the task of drawing lots shall be performed by the 
Chairman of the OAU Assembly of Heads of States and Government. By the time the Charter was ratified 
Zambia made a reservation with respect to Article 37 stressing that it was a minor task which should be entrusted 
not to the chairman of the OAU Assembly but to the Secretary-General of the OAU. See Michelo Hansungule, 
‘The African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights: A Critical Review’ (2000) 8 African Yearbook of 
International Law 281. 
1060 Article 15 (3) The Protocol. 
1061 Article 20(1) The Protocol. 
1062 Article 20(2) The Protocol. 
1063 Article 20(3) The Protocol. 
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It is important to point out here that the Protocol did not make provision on what should be 
done where a judge sitting on a case ends up not re-elected unlike what obtains in the 
other regions. Whether such a judge can continue to preside over a case he began 
consideration of or such a case will be reassigned to another judge is not made provision for 
by the Protocol. The European and Inter-American systems provide for such judge not re-
elected to continue to preside over cases they have begun to hear for which they shall 
not be replaced by the newly elected judge.
1064
 In the African Human Rights System, it is 
the Rules of Procedure of the Court that took care of this.
1065
 
6.3.4 Discharge of Official Duties by the Judges 
 
After the election of candidates as judges of the Court and prior to the commencement of 
their official assignment as judges, the newly elected judges are required to make a solemn 
declaration to discharge their duties impartially and faithfully.
1066 
The judges are elected 
to function on a part-time basis with the exception of the President who performs his 
judicial function on full time basis and as expected, this caused a lot of disagreement 
among members but they were eventually convinced that a full-time court will increase 
expenses considerably and that the initial  caseload  might  not  justify  the  appointment  
of  judges  on  full-time  basis.
1067 
This arrangement may be changed by the Assembly of 
Heads of States and Government as it deems appropriate.
1068 
The Inter-American Court 
                                                             
1064 See Article 54(3) American Conventions on Human Rights and Article 23(7) European Convention on 
Human Rights. See also Article 13(3) Statute of International Court of Justice. 
1065 Rule 2(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the African Court provides thus: notwithstanding the foregoing sub-
rule, outgoing Members of the Court shall remain in office until such time as they are replaced; after they are 
replaced, they shall continue to sit until the completion of all stages of any case in which the court has met for an 
oral hearing prior to the date of replacement. 
1066 Article 16 The Protocol; this provision was not included in the Cape town Draft Protocol but was added to 
the Nouakchott Draft. The provision was adopted by everyone without any objection and this led to its 
subsequent adoption at Addis Ababa without any modification. The reason behind this may not be farfetched as 
making solemn declaration is an act known to all national and international courts. See the Nouakchott 
Legal Experts Report, OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHPR/RPT(2) and the Addis Ababa Legal Experts Report, 
OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHPR/RPT(III) Rev. 1. 
1067 Article 15(4) of the Protocol. This caused a lot of debate and objections from delegates at the Ministers 
of Justices Conference held in Addis Ababa with their reason being that Judges acting on a part-time basis may 
engage in other professions that might be incompatible with their responsibilities as Judges of the Court. The 
fear that Judges working on a part-time basis may cast doubt on the mind of members of the public on the image of 
the Court as a Court of law was also expressed by the delegates. This led to the suggestion to either reduce the 
number of Judges to seven and make them full time or have a number of judges from the eleven Judges to 
act with the president of the Court on full time basis. See Ibrahim Ali Badawi El-Sheikh, Draft Protocol to the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples 
Rights: Introductory (1997) Note 9 African Journal of International and Comparative Law 943-952 at 948. 
See also Gino Naldi & Magliveras (1998) 448-449. 
1068 Article 15(4) The Protocol. 
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also operates on a part-time basis
1069 
just like the African Court. However, the European 
Court,
1070 
functions on a full time basis.
1071
 
In my view, the low level of patronage the African Court is witnessing will put the Judges of 
the Court on break most of the time and this can lead to a situation where they might want to 
take up additional posts in order to keep them busy even though they are not allowed to 
participate in any other activities which are not compatible to their position as 
judges.
1072 
These activities might not be compatible with their judicial duties. The situation 
with the African Commission’s Commissioners who are also elected on part-time basis 
is a good example and this can be described as one of the weaknesses of the 
Commission which should be avoided by the African Court as the workload of the 
Commission is huge. The judges serve in personal capacities and cannot perform any other 
activities other than as judges.
1073
 
The Rules of Procedure of the Court have been able to clarify this ambiguity by listing 
out activities, which if embarked on by the Judges, will compromise their impartiality 
and independence. The rule states that Judges may not hold political, diplomatic or 
administrative positions or function as government legal advisers at the national level.
1074
 
When examining cases, the Court’s quorum will only deemed be formed when there are at 
least seven (7) judges in attendance.
1075
 A Judge who is a national of any State which is a 
State Party to an Application before the court will be excluded from presiding over such an 
Application.
1076 
This is contrary to the initial suggestion of the drafters of the Protocol as it 
was recommended in the initial Cape Town Draft that such Judges should be allowed to 
                                                             
1069 See, Article 11, Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Court on Human Rights, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 
18, Article 11 OEA/Ser.L/V/III.25 doc.7 (1992) Available at 
hrlibrary.umn.edu/humanrts/oasinstr/zoas7ctr.htm (Accessed 24thAugust, 2016). 
1070 Article 19 revised European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
1071 See Statute of International Court of Justice Available at  
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf  (Accessed 24thAugust, 2016). 
1072 This situation has improved now as the judges are more busy compared to what obtained when the Court 
was still newly established. Cases are being filed before the Court more now. The Court has received 83 
applications since it was established 28 of which has been finalized, four referred to the Commission and 11 
are still pending before the Court. Available aten.african-court.org/index.php/cases (Accessed 24thAugust, 2016). 
See also Article 18 of the Protocol. 
1073 Article 11(1) The Protocol.  
1074 Rule 5, Rules of Procedure of the African Court on Human and Peoples Rights which entered into force on 
2
nd June 2010. 
1075 Article 23 The Protocol. 
1076 Article 22 The Protocol. 
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partake in the hearing of such cases.
1077 
The reason given was that the decision to either 
participates in a case or not should be made by the Judges and not subjected to a 
predetermined rule.
1078 
They emphasised that the Judges being people with integrity and 
independence, should be allowed to take part in all cases without any exception including 
the ones that involve their States of origin.
1079
 
Quorum at the Inter-American Court which also has 11 judges is five
1080 
while the 
European Convention did not lay down any quorum. Instead, it is the Rules of Court of the 
European Court which came into force on the 1
st 
of November, 1998 that made provision 
for this. The Rules state that a quorum will be formed with the two-third of the elected 
judges in office.
1081 
In the case of the International Court of Justice which has 15 Judges, 
quorum will be formed with nine Judges.
1082 
For the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights, quorum will be formed where there are seven members in attendance as 
provided for by the African Charter.
1083
 
Having looked at the Protocol from the first article to the last one, there is no place 
where reason(s) was given as to why the drafters of the Protocol wanted Judges not to take 
part incases which involve their state of origin; in my view it is as a result of not wanting the 
national interest of the Judges to interfere with the administration of justice. 
 
                                                             
1077 Article 19 Cape Town Draft Protocol. 
1078 Explanatory notes to The Protocol to the African Charter on the Establishment of an African Court on 
Human and Peoples Rights 1 (6-12 September, 1995) Cape Town South Africa at 6. 
1079 Explanatory notes to the Protocol to the African Charter on the Establishment of an African Court on 
Human and Peoples Rights 1(6-12 September, 1995) Cape Town, South Africa at 6. The provision of Article 
22 of the Protocol forbids a judge from Member States to form part of the quorum to preside over a suit 
involving its State of origin. This appeared first in the Nouakchott draft as there was a deviation from the position 
under the Cape Town draft. The change came mainly to avoid having ad hoc judges in the Court (See the 
Nouakchott Legal Experts Report at page 8 particularly paragraph 39) and this was why at the Third Legal 
Experts Meeting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia the proposal to include the notion of ad hoc judges was generally 
rejected thereby preventing an amendment of the provision. See The Addis Ababa Legal Experts Report at page 
7particularly paragraph 28. 
1080 Article 56 of the American Convention. 
1081 Rule 20(2) Rules of Procedure of the European Court on Human Rights. 
1082 Article 25, Statute of the International Court of Justice. 
1083 Article 42(3) African Charter. Although there has been an instance where the Commission did not attain 
quorum as set out in the African Charter; on the first day of the 21st Ordinary Session of the Commission which 
was held in Nouakchott, Mauritania from the 15th to the 24th of April, 1997 only five (5) members were 
present while two (2) Commissioners arrived on the second day. See Rachel Murray, Report on the 1997 
Sessions of the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights-21st and 22nd Sessions:15-25 April, and 2-
11 November 1997, 19 (5-7) Human Rights Law Journal 170.  
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6.3.5 Independence of the Judges of the African Court 
 
By virtue of the provision of Article 17 of the Protocol to the African Charter on the 
Establishment of an African Court and in line with the practice of international law, the 
independence of judges of the Court must be ensured.
1084 
The Judges shall enjoy, right from 
the moment they are elected till the end of their tenure, the immunities extended to 
diplomatic agents in accordance with international law.
1085 
This can be seen as a way of 
helping the judges in the performance of their duties. 
 
Article 17(1) of the Protocol was introduced by the Nouakchott draft which is a revision of 
the provision of Article 15(1) of the Cape Town draft
1086 
which was amended because it was 
seen as been overloaded with biased language.
1087 
Perhaps the reason for this provision 
in the Cape Town draft was because of the fear of the fact that the independence of 
the Court might be compromised by State parties. This can be said to be against a practice 
which is still in existence in most African domestic justice administration.
1088
 
Any decision taken by the judges of the Court in the course of exercising their official 
duty is binding unless and until such decision is set aside by the Assembly at its next 
session.
1089 
This provision gives power to the Assembly to interfere in the activities of 
the Court. Neither the European Convention on Human Rights, the Inter-American 
Convention on Human Rights nor the Statute of the International Court of Justice made 
provision for this. They cannot be held responsible or liable for any decision or opinion 
issued in the course of carrying out their functions;
1090 
this is also provided for in the 
                                                             
1084 Article 17(1) the Protocol. 
1085
 Article 17(3) the Protocol, see also Article 51 of the Revised European Convention on Human Rights 
and Article 70(1) of the American Convention. 
1086 Article 15(1) of the Cape Town Draft Protocol read thus: Judges shall be independent in the exercise of 
their functions. The Court shall decide matters before it impartially, on the basis of fact and in accordance 
with law, without restriction, undue influence, inducement, pressure, threat or interference, direct or indirect, from 
any quarter or for any reason. 
1087 See the Nouakchott Legal Experts Report at pg. 8 para. 34. 
1088Michelo Hansungule, ‘African Courts and the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights’ in 
Anton Bosl & Joseph Diescho (eds) ‘Human Rights in Africa: Legal Perspectives on their Protection and 
Promotion’ (2009) 233. 
1089 Article 19(2) the Protocol.  
1090 Article 17(4) the Protocol and Article 70(2) of the American Convention has a similar provision. The 
Cape Town Draft Protocol stressed that the independence provision of the Protocol is crucial for the functioning 
of the Court and therefore derives from Article 10 of the 1985 UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the 
Judiciary. Therefore in order to ensure that the judges carry out their functions without fear or favour and with 
the diligence required of them, it is important to provide them with the maximum immunity allowed under 
international law. See Explanatory notes to the Cape Town Draft Protocol at page 5. 
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Banjul Charter in relation to the members of the African Commission.
1091 
This is to secure 
the full independence of the judges.
1092
 
Furthermore, in order to further ensure the independence of the Judges, it is provided 
that no judge of the Court shall be suspended or removed from office unless by the 
unanimous decision of other judges of the Court where the judge in question has been found 
to be no longer fulfilling the required conditions to be a judge of the Court.
1093 
This 
decision, once it is taken by the Judges, becomes final and binding except and unless it 
is set aside by the Assembly at its next sessions.
1094 
What this means is that the Judge 
affected can appeal to the Assembly of the OAU against his removal. 
 
The European Convention on its part lays down a two-thirds majority decision of other 
Judges of the Court before a Judge of the Court can be either removed or suspended 
1095 
while the American Convention states that the General Assembly of the American 
States may, only at the request of the Court, determine sanctions to be applied against 
Judges when there are justifiable grounds for such action as set forth in the Statute of the 
Court.
1096 
What the provision of Article 19 means is that it will be difficult to remove a 
serving Judge of the Court and this is a guarantee of their independence vis-a-vis States and 
this is reinforced by the enjoyment of the diplomatic privileges and immunities as laid 
down by the OAU Convention on the Privileges and Immunities
1097 
and implicitly 
pointed out in Article17 (1 & 3) of the Protocol to the African Charter on the 
                                                             
1091 Article 43 Banjul Charter. 
1092 Experience with the African Commission has shown that while these measures are important and necessary 
they are not enough to ensure the independence of institutions in situations where there are no other measures 
put in place. Such other measures can be said to include provision of sufficient funding for these institutions  
and enforcement powers. 
1093 Article 19(1) The Protocol. 
1094 Article 19(2) The Protocol. 
1095 Article 24 of the European Convention. 
1096 Article 73, American Convention See also Article 19 of the Statute of the American Court adopted in 1979 
as revised in 1992, Buergenthal T & Dinah Shelton, ‘Protecting Human Rights in the Americas: Cases and 
Materials’ (1995) 667-671. The protocol to the American Convention did not provide for the conditions to be 
fulfilled in order to become a judge at the Inter-American Court on Human Rights but reference can be made to 
Article 18(1) of the Statute of the Inter-American Court which provides that the position of the judge is 
incompatible with being a member or high-ranking official of the executive branch of government, official of 
international organisations or any other position which prevents discharge of duties or affects independence or 
impartiality or the dignity and prestige of the office. See Statute of the Inter-American Court on Human Rights 
O.A.S. Res. 448 (IX-0/79), O.A.S. Off Rec. OES/Ser.P/IX.0.2/80, Vol. 1 at 98, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 16, 
OEA/Ser.L/V.III.3 doc.13 corr.1 (1980). 
1097 General Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Organisation of African Unity, adopted at 
Accra, Ghana on the 25th of October, 1965. Text of it can also be found in United Nations Treaty Series (1979) 
1000 No. 14688 at 403-409. 
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establishment of an African Court. 
 
Furthermore, in order to ensure that there is no conflict of interest and further ensuring 
the independence of the judges, no judge may hear any case which he/she had previously 
taken part as agent, counsel or advocate for one of the parties or as a member of a national 
or international court or a commission of enquiry or in any other capacity.
1098 
This can be 
said to be a guarantee to parties appearing before the Court that their legitimate interest is 
guaranteed. Any dispute or doubt that may arise as a result of the conflict of interest 
provision will resolved by the Court.
1099
 
As can be seen from the above, the Protocol is made up of important guarantees put in 
place to ensure that the Judges’ independence and impartiality are secured with the 
safeguards resting extensively on international law as can be seen from the provision of 
Article 17 of the Protocol. In Africa especially with the leaders, what is written down on 
paper does not always transform into practice and this was what played out with the 
nomination of the judges to replace those whose terms lapsed in July 2008. This also 
raised suspicion of possible threats to the independence of the judges. As the Protocol 
provided in Article 12 that Members State should nominate  judges  for  election  to  the  
Court,  the  decision  of  Uganda  to  replace  George Kanyeihamba with Joseph Mulenga 
was filled with controversy.
1100 
The government of Uganda blocked the nomination of 
Justice Kanyeihamba because of the fear that he would ‘embarrass’ the state at the 
Court.
1101 
The government did not give any reason for not nominating the Judge for a 
second term thereby prompting members of the Coalition of an Effective African Court to 
express concern that the actions of Uganda could spell disaster for the independence of 
Judges of the Court. With this incidence from Uganda, it is believed there is a need to 
revisit the issue of tenure of the Judges. A single term of six years just will not be bad as 
tenure for the Judges of the Court just like what obtains at the Inter-American Court. 
                                                             
1098 Article 17(2) the Protocol. 
1099 Article 17(2) the Protocol; there is no directly similar provision under the European and Inter-
American Conventions. 
1100 See ‘Ugandas Government Accused of Blocking the Re-election of Judge to the African Court’ Available 
at  http://www.voanews.com/a/a-13-2008-06-23-voa4-66821492/374439.html.(Accessed 5th September, 2016). 
1101 See ‘Ugandas Government Accused of Blocking the Re-Election of Judge to the African Court’ Available 
at 
http://www.voanews.com/a/a-13-2008-06-23-voa4-66821492/374439.html. (Accessed 5th September, 2016). 
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6.3.6 Procedures before the Court 
 
Aside the power to create its own Rules, there are other compulsory provisions on 
procedure which are already set out in the Protocol and these provisions are on admissibility 
requirements, hearing procedures and finality.
1102
 
6.3.6.1 Admissibility 
 
In admitting cases, the Protocol provides that the Court will take into consideration the 
provision of Article 56 of the Banjul Charter when making admissibility determinations on 
pending communications.
1103 
Before a communication can be admissible, it must be 
compatible with the Charter,
1104 
  it  must  be  filed  within  a  reasonable  time  after  
domestic  remedies  have  been exhausted and not deal with matters that have been settled 
by other means.
1105 
Looking at the provision of sub-paragraph (1) of Article 6 of the 
Protocol, it is clear that the provision relate mainly to cases filed before the Court by 
‘individual’ and ‘non-government organisations’ as it gives an option to the Court by 
not making it compulsory on it to seek opinion from the Commission.
1106 
The Court 
can decide to seek the opinion of the Commission before deciding to admit an application 
filed before it in accordance with Article 5(3) of the Protocol. Communications filed 
before the Commission which are coming from States parties have only one condition to 
fulfil which is exhaustion of local remedies compared to what individual and non-
governmental organisations are subjected to. This is also the case under the European 
system as reflected by the provision of Article 35 of the European Convention.
1107 
The 
Rules of Procedure of the Court also has the same conditions for the admissibility of 
applications by the Court just like as it is set out for the Commission.
1108
 
Even looking critically at the provision of Article 6(2) of the Protocol reading it vis-à-vis 
the provision of Article 56 of the African Charter, one will not be wrong to conclude 
                                                             
1102 Nsongurua Ndombana (2000) 3 Yale Human Rights & Development Journal 45 at 96. 
1103 Article 6(2) The Protocol. 
1104 Article 6(2) The Protocol. 
1105 Article 56(2)(6) & (7) of the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (hereinafter referred to as the 
Banjul Charter). See also Rule 40(6) Rules of Procedure of the African Court. 
1106 Article 6(1) The Protocol states thus: The Court, when deciding on the admissibility of a case instituted 
under Article 5(3) of this Protocol, may request the opinion of the Commission which shall give it as soon as 
possible. 
1107 See Article 35 of the European Convention. See also Obiora Chinedu Okafor, ‘The African Human 
Rights System, Activist Forces and International Institutions’ (2009) 99; Dinah Shelton et al, ‘Regional 
Protection of Human Rights (2013) 1 at 402.  
1108 Rule 40 Rules of Procedure of the African Court. 
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that the provision also referred to applications submitted before the Court by individuals 
and non- governmental organisations because Article 56 of the Charter set out conditions 
that have to be met before a communication can be admissible by the Commission other 
than communications coming from States.
1109
 
Provisions such as the one requiring applicants to identify themselves even where they 
request anonymity
1110 
and the one requiring that the language not be disparaging or 
insulting
1111 
in relation to a State or regional institution can be said to be questionable.
1112 
This is because they are not relevant either to the merit of the complaint or do they serve 
any important procedural functions. The Court has the discretion to retain any case before 
it where it feels such case is in order if not such application will be referred back to the 
Commission.
1113
 
General international law practice requires that local remedies must be exhausted and this 
extends to both judicial and administrative remedies,
1114 
before making recourse to 
international remedies to which the Court proffers. Where a case suffers unduly 
prolonged procedures and unjustified delay then recourse can be made to international 
remedies.
1115
  This can be said to be as a result of the problems associated with the 
administration of justice in Africa such as the slow and ineffective domestic judicial 
interventions in cases of violations of human rights;
1116 
the exception can be applied here. 
Also, the exception can be brought into play where there are no domestic remedies in 
place to protect a right which is being violated or where the party alleging violations has 
been denied access to the remedies under domestic laws, just as it obtains under the 
American system.
1117
 
                                                             
1109 The first sentence of Article 56 reads thus: Communications relating to human and peoples rights referred to 
in Article 55 received by the Commission, shall be considered if they: […]. Article 55 states thus: 1. ‘Before 
each Session, the Secretary of the Commission shall make a list of the communications other than those of States 
parties to the present charter and transmit them to the members of the Commission, who shall indicate 
which communications should be considered by the Commission.’ 
1110 Rule 40(1) Rules of Procedure of the African Court. 
1111 Rule 40(3) Rules of Procedure of the African Court. 
1112 Article 56(1)(3) Banjul Charter. 
1113 Article 6(3) The Protocol. 
1114 Rule 40(5) Rules of Procedure of the African Court. 
1115 Rule 40(5) Rules of Procedure of the African Court; see also Article 56(5) Banjul Charter. 
1116 See Communication 477/14, Crawford Lindsay Von Abo v The Republic of Zimbabwe adopted at the 
57th Ordinary  Session  of  the  African  Commission  held  in  Banjul,  The  Gambia  from  4  –  18  
November,  2015; Communication 60/91Constitutional Rights Project (in respect of Akamu& Others) v 
Nigeria; Communication 101/93Civil Liberties Organisation (in respect of Bar Association) v Nigeria.  
1117 Article 46(2) American Convention on Human Rights.  
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6.3.6.2 Hearing Procedure 
 
The Protocol provides for hearing procedures for the Court 
1118 
and it functions as a 
single chamber when examining cases brought before it as long as there is a quorum of 
seven Judges of the Court.
1119 
The Court has power to preside over plenary hearings and to 
receive written or oral evidence including expert testimony.
1120  
The written procedure shall 
consist of the communication to the Court, the Parties, as well as the Commission, as 
appropriate, of applications, statements of the case, defences and observations and of replies 
if any, as well as all papers and documents in support, or of certified copies thereof.
1121 
Oral proceedings on its part shall consist of a hearing by the Court of representatives of 
parties, witnesses, experts or such other persons as the Court may decide to hear.
1122 
Where the Court deems it necessary, it shall hold an inquiry
1123 
while it is expected of 
Member States concerned to assist the Court by making available to it, relevant facilities 
which will aid the Court to efficiently handle the case before it.
1124
 
The sessions of the Court are held in public as cases brought before it are heard in open 
court
1125 
this is aimed at ensuring transparency and fairness in the hearing proceedings. 
This is an act which the African Traditional Justice system is known for as it is also an 
important guarantee which is not mentioned in either by the American Convention or by 
the European Convention before its amendment by Protocol No.11.
1126 
However, the 
Court can decide either of its own volition or on the request of a party to hold its hearing 
in camera where in its opinion, it is in the interest of the public, morality, safety or public 
order to do so.
1127 
Whenever the Court decides to preside over a case in camera, the 
                                                             
1118 Article 10 The Protocol. 
1119
 Article 23 The Protocol. 
1120 Article 26(2) The Protocol. See also Rule 27 Rules of Procedure of the African Court. 
1121 Rule 27(2) Rules of Procedure of the African Court. See also Manisuli Ssenyonjo (2011) 276. 
1122 Rule 27(3) Rules of Procedure of the African Court.  
1123 Article 26(1) The Protocol states that The Court shall hear submissions by all parties and if deemed 
necessary, hold an enquiry. Also according to the Rules of Procedure of the Court, The Court may, at any 
time during the proceedings, assign one or more of its Members to conduct an enquiry, carry out a visit to the 
scene or take evidence in any other manner. See Rule 45(2) Rules of Procedure of the African Court. 
1124Article 26(1) The Protocol and Rule 32 Rules of Procedure of the African Court. 
1125 Article 10 The Protocol. See also Rule 43(1) Rules of Procedure of the African Court. 
1126 Article 40(1) of the European Convention now expressly lay down that hearings shall be in public unless 
the Court in exceptional circumstances decides otherwise. The Court found the protection of the interest of 
children to require a restriction on public hearing in O, H, W, B and R v. United Kingdom (1987) Series A, Vols. 
120 and 121, reprinted in Naldi and Magliveras, ‘Reinforcing the African System of Human Rights: The 
Protocol on the Establishment of a Regional Court of Human and Peoples Rights’ (1998) 16 Netherlands 
Quarterly on Human Rights 431. See also Rule 33 Rules of Procedure of the European Court. 
1127 Rule 43(2) Rules of Procedure of the African Court. 
https://etd.uwc.ac.za
275 
 
 
 
reason(s) for making such a decision must be given and parties or their legal representative 
will be permitted and heard in camera.
1128 
It should be noted that the public nature of the 
proceedings which Article 10 of the Protocol covers only concern the hearings and 
does not extend to the deliberations of the Court as it will be confidential just as what 
obtains with cases in local courts.
1129
 
6.3.6.3 Representation 
 
A party before the Court is entitled to representation by a legal representative of his 
choice
1130 
who may be any person appointed to carry out this task without necessarily 
having the status or qualification of a legal counsel.
1131 
Free legal representation will also 
be provided by the Court where the interest of justice will be required.
1132 
The lack of 
provision of free legal representation for indigent parties was an issue upon which the 
African Charter was criticised considering the level of poverty in the continent.
1133 
Therefore, allowing parties who cannot afford to hire the services of a legal counsel to 
stand in on their behalf before the court, to have access to free legal representation should 
be seen as an attempt to ensure the realisation of the right to fair hearing. 
 
Furthermore, the protocol gives protection to parties, their witnesses or their 
representatives before the Court. They will also enjoy all facilities in accordance with 
international law which are necessary for the discharge of their functions, tasks ad duties in 
relation to the Court.
1134 
The extension of immunity to parties, witnesses and 
representatives of parties appearing before the Court is a standard practice which is aimed 
at ensuring the protection of human rights.
1135 
Aside this, the relevance of the protection of 
                                                             
1128 Rule 43(3) Rules of Procedure of the African Court. 
1129 Rule 14(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Court and the Article 54(3) of the Statute of 
the International Court of Justice. 
1130 Article 10(2) the Protocol. 
1131 Fatsah Ouguergouz (2003) 737. 
1132 Article 10 The Protocol. 
1133 Odinkalu Chidi & Camilla Christensen, ‘The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights: 
Development of its Non-States Communication Procedures’ (1998) 20 Human Rights Quarterly 273. 
1134 Article 10(3) of the Protocol. 
1135 The provisional measure and practice of the Inter-American system under Article 63(2) of the 
American Convention covers all persons who appear before the Inter-American Court. Therefore, States are 
prohibited from either instituting proceedings against witnesses or expert witnesses or bring illicit pressure to 
bear on them or their families on account of declarations or opinions they have delivered before the Court. See 
David Harris & Stephen Livingstone (eds.), ‘The Inter-American System of Human Rights’ (1998) 545. The 
Statute of the International Court of Justice on the other hand makes available to agents, counsel and 
advocates of parties appearing before it, privileges and immunities necessary for the independent performance 
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witnesses and parties in the African human rights mechanism cannot be overemphasised 
because in many parts of African continent, State harassment and intimidation of parties 
and witnesses against the States is rampant therefore, the protection will enable individuals 
or groups of persons to appear before the Court without fear of retribution.
1136
 
It has been suggested that one of the ways to ensure the implementation of the 
provisions of Article 10(3) of the Protocol by the Court is by it inserting corresponding 
provisions into the headquarters agreement which the Court signed with the host country.
1137
 
6.3.7 Rules of Procedure 
 
The power to develop its own rules of procedure was granted to the Court by the Protocol
1138 
and this came with a further requirement that it must consult with the African 
Commission as appropriate when drawing up these rules. This can be said to be in line 
with international best practice as experience from other regions has shown.
1139
 
The Rules of Procedure of the Court entered into force on the 2nd of June, 2010 and it 
replaced the interim Rules of Procedure of 20
th
June, 2008. This was as a result of the 
harmonisation of the Interim  Rules  of  Procedure of  the  Court  and  the  Commission  
carried  out  during the  joint meetings held in July 2009 in Arusha, Tanzania in October, 
2009 in Dakar, Senegal and in April, 2010 in Arusha, Tanzania.
1140
 
Article 2 of the Protocol to the African Charter on the Establishment of an African 
Court recognised the complementarity between the Court and the Commission in 
discharging the protective mandate under the Charter.
1141 
This is further reiterated by the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
of their duties. See Article 42, paragraph 3, Statute of the International Court of Justice. These privileges and 
immunities are also extended to witnesses, experts and other persons who may be performing missions on the 
order of the Court during the duration of their mission including times spent on journeys in connection with 
them. See paragraph 5 (iii) of Resolution 90 (I) of the United Nation General Assembly adopted on the 11th of 
December, 1956 and tilted privileges and Immunities of Members of parties and of Witnesses and Experts. 
1136 Naldi & Magliveras (1998) 442. 
1137 Fatsah Ouguergouz (2003) 739. 
1138 Article 33 the Protocol. 
1139 See Article 26(d) European Convention and Article 60 American Conventions. Also the African Charter 
in Article 42(2) gave power to the Commission to formulate its own Rules of Procedures. 
1140 See  Rules  of  Court  of  the  African  Court  on  Human  and  Peoples  Rights  available  at  
en.african-  
court.org/images/Basic%20Documents/Final_Rules_of_Court_for_Publication_after_Harmonization_- 
_Final__English_7_sept_1_.pdf. (Accessed 5thSeptember, 2016). 
1141 It provides that the Court shall, bearing in mind the provisions of the Protocol, complement the 
protective mandate of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights conferred upon it by the African 
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Rules of the Court where it laid down the modalities for the relationship between the 
Commission and the African Court.
1142 
This Complementarity between the two organs 
will be discussed at length under a separate sub-heading in this chapter. 
 
The Rules of Procedure of the African Court laid down the detailed conditions with which 
the Court considered applications brought before it, bearing in mind the complementarity 
between the Court and the Commission.
1143 
The formulation of the Rules of Procedure 
by the African Court is crucial to the effectiveness with which it will be able to carry out its 
tasks. The Rules of the Court make provision for issues such as personal jurisdiction, 
particularly regulation of NGO status, questions of standing, direct access to the Court by 
individuals, and application to individual cases of the provisions on ‘other treaties,’ 
‘economic, social and cultural rights’, and group rights’ in the Charter.1144 
Furthermore, the Rules also define the precise relationship between the Commission and 
the Court
1145 
as well as the scope of the exception of automatic jurisdiction for ‘non-state 
cases’ (that is for NGOs and individuals). The Rules also touches on how proceedings are 
to be commenced before   the   Court,
1146   
written   briefs   by   the   parties,
1147   
oral   
evidence,
1148  
preliminary Objections
1149 
and interim measures of protection.
1150 
These are 
areas seen during the drafting of the Protocol as important problematic areas which the 
Court has tried to deal with in its Rules of Procedure in a comprehensive manner. 
6.4 Jurisdiction and Access to the Court 
 
The establishment of the Court can be said to be a significant achievement in the 
institutionalisation of human rights in the continent. The Protocol established the Court’s 
jurisdiction and the provisions on jurisdiction can be seen as the heart of the Protocol since 
they determine who will have access to the Court, what conditions are to be met in 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
Charter. 
1142 Rule 29, Rules of Court of the African Court. 
1143 Article 8 The Protocol. 
1144 See en.african- 
court.org/images/basic%20Documents/Final_Rules_of_Court_For_Publication_after_Harmonisation_Final_Engl
ish 
_7_sept_1_pdf (Accessed 5th September, 2016). 
1145 Rule 29 Rules of Procedure of the African Court. 
1146 Rule 33 Rules of Procedure of the African Court. 
1147 Rule 70 Rules of Procedure of the African Court. 
1148 Rule 45 Rules of Procedure of the African Court. 
1149 Rule 52 Rules of Procedure of the African Court. 
1150 Rule 51 Rules of Procedure of the African Court.  
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order to have access to the Court and the types of violations which will be redressed. The 
Protocol gives to the Court, a broad mandate and provides for automatic jurisdiction once a 
State ratifies it.
1151 
There is no need for a further deposit of additional declaration before the 
Court can entertain petitions filed by the Commission, a State party or an African Inter-
Governmental Organisation.
1152
 
The African Human Rights Court, just like other regional human rights Courts, has both 
adjudicatory and advisory jurisdiction
1153 
which can be said to be a prospect in strengthening 
the African human rights system and ensuring the protection and fulfilment of 
fundamental rights and duties in the continent. With this, caution has been called for as 
it is believed that the establishment of the Court is by no means a panacea to the 
normative and institutional pitfalls of the African Human Rights System 
1154  
and the 
Commission whose function the Court is to ‘complement and reinforce.’1155 A major 
concern has been the restricted direct access of individuals to the Court.
1156
 
It has power to try disputes between individual and State parties and to also issue 
general interpretative opinions regarding subjects that are not the subject of contentious 
proceedings. The adjudicatory jurisdiction of the Court extends to all cases and disputes 
submitted to it concerning the interpretation and application of the African Charter, the 
                                                             
1151 Article 34(3) the Protocol. 
1152 There is an exception to this general rule but it relates to individual and NGOs. Under Article 34(6) of 
the Protocol, the Court does not have jurisdiction to entertain cases filed by individuals and NGOs except 
where the State against which the complaint is filed has made an explicit declaration to that effect and it has 
deposited its declaration with the OAU Secretariat. See Article 34(6) the Protocol. 
1153 Articles 3 and 4 the Protocol. For an analysis of the Courts jurisdiction, see Osterdahl I, ‘The 
Jurisdiction rationemateriae of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights: A Comparative Critique’ (1998) 
7(2) Review of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 132; see also Van der Mai A.P., ‘The New 
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Towards an Effective Human Rights Protection Mechanism for 
Africa?’ (2005) 18 Leiden Journal of International Law 113; Robert Wundeh Eno, ‘The Jurisdiction of the 
African Court on Human and Peoples Rights’ (2002) 2 African Human Rights Law Journal 223-233. 
1154 Mutua M., ‘The African Human Rights Court: A Two Legged stool?’ (1999) 21 Human Rights Quarterly 342 
at 357-362. See also Frans Viljoen, ‘A Human Rights Court for Africa and Africans’ (2005) 30 Brooklyn 
Journal of International Law 1 at 14-22. 
1155 Paragraph 7, Preamble to the Protocol. 
1156 Mutua M, ‘The African Human Rights Court: A Two Legged Stool?’ (1999) 21 Human Rights Quarterly 342 
at 355- 360; Harrington J, The African Court on Human and peoples Rights in Evans M. & Murray R, ‘The 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: The System in Practice, 1986-2000’ (2002) 319, 320. See also 
Mohammed A.A., ‘Individual and NGO Participation in Human Rights Litigation before the African Court 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Lessons from the European and Inter-American Courts’ (1999) 43(2) Journal 
of African Law 202- 203; E de Wet, ‘The Protection Mechanism under the African Charter and the Protocol 
on the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ in Alfredsson et al., ‘International Human Rights 
Monitoring Mechanisms: Essays in Honour of Jakob Th. Moller’ (2001) 724-725. 
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Protocol and other relevant human rights instruments ratified by States concerned.
1157
 
On access to the Court, only the African Commission, States Parties and African Inter- 
governmental Organisations have automatic direct access to the Court.
1158 
The Court has 
the discretion to allow relevant non-governmental organisations with observer status with 
the Commission and individuals to institute cases directly before it
1159 
provided that the 
state concerned makes a declaration accepting the competence of the Court to receive 
such cases at the time of the ratification of the Protocol or any time thereafter.
1160 
A 
substantive analysis of the provisions on access to court will be looked into later on in this 
chapter. 
 
6.4.1. Contentious Jurisdiction 
 
The Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate over disputes brought against a State party to 
the Protocol in which it is alleged that the State has violated the African Charter or any 
other human rights instrument which it has ratified.
1161 
Such claims can be filed either 
directly by the party complaining to the Court
1162 
or filed indirectly through the 
Commission.
1163
 
 
In comparing the material jurisdiction of the African Human Rights Court with that of 
the European Human Rights Courts in contentious matters, the European Court’s 
material jurisdiction extends only to matters concerning the interpretation and application of 
the European Convention and its Protocols.
1164 
Also the material jurisdiction of the Inter-
American Court is also limited to the interpretation and application of the American 
Convention alone.
1165 
What this means is that the interpretation and application of the 
European Social Charter of 18
th
 
October, 1961 and of the Additional Protocol to the 
American Convention on Human Rights in the area of Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights of 17
th 
November, 1988 fall outside the jurisdiction of both the European Court and 
                                                             
1157 Article 3 the Protocol. 
1158 Article 5(1) the Protocol. 
1159 Article 59(3) the Protocol. 
1160 Article 34(6) the Protocol. 
1161 Article 3 and 7 the Protocol. 
1162 See Falana v The African Union, Application No. 001/2011. 
1163 See Michelot Yogogombaye v The Republic of Senegal, Application No. 001/2008; African Commission 
on Human and Peoples Rights v Libya, Application No. 002/2013. 
1164 Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the European Convention. 
1165 Article 62 (1) American Convention. 
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the Inter-American Court respectively
1166 
despite the fact that these are two instruments 
which recognise the important category of the economic, social and cultural rights.
1167
  
The main purpose of a court’s contentious jurisdiction is to rule on whether a State has 
violated any rights contained in a particular human rights instrument ratified by the 
State Parties for which the victim seeks redress.
1168 
In this case, we are looking at the 
rights contained in the African Charter. The exercise of the contentious jurisdiction by the 
Court enables it to apply the instruments and issue a decision on the merit which may 
include the award of reparations or other remedies where the Court finds a violation.
1169
 
 
6.4.1.1 Who can file a Complaint with the Court? 
 
The Protocol provides for the Commission,
1170 
state party which has lodged a complaint to 
the Commission, state party against which the complaint has been lodged at the 
Commission, the state party whose citizen is a victim of human rights violation and 
African intergovernmental organisations as entities which may submit contentious cases 
to the Court.
1171
 Furthermore, Article 5(3) of the Protocol provides that ‘the Court may 
entitle relevant NGOs with observer status before the Commission and individuals, to 
institute cases directly before it, in accordance with Article 34(6) of the Protocol’.1172 The 
discretion to allow direct access to the Court by individuals and NGOs lies jointly with 
                                                             
1166 Given the legal nature of the rights recognised by these two instruments, their implementation is monitored 
by the submission of periodic reports by States parties. The Additional Protocol to the American Convention 
provides however for the two exceptions which concern the rights of workers to organise trade unions and to join 
the union of their choice, and the right to education. Paragraph 6 of Article 19 provides: Any instance in 
which the rights established in paragraph (a) of Article 8 and in Article 13 are violated by action directly 
attributable to a State Party to this Protocol may give rise, through participation of the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights and, when applicable, of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, to 
application of the system of individual petitions governed by Articles 44 - 51 and 61- 69 of the American 
Convention on Human Rights. 
1167 See Selmouni v France (1999) ECHR 100, 25803/94. See also, Lucas Lixinski, ‘Treaty Interpretation by 
the Inter-America Court of Human Rights: Expansionism at the Service of the Unity of International Law’ (2010) 
21 (3) European Journal of International Law 585 - 604. 
1168 Dinah Shelton & Paolo Carozza (2013) 249. 
1169 Art. 27. See Vincent Orlu Nmehielle, ‘The African Human Rights System: Its laws, Practice and 
Institutions’ (2001) 263. 
1170 African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights v Libya Application No002/2013; African Commission 
on Human and Peoples Rights v Great Socialist Peoples’ Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Application No 004/2011; 
African Commission on Human and peoples’ Rights v Kenya Application No 006/2012 
1171 Article 5(1) The Protocol. 
1172 Article 34(6) provides that at the time of the ratification of this Protocol or any time thereafter, the state 
shall make a declaration accepting the competence of the Court to receive cases under article 5(3). See 
Tanganyika Law Society and Legal and Human Rights Centre v The United Republic of Tanzania Application No 
009/2011; See also Request for Advisory Opinion by Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project 
(SERAP) Application No. 001/2012. 
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the Court and the target State but on one hand, the Court has discretion to either grant or 
deny individual and NGO access at will. 
 
Looking at the provision of Article 34(6) of the Protocol, one will believe that it was 
inserted as a compromise to facilitate the adoption of the Protocol. The issue of access to 
Court by individuals and NGOs during the process of the drafting of the Protocol generated 
a lot of views; there was a struggle to adopt either the position under the Inter-
American system, the old European system or the UN system under the First Optional 
Protocol to International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, or a variation of these 
systems.
1173 
The Cape Town draft allowed NGOs and individuals direct access to the 
Court to file cases before it in ‘exceptional circumstances’, with each case to be 
determined by the Court.
1174 
The Draft did not require separate acceptance by the States 
Parties of the Court’s competence over such cases.1175  This provision was eventually 
criticised by NGOs as being too restrictive and subjective,
1176 
opening decisions about what 
constitutes ‘exceptional circumstances’ to political considerations. 
                                                             
1173 It should be mentioned that under Article 61 of the American Convention only States Parties and the 
Inter- American Commission have the right to submit cases to the Inter-American Court. Therefore, 
individuals do not have access to the Court, even though individual access to the Inter-American 
Commission is automatic under Article 44. In the same vein, the European Convention before subsequent 
amendments through Protocols 9 and 11, limited access to the European Court on Human Rights to the High 
Contracting Parties and the European Human Rights Commission under Article 44, but recognised individual 
access to the former European Commission on Human Rights only after a declaration by a State Party to 
that effect. Protocol 9, however, introduced individual access to the Court after the consideration of a case by 
the Commission where the respondent State has ratified the Protocol. The European Convention has been 
amended since by Protocol 11 which makes provision for the Court as the only institutional organ of the 
European system, and providing for direct individual access to the Court. The Optional Protocol to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is primarily an instrument that recognises the 
competence of the UN Human Rights Committee to receive cases from individuals when ratified by the 
particular State Party concerned. The inter-play of these various instruments and their effect on human rights 
dispute resolution in these systems, as well as their application to the African situation, especially the 
African Indigenous Justice System, can be said to be the guides of the drafters of the Protocol on the 
Establishment of the African Court. 
1174 Article 5(1) Cape Town Draft Protocol. See also Badawi El-Sheikh, ‘Draft Protocol to the African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights: 
Introductory Note’ (1997) 9 African Journal of International and Comparative Law 943-952 at 947. 
1175 The drafters of the Cape Town Draft Protocol contended that there may be instances where it may be 
necessary for victims of human rights abuse or their representatives and NGOs to file complaints directly in 
Court without first approaching the Commission, especially where irreparable harm may be caused by the delay 
in consideration of the matter. Such persons do not have the rights for their complaints to be heard and therefore 
a preliminary hearing has to establish whether the Court will hear the matter. They argued that this provision 
which gives the Court original jurisdiction, once domestic remedies have been exhausted, being unique, is in 
keeping with the unique provisions of the Charter which allows the Commission, in Article 55 of the Charter 
to receive other communications, and as such, was moving in the right direction. See Explanatory Notes to 
the Protocol to the African Charter on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples Right 1 
(6-12 September, 1995) Cape Town, South Africa at page 4. 
1176 Vincent Orlu Nmehielle, ‘The African Human Rights System: Its Laws, Practice and Institutions’ (2001) 266. 
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The Nouakchott Draft Protocol in amending the Cape Town draft protocol, modified the 
access of non-State entities by limiting it to ‘urgent cases or serious, systematic or massive 
violations of human rights,’ but subject to a declaration by States Parties accepting the 
competence of the Court to receive such cases.
1177 
States parties were also allowed to 
exclude by declaration, the Court’s jurisdiction over non-state cases filed against it. 
Another limitation was a requirement that the Commission decide the admissibility of all 
cases submitted to the Court by non-State actors.
1178 
A compromise was reached at the 
Nouakchott meeting of the Legal Experts after a prolonged debate; they eventually gave 
in to the preferred optional clause for submission by Member States to the contentious 
jurisdiction of the Court.
1179 
The final draft of the Protocol amended this by making the 
consultation of the Commission on admissibility issues optional;
1180 
in cases where the 
Court is required to act in utmost urgency it may waive this in order to avoid irreparable 
damage. 
The practice in international human rights protection is to give to States Parties an 
unfettered right of access to a court on human rights or other institutional organs and this 
was what was borrowed when Article 5 of the Protocol to the African Charter on the 
Establishment of an African Court was being drafted. The direct access to the Court by 
the Commission and State Parties is therefore not something new as it is the practice 
under the European and the Inter-American systems.
1181   
The  only  new  addition  can  
                                                             
1177 Article 6(1)&(5) Nouakchott Draft Protocol. 
1178 This provision suffered some criticism as some NGOs argued then that to make the Commission determine 
the admissibility of urgent cases sent directly to the Court would defeat the very purpose of the provision as it 
would increase delay in those cases in which urgency was the decisive factor. See Dan Juma, ‘Access to the 
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights: A Case of the Poacher turned Gamekeeper’ (2007) 4 (2) Essex 
Human Rights Law Review 3-7. See also Nsongurua Udombana, ‘Towards the African Court on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights: Better Late than Never’ (2014) 3 Yale Human Rights and Development Journal 45. 
1179 See Nouakchott Legal Experts Report, OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHPR (2) at page 6. Most of the delegates were 
of the view that the Court should be accessible to individuals and non-governmental organisations just 
like the Commission and States Parties. They even pointed it out at the meeting that instruments of other 
regional human rights systems were being amended to allow individuals and NGOs to have access to their 
Courts without any hindrance.  See  Manisuli Ssenyonjo,  ‘Direct  Access  to  the  African  Court  on  Human  
and  Peoples’  Rights  by Individuals and Non-Governmental Organisations: An Overview of the Emerging 
Jurisprudence of African Court 2008-2012’ (2013) 2 International Human Rights Law Review 17-56. 
1180 Article 6(1) The Protocol. 
1181 The Protocol borrowed more from the European system based on the old European Convention as Article 
5(b),(c) and (d) of the Protocol to the African Charter on the Establishment of an African Court are similar 
to the provisions of Article 48 of the European Convention before the amendment by Protocol 11. Comparing 
with the new Article 36 of the European Convention which was amended by Protocol 11, it now requires that 
In all cases before a Chamber or the Grand Chamber, a High Contracting Party, one whose national is an 
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be  said  to  be  the  adding  of  Inter-Governmental Organisations to the list of those that 
are entitled to submit cases to the Court
1182 
and what makes this interesting is the fact that 
the access granted is in relation to contentious applications and not in seeking advisory 
opinion from the Court.
1183
 
Looking critically at the provision of Article 5 of the Protocol, it shows that even States 
Parties to the Protocol do not have a general direct access to the Court like the Commission 
as reflected by the wording of Article 5 of the Protocol. What this mean is that a 
Communication must first be filed at the Commission either by a State or against a State 
before an application can be lodged before the Court.
1184 
It is only the Commission that 
can be said to have unlimited direct access to the Court not only in referring cases to the 
Court but also in filing new cases before it especially cases which reveals the existence of 
a series of violations human rights as expected under Article 58 of the Charter.
1185
 
The limited direct access of individuals and NGOs to the Court should be seen as limiting 
and representing a shortcoming to the jurisdiction of the Court but however, they should also 
be seen as an innovation among regional human rights systems giving traditional notions 
of how two- legged systems work.
1186 
Looking at the Inter-American system as an 
example, it is only States Parties and the Commission that have the right to submit 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
applicant, shall have the right to submit written comments and to take part in the hearings. This is absent in the 
American convention. 
1182 Article 5(e) The Protocol. 
1183 Among the entities listed under Article 4 of the Protocol which can request for an advisory opinion is 
the African Intergovernmental Organisation. See Article 4 (1) the Protocol. Article 64 of the American 
Convention allows the organs of the Organisation of American States that are listed under chapter X of the 
OAS Charter to consult the Court regarding the interpretation of the Convention or of other treaties 
concerning the protection of human rights in American States. Interpreting this refers to the ability of the 
OAS organs to make use of the advisory jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court. Similarly, there is no direct 
provision in the European Convention allowing European intergovernmental organisations access to the 
contentious jurisdiction of the court. It can however be argued that since individuals now have access to 
the European Court on Human Rights under the European Convention as amended by Protocol 11, 
intergovernmental organisations where they exist can also be allowed access. 
1184 Article 5(b) and (c) of the Protocol appears to suggest that there need not be an outcome of the complaint 
lodged by a State or against a State before the State proceeds to the Court, the interest of justice will not be 
served by waiting for such outcome and the procedure will ridicule the object of the Protocol. See Gino Naldi & 
Magliveras (1998) 437. A possible exception to this can be said to be the situation under Article 5(d) of the 
Protocol where a State Party whose citizen is a victim of human rights violation is allowed to file a case before 
the Court. See Gino Naldi & Magliveras (1998) 437. 
1185 Gino Naldi & Magliveras (1998) 437. 
1186 Inger Osterdahl, ‘The Jurisdiction RationeMateriae of the African Court of Human and Peoples Rights: 
A Comparative Critique’ (1998) 7 Revue Africaine Des Droits de LHomme 132-134. 
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cases directly to the Court while individuals must first go to the Commission.
1187
 
Another feature of the Protocol as regards access to Court is the provision for joinder of 
parties. The Protocol allows a State Party to join a case before the Court where such State 
Party has an interest in the matter.
1188 
The nature of the ‘interest’ here was not defined by 
the Protocol
1189 
like what obtains in the Revised European Convention where a request 
for joinder must be ‘in the interest of the proper administration of justice.’1190 In 
determining the level of interest that is required before a State can be allowed to be 
joined as a party before the court the court might want to be guided by its own interest for 
proper administration of justice. In doing this, caution must however be exercised by States 
Parties since real danger exists in that States could exercise their rights to intervene too 
readily in an attempt to subvert the administration of justice.
1191 
The Court can also be 
guided by the practice of other international tribunals, like the International Court of 
Justice which have adopted a fairly strict approach to request for intervention.
1192
 
Allowing States whose citizens are victims of human rights violations to submit cases before 
the Court
1193 
can be said to be an African classification of the provision of Article 
48(b) of the European Convention which allows a State to embrace the claims of its 
citizens.
1194 
See Loizidou v Turkey.
1195
 This provision, one can say will make African States 
show interest in the vindication of the rights of their citizens against other States Parties. 
This provision can also be seen as an opportunity to bring in inter-state petitions since under 
the provision; it is only a State that can be the respondent. 
6.4.1.2 Jurisdiction on Subject-Matter 
 
As earlier mentioned in this chapter, the adjudicatory jurisdiction of the African Court 
                                                             
1187 Article 61 American Convention. The contentious jurisdiction of the Court is not automatically accepted 
through ratification of the Convention instead, the State Party must file a declaration or enter a special 
agreement to that effect. See Article 62(1) American Convention. 
1188 Article 5(2) of the Protocol. Under the new Article 36(1) of the European Convention, a variation of 
this provision is that in all cases before the European Court, a State Party one of whose national is an applicant 
shall have the right to submit written comment and to take part in the hearing. 
1189 The earlier draft Protocols of Cape Town and Nouakchott made provision that States have a legal Interest but 
the final protocol eliminated the qualification of the interest to be shown by States Parties as a legal one. See 
Articles 5(2) of the Cape Town and Nouakchott Draft Protocol.  
1190 Article 36(2) Revised European Convention. 
1191 Gino Naldi & Magliveras (1998) 438. 
1192 See generally, Rosenne Shabtai, ‘Intervention in the International Court of Justice’ (1997) particularly chapter 7. 
1193 Article 5(d) The Protocol. 
1194 Vincent Nmehielle (2001) 269. 
1195 Application No 15318/89. See Loizidou v Turkey. 
https://etd.uwc.ac.za
285 
 
 
 
extends to all cases and disputes brought before it, concerning the interpretation and 
application of the Charter, the Protocol and other relevant human rights instruments ratified 
by states concerned.
1196 
The provision goes beyond Articles 60 and 61 of the Charter 
which require the Commission to merely look towards comparative and international 
human rights law when interpreting the provisions of the Charter. Infact the Commission 
may not interpret or apply any human rights instrument except the African Charter under 
its contentious jurisdiction.
1197 
While the Charter may be interpreted by the Commission 
by drawing inspiration from other international and regional human rights instruments,
1198 
other cases must be decided with reference to the African Charter.
1199
 
The situation under the Protocol is pretty different as the Court will exercise direct 
jurisdiction over all human rights instruments that have been ratified by the States 
concerned. This can be said to extend to all regional, sub-regional, bilateral, multilateral 
and international treaties.
1200
 This can be said to be encouraging and important because a 
person whose rights are not adequately protected in the African Charter can easily hold the 
state concerned accountable by invoking another treaty which such state is a party either at 
the UN or sub-regional level.
1201
 Depending on how the Court interprets its mandate, it will 
give a wider consideration to international legal resources, standards and norms than is 
currently the practice with the Commission.
1202 
By doing this, the Court will make use of 
alternative legal resources from other international and regional standard setting 
mechanisms such as the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
and the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Minorities by states parties.
1203
 
The Court has the opportunity to interpret and determine violations of other important 
                                                             
1196 Article 3 The Protocol. 
1197 Article 45 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. 
1198 Article 60 African Charter. 
1199 The same also obtains with the European and the Inter-American Courts whose direct subject matter is limited 
to the Conventions under which they were created. See Article 32 of the Revised European Convention and 
Article 62 of the American Convention. It should be pointed out here that this does not prevent the Courts 
from looking towards each others decisions and those of other human rights agencies in order to find 
solutions to questions concerning the interpretation and application of their own Convention. 
1200 Nsongurua J. Udombana (2000)3 Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal 45 at 89. 
1201 Udombana N.J., ‘Towards the African Court on Human and Peoples Rights: Better Late than Never?’ (2000) 
3 Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal 45. 
1202 See Request No. 002/2013, Request for Advisory Opinion by the African Committee of Experts on the 
Rights and Welfare of a Child on the Standing of the African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare 
of a Child before the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights. 
1203 George Mukundi, ‘African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Ten Years and Still No Justice’ (2008) 18. 
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human rights treaties within the AU framework such as the OAU Convention Governing 
the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa and the Protocol to the African Charter 
on the Rights of Women in Africa. The interpretation of the Protocol on women by the 
Court will be particularly important for the development of women’s rights in Africa as it 
contains important provisions which eliminate all forms of discrimination against women in 
Africa.
1204
 
Also the Court can hear cases that could be submitted to it by the Committee on the Rights 
and Welfare of the Child on violations of children rights as protected by the African 
Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child in Africa.
1205 
Cases on the Rights and 
Welfare of a Child where instituted before the Court, can make the Court attach a legally 
binding force to the Committee on the Rights of the Child’s recommendations or make it 
hear such cases afresh thereby ensuring that the Court’s enforcement mechanism is 
activated.
1206
 
Furthermore, cases on treaties that may not expressly be human rights treaties can also 
be entertained by the Court because some of the existing regional and sub-regional 
instruments like bilateral and multilateral economic treaties may have traces of human 
rights. This is notwithstanding the Protocol’s qualification to only ‘human rights treaties 
ratified.’1207 It also has jurisdiction to interpret and deliberate on cases on other 
international human rights treaties
1208
 which are ratified by States concerned like the 
International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Covenant 
on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the Convention on the 
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women. This provision is full of 
possibilities and potentials for the Court to give adequate protection to victims of 
                                                             
1204 Mukundi (2008)18; Robert Wundeh Eno, ‘The Jurisdiction of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights’ (2002) 2 AHRLJ 223-233. 
1205 The Committee on the Rights and  WELFARE of a Child fits within the definition of an African 
Inter- governmental  Organisation  and  as  such can  take  cases  to  the  African  Court  just  the  same  way 
the  African Commission will do. See Article 5(e) of the Protocol. 
1206 Request No. 002/2013, Request for Advisory Opinion by the African Committee of Experts on the Rights 
and Welfare of the Child on the Standing of the African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the 
Child before the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights. 
1207 Article 7 of the Protocol. Some of these treaties could include the sub-regional economic treaties like 
the ECOWAS, the East African Community (EAC), the SADC, the Common Market for East and Southern 
Africa (COMESA). It also includes Treaties to protect bio-diversity, natural resources, democracy, peace and 
security which all have an impact on the protection and abuse of human rights. See Wachira G.M. (ed.), 
‘Regional and Sub- Regional Platforms for Vindicating Human Rights in Africa’ (2007) 6 Judiciary Watch 
Report, Nairobi, Kenya Section on International Commission of Jurists. 
1208 Article 3 of The Protocol. 
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human rights violations in Africa in line with international standards, norms and 
developing jurisprudence. 
The danger associated with this is that it will lead to chaos of jurisprudence.
1209 
What this 
will mean is that all human rights treaties ratified by State Party to the Protocol on the 
African Court in the past will become justiciable and future ratification will have the 
same effect.
1210 
Infact, States can even get discouraged from ratifying the Protocol and 
other human rights treaties. The broad interpretation may flood the African Court with a lot 
of cases. 
 
On the other hand, the broad jurisdiction of the African Court should be seen as a test 
for countries which have adopted strategies to beat international human rights mechanisms 
in order to escape scrutiny. The broad interpretation will expose States Parties which sees 
ratification of international treaties as a public relations exercise.
1211
 
6.4.2 Advisory Jurisdiction of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
 
The Court may, at the request of a Member State of the African Union, any of the organs of 
the African Union, or any African organisation recognised by the African Union, provide an 
opinion on any legal matter relating to the Charter or any other relevant human rights 
instruments, provided that the subject matter of the opinion is not related to a matter being 
examined by the Commission.
1212 
See, ‘The Request for Advisory Opinion by Pan African 
Lawyers’ Union and Southern African Litigation Centre.’1213 
Advisory opinions do not have the legally binding force like a Judgement in a contentious 
case though it has an alternative or additional value. First, the African Court is not bound 
by facts or legal details of the dispute under consideration by it. This enables them, more 
than in contentious cases to establish general legal principles and rules that will impact 
upon many more states unlike Judgement in contentious cases which will only be 
applicable to the few parties involved. Secondly, advisory proceedings are less 
                                                             
1209 Heyns C., ‘The African Regional Human Rights System: In Need of reforms?’ (2001) 2 AHRLJ 167. 
1210 Eno R.W., ‘The Jurisdiction of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ (2002) 2 AHRLJ 227. 
1211 Ndombana N. J., ‘Towards the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Better Late than Never’ (2000) 
3 Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal 45. 
1212 Article 4 of The Protocol. 
1213 Request No. 002/2012. See, ‘The Request for Advisory Opinion by Pan African Lawyers’ Union and 
Southern African Litigation Centre. 
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confrontational unlike in contentious proceedings as States Parties are not placed in a 
position where they will see themselves as the ‘accused’ neither will they be ordered to alter 
a given rule.
1214 
Parties are only advised and encouraged to put the advice into use; it is 
believed that this ‘soft’ method of promoting human rights norms can also be as effective 
as the ‘hard’ method of condemning states in contentious cases.1215 
The Protocol confers on the Court, advisory powers which are wider than that of any 
other international human rights tribunal
1216 
although this advisory jurisdiction of the 
Court cannot fully compensate for the absence of jurisdiction in dispute brought by 
individuals. Advisory Opinions maybe more influential and authoritative than a 
Judgement in a contentious case because it affect the general interpretation of 
International law for all States rather than for just parties to individual cases.
1217
 
In looking at the advisory jurisdiction of the African Court as provided for by the Protocol, 
this thesis will look at it from three different angles which are: who can request an advisory 
opinion, what forms the subject matter of a request for an advisory opinion and the last 
will be what the effect of an advisory opinion will be on the compatibility of domestic 
laws with international law. This sub-paragraph will also seek to establish the extent to 
which the advisory power of the Court may enable the Court to strengthen the region’s 
human rights protection mechanism. 
6.4.2.1 Who can request an advisory opinion? 
 
Requests for advisory opinions can be made by ‘a member state of the African Union, the 
AU, any of its organs, or any African organisation recognised by the AU.’ 1218Though 
the term ‘African’ is not defined, in practice, NGOs with observer status with the 
                                                             
1214 AP Van der Mei, ‘The Advisory Jurisdiction of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ (2005) 
5 AHRLJ 27-46 at 30. 
1215 See, The Request for Advisory Opinion by Advocate Marcel Ceccaldi on behalf of the Great Socialist Peoples 
of Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Request No. 002/2011. 
1216 Article 4 of the Protocol provides thus: (1). At the request of a Member State of the OAU, any of its organs, 
or any African organisation recognised by the OAU, the Court may provide an opinion on any legal matter 
relating to the Charter or any relevant human rights instruments, provided the subject matter of the opinion is 
not related to a matter being examined by the Commission. (2) The Judge shall give reasons for its advisory 
opinions provided that every judge shall be entitled to deliver a separate or dissenting opinion. 
1217 Liz Heffernan, ‘The Nuclear Weapons Opinions: Reflections on the Advisory Opinion Procedure  of the 
International Court of Justice’ (1998) 28 Stetson Law Review 133 at 139; Pasqualucci Jo M, ‘The Practice 
and Procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ (2003) 3. See also, Interpretation of Peace 
Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania (1950) ICJ Report 65. 
1218 Article 4(1) of The Protocol. 
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Commission and the ECOSOC are able to make requests for advisory opinions.
1219 
As 
pointed out earlier, Advisory Opinions are not binding but they do have, according to 
Viljoen, ‘profound persuasive force and international repercussions.’1220 
The scope of the provision of Article 4 of the Protocol is very wide and it went further 
than Article 45(3) of the African Charter which entitles AU member states, AU organs 
and African Organisations recognised by the AU to ask the Commission to give an 
interpretation of the Charter. It also surpasses the provision of Article 64(1) of the 
American Convention on Human Rights which entitles member states of the Organisation 
of American States and within their spheres of competence, OAS organs, to consult the 
Inter-American Court regarding the interpretation of human rights treaties. The 
difference being that the Protocol extends locus standi to other African organisations 
recognised by the AU.
1221
 
The AU, unlike other international organisations, can also request for an Advisory opinion 
from the Court.
1222 
To be able to do this, the AU will have to be represented by one of 
its organs which in its own right, also enjoys the right to seek advisory opinion from the 
Court.
1223 
The fact that the Protocol did not clearly require the AU organs to act within 
their area of competence is not likely to have much practical meaning because it can be 
assumed that if they were to have the right, they will rarely seek an opinion on an issue 
                                                             
1219 Request No. 001/2012, Request for Advisory Opinion by Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability 
Project; Request No. 002/2012, Request for Advisory Opinion by Pan African Lawyers Union and Southern 
Africa Litigation Centre; Request No. 002/2013, Request for Advisory Opinion by The African Committee of 
Expert on The Rights and Welfare of the Child on the Standing of The African Committee of Experts on the 
Rights and Welfare of the Child before the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights. 
1220 Frans Viljoen, ‘A Human Rights Court for Africa and Africans’ (2004-2005) 30 Brook Journal of 
International Law 1.  
1221 Under Article 47(1) of the new European Convention, only the Committee of Ministers of the Council of 
Europe may request advisory opinion from the European Court on legal questions concerning the 
interpretation of the Convention and its protocols. Under Article 47(2), such opinions, however, would not 
deal with any question relating to the content or scope of the rights or freedoms defined in section 1 of the 
Convention and its Protocols, or with any other such proceedings as could be instituted in accordance with the 
Convention. Article 47(3) requires that a decision of the Council of Ministers to request an advisory opinion of 
the Court should require a majority vote of the representatives entitled to sit on the Committee. See Gino Naldi & 
Magliveras (1998) 439. 
1222 Article 4 The Protocol. 
1223 Such AU organs are the Assembly, the Executive Council, the AU Commission, the Pan-African Parliament 
and the Peace and Security Council. Each of these organs has a broad and general mandate which explicitly 
includes the promotion and protection of human rights. The other group of AU organs that can seek for 
advisory opinion on behalf of the AU are organs whose mandate covers specific areas like the AU Financial 
Institutions such as the African Central Bank, the African Monetary Fund and the African Investment Bank 
(Article 19, Constitutive Act ); the Specialised Technical Committees and the Economic, Social and Cultural 
Council (Article 22 Constitutive Act ) 
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outside their entrusted field. Also, the fact that the Protocol does not explicitly limit the 
right of AU’s organs to request opinions to issues they are made responsible for does not 
mean that they are entitled to do so.
1224
 
All AU member states can seek for advisory opinion from the African Court
1225 
and in 
seeking the advisory opinion; the Protocol did not impose the condition that a state must 
have ratified the Protocol before it can do so.
1226 
This is in contrast with the provision of 
Article 5 of the Protocol which only allows States Parties to the Protocol to initiate a case 
against another state party. The notion that Statesnot willing to accept the Court’s 
jurisdiction should not have the right to initiate a case against another as underlined by 
Article 5 of the Protocol does not extend to Article 4. The purpose of advisory proceedings is 
to enable states to obtain a judicial interpretation on human rights matters which might also 
assist other states in fulfilling their human rights obligations.
1227
 
The inclusion of African Organisations in Article 4(1) of the Protocol as organisations 
recognised by the AU stand out as the most important difference between the Protocol to 
the African Charter on the Establishment of an African Court and the American 
Convention on Human Rights; but what is still not clear is whether NGOs can be 
regarded as organisations recognised by the AU. Neither the Protocol nor the rules of 
procedure of the African Court clarified this. In arguing this provision of Article 4 of the 
Protocol, one will not be wrong to say that since the provision did not make a distinction 
between governmental and non-governmental organisations like in Article 5 of the Protocol 
which deals with contentious jurisdiction of the Court,
1228
 therefore non-governmental 
organisations can request for legal opinions from the Court
1229 
and this, they have been 
doing.
1230
 
                                                             
1224 AP Van der Mei (2005)33. 
1225 Morocco is the only African Country which is not part of AU and therefore cannot seek for advisory 
opinion from the Court. See http://www.au.int/en/treaties (Accessed 19th September, 2016). 
1226 Article 4 The Protocol.  
1227 AP Van der Mei (2005) 35. 
1228 By Article 5(1) of the Protocol, African intergovernmental organisations enjoy an absolute right to submit 
cases to the Court. From Article 5(3) through to Article 34(6) of the Protocol, it shows that non-governmental 
organisations only have direct access to the Court when the state in question has made a declaration accepting 
the Courts jurisdiction. 
1229 This is the view held by one of the Judges of the Court, Justice Fatsah Ouguergouz in, ‘The African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights: A Comprehensive Agenda for Human Dignity and Sustainable Democracy in 
Africa’ (2003) 750. 
1230 See Request No. 002/2015, Request for Advisory Opinion by the Centre for Human Rights, University 
of Pretoria and The Coalition for African Lesbians (still pending before the Court); Request No. 002/2012 
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One can also argue that since NGOs have no direct access to the Court in contentious cases 
they have no right to request for an opinion since doing that will enable them to initiate 
disguised contentious cases against a member state which has not accepted the jurisdiction 
of the Court in cases brought by private parties.
1231 
Obviously it will be in the interest of 
justice to ask the Court to opt for the first interpretation especially because NGOs in Africa 
play significant roles in the promotion of human rights.
1232 
Infact, it cannot be imagined 
what would have become of the African Commission without the participation of NGOs in 
the protection of human rights as this can be justified by the number of NGOs with 
observer status with the Commission. Presently there are 477 NGOs recognised by the 
Commission.
1233 
If given the right to ask for advisory opinion from the Court, it is 
definitely certain that NGOs will make contributions, no matter how little, to the Court. 
6.4.2.2 What forms the subject matter of a request for Advisory opinion? 
 
At exercising its advisory opinion powers, the Court can provide opinion on any legal 
matter relating to the Charter or any other human rights instruments as long as the subject 
matter of the opinion is not related to a matter being examined by the Commission.
1234 
The 
extent to which the Court can exercise its advisory jurisdiction, where compared to the 
interpretative powers of the African Commission, is larger because it covers any other 
human rights instrument. The interpretative power of the Commission is only limited to the 
Charter.
1235 
This advisory power of the Court also exceeds that of the Inter-American Court 
which has jurisdiction over the American Convention and other treaties concerning the 
protection of human rights in the American States.
1236
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
Request for Advisory Opinion by Pan African lawyers Union and Southern Africa Litigation Centre. 
1231 Eno R.W., ‘The Jurisdiction of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ (2002) 2 African Human 
Rights Law Journal 227-228. 
1232 Mortala A, ‘Non-Governmental Organisations in the African System’ in Heyns C & Stefiszyn K (eds), 
‘Human Rights, Peace and Justice in Africa: A Reader’ (2006) 220. 
1233 NGOs with Observer Status Available at www.achpr.org/network/ngo/by-name/ (Accessed 21st 
September, 2016).  
1234 Article 4(1) the Protocol. See also, request for Advisory Opinion by Pan African Lawyers Union and 
Southern African Litigation Centre Request No. 002/2012 wherein the Court declined to issue Advisory Opinion 
because the Commission confirmed there was a pending matter before it related to the subject matter of the request. 
1235 Article 45 the Charter. 
1236 Article 64(1) American Convention. Article 4(1) of the Protocol to the African Charter on the Establishment 
of an African Court, unlike the American Convention, does not refer to other treaties but rather to human 
rights instruments and interpreting this could mean that the Court is also empowered to give interpretations of 
non-binding instruments like resolutions or recommendations of relevant bodies. See Osterdahl I, ‘The 
Jurisdiction rationemateriae of the African Court on Human and Peoples Rights’ (1998) 7 Reveue 
Africaine des Droits de lHomme 132 at 144. This does not mean that the Court will completely not interpret 
other instruments aside treaties. This is evidenced when it interpreted the American Declaration of the Rights 
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In trying to interpret the phrase ‘relevant human rights instruments’ taking a hint from the 
Inter- American Court’s interpretation of the notion ‘other treaties’ as used in Article 
64(1) of the American Convention will be adequate. In the first advisory opinion ever to 
be issued by the American Court it was suggested that ‘other treaties’ would refer to: 
 
(a) Only treaties adopted within the context of the Inter-American system 
(b) To treaties in which only American states are parties 
(c) To all treaties to which one or more American states are parties. 
None of these options was chosen by the Court but instead it held that ‘other treaties’ include 
 
‘[a]ny provision dealing with the protection of human rights set forth in any international 
treaty applicable in the American States, regardless of whether it be bilateral or 
multilateral, whatever be the purpose of such a treaty, and whether or not non-member 
states of the Inter-American system are or have become parties thereto.’
1237
 
The African Court can interpret Article 4(1) of the Protocol in a broader manner just the 
same way the Inter-American Court interpreted ‘treaties concerning the protection of 
human rights.’ But in this case, the African Court will be interpreting human rights 
instruments and what this means is that the Court can only interpret treaties primarily or 
exclusively adopted to protect human rights.
1238  
The wording of  Article  4  of  the  
Protocol  has  been  said  not  to  reflect  a deliberate choice of those that drafted
1239 
the 
protocol in denying the court the power to deliver advisory opinions on human rights 
issues which may arise within the context, for example, treaties mainly striving at 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
and Proceedings of the Tenth Annual Conference, held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia 3 - 5 August, 1998, 61 – 
62.Duties of Man which was adopted in 1948 in the form of a resolution when it was necessary to classify the 
OAS Charter or the American Convention. See I/A Court HR Interpretation of the American Declaration of the 
Rights and Duties of Man within the Framework of Article 64 on the American Convention of Human Rights, 
Advisory Opinion OC-10/89 of 24th July, 1989, Series A No. 10 Paragraph 44. Secondly, Article 4(1) of the 
Protocol does not formally require that other treaties should protect human rights in African States. What this 
means is that the Court can also give opinion on issues like questions on the diplomatic protection to be offered 
to Africans in diaspora or African States treatment of nationals in exile. See Van der Mei A.P. (2005) 38. 
1237 See Advisory Opinion Requested by Peru, I/A Court HR Other Treaties Subject to the Consultative 
Jurisdiction of the Court (Article 64 of the American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-
1/82 of 24 September, 1982, Series A No. 1, Paragraph 52. 
1238 Quasigah E, ‘The African Court of Human Rights: Prospects in Comparison with the European Court of 
Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ in ‘African Society of International and 
Comparative Law’  
1239 The only conclusion that can be drawn from the drafting history of the Protocol is that the phrase any 
relevant human rights instruments was chosen by the drafters to confer upon the Court a broader jurisdiction than 
the African Commission which can only be asked to clarify the meaning of the Charter. See Article 45(3) African 
Charter. 
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economic integration.
1240 
The objective of the Protocol and the text of Article 4(1) of the 
Protocol allow the Court to give a wider reading into other treaties aside just human rights 
treaties. 
 
The African Court, like the Inter-American Court, is an independent and autonomous organ 
not subordinated to or formerly bound by Judgements, decisions or opinions of other 
regional or international Courts or organs. Its powers are conferred by its constituent treaty 
adopted within a framework of the AU. The Court can interprete any universal, regional or 
sub-regional instruments regardless of their purpose, main subject and state parties as long 
as the provision in question has bearing upon, affects or is in the interest of human rights 
protection in Africa.
1241
 
6.5 Relationship between the African Court and the African Commission 
 
Pursuant to Article 2 of the Protocol establishing the Court, the Court is established to 
complement the protective mandate of the Commission. However, Rule 29 of the Rules of 
the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the Protocol establishing the Court, 
provides for the guiding provisions in regard to the relationship between these two organs. 
These Rules set out the basic interactive framework between the Commission and the Court, 
including provisions on: 
(a) ) Complementarities1242 
(b) Consultations  between  the  Commission,  the  Court,  and  their  respective 
Bureaux;
1243
 
(c) consultations on any amendment of any issue, or procedure governing the 
relations between the two institutions;
1244
 
(d) Requirements in situation where a case is submitted by the Commission under 
Article 5(1)(a) of the Protocol;
1245
 
                                                             
1240 Quasigah E, ‘The African Court of Human Rights: Prospects in Comparison with the European Court of 
Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ in ‘African Society of International and 
Comparative Law’Proceedings of the Tenth Annual Conference held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia 3-5 August, 1998, 
61-62. 
1241 I/A Court HR The Right to Information on Consular Assistance. In the Framework of the Guarantees of the 
Due Process of Law, Advisory Opinion OC-16/99 of 1 October, 1999, Series A No. 16 Paragraph 72.  
1242 Article 2 the Protocol. 
1243 Rule 29 (1)(a)&(b) Rules of Procedure of the African Court. 
1244 Rule 29(2) Rules of Procedure of the African Court. 
1245 Rule 29(3)(a) Rules of Procedure of the African Court. 
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(e) the Court’s ability under Rule 45 to hear individuals or NGOs with 
communication originating from the Commission pursuant to Article 55 of the 
Charter;
1246
 
(f) ) opinions on admissibility under Article 6 of the Protocol;1247 
(g) procedures to transfer a case to the Commission pursuant to Article 6 (3);1248 
(h) situations of examining an application before it on issues in a communication 
before the Commission.
1249
 
As a result of the harmonisation of the Interim Rules of the Court and the Commission 
carried out during joint meetings
1250 
the Court and the Commission have an 
understanding to meet at least once a year. Their primary objective is to discuss questions 
relating to their relationship.
1251
 
 
While seeking to clarify the relationship between the Commission and the Court, the 
concept of complementarity comes with its own ambiguities. Infact, it has been described 
as ‘a notion in motion,’1252 and said to be usable in normative and descriptive 
dimension.
1253 
Looking at it from the angle of African human rights system, the use of 
complementarity with little or no detailed explanations helps its character as a tool of 
description but in employing it to carry out this act, it does little as regards prescribing the 
relations between the African Human Rights Court and the African Court of Justice and 
Human Rights on one hand and the system’s non-judicial supervisory institutions on the 
other hand.
1254 
This despite the fact that it is normally that the establishment of the 
judicial institutions after many years of existence of the quasi-judicial bodies has the 
                                                             
1246
 Rule 29(3)(c) Rules of Procedure of the African Court. 
1247 Rule 29(4) Rules of Procedure of the African Court.  
1248 Rule 29(5)(a) Rules of Procedure of the African Court. 
1249 Rule 29(6) Rules of Procedure of the African Court.  
1250 The meetings were held in Arusha, Tanzania from 14-17, July, 2009; 12-16 October 2009 in Dakar, Senegal 
and Arusha, Tanzania in April 2010. See Higgins Gillian, ‘The African Commission and the African Court on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights: Case Progression from Commission to the Court’ (2012) 1. See also Lucky Michael 
Mgimba & Stephen Waters, ‘Jurisprudential Analysis of the African Court on Human and Peoples Rights: From 
2004 to 2010’ (2013) 20 African Yearbook of International Law 12.  
1251 Higgins Gillian, ‘The African Commission and the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Case 
Progression from the Commission to the Court;’ ARC Project Paper (2012) 1. 
1252 Solomon Ebobrah, ‘Towards a Positive Application of Complementarity in the African Human Rights 
System: Issues of Functions and Relations’ (2011) 22 European Journal of International Law 663-688.  
1253 Clapham A., ‘On complementarity: Human Rights in the European Legal Orders’ (2000) 21 Human Rights 
Law Journal 313. 
1254 Ebobrah Solomon, ‘Towards a Positive Application of Complementarity in the Africa Human Rights 
System: Issues of Functions and Relations’ (2011) 22 European Journal of International Law 663 – 668. 
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potential to impact significantly on the relationship between these institutions.
1255 
What 
was expected was that the Rules of procedure of these institutions would give more 
concrete meaning to complementarity but neither the Rules of the Court nor that of the 
Commission did. 
 
The use of the term ‘complementarity’ in the African human rights system has drawn 
more attention in the context of the relationship between the Court and the Commission 
such that the relationship has been characterised as ‘peculiar,’1256 ‘unique’1257   and 
‘organic.’1258 Nevertheless, the lack of clarity is not restricted to this relationship as it is 
bound to appear in relation to other institutions of the African system.
1259
 
 
Complementarity between the Commission and the Court can produce debilitating 
inefficiencies if the relationship between the two organs is not well conceived. In the 
Inter-American system because of the fact that the Commission and the Court apply 
themselves to the case at different times, there is duplication in procedure relating to 
contentious matters especially in fact-finding and admissibility proceedings.
1260 
Although 
the Commission would have done this before submitting a dossier to the Court, the Court 
continues to do its own fact-finding and investigative research despite the fact that much of 
it mirrors the Commission’s earlier deliberations. For its part, the Court reviews the 
Commission’s findings on admissibility, especially in relation to domestic remedies and 
the result is a lengthier, more expensive proceedings.
1261 
This is one of the challenges that 
come along with complementarity as it is also being experienced in other international 
legal sub-system.
1262
 
                                                             
1255 Vincent Nmehielle, ‘Towards an African Court of Human Rights: Structuring and the Court’ (2000) 6 
Annual Survey of International and Comparative Law 27 at 46. 
1256 Osterdahl, ‘The Jurisdiction Ratione Materiae of the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights: A 
Comparative Critique’ (1998) 7 Revue Africaine des Droits de lHomme132 at 133.  
1257 Osterdahl (1998) 150.  
1258 Osterdahl (1998) 133. 
1259 Ebobrah Solomon (2011) 22 EJIL 665. 
1260 Ebobrah Solomon (2011) 22 EJIL 665. 
1261 Ibrahim Ali Badawi Elsheikh, ‘The Future Relationship between the African Court and the African 
Commission’ (2002) 2 African Human Rights Law Journal 252-260.  
1262 For example, under the Inter-American System of human rights, there is a sub-system which came into 
force with the adoption of the Organisation of American States Charter while the entry into force of the 
American Convention of Human Rights created another sub-system. The first sub-system comprises of members 
of OAS that has remain subject to the law of American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man as 
well  as to  the recommendations issued by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights under the 
Declaration. The second sub-system consists of members that are parties to the American Convention on 
Human Rights and have also accepted the Inter-American Courts contentious jurisdiction. These States are 
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Other challenges which the Court and Commission are likely to face, aside the 
duplication of functions,  include  waste  of  resources,
1263 
lengthening  of  the  time  
frame  for  concluding procedures,
1264 
the creation of institutional tension as a result of 
struggle for supremacy and finally the creation of loopholes for states to avoid 
responsibility by manipulating institutions. 
 
Although critics and supporters have argued that it makes little sense to create an institution 
that duplicates the weakness of the African Commission.
1265 
In the context of the African 
Union, an organisation with scarce financial resources and limited moral clarity, the 
establishment of a new body would have been approached sombrely.
1266 
A human rights 
court would have been more useful if it genuinely sought out to correct the shortcomings 
of the African system, and provide the victims of human rights violations with a real and 
accessible forum to vindicate their basic rights. 
 
Another concern is the likelihood of overlap and conflict of jurisdiction between the Court 
and sub-regional courts of justice which have sprung up recently in the continent
1267 
like the 
ECOWAS Court
1268 
and the East African Court of Justice.
1269 
According to Nyaga, there 
are possible jurisdictional overlaps and conflicts that demand urgent resolution in ensuring 
that the Court does not duplicate efforts and are effective in protecting human rights on the 
continent.
1270 
Some of these sub-regional Courts are vested with jurisdiction to 
pronounce on human rights violations whether expressly or implicitly;
1271 
the Protocol is 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
subject to the law of the binding Judgements issued by the Inter-American Court in cases referred to it by 
the Inter-American Commission and concurrently, to the law of the Inter-American Commissions resolutions 
and recommendations. These States are committed to honour both the American Declaration and the American 
Convention. See Dinah Shelton, ‘Regional Protection of Human Rights’ (2008) 70. 
1263 Supelveda C., ‘The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of the Organisation of American 
States’ (1985) 65 German Yearbook of International Law 83. See also Cowen, Forward(2000)21 Human 
Rights Law Journal 290. 
1264 Pasqualucci, ‘The Inter-American Human Rights System: Establishing Precedents and Procedure in 
Human Rights Law’ (1994-1995) 26 U Miami Inter-Am L Rev 297 at 311; Frans Viljoen, ‘A Human Rights 
Courts for Africa and Africans’ (2004-2005)30 Brookes Journal of International Law 1 at 19. 
1265 Wundeh Robert Eno, ‘The Jurisdiction of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ (2002) 2 
African Human Rights Law Journal 223. 
1266 Pityana Barney N., ‘Reflections on the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ (2004) 4 African 
Human Rights Law Journal 121. 
1267 Wachira George Mukundi (ed.), ‘Regional and Sub-Regional Platforms for Vindicating Human Rights in 
Africa’ (2007) 6. 
1268 Established by Section 6&15 of the ECOWAS Treaty. 
1269 Established under Article 9 of the East African Community Treaty. 
1270 Nyaga J.M, ‘Conflicts and Overlaps of Jurisdiction of various regional Courts in Africa’ (2007) 7 
Judiciary Watch Report, Nairobi, International Commission of Jurists (Kenya). 
1271 See ECW.CCJ/APP/07/08 HisseinHabre v Senegal; ECW/CCJ/APP/13/11 AliyuTasheku v Federal Republic 
Of Nigeria; WCW/CCJ/APP/12/07 Registered Trustee Of The Socio-Economic Rights And Accountability 
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silent on this possibility thereby leaving it to the Court to determine how such overlap will 
be resolved. 
 
There is a possibility that a matter may be brought before a sub-regional court and 
eventually ending up before the African Human Rights Court. Where this happens, the 
question then arises as to whether the sub-regional Courts can be referred to as an 
international tribunal, thereby precluding determination of matters before them by the 
African Court. In the event they are considered in this way, matters before the sub-
regional courts will not be entertained by the African Court on the ground that they 
have already been deliberated upon by another international tribunal.
1272 
It is therefore 
important that these institutions share their rules of procedure in a bid to avoid possible 
loop-holes that could potentially hamper the effectiveness of the African Court. 
Interpretation of the Charter by the sub-regional courts is another potential difficulty.
1273 
This may involve the sub-regional human rights courts applying directly, the provisions of 
the African Charter in a dispute or alternatively relying on the African Charter and the 
jurisprudence of the African Commission as well as that of the African Court as a source 
of law.
1274 
The interpretation of the Charter by sub-regional human rights bodies may 
differ from that of the Commission and the Court, therefore in view of the possibilities of 
different outcomes depending on which forum a litigant decides to take a case to, there is 
need for proper coordination and harmony among the available platforms for defending 
fundamental human rights.
1275
 
6.6 Courts’ Merger with the African Court of Justice 
 
The Constitutive Act of the African Union provides for the establishment of an 
additional judicial body to function as the primary judicial organ of the African Union, 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
Project (Serap) v President, Federal Republic Of Nigeria & Anor. (All decided by the Community Court of 
Justice – ECOWAS). 
1272 Article 56(7) African Charter; see also, George Mukundi, African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights: 
Ten Years and Still no Justice (2008)14 
1273 Odinkanlu Chidi, Complementarity, Competition or Contradiction: The Relationship between the African 
Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights and Regional Economic Courts in East and  Southern Africa.  
Presentation to Conference of East and Southern African States on the Protocol Establishing the African 
Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Gaborone, Botswana, 9-10 December, 2003 Available at 
www.africancourtcoalition.org/images/docs/research-papers/chidionComplementarity.pdf (Accessed 22nd 
September, 2016). 
1274 Chidi (2003) 10.  
1275 Mukundi (2008) 15. 
https://etd.uwc.ac.za
298 
 
 
 
to be called the ‘African Court of Justice.’1276 The Protocol of the Court of Justice was 
thus adopted on the 11th of July, 2003 in Maputo Mozambique, but has yet to enter into 
force. 
 
However, following a proposal by the then Chairperson of the Assembly of the African 
Union and Head of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, President Olusegun Obasanjo, the AU 
Assembly at its third
1277 
and fifth
1278 
Ordinary Sessions, decided to merge the African 
Court on Human and Peoples Rights and the Court of Justice of the African Union into a 
single court. The merger was mainly instituted for part implementation of the decision of the 
Assembly of Heads of States and Governments to rationalize institutions in order to avoid 
duplication of mandates and to ensure cost effectiveness within the African Union.
1279
 
The draft on ‘The Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human 
Rights’ was adopted at the AU Summit in Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt, on the 1
st
 
of July, 2008. 
The Protocol and the Statute annexed to it will enter into force 30 days after the deposit of 
the instruments of ratification by fifteen (15) Member States and so far, only five States, 
namely Libya,
1280 
Mali,
1281 
Burkina Faso,
1282 
Congo
1283 
and Benin
1284 
have ratified the 
Protocol as at September 2016 while thirty (30) Member States have signed.
1285
 
6.7 Judgement of the Court 
 
Article 28 (1) of the Protocol requires the Court to deliver its Judgement within 90 
days of having completed hearing.
1286 
This was introduced in the Nouakchott draft 
protocol as it was deemed necessary to include a time frame within which the 
                                                             
1276
 Article 5 and 17 Constitutive Act of the AU.  
1277 Assembly/AU/Dec.45 (III) adopted at the 3rd Ordinary Session held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia from 6th– 8th, 
July 2004. 
1278 Assembly/AU/Dec.83 (V) adopted at the fifth Ordinary Session held in Sirte, Libya from 4th – 5th July, 
2005 in Sirte, Libya. 
1279 Sutherland Kirsty & Sander Barrie, Endowing the African Court of Justice and Human Rights with 
Jurisdiction over International Crimes – A More Legitimate Form of Justice for Africa or a Recipe for Disaster?, 
Paper proposal for conference on International Law in Africa, International Criminal Law Bureau, p. 2 
1280Signed on 14/05/2009, ratified on 06/05/2009, deposited instrument on 17/06/2009.  
1281 Signed on 24/12/2008, ratified on 13/08/2009, deposited instrument on 27/08/2009.  
1282 Signed on 21/01/2009, ratified on 23/06/2010, deposited instrument on 04/08/2010. 
1283 Signed on 28/06/2009, ratified on 14/12/2011, deposited instrumenton06/08/2012. 
1284 Signed on 14/01/2009, ratified on 28/06/2012, deposited instrument on 11/07/2012. 
1285 Available at www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/treaties/7792-sl-  
protocol_on_stature_of_the_african_court_of_justice_and_hr_0.pdf(Accessed 21st September, 2016). 
1286 Rule 59 Rules of Procedure of the Court. 
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Judgement of the Court will be delivered.
1287 
Judgement delivered by the Court as a result 
of majority decision will be final and will not be subject to appeal.
1288 
The Court is also 
empowered to review its own decision in the light of new evidence
1289 
and the Rules of 
Court went further to state the condition precedence for the review.
1290
 
Furthermore, the Court can also interpret its own decisions.
1291 
Any party may, for the 
purpose of executing a Judgement, apply to the Court for interpretation of the Judgement 
within 12 months from the date of delivery of the Judgement.
1292 
This application for 
interpretation of the Judgement of the court will not stand as a stay of execution of the 
Judgement of the Court except in circumstances where the Court decides otherwise.
1293 
The Judgement of the Court is read in open court upon adequate notice given to all 
parties to the suit,
1294 
and the reason(s) for the decision must be given by the Court.
1295
 
The Court has delivered some Judgements based on applications filed before it and 
issued Advisory Opinions. Notable among them is where it allowed for the first time, 
NGOs to make submissions before it as amicus curiae.
1296 
The Court, on 30 March 2012, 
made an order granting the Pan African Lawyers Union (PALU) leave to participate as 
amicus curiae in the matter of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and 
the Great Socialist Libyan People's Arab Jamahiriya.
1297
 On the 3
rd 
of June, 2016, the 
Court, in delivering Judgement over an application submitted to it by the Commission on 
behalf of Mr. SaifKadhafi, finds that Libya has violated and continue to violate Articles 6 
and 7 of the African Charter, thereby ordered Libya to protect and terminate all illegal 
criminal proceedings instituted against Mr. SaifKadhafi instituted before domestic courts. 
                                                             
1287 See Nouakchott Legal Experts Report, at 9 paragraph 43. 
1288 Article 28(2) The Protocol. This is similar to Article 67 of the American Convention and Article 44(1) of 
the European Convention. 
1289 Article 28(3) The Protocol. 
1290 Rule 67 Rules of Procedure of the African Court. This provision is consistent with Rule 118 of the Rules 
of Procedure of the African Commission which confers the Commission with the power to reconsider a 
Communication declared inadmissible. See Urban Mkandawire v The Republic of Malawi; Application No: 
003/2011. See also, Frank David Omary & Others v The United Republic of Tanzania Application No; 001/2012. 
1291 Article 28(4) The Protocol. 
1292 Rule 66 Rules of Procedure of the Court. 
1293 Rule 66(5) Rules of Procedure of the Court. 
1294 Article 28(5) The Protocol and Rule 61(3) Rules of Procedure of the African Court. 
1295 Article 28(6) The Protocol. See also Article 66(1) of the American Convention; and Article 45(1) of 
the European Convention. 
1296 A    copy    of    the    Order    is    available    atwww.african-court.org/en/images/documents/orders/ORDER- 
%20PALU%20Amicus%20Curie%20-%20APPLICATION%20004.2011.pdf (Accessed 20th April, 2015). 
1297 Application No. 004/2011. 
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The Court went further in its Judgement to order Libya to submit to it, within sixty 
days, a report on the measures taken to guarantee the rights of Mr. Kadhafi from the date 
of notification of the Judgement.
1298
 
In another major Judgement of the Court, in the matter of LoheIssaKonate v Burkina 
Faso,
1299 
unanimously declared Burkina Faso to have violated the Article 9 of the African 
Charter, Article 19 of the Covenant and Article 66 (2)(c) of the revised ECOWAS treaty 
due to the existence of custodian sentences on defamation in its laws.
1300 
The Court, in its 
Judgement, also found the State to have violated Article 9 of the African Charter, Article 
19 of the Covenant and article 66 (2) (c) of the Revised ECOWAS Treaty because of the 
conviction and sentence to a term of imprisonment of the Application in a defamation 
case. It holds that this is against the Applicant’s freedom of speech.1301 
The Court also at its 20
th
 
Ordinary Session 
1302 
issued an order for provisional measures 
in relation to an application received from the Commission alleging serious and widespread 
violations of human rights by the government of the Great Socialist People’s Libyan 
Arab Jamahiriya. The case concerned the violent repression of the anti-government protest 
that started in Benghazi and then spread to other major cities in Libya including Tripoli. 
Government forces responded to the protest with live ammunition and violent attacks, 
resulting in numerous deaths and injuries. According to the Applicant, these actions 
amounted to serious and widespread violations of the rights enshrined in Articles 1, 2, 
4, 5, 9, 11, 12, 13 and 23 of the African Charter.
1303
 
 
During the session, the Court deliberated on the application and decided that in view of 
the extreme gravity and urgency of the matter, and in accordance with its powers under 
Article 27 (2) of the Protocol establishing the Court and Rule 51 (1) of the Rules of Court, it 
was necessary to order provisional measures with a view to avoid irreparable harm being 
caused to persons who are the subject of the application.
1304
 
                                                             
1298 See Application No. 002/2013, African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights v Libya 
1299 Application No. 004/2013, Judgement delivered on the 5th of December, 2014. 
1300 See Par. 176 (3) of the Judgement. 
1301 See par. 176 (5) & (6) of the Judgement. 
1302 Held in Arusha, Tanzania from 14-25 March, 2011. 
1303 See en.african-court.org/en/images/documents/Court/Cases/casae_summaries/Application_No_004_- 
_libya_summary_-_august_2011_update.pdf(Accessed 20th September, 2015). 
1304 en.african-court.org/en/images/documents/Orders- 
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In the order, issued on the 25
th
 of March 2011, the Court called on the Great Socialist 
People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to ‘immediately refrain from any action that would result 
in loss of life or violation of physical integrity of persons, which could be a breach of the 
provisions of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights or of other 
international human rights instruments to which it is a party.’ 
The Court also delivered a judgement in the case African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights v Republic of Kenya1305 wherein it classified the Ogiek People of 
Kenya as ‘indigenous people’ living in the Mau Forest.1306 The Court further affirmed the 
Commission’s (Applicant) assertion that the Mau Forest as the Ogieks’ ancestral home by 
stating that the most salient feature of most indigenous populations is their strong 
attachement with nature, particularly, land and the natural environment. That their 
survival in a way depends on unhindered access to and use of their traditional land and 
the natural resources thereon.1307 It described the Ogieks as hunter-gatherer community 
which has depended on the Mau Forest for centuries for their residence and 
livelihood.1308 
 
6.9      Conclusion 
 
The African human rights system, despite various challenges, is full of promises as regards 
the protection of human rights in the continent. Despite the fact that the journey towards the 
effective protection of human and Peoples’ rights has been a long and difficult one, the 
Commission, it cannot be denied, laid the foundation for greater advances. The adoption of 
the Protocol to the African Charter on the Establishment of an African Court raised hopes 
among victims of human rights abuses ranging from minority groups to indigenous people. 
Despite this, there is still a long way to go with part of the solutions being with the 
States themselves. They have to demonstrate political will in order for the Court to succeed 
in the fight against human rights abuses in the continent. They should step up their 
ratification of the Protocol as well as declare direct access to the Court for individual and 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
Files/Copy%20of%20Order%20for%20provisional%20measures%20Appl%20004       -2011%20(2)-Copy.pdf 
(Accessed 20th April, 2015). 
1305 Application No: 006/2012, Judgement delivered on the 26th May, 2017. 
1306 Paragraph 109 of the Judgement. 
1307 Paragraph 109 of the Judgement. 
1308 Application No> 006/2012, judgement delivered on the 26th May, 2017, paragraph 109. 
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NGOs. 
Furthermore, it is important that African people are aware of the existence of the African 
Court’s potential and ability to redress human rights violations.1309  The enforcement and 
implementation of the Court’s decisions can also be influenced by the role played by 
victims of human rights violations to illuminate the Court’s decisions and the measures 
adopted by the state. The Court should ensure that the hopes and confidence of Africans as 
regards its effectiveness in protecting their fundamental rights is not just a dream. 
The coming into existence of the Court is seen as the turning point in the protection of 
human rights in the continent and can be said to be a welcome development from African 
leaders. This phase which they have embarked upon as regards human rights issues in the 
last two decades can be said to be a welcome development even though, in many aspects it 
is a necessary condition for reinforcing human rights protection in Africa; the 
introduction of judicial protection of human rights by the Protocol can be said not to 
be sufficient to attain this objective.
1310 
The Protocol establishing the Court has its 
weaknesses and shortcoming such as the access to the Court by NGOs and individuals 
is subject to an optional declaration by States Parties. The Protocol is also generous 
with some of its provisions, for example, with respect to the material jurisdiction of the 
Court and its often uncertain language can profitably be exploited by the Judges.
1311
 
The location of the Court too will play a role in its success especially by the effectiveness of 
the overall African system of promoting and protecting human rights.
1312 
The war against 
                                                             
1309 According to Barney Pityana, it is unfortunate that judges of the African Court on Human and Peoples 
Rights and indeed the Court itself have not provided much information, if any, to the public it is expected to 
serve on progress made, which is a course for concern. It is essential that the African Court on Human and 
Peoples Rights provides sufficient information on its progress if it hopes to receive requisite support and cases 
from individuals and peoples it is created to protect. Professor Barney Pityana is the former Chairman of the 
African Commission and Vice-Chancellor and Principal of the University of South Africa, Pretoria, South Africa. 
1310 See Frans Viljoen, ‘Argument in favour of and against an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ 
(1998) African Society of International and Comparative Law – Proceedings of the Tenth Annual 
Conference, Addis Ababa, 3-5August, 21-44. 
1311 Fatsah Ouguergouz (2003) 755. 
1312 See I.A.B El-Sheikh, ‘Draft Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights on the 
Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights – Introductory Notes’ (1997) 9 African Journal 
of International and Comparative Law 951. See also the Conclusion of the Report Presented to the OAU 
Ministerial Conference on Human Rights held in April 1999 which states thus: ‘The proposed African Court on 
Human and Peoples Rights is expected to be an important instrument for the protection and promotion of human 
rights in Africa. However, the existence of such a Court will not per se ensure the protection of rights, if the 
necessary political goodwill and sense of tolerance and accommodation continues to elude our societies and 
particularly its leaders and opinion makers. However, the Court can be an effective weapon for the protection of 
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human rights violation in Africa is a collective effort which requires the cooperation of many 
actors; the Court is no doubt an important component in the normative and institutional 
structure established in the regional context but it will be dangerous to attach much 
importance to it over the Commission whose role in the protection of human rights will 
prove crucial to the eventual success of the Court. In the next chapter, which is the 
conclusion and recommendation chapter of this thesis, some of the recommendations that 
have been made by other scholars and academics will be revisited. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
rights, if individuals of goodwill, both State and non-State actors, play their part.’ (Report on the progress made 
towards the establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples Rights, OAU Ministerial Conference 
on Human Rights) 12-16 April, 1999, Grand Bay, Mauritius; OAU DOC MIN/CONF/HRA/4 (1) particularly 
at 39.  
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Chapter 7 
 
RECOMMENDATION AND CONCLUSION: TOWARDS AN EFFECTIVE 
AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS JUSTICE SYSTEM 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The question of justice is not for the law courts alone and denying this will amount to 
assuming a position which does not only suggest a lack of awareness of the existence of 
traditional African perspectives on justice but the inability to appreciate the cultural realities 
of post colonial Africa. 
The interpretation of justice brings out the notionof ‘equality’ because justice justice 
appears operational on the condition that all human beings are deemed to require, deserve 
and entitled to the same treatement of restoration.
1313
 The African indigenous justice 
system, as demonstrated in this thesis, is community based and employs restorative and 
transformative ideas in resolving conflicts.
1314
 
This research presents the central question around the notion of justice in Africa by 
highlighting the answers to the research questions posed at the beginning of the study in 
order to bring this thesis to a close. My conclusions will be drawn and 
recommendations targeted at the improvement of human rights protection in Africa will be 
made. 
7.2 Research questions anwered 
 
Chapter 1 of this thesis laid out the structure of the work particularly the background to 
the research, definition of the problem and the scope of the research work. The thesis 
set out to answer and indeed answered the following questions: 
(a) Whether the African value of reconciliation and non-confrontation upon which the African 
Commission was built is compatible with the idea of western-style-Court systems? 
(b) Whether these values are been reflected in the conceptualisation of the African Human 
Rights Court and the proposed African Court of Justice and Human Rights? 
 
                                                             
1313 Majeed M. H., ‘The Notionof Justice in Akan Culture: How Consequential is it?’ (2014) 2 
Contemporary Journal of African Studies 99 – 112. 
1314 Elechi O. O., ‘Human Rights and the African Indigenous Justice System’ (2004) 2. 
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(c) Whether adequate promotion and protection of human rights require judicial enforcement 
mechanisms at the regional level? 
7.3 Findings 
 
Conclusions to each chapter of the thesis have already been made at the end of each chapter 
however; in order to appreciate the conclusion arrived at in this chapter it is important to 
show in brief, the findings of the research in line with the research questions highlighted at 
the beginning of the thesis. 
Chapter 2 provided an historical insight into the development of human and Peoples’ rights 
in Africa by examining the historical development of events during pre-colonial and colonial 
eras. The chapter examined the process of administration of justice during these periods 
by looking at roles played by the major actors in the administration of justice ranging from 
the Kings to the family heads. It also looked at the role of the colonial masters. 
History plays a role in how pattern of African traditional family subsisits even till today. 
Despite the changes that have impacted on the indigenous method of dispute resolution in 
Africa over time as a result of colonisation and the introduction of western style of dispute 
resolution, Africa has adapted rather than be overwhelmed. 
7.4 Status of Dispute Resolution 
 
Unpon establishing the fact that disputes resolution has always been an integral part of 
indigenous African societies, colonialism, urbanisation and industrialisation grew thereby 
alienating people and giving birth to new communities. The communities based on 
relationship gave way to a society made up of rights which prompted a system to mediate 
claims based on rights. 
This led to the discussion in chapter 3 wherein the notion of justice was discuused. Here, the 
concepts of justice in relation to human rights from an African perspective were examined 
and in achieving this, an examination of African belief systems, values, culture and the 
economic, social and political structure of African societies was carried out. 
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Although what is left of traditional African society is its history, none the less it cannot be 
ignored as it was a victim-centred justice system aimed at restoration of victims and 
integrating them back into the community.The African system of justice administration 
promotes a spirit of communialism wherein an individual exist for the benefit of the greater 
community. The justice system was a negotiative and democratic one; a system where the 
victims, their family and the entire community participated in the identification, definition of 
harm and the search for restoration, healing, responsibility and prevention.
1315
 
 
The African communities play a major role in dispute resolution due to the restorative nature 
of justice in Africa. African communities rely on each other to find solutions to problems 
among themselves. Indigenous African socieities also dealt with human rights issues like 
right to life (where they believed that no one has the right to take the life of another) and 
freedom of association (age group societies and the women’s group) among others. A 
situation where the victim, the offender and the community participate in defining the harm 
done and finding a solution to rectify such harm, all complaints and issues relevant to such a 
case are openly discussed. Where people are free to openly express themselves in an 
environment free of power there will be nothing left to embitter thereby peace will reign.
1316
 
 
An understanding of the background to the African human rights regime will enable us to 
understand and appreciate the coming into existence of the African human rights regime. To 
appreciate this, chapter four of this thesis took us on an historical journey into African human 
rights regime. 
The coming into existence of the Organisation of African Unity (now known as ‘African 
Union’) and the development of the African Charter, which marked the beginning of human 
rights regime in Africa after colonisation was critically analysed. The content, application, 
enforcement and implementation of the Afrian Charter were looked into. 
 
There is no denying the fact that colonialism relegated African traditions and values; it 
destroyed the evolution of African societies and abolished some traditional practices which 
were prevalent in indigenous Africa but carried into colonial African society. This can be 
                                                             
1315 Elechi O. O., ‘Human Rights and the Africa Indigenous Justice System’ (2004) 19. 
1316 Elechi O. O. (2004) 23. 
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said to be against the promotion and protection of human rights. Human rights, as argued 
in this thesis, are the rationale for the quest for justice, peace, reconciliation and democracy 
in Africa. Under the African indigenous justice system, opportunies for the achievement 
of justice and the respect and protection of the rights of victims, offenders and the 
community are higher than under African state criminal justice system. It must be noted 
though that in indigenous Africa societies, like other societies, there are times when ideal 
will contradict the practice as it relates to justice and human rights.
1317 
Some cultural 
practices denied individuals or groups human dignity and human rights. 
 
7.5 Human Rights Protection 
 
The objective of the promotion and protection of human rights is to reduce their 
violation.The African Commission, created by Article 30 of the African Charter, is playing 
an important role with the implementation of human rights in Africa. Established as a 
quasi-judicial body, its recommendations have been ignored by States parties since it is not 
binding. This explains why it is termed ‘toothless.’1318  In chapter 5 of the thesis, an 
appraisal of the African Commission as an organ of human rights in Africa was done. The 
structure, mandate and rules of procedure of the African Commission were discussed 
in order to determine whether it reflects the African system of justice. 
 
Problem of lack of awareness of the existence of the Commission, inadequate funding and 
independence of the Commission are some of the factors that haspreventedthe African 
Commission from being successful. Although the Commission has witnessed improved 
budgetary allocation of late, the need to create public awareness of the existence of the 
Commission and the African Charter cannot be over emphaisised.
1319
 Lack of 
implementation and  enforcement  of  the  Commission’s  recommendations  is  a  major  
setback for  the Commission.
1320 
This has been associated with the refusal of minorities 
and indigenous communities to submit cases before the Commission.
1321
 
The adoption of the Protocol to the African Charter raised hope among victims of human 
                                                             
1317 Elechi O. O. (2004) 24. 
1318 Viljoen & Louw, ‘State Compliance with the Recommendations of the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights: 1994 - 2004’ (2007) 101 American Journal of International Law 1-34. 
1319 George Mukundi, ‘African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights: 10years on and still no Justice’ (2008) 11. 
1320 Civil Liberties Orgnaisation v Nigeria (2000) AHRLJ 188.  
1321 Mukundi (2008) 13.  
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rights violations that finally an end to their human rights abuses has come. But States still 
have a massive role to play in the Court’s achievement of success. They should declare direct 
access to the Court for individuals and NGOs and also show political will to support the 
court. Furthermore, more awareness about the existence of the African Court should be 
created among Africans of the ability of the court to redress human rights violations in the 
continent. 
The creativity of the judges of the African Court in the interpretation of the mandate and 
jurisdiction of the court will also play a role in the success story of the Court. There is a 
strong need for a broad interpretation of the Protocol by the judges in order to overcome the 
problem of implementation of the Protocol.
1322 
This strong interpretation of the Protocol will 
also give an effective role to the Court in the protection of human rights in the region. The 
Court has the ability to take the lead on innovative trends in regional and international human 
rights protection if it can interprete its mandate right as spelt out under the Protocol. 
 
7.6 Recommendations 
 
In this section, recommendations to the various stakeholders involved in the administration 
of justice under the African Human Rights System are made. These recommendations are 
aimed towards having a more effective protection of human rights and justice in Africa. 
7.6.1 State parties 
 
State Parties must show political will to support the Court by ratifying the Court’s Protocol 
and also declare direct access to the Court for individuals and NGOs. The Court cannot 
exercise its jurisdictional power over many of the State Parties due to the fact that such State 
Parties have not ratified the Court’s Protocol. A treaty does not create either obligations or 
rights for a third State without its consent
1323 
and what this means is that the Tanganyika 
case does not put duties and obligation on Zambia and Sierra Leone that prohibit 
independent candidacy because they are yet to ratify the Protocol.
1324
 
                                                             
1322 Udombana N. J., ‘Towards the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Better Late than Never’ (2003) 3 
Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal 45 at 57. 
1323 Article 34 Vienna Convention on Laws of Treaties. See also Charney J. I., ‘Universal International Law’ (1993) 
87 American Journal of International Law 529.  
1324 Enabulele A. O., ‘Incompatibility of National Law with the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: 
Does the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights have the Final Say?’ (2016) 16 AHRLJ 15. 
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It is doubtful we witness a situation where State Parties sue each other on behalf of 
individuals either as an interested party for the safeguard of the African Charter or in its 
exercise of its rights to diplomatic protection because African States are unwilling to bring 
human rights claims against another African State and the African Commission is generally 
unwilling to refer cases to the Court.
1325
 
Furthermore, State Parties should come up with a means by which the Judgement of 
the African Court will be enforced within their national frameworks. The fact that a final 
Judgement has been delivered by the Court and State Parties have made an undertaking (by 
adopting the Protocol) to comply with the decisions of the Court does not make such 
Judgement enforceable within member States. Likewise judicial powers of the African Court 
as an international Court does also not necesssarily amount to compliance under the local 
laws of members States. What this means in essence is that the binding nature of the 
Judgement of an International Court, like the African Court, does not lead to compliance by 
Member States.
1326 
The consequence of this on State Parties that have ratified the Protocol to 
the African Charter on the Establishment of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
and have made the optional declaration is that they still have to face the problem of 
interpreting international norms into something acceptable locally. 
 
With the new international legal regime of the African Union especially where there is no 
legal relationship between the African Court and the legal system of State Parties, a national 
judge faced with an application for the enforcement of a Judgement of the African Court to 
make recourse to the decision of the Court as precedence will ask himself if the Court’s 
Protocol is recognised under their law or whether he is under any obligation to take into 
account, the judgement of the African Court or any of its jurisprudence. Where the national 
Court Judge finds that his answers to these two questions are in the negative he is likely to 
decline jurisdiction over such matters.
1327 
It must be pointed out here that for African Court’s 
Protocol to function properly within the legal system of member States it needs domestic 
status. 
                                                             
1325 Michelot Yogogombaye v Republic of Senegal (2010) 104 American Journal of International Law 620. 
1326 Dan Juma, ‘Provisional Measures under the African Human Rights System: The African Court’s Order against 
Libya’ (2012 – 2013) 30 Wisconsin International Law Journal 344.  
1327 Frans Viljoen, ‘Appliation of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights by Domestic Courts in Africa’ 
(1999) 43 Journal of African Law 1. 
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7.6.2 The Role of the African Commission and the African Court 
 
The complementarity relationship between the African Commission and the African Court 
should be clearly defined. The Commission should be allowed to conduct full procedural 
investigation before it makes any referral to the Court and in doing this, Articles 55 and 56 of the 
African Charter must be taken into consideration. By doing this, all admissibility issues would 
have been resolved by the Commission before it is referred to the Court. It will also give 
opportunity to the Commission to properly outline all its decisions and consideration in a report 
which will form part of the referral. With this, ample time of the Court will be saved in deciding 
whether a case was properly conceived or not. 
7.6.3 The Role of the AU 
 
The tenure of office of the Judges of the Court should be guaranteed. This, the AU can achieve 
by having a fixed term of office for the judges of the Court. It can either be a fixed single term of 
6 years or 8 years. The essence of this is to enable the Judges focus fully on the administration of 
justice without the fear of reappointment. Where the judges know that their appointment is 
secured for the duration of their term of office, they will be able to concentrate on other things. 
Furthermore, the AU should amend the instrument establishing the Court of Justice and Human 
Rights inorder for it to allow NGOs and individuals to have direct access to the merged court. 
This will be in line with the notion of justice in Africa which is about fairness to all the parties 
involved. 
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